Introduction

In R.G. (Father) v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the termination of a father’s parental rights to four very young children after a nine-day trial. The case arose when daycare workers discovered severe bruising on one child shortly after the children were returned from the father’s care; a forensic nurse deemed the injuries highly suspicious for non-accidental trauma. During the ensuing Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings, the father repeatedly challenged his appointed counsel’s effectiveness, precipitating six representation hearings from November 2020 to March 2022, while simultaneously refusing to cooperate with reunification services arranged by OCS.

Two core issues reached the Supreme Court on appeal: (1) whether the superior court deprived the father of due process in managing his repeated complaints about appointed counsel and claims of ineffective assistance; and (2) whether OCS made “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family as required by Alaska Statute 47.10.086 before parental rights can be terminated.

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed. The decision underscores two important themes in Alaska CINA practice: courts have discretion to thoroughly address representation complaints without violating due process, and OCS’s reunification efforts are evaluated holistically and in light of a parent’s sustained noncooperation and obstructive conduct.

Summary of the Judgment

• The superior court terminated the father’s parental rights upon clear and convincing findings that the children were in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(6) (physical harm), (7) (sexual abuse), and (8) (mental injury); that the father failed to remedy the conduct/conditions causing the CINA status; that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify; and that termination was in the children’s best interests.
• On due process, the Supreme Court held the superior court did not err in how it handled the father’s repeated representation complaints and ineffective-assistance claims; the father received ample process and was continuously represented by counsel.
• On reasonable efforts, the Court concluded OCS met its statutory duty despite a few discrete imperfections, given the extensive, tailored services offered over time and the father’s persistent refusal to participate, intimidation of providers, and failure to sign releases enabling information-sharing.
• Judgment affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): The Court applied the familiar three-part Mathews test to the father’s procedural due process claim — balancing the private interest (here, the fundamental parental liberty interest), the risk of erroneous deprivation given the procedures used and the value of additional safeguards, and the State’s interests/costs. The Court held that the extensive representation hearings and ongoing representation by counsel sufficiently protected against erroneous deprivation.
• Alex H. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 389 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2017) and Seth D. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 175 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2008): Cited for the constitutional dimension of parental rights and the resulting due process protections. These cases frame the importance of process but do not guarantee success on non-meritorious representation complaints.
• Paula E. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012) and D.M. v. State, DFYS, 995 P.2d 205 (Alaska 2000): Provide due process standards and the principle that due process ensures a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present one’s case.
• Kylie L. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 407 P.3d 442 (Alaska 2017) and Jay B. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016): Clarify standards of review and the mixed question nature of “reasonable efforts” — factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal questions under independent judgment.
• Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869 (Alaska 1980): Reiterates that indigent litigants have no right to counsel of their choice. The Court used this to reject the father’s insistence on dictating counsel strategy and selection.
• Chloe W. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014) and Chloe O. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013): Supply the benchmark for evaluating ineffective assistance in CINA: performance must fall below that of a reasonably competent attorney; reasonable tactical decisions are virtually immune from later attack. The magistrate and superior court found counsel exceeded this standard.
• Massey v. State, 435 P.3d 1007 (Alaska App. 2018), Shorthill v. State, 354 P.3d 1093 (Alaska App. 2015), James v. State, 730 P.2d 811 (Alaska App. 1987): Outline standards for valid self-representation — knowledge of the right to counsel and risks of self-representation, and minimal capacity to proceed rationally. The superior court advised the father accordingly.
• Annette H. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019); Violet C. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019); Amy M. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013); Sylvia L. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015); and Emma D. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 322 P.3d 842 (Alaska 2014): These cases provide the contours of “reasonable efforts” — efforts must be timely and reasonable, not perfect; assessed in light of case circumstances including a parent’s unwillingness to participate; courts review the entire history of OCS’s services; OCS fulfills its duty by identifying and offering services in a way that allows the parent to use them.
• Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979): Establishes entitlement to appointed counsel in a private custody case when the opposing parent is represented by ALSC. The superior court ultimately appointed the father’s “Flores counsel” from the divorce case to the CINA matter after the attorney-client relationship with the appointed CINA agency deteriorated beyond repair.
• Molly O. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 320 P.3d 303 (Alaska 2014) (Bolger, J., dissenting): Cited by the father, but inapposite. That dissent addressed denial of counsel to an Indian custodian; here, the father was represented at all times. The Court rejected reliance on the dissent and the structural-error framing.

Legal Reasoning

1) Due Process and the Management of Representation Issues

The father contended that the superior court “gaslighted” him by holding multiple hearings on his dissatisfaction with counsel and by failing to quickly resolve his ineffective-assistance claims. Applying Mathews, the Supreme Court acknowledged the fundamental private interest but found the procedures employed minimized the risk of erroneous deprivation:

• He had continuous representation; the right to counsel was never denied.
• The superior court held six representation hearings, including one before a magistrate, took testimony from the appointed attorney and agency representative, and entered detailed findings that counsel’s performance was well above the required standard.
• The court educated the father that he was not entitled to counsel of choice, that he could not compel frivolous filings (e.g., motions premised on an “Indonesian arbitration agreement” purportedly stripping Alaska courts of jurisdiction), and that he could elect self-representation if the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
• Ultimately, recognizing the irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the court released the appointed agency and appointed different counsel (his “Flores counsel”).

In short, the Court concluded the process was more than adequate. Crucially, the distraction from the merits was self-created: despite repeated judicial explanations and findings, the father persisted in seeking filings the court deemed frivolous and in re-urging meritless claims of ineffectiveness. Due process ensures a meaningful opportunity to be heard; it does not guarantee deference to a litigant’s preferred tactics or preferred counsel.

2) “Reasonable Efforts” to Reunify in Light of Parental Noncooperation

Alaska law requires OCS to make timely, reasonable efforts to provide family support services aimed at reunification before termination (AS 47.10.086 and AS 47.10.088(a)(3)). The Supreme Court emphasized settled principles:

• Efforts must be reasonable, not perfect, and are judged across the entire life of the case, in light of the parent’s willingness to participate.
• OCS meets its duty by identifying appropriate services and offering them in a way that allows use; a parent’s refusal to engage may render the efforts reasonable even if some services are curtailed or imperfectly executed.

The record supported the superior court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that OCS fulfilled its duty:

• Two five-hour-plus case planning meetings in the first month, followed by near-daily contact by text, call, email, or in person; repeated attempts to “build rapport.”
• Referrals for psychological evaluation; OCS tried to provide collateral information to the father’s chosen evaluator but was blocked when the father refused to sign releases. OCS nonetheless incorporated that evaluator’s recommendations into the case plan.
• OCS arranged and agreed to pay for individual counseling with a licensed psychologist experienced with individuals who committed sex offenses, consistent with the father’s evaluator’s recommendations; the father refused, insisting on a non-approved provider.
• Parenting coaching was initiated; the father attended four sessions but refused to sign releases, and the coach refused to review collateral; OCS terminated that particular service, which the superior court labeled “unfortunate,” yet it did not change the overall calculus given the breadth of services attempted and the father’s continuing noncooperation.
• Arranged therapeutic visitation with an experienced provider; the provider withdrew after an intimidating call in which the father disclosed he had used a private investigator to obtain her personal phone number, evidencing serious boundary issues.
• Additional support for the children: monthly home visits, therapeutic services, and vouchers for maintenance while in OCS custody.

The father’s challenge emphasized two perceived shortcomings — lack of collateral information for his chosen evaluator and termination of the parenting coach — but the Court found these were attributable largely to his own refusals (e.g., not signing releases) and conduct (intimidation/unsafe boundaries), and were outweighed by OCS’s extensive, tailored efforts throughout the case.

3) Substantive Termination Elements

Beyond process and efforts, the superior court found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds under AS 47.10.011(6), (7), and (8), sustained non-remedy of the causal conditions, and best interests. The Supreme Court did not disturb these determinations, which were anchored in evidence of severe bruising “highly suspicious for non-accidental trauma,” the father’s pattern of abusive and threatening behavior, and his persistent resistance to services.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Courts:
  • Extensive representation hearings do not violate due process where they meaningfully test ineffectiveness claims and safeguard the parent’s right to counsel; appointing new counsel after an irreparable breakdown is appropriate even absent deficient performance.
  • Judges may decline to order frivolous filings and may educate litigants about counsel-of-choice limits and self-representation requirements.
• OCS and Service Providers:
  • Document early, sustained, and tailored engagement — repeated case planning, frequent contact, and flexibility in visitation locations can be decisive “reasonable efforts” evidence.
  • Integrating recommendations from a parent’s chosen evaluator can show good-faith collaboration, but lack of releases may lawfully limit OCS’s ability to share collateral information.
  • Provider safety and professional boundaries are legitimate; when a parent threatens or intimidates, discontinuing a particular service may be reasonable if OCS continues to offer alternatives.
• Parents and Counsel:
  • Signing releases of information is often essential for service coordination; refusal can undercut claims that OCS failed to provide effective services.
  • Insistence on meritless litigation strategies may strain attorney-client relationships and does not advance due process claims.
  • Engagement with recommended therapy, parenting supports, and structured visitation is critical to counter findings of failure to remedy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• CINA (Child in Need of Aid): A legal designation for children who face abuse, neglect, or other conditions that warrant state intervention (AS 47.10.011 lists grounds). A CINA case can lead to services, removal, and, if unresolved, termination of parental rights.
• Reasonable Efforts: OCS must identify, offer, and facilitate services that help remedy the issues causing the CINA status (AS 47.10.086). Efforts must be timely and tailored but need not be perfect; they are evaluated over the whole case and in light of parental cooperation.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A high standard of proof — the evidence must persuade the factfinder that the claim is highly probable. Used for key termination elements.
• Collateral Information and Releases: “Collateral information” is background or corroborating information (e.g., prior reports, case histories) that providers use to assess needs. Privacy laws generally require the parent’s signed release before OCS can share this information with private evaluators or therapists.
• Therapeutic Visitation: Supervised parent-child contact led by a trained clinician or specialist to improve parenting skills, address safety concerns, and strengthen attachment.
• Counsel of Choice vs. Right to Counsel: Indigent parents have the right to appointed counsel but generally not to counsel of their choosing. Courts may substitute counsel when justified, but litigants cannot require appointed counsel to file frivolous motions.
• Flores Counsel: Under Flores v. Flores, when one parent is represented by the Alaska Legal Services Corporation in a custody case, due process can require the appointment of counsel for the opposing indigent parent. In this case, the court ultimately appointed the father’s “Flores counsel” to the CINA case after the relationship with the appointed CINA agency broke down.
• Protective Order: A court order to prevent contact or impose conditions, often in domestic violence contexts, to protect safety during litigation or services.

Conclusion

The Alaska Supreme Court’s memorandum disposition in R.G. reinforces two practical propositions in CINA litigation. First, courts do not violate due process by thoroughly, repeatedly, and even patiently addressing representation complaints — including holding evidentiary hearings, clarifying counsel-of-choice limits, and appointing new counsel after a relationship breakdown — especially where the parent is continuously represented and the complaints revolve around demands for frivolous filings. Second, “reasonable efforts” are measured across the full chronology of a case and in context; OCS’s duty does not require flawless execution or unlimited tolerance of unsafe conduct. Where the agency documents sustained, tailored service offerings and the parent consistently refuses to cooperate, fails to sign releases, and intimidates providers, the “reasonable efforts” requirement can be satisfied even if particular services are discontinued or imperfect.

Although nonprecedential, the decision offers a roadmap for trial courts and practitioners: build a detailed record of service offerings and engagement efforts; address representation issues forthrightly and on the record; and evaluate reasonableness pragmatically, with a sharp eye on both the parent’s participation and provider safety. The ultimate affirmance here rests on robust process and a comprehensive, well-documented service history in the face of persistent parental obstruction.