No Five‑Second Rule: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Ban on Deadly Force After Incapacitation and Aligns Excessive‑Force Review with Barnes’s Totality‑of‑Circumstances Framework

Introduction

In Chelesy Eastep v. City of Nashville, the Sixth Circuit issued a published decision addressing qualified immunity at the pleadings stage in a multi‑officer shooting following a prolonged highway standoff. The panel—relying on dashcam and body‑worn camera footage submitted at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage—parsed the allegations insofar as the video “blatantly contradicted” them, while otherwise accepting the complaint as true. The court ultimately took a differentiated approach to nine officers: it held that eight officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their initial volley of shots was objectively reasonable under the totality‑of‑the‑circumstances, but it permitted a Fourth Amendment excessive‑force claim to proceed against one officer (Murphy) who fired only after the suspect had fallen, calls for “ceasefire” had been made, and the threat had dissipated.

Two doctrinal clarifications are the opinion’s central contributions. First, following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025), the Sixth Circuit emphasizes that excessive‑force review turns on the totality of the circumstances, not a narrow “moment‑of‑threat” snapshot or any bright‑line temporal rule. Second, the court expressly rejects any “five‑second rule” that would immunize continued deadly force for a set number of seconds without reassessment; once a suspect is incapacitated or neutralized, further force is “gratuitous” and clearly unconstitutional—even if only seconds later.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction: The panel held it had interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage because the appeal raised legal questions based on facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, except where clearly contradicted by video (Ashcroft v. Iqbal; Scott v. Harris; Adams v. Blount County).
Standard and Record: The court conducted a de novo review under Twombly/Iqbal, considering the complaint and the submitted videos, crediting the videos where they “blatantly contradict” the pleadings (Scott; Bell v. City of Southfield; Heeter v. Bowers; Latits v. Phillips).
Merits—Eight Officers: As to Officers Carrick, Plancic, Williams, Pinkelton, Kidd, Llukaj, Edge, and Achinger, the court held that initiating deadly force was objectively reasonable when Mr. Eastep took two steps toward officers, withdrew an object, and leveled it at shoulder height in a shooting stance. Given the rapidly evolving five‑second volley and the officers’ quick compliance with ceasefire calls, the court deemed their conduct reasonable under Graham’s totality test and did not micro‑parse the continuous gunfire into sub‑segments.
Merits—Officer Murphy: The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Murphy, who did not fire until after Mr. Eastep had fallen, calls for ceasefire had been issued, and other officers had ceased firing. On those alleged facts, his two shots were plausibly “gratuitous” under clearly established law forbidding force against a neutralized suspect (Baker v. City of Hamilton; Russo v. City of Cincinnati; Gambrel v. Knox County).
No Bright‑Line Rule: The panel rejected defendants’ contention that Mullins v. Cyranek and Untalan v. City of Lorain establish a de facto “five‑second rule.” The court stressed there is no time‑based safe harbor; the totality governs, and Barnes confirms that the reasonableness inquiry “has no time limit.”
Disposition: Affirmed in part and reversed in part—claims proceed only against Officer Murphy; the other eight officers are entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): The foundational framework—deadly force is a seizure and must be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, balancing the intrusion against governmental interests.
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025): The Supreme Court rejected the “moment‑of‑threat rule,” requiring courts to assess the totality, including earlier facts that inform an officer’s perceptions. The Sixth Circuit leans on Barnes to avoid hyper‑segmentation of a rapidly unfolding five‑second volley, while still recognizing that force initiated after incapacitation must be independently justified.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362 (6th Cir. 2022); Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900 (6th Cir. 2024); Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017): Establish the video‑evidence rule at the pleadings stage—courts may credit clear video over the complaint; gaps or ambiguities are resolved for the plaintiff.
Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2015), and Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2005): Defendants relied on these to argue for a timing cushion. The panel clarified that these cases rested on the continued presence of a threat under the totality—not on any fixed timing rule.
Simmonds v. Genesee County, 682 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2012); Pollard v. City of Columbus, 780 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2015); Lemmon v. City of Akron, 768 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2019): Support the reasonableness of initiating deadly force when a suspect threatens officers by brandishing an object as a weapon and assuming a shooting stance. Importantly, these cases do not authorize force after a threat ends.
Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2006); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992); Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391 (6th Cir. 2022); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004); Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2006): Establish and reinforce that “gratuitous” force against an incapacitated or surrendering person is excessive as a matter of law—a principle the court applies to Murphy’s late‑initiated shots.
Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001); Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2008): Underscore that the right to be free from excessive force, especially when unarmed and non‑dangerous, is clearly established.
Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids, 139 F.4th 495 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited to confirm that “the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most,” consistent with Barnes’s totality approach.
Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear, 78 F.4th 286 (6th Cir. 2023); Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900 (6th Cir. 2024): Explain “clearly established” law demands fair and clear warning, typically via published precedent.
Qualified‑immunity procedure and interlocutory appeal: Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2016); Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008); Sterling Hotels, LLC v. McKay, 71 F.4th 463 (6th Cir. 2023).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds along two tracks: (1) whether any officer violated the Fourth Amendment, and if so (2) whether that violation was clearly established. Applying Graham’s factors (severity of offense, immediate threat, resistance/evasion) and, paramountly, the totality of circumstances, the court differentiates the initial eight officers from Murphy.

1) The initial eight officers: objectively reasonable under the totality

Severity of offense: Minimal. The underlying conduct (walking on the interstate shoulder) was a Class C misdemeanor under Tennessee law (Tenn. Code Ann. § 55‑8‑127). This factor weighed against deadly force.
Immediate threat: Decisive. Video shows Mr. Eastep ignored repeated commands, took two steps toward officers, withdrew an object from his pocket, and, with both hands, pointed it at shoulder height exactly as one would aim a firearm. That set of actions reasonably signaled an imminent deadly threat, justifying the initiation of deadly force (Simmonds; Pollard).
Resistance/evasion: Present. Mr. Eastep consistently defied commands and escalated beyond mere noncompliance when he moved toward officers and mimicked firing, satisfying Sixth Circuit standards for active resistance (Kapuscinski; Eldridge; Puskas).
Continuous volley and ceasefire: The shooting lasted roughly five seconds. Although approximately ten shots were fired after Mr. Eastep fell, the court—citing Barnes’s totality focus and the need for officers to make split‑second judgments—declined to micro‑segment those few seconds. Because the initiation of deadly force was justified and the officers quickly heeded ceasefire calls, their conduct, taken as a continuous rapidly evolving event, was objectively reasonable.

Crucially, the panel declined to adopt or apply a rigid “segmented approach” that would re‑slice milliseconds of continuous fire into distinct constitutional events, noting Barnes’s admonition against time‑boxed analysis. Nor did the court accept plaintiff’s “vape” theory, because the video clearly contradicted the claim that officers fired only because he reached for a vape; what mattered was the reasonable perception created by Eastep’s conduct at the time.

2) Officer Murphy: plausibly unconstitutional “gratuitous” force

Murphy’s posture was categorically different. The video and allegations, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that:

Multiple “ceasefire” calls had been issued.
Mr. Eastep had fallen and lay on the ground, unmoving, with no visible object in his hands.
Other officers had already stopped firing when Murphy—positioned farther away—raised his weapon for the first time and fired two shots.

Under a long line of Sixth Circuit cases, force “after a suspect has been incapacitated or neutralized is excessive as a matter of law” (Baker, Champion, Gambrel, Shreve). The panel rejected the defense invitation to read Mullins and Untalan as creating a “five‑second rule.” Those decisions turned on a continued perception of danger under their own facts, not stopwatch immunity. Echoing Barnes, the court stressed that reasonableness “has no time limit” and depends on the totality—here, including the ceasefire calls and the suspect’s apparent incapacitation. The panel also distinguished Boyd v. Baeppler, where officers confronted an on‑the‑ground suspect who raised a gun toward them; the video here did not plainly show any weapon or threatening movement by Eastep, and any slight arm motion appeared ambiguous or involuntary from gunfire.

3) Clearly established law

Because Murphy’s alleged conduct—initiating fire only after the suspect was down and neutralized—falls squarely within the Sixth Circuit’s “gratuitous force” doctrine, the court held the right was clearly established. Baker’s holding that strikes with an asp against surrendering or neutralized suspects are unconstitutional gave fair notice; if an officer may not strike with an asp post‑neutralization, he certainly may not begin shooting under those same conditions. Russo and Gambrel reinforce the same rule. By contrast, Simmonds, Pollard, and Lemmon pertain to the justification for initiating deadly force in the face of a perceived threat, not the use of force after the threat ends. The Sixth Circuit thus affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Murphy.

Impact

This decision will shape litigation and police practices in several important ways:

No bright‑line timing safe harbors: The court expressly rejects a “five‑second rule” permitting unchecked deadly force for some temporal window after a threat arises. Officers must reassess continuously; once a threat is neutralized, force must cease.
Totality over micro‑segmentation: Post‑Barnes, courts in the Sixth Circuit will be less inclined to slice continuous volleys into millisecond segments. Where an initial volley is justified and officers promptly stop when the threat ends, courts may deem the entire burst reasonable, especially in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” events.
Ceasefire calls matter: Audible ceasefire calls that are followed by immediate cessation can strongly support reasonableness for officers who initiated justified fire. Conversely, firing after such calls—particularly by officers who had not previously fired—can expose those officers to liability for “gratuitous” force.
Individualized liability in multi‑officer shootings: Plaintiffs must plausibly allege which officer engaged in the allegedly excessive use of force, especially where video allows attribution. Generalized allegations that “every” officer fired excessively may fail insofar as video contradicts them. Here, the claim survives only against Murphy, whom the video distinctively placed firing after neutralization.
Pleading with video: Defense counsel will continue to attach body‑cam/dash‑cam footage at Rule 12 to narrow claims early. Plaintiffs must draft complaints that anticipate and harmonize with video evidence; allegations contradicted by clear video will not be credited.
Training and policy: Agencies should reinforce continuous threat reassessment, build protocols around ceasefire commands, and train officers—especially late‑arriving or perimeter officers—not to engage in “catch‑up” firing after a threat has dissipated. The opinion underscores that “gratuitous” force can attach individual liability even where other officers’ initial shots were justified.
Monell landscape: Although municipalities were named, this interlocutory appeal addressed only individual officers’ qualified immunity. The ruling leaves Monell claims unadjudicated at this stage, but it narrows potential municipal exposure tied to the eight officers while preserving exposure related to Murphy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A defense that shields officers from suit unless the plaintiff plausibly alleges both (a) a constitutional violation and (b) that the violated right was “clearly established” at the time—meaning existing precedent gave fair warning the conduct was unlawful.
Clearly Established: Plaintiffs need not find a case with identical facts, but they must point to sufficiently analogous published decisions that would inform a reasonable officer that the conduct was unconstitutional. “Gratuitous” force after neutralization has long been clearly established in the Sixth Circuit.
Totality of the Circumstances (Barnes): Courts assess all relevant facts, not just the instant of the trigger pull. Earlier events can inform how a reasonable officer perceives danger. There is no fixed time window that automatically immunizes continued force.
Moment‑of‑Threat Rule (Rejected): A prior tendency to focus only on the split second of the threat. Barnes rejects that narrow focus, insisting on a holistic assessment.
Segmented Approach: An analytic tool that sometimes evaluates distinct phases of an encounter separately. Post‑Barnes, the Sixth Circuit cautions against over‑segmenting a continuous, fast‑moving volley; but it will still treat truly distinct acts—like a different officer firing after a ceasefire—as separable events.
Gratuitous Force: Force used after a suspect has been incapacitated or neutralized (e.g., on the ground, no weapon, no immediate threat). Such force violates the Fourth Amendment.
Video Contradiction Rule (Scott v. Harris): At the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, clear video evidence can override contrary allegations, but ambiguities and gaps favor the plaintiff.
Interlocutory Appeal of QI Denials: Although denials of motions to dismiss are usually not appealable immediately, a denial of qualified immunity is if the appeal raises purely legal issues based on facts taken in the plaintiff’s favor (or as shown on clear video).

Conclusion

Chelesy Eastep v. City of Nashville is a careful and pragmatic application of excessive‑force doctrine in a multi‑officer shooting with video evidence. The court harmonizes its analysis with the Supreme Court’s Barnes decision by emphasizing the totality of the circumstances and resisting hyper‑segmentation of a fast, continuous volley—yet it remains steadfast that force after incapacitation is “gratuitous” and clearly barred. The opinion clarifies that:

There is no “five‑second rule” or similar temporal safe harbor for deadly force; continual reassessment is required.
Initiating deadly force can be reasonable when a suspect quickly withdraws and aims an object in a manner indistinguishable from a firearm.
Shots fired after ceasefire calls, after the suspect is down and neutralized, are plausibly unconstitutional and not protected by qualified immunity.
Individualized attribution is essential in multi‑officer cases; generalized allegations yield to clear video.

Going forward, this decision will guide courts, litigants, and law‑enforcement agencies in evaluating split‑second uses of force: totality controls; bright‑line timing rules do not; and once a threat is gone, any further force is constitutionally intolerable.