No Contemporaneity Requirement: “Operating” Need Not Occur at the Moment of Collision for Criminal Vehicular Homicide (Leaving the Scene) in Minnesota

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Henry Lee Brown, 19 N.W.3d 438 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified a pivotal question of statutory interpretation: whether the State must prove that a defendant was “operating” a motor vehicle at the precise moment of a fatal collision to secure a conviction for criminal vehicular homicide under the “leaving the scene” provision, Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7). The Court answered no. The opinion, authored by Justice Hennesy, holds that the statutory phrase “as a result of operating a motor vehicle” does not impose a temporal requirement that the act of operating be contemporaneous with the collision. An act of operating that occurs before the collision can suffice, so long as it proximately causes the death and the defendant then leaves the scene in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.09.

The case arose after Brown struck and killed a pedestrian, left the scene, and did not report the collision. He later claimed he had suffered a medical event and was unconscious at the time of impact, and he sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the theory that the State was required to prove volitional operation at the time of collision. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, concluding that the statute does not require a volitional act of operation at any time. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that the statute does not require operation at the moment of collision and therefore did not reach the volitional-operation issue.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7) (criminal vehicular homicide—leaving the scene) does not require proof that the defendant was operating the vehicle at the time of the collision. An earlier act of operation that proximately causes the death satisfies the statute.
• Rationale: The statute punishes causing death “as a result of operating a motor vehicle” under enumerated conditions; subd. 1(a)(7) focuses on leaving the scene in violation of § 169.09. The phrase “as a result of” denotes causation, not simultaneity. If the Legislature intended a contemporaneity requirement, it could have used “while operating,” but it did not.
• Application: Brown’s guilty plea had a sufficient factual basis because he admitted he operated the vehicle before losing consciousness, that his operation proximately caused the death, and that he left the scene without reporting as required by § 169.09.
• Issues not reached: Whether “operation” must be volitional as a standalone element for subd. 1(a)(7).
• Concurrence (Thissen, J., joined by McKeig, J.; Moore, III, J., joins both): The volitional criminal act for subd. 1(a)(7) is the knowing decision to leave the scene when the driver knows or has reason to know of injury or death; there is no need to inquire whether vehicle operation was volitional at any time.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

On March 4, 2021, Brown drove a vehicle that struck and killed a pedestrian in Minneapolis. He did not stop or report the crash. The State charged two counts of criminal vehicular homicide: (1) negligent operation while under the influence, § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(2)(i), and (2) leaving the scene after causing the collision, § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7). After jury selection began, Brown pled guilty to Count II. He admitted operating the vehicle and leaving the scene but claimed he lost consciousness immediately before the collision due to a medical incident.

Before sentencing, Brown moved to withdraw his plea, arguing it was inaccurate because the State had to prove that at the time of collision he was volitionally operating; thus, his claimed unconsciousness at impact negated an element. The district court denied withdrawal and sentenced him to 58 months. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning the statute does not require volitional operation. The Supreme Court granted review limited to whether § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7) requires volitional operation at the time of collision. It affirmed the conviction on the alternative ground that the statute does not require operation at the moment of collision at all.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2018): Defined “operating” as “any act that causes a motor vehicle to function or controls the functioning of the motor vehicle,” including a passenger’s manipulation of a steering wheel. Henderson addressed what counts as operation, not when it must occur. Brown relies on Henderson to argue about “operation,” but the Court explains the timing question is separate and resolved by the text here.
• State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2005): For gross negligence, courts examine conduct leading to falling asleep (e.g., fatigue, intoxication), not conduct while asleep. Al-Naseer supports the idea that culpable operation can occur before the moment of impact.
• State v. Smith, 835 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2013), quoting State v. Schaub, 44 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 1950): The causation element requires proximate cause—death must follow from the defendant’s operation “without the intervention of an efficient independent force” in which the defendant did not participate and could not reasonably foresee. This confines liability to non-remote consequences and answers concerns about far-removed acts of operation.
• Minnesota Statutes:
  • § 609.2112, subd. 1(a) (2024): Defines criminal vehicular homicide as causing death “as a result of operating a motor vehicle” under listed circumstances, including subd. 1(a)(7) (leaving the scene after causing the collision).
  • § 169.09, subd. 1, 6 (2024): Hit-and-run duties—to stop “at the scene” or “as close as possible,” investigate, remain, and give notice by the quickest means if injury or death occurred, with coverage keyed to whether the driver knew or had reason to know injury or death occurred.
  • § 169.09, subd. 15 (2024): Affirmative defense—leaving to transport an injured person for emergency care, subject to prompt notice obligations.
• Guilty-plea validity cases: State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 2010); State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 2003); Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 2017): A plea must be accurate and supported by a proper factual basis; validity is reviewed de novo.
• Treatise: 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1(c) (3d ed. 2018): One may be criminally liable for homicide even if unconscious at the time of impact where earlier culpable conduct proximately causes the harm; cited to show the doctrine’s broader pedigree.
• Concurrence’s additional authority: State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2021) (illustrates that some vehicular-homicide subparts are strict-liability as to intoxication status), used to emphasize subparts differ in what the volitional act is.

Legal Reasoning

1. Text controls and “as a result of” denotes causation, not timing.
   • Section 609.2112, subd. 1(a) criminalizes causing death “as a result of operating a motor vehicle.” The general clause modifies “causes the death,” not the word “collision.” The only subpart referencing “collision” is subd. 1(a)(7), which adds the requirement that “the driver who causes the collision leaves the scene … in violation of § 169.09.”
   • Using ordinary meaning (dictionary), “as a result” indicates consequence, not simultaneity—unlike “while,” which would denote contemporaneity. The Legislature chose “as a result,” not “while operating,” signaling no requirement that the operation coincide with the collision.
2. The proximate-cause limitation prevents unlimited liability.
   • The Court reiterates from Smith/Schaub that the State must prove the defendant’s operation proximately caused the death—i.e., no efficient intervening cause and foreseeability. That requirement filters out remote or unforeseeable consequences and mitigates the concern that early or temporally distant acts of operation could trigger liability.
   • The Court notes that a medical emergency could, in some circumstances, constitute an independent intervening cause, but in Brown’s case proximate cause was uncontested.
3. The hit-and-run statute (§ 169.09) provides additional safeguards.
   • Liability under subd. 1(a)(7) hinges on violating § 169.09, which applies only if the driver knows or has reason to know of injury or death. It also requires stopping “as close as possible,” which accommodates ongoing medical exigencies, and recognizes an affirmative defense when leaving to secure emergency medical care, coupled with timely notice.
4. Precedent and statutory structure align with the timing rule.
   • Al-Naseer shows that culpability can rest on pre-collision conduct (e.g., choices that lead to falling asleep); Henderson defines “operation” broadly; neither demands contemporaneity. The Court’s reading harmonizes those cases and the statutory framework.
5. Application to Brown’s plea.
   • Brown admitted he operated the vehicle before losing consciousness, his operation proximately caused the death, and he knowingly left the scene without reporting despite learning the pedestrian had died. Those admissions satisfy subd. 1(a)(7) under the Court’s construction; thus, the plea’s factual basis was accurate.
   • Because operation need not be contemporaneous, the Court had no need to decide whether “operation” must be volitional at the time of collision.

The Concurrence’s Distinct Path

Justice Thissen, joined by Justice McKeig, would affirm on a different ground: the phrase “as a result of operating a motor vehicle” is descriptive and causative, not an independent volitional element. In his view, each subpart of § 609.2112 identifies the volitional act that makes the conduct criminal:

• For gross/negligent operation while impaired (e.g., subd. 1(a)(1), (2)), the volitional act is the negligent or grossly negligent manner of operation (often resting on pre-collision choices like driving while fatigued).
• For per se alcohol concentration offenses (subd. 1(a)(3)-(4)), the volitional act is the decision to drive with the proscribed alcohol concentration—these are strict liability as to impairment status.
• For defective maintenance (subd. 1(a)(8)), the volitional act is operating despite actual knowledge of a previously cited dangerous defect and failure to remediate.
• For leaving the scene (subd. 1(a)(7)), the volitional act is knowingly leaving the scene under circumstances described in § 169.09—there is no requirement to separately prove that “operation” was volitional at any time.

The concurrence emphasizes grammar: “operating” functions as a gerund (a noun), shorthand for “operation,” which describes the context from which the death results, rather than a distinct volitional element that itself must be proven to be voluntary at the time of death.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Narrowed defenses based on unconsciousness at impact for subd. 1(a)(7): Defendants can no longer argue that the State must prove they were consciously operating at the precise moment of collision to sustain a conviction for leaving the scene. Pre-impact operation that proximately causes death is sufficient, coupled with a § 169.09 violation.
• Charging and trial strategy:
  • Prosecutors may rely on subd. 1(a)(7) without proving contemporaneous operation at impact; their focus will be on proximate cause and hit-and-run knowledge elements (actual or “reason to know” injury or death).
  • Defenders will prioritize proximate-cause challenges and knowledge under § 169.09, including arguing efficient intervening cause (e.g., sudden unforeseeable medical emergency) and invoking the medical-transport affirmative defense (§ 169.09, subd. 15) or inability to comply fully due to ongoing medical issues (stopping “as close as possible”).
• Jury instructions and plea colloquies:
  • Pattern instructions should not state or imply a simultaneity requirement between “operation” and collision for subd. 1(a)(7). Factual bases for pleas should establish: (i) operation at some point before the collision; (ii) proximate causation of death; (iii) leaving the scene in violation of § 169.09; and (iv) knowledge or reason to know injury or death occurred.
• Interaction with other subparts:
  • Although the Court’s holding is framed in the context of subd. 1(a)(7), its textual analysis of “as a result of” is embedded in the prefatory clause that applies to all subparts. Expect advocates to cite Brown across the § 609.2112 framework—and to § 609.2113 (criminal vehicular operation)—to argue that contemporaneity is not required for the “operation” component, with causation doing the limiting work.
• “Driver” versus “operator” nuances:
  • The Court notes that under Henderson a passenger who grabs a steering wheel “operates” the vehicle and suggests timing does not defeat liability if the harmful result follows. Although subd. 1(a)(7) refers to “the driver,” Minnesota’s vehicle code defines “driver” broadly as a person in actual physical control. A future case could test the boundary of whether a non-seated “driver” (e.g., a momentary passenger-operator) fits subd. 1(a)(7), but Brown’s reasoning points toward functional control being dispositive.
• Medical emergencies:
  • Brown does not foreclose medical-emergency defenses. A truly sudden, unforeseeable medical event could constitute an efficient intervening cause breaking proximate cause, or it could negate the knowledge element or the ability to comply fully with § 169.09. The Court explicitly leaves those avenues open; it simply holds they were not implicated on the undisputed facts of this case.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “As a result of” versus “while”: “As a result of” means because of or due to. It does not require the cause and effect to happen at the same moment. “While” would mean “during,” which is not what the Legislature used here.
• Proximate cause: A legal standard of causation. The death must be a natural, direct, and foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s operation, without a superseding, independent cause intervening (like a sudden, unforeseeable medical event wholly unrelated to the defendant’s conduct).
• Volitional act: A conscious, voluntary act. In criminal law, some crimes require a voluntary act that constitutes the offense. Under the concurrence’s view, the volitional act for subd. 1(a)(7) is leaving the scene knowing someone was injured or killed, not operating at the moment of impact.
• Norgaard plea: A plea where a defendant asserts lack of memory about the offense (e.g., due to intoxication or amnesia) but acknowledges that the State’s evidence would likely prove guilt. The record must independently establish a sufficient factual basis. The district court here raised whether a Norgaard plea was needed; the parties opted to supplement the record instead.
• Knowledge under § 169.09: The hit-and-run duties attach when a driver knows or has reason to know that a collision caused injury or death. This objective standard prevents liability for leaving the scene when a driver reasonably lacked awareness of harm.
• Affirmative defense for emergency transport (§ 169.09, subd. 15): A driver who leaves the scene to take an injured person for emergency medical care has an affirmative defense if the driver gives notice to law enforcement as soon as reasonably feasible after care is undertaken.

Key Takeaways

• New rule of law: For criminal vehicular homicide under § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7) (leaving the scene), the State need not prove the defendant was operating at the precise moment of the collision; pre-collision operation suffices if it proximately caused the death.
• Causation, not simultaneity, anchors liability: The phrase “as a result of operating a motor vehicle” is causative; the Legislature could have required contemporaneity by using “while operating” but did not.
• Safeguards remain: Proximate cause and the knowledge-based requirements of § 169.09, plus its emergency-transport defense and “as close as possible” stopping standard, protect against unjust convictions in medical-emergency scenarios.
• Concurrence’s guidance: The volitional act for subd. 1(a)(7) is leaving the scene with the requisite knowledge, not the act of operation itself—an approach likely to influence future litigants and instructions even though the majority did not reach that question.

Conclusion

State v. Brown marks a significant clarification in Minnesota’s criminal vehicular homicide jurisprudence: the State does not have to prove the defendant was operating the vehicle at the moment of collision to convict under the leaving-the-scene provision. By focusing on causation (“as a result of”) rather than simultaneity and by integrating proximate-cause limits with the knowledge-based duties of Minnesota’s hit-and-run statute, the Court provides a coherent, text-driven framework that both preserves culpability for those who flee fatal crashes and maintains safeguards for drivers experiencing genuine medical emergencies.

Practically, Brown will reshape charging decisions, jury instructions, and plea colloquies for § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7) prosecutions. The concurrence offers an even cleaner analytic path—locating the volitional act squarely in the decision to leave—that may influence future doctrine. Either way, the central message is clear: under Minnesota law, it is enough that the death occurred as a consequence of earlier operation and that the driver then violated the legal duty to stop and report. The Court affirmed Brown’s conviction on that basis.