No Clearly Established Taking from Temporary Airport Exclusion; Exhibits Trump Franks Allegations at the Pleadings Stage — De Leon v. Munoz (5th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This Fifth Circuit per curiam decision reverses a district court’s denial of qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage in a § 1983 suit brought by an aircraft mechanic and tenant at the City of Weslaco’s Mid‑Valley Airport. The plaintiff, Christopher De Leon, alleged that the Airport Director, Andrew (misnamed “Anthony”) Munoz, (1) effected a “taking” by barring him from his hangars for approximately four months, and (2) precipitated his arrest and prosecution for criminal trespass by submitting and relaying false or misleading information in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Two core issues frame the appeal: whether De Leon plausibly pleaded a constitutional violation overcoming qualified immunity; and, as to the Takings Clause theory, whether it was “clearly established” in 2020 that temporarily denying a tenant access to municipally owned airport property constitutes a taking by an individual official. The Fifth Circuit answers both in Munoz’s favor and remands for dismissal of the claims against him.

Summary of the Opinion

• Appellate jurisdiction: The court holds the appeal is timely because the district court’s earlier, without-prejudice denial of a first motion to dismiss was not an appealable final decision on qualified immunity. See Ueckert v. Guerra and Phillips v. Montgomery County.
• Qualified immunity framework: The court reiterates that qualified immunity is immunity from suit, to be resolved as early as possible, and that a plaintiff bears the burden at the pleadings stage to allege specific facts that, if true, both state a constitutional violation and overcome qualified immunity.
• Takings claim: Even assuming arguendo that a four-month exclusion from airport hangars could amount to a taking, De Leon did not show that such a right was clearly established. A single district court decision (Spell v. Edwards) is insufficient to provide the necessary fair warning to a reasonable official. Munoz is entitled to qualified immunity on the takings theory.
• Fourth Amendment claims (malicious prosecution/probable cause): The court bypasses the debate over whether a freestanding § 1983 malicious prosecution claim existed pre-Thompson v. Clark because De Leon failed to plausibly allege any Fourth Amendment violation under Franks v. Delaware. Incorporated exhibits—Munoz’s April 29, 2020 affidavit and transcript excerpts—contradict De Leon’s claim that Munoz submitted knowingly false statements. The materials show oral notice of suspension and identify April 25, not April 21, as the date of the alleged trespass that led to the warrant. Under Texas Penal Code § 30.05, oral notice by one with apparent authority (the Airport Director) suffices. No plausible Franks violation; qualified immunity applies.
• Disposition: Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims against Andrew Munoz.

Background

De Leon maintained an aircraft maintenance business at the City-owned Mid-Valley Airport, occupying hangars W6 and W32 under a land lease/sublease. In April 2020, after two reported burglaries at the airport in which De Leon and another individual (Remy) were cross‑identified as suspects, Airport Director Munoz suspended both from the premises pending a police investigation. De Leon was later arrested for criminal trespass, and a county prosecutor filed an information alleging an April 21, 2020 trespass. The criminal case was ultimately dismissed in March 2023 for insufficient evidence.

Separately, De Leon alleges he was denied access to his hangars for about four months, causing significant financial losses. He sued the City and Munoz under § 1983 (Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments). The district court denied a second Rule 12(b)(6) motion, including Munoz’s qualified immunity, indicating the disputes should proceed to summary judgment. Munoz appealed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Qualified immunity foundations:
  • Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan; Mitchell v. Forsyth — establish qualified immunity as immunity from suit and the two-pronged analysis (violation and clearly established law), with sequencing discretion.
  • Plumhoff v. Rickard; Mullenix v. Luna; District of Columbia v. Wesby; Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd — clarify that clearly established law must give fair warning in the specific context, requiring controlling authority or a robust consensus.
  • Cole v. Carson; Bailey v. Iles; Roque v. Harvel; Melton v. Phillips; Morgan v. Swanson — Fifth Circuit formulations and applications of the two-prong qualified immunity test.
• Pleading standards:
  • Bell Atlantic v. Twombly; Ashcroft v. Iqbal — plausibility pleading; no reliance on naked conclusions.
  • Collins v. Morgan Stanley; Walker v. Beaumont ISD; In re Katrina Canal; Lone Star Fund V; Sullivan v. Leor Energy — incorporation-by-reference rule: a court may consider documents referenced in and central to the complaint, even if attached to a motion.
  • Rogers v. City of Yoakrum; United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s — exhibits control over contrary allegations.
• Fourth Amendment framing:
  • Franks v. Delaware — two-part test for challenging warrants based on deliberate or reckless falsehoods essential to probable cause.
  • Thompson v. Clark; Manuel v. City of Joliet; Albright v. Oliver — the Supreme Court’s modern Fourth Amendment approach to challenges to seizures pursuant to legal process; the Fifth Circuit declines to resolve the precise scope here because no violation is plausibly alleged.
• Takings doctrine:
  • Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid; Loretto v. Teleprompter; Tahoe-Sierra; Penn Central — distinguish per se (physical) and regulatory takings frameworks; the panel assumes a violation arguendo but resolves on clearly established law.
  • Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans — Fifth Circuit recognition of the Takings Clause’s application to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Spell v. Edwards (E.D. La.) — a non-binding district court decision found insufficient to clearly establish the law.
• Jurisdiction and appealability:
  • Ueckert v. Guerra; Phillips v. Montgomery County — an interlocutory appeal lies from the denial of qualified immunity; earlier denials without prejudice are not appealable final decisions.

Legal Reasoning

1) Threshold Appellate Jurisdiction

The court rejects De Leon’s timeliness objection. The earlier (March 2023) denial was without prejudice and did not amount to an unequivocal refusal to decide qualified immunity; it was not appealable. The later (March 2024) denial was appealable, and the April 2, 2024 notice was timely.

2) Qualified Immunity at Rule 12(b)(6)

Qualified immunity is to be resolved “at the earliest point” it is determinable. At the pleadings stage, the plaintiff must allege specific facts that, if true, show both a constitutional violation and that the law was clearly established, or otherwise defeat qualified immunity with equal specificity. The court may consider not only the complaint and its attachments but also documents referenced in and central to the claims that are appended to a motion. If exhibits contradict pleaded characterizations, the exhibits control.

3) Takings Claim — No Clearly Established Law

Assuming, without deciding, that excluding a tenant from his hangars for approximately four months could amount to a taking (whether per se or regulatory), the panel concludes that De Leon failed to identify controlling or robustly persuasive authority that would have put a reasonable airport director on clear notice in 2020 that such an exclusion constituted a taking actionable in damages against an individual official. A single district court opinion (Spell v. Edwards) is neither binding nor factually analogous enough to supply the necessary “fair warning.” Consequently, the “clearly established” prong is not met, and qualified immunity attaches.

4) Fourth Amendment Claims — No Plausible Franks Violation

De Leon framed his Fourth Amendment theory under Franks v. Delaware, asserting that Munoz (a) knowingly or recklessly made false statements or omissions to induce his arrest and prosecution, and (b) that the falsehoods were necessary to probable cause. The complaint alleged that Munoz first gave notice of an airport ban on April 29, 2020, rendering an April 21 trespass charge baseless; it also alleged that the affidavit supporting the arrest was therefore false.

But key exhibits incorporated into the pleading defeat those assertions:

• Munoz’s sworn April 29, 2020 affidavit to Investigator Ramirez reports that:
  • On April 21, two burglaries were reported; De Leon and another individual were cross‑suspects and were verbally suspended pending investigation;
  • Notification was conveyed by telephone and text; and
  • The alleged trespass prompting charges occurred on April 25, when De Leon was seen at the airport crossing the runway.
• Transcript excerpts (attached by De Leon) confirm that April 29 was the first written notice via text, not the first notice, and that the ban had been verbally communicated earlier. They also tie the arrest to an April 25 incident.
• The prosecutor’s September 2020 “Affidavit and Information” alleges an April 21 offense date but was not signed by Munoz, and there is no allegation or indication that Munoz authored or approved that date.

Under Texas Penal Code § 30.05, “notice” can be oral or written by the owner or one with apparent authority acting for the owner; an airport director plainly carries apparent authority for the municipal owner. Consequently, the exhibits support, rather than negate, probable cause for an April 25 trespass after oral notice of suspension on April 21. Because the exhibits contradict the complaint’s characterization of Munoz’s statements, the complaint does not plausibly allege a knowing or reckless falsehood “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” With no plausible Fourth Amendment violation alleged, the court does not need to reach clearly established law; qualified immunity applies.

Impact

• Qualified immunity and early resolution:
  • The opinion reinforces that courts should resolve qualified immunity at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage when the record consists of the complaint and incorporated documents. District courts should not reflexively defer to summary judgment if the pleadings and exhibits make the qualified immunity analysis determinable as a matter of law.
• Takings claims against individual officials:
  • The decision underscores the high bar to defeat qualified immunity for takings-based § 1983 claims against individual officers. Absent controlling Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit authority (or a robust consensus) addressing materially similar circumstances, officials will generally be entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary access-control decisions—particularly in sensitive settings like airports.
  • Practically, litigants targeting temporary exclusions or operational restrictions at public facilities should anticipate that clearly established law will be hard to show against individuals, even if a municipal liability or inverse condemnation theory against the governmental entity might remain.
• Franks-based pleading:
  • Plaintiffs must confront incorporated exhibits head-on. Where exhibits show oral notice satisfying statutory elements, and identify a different operative date than alleged, generic assertions of falsity will not survive. The “exhibits control” principle is decisive.
  • For law enforcement and municipal officials, careful documentation (affidavits, contemporaneous texts, and incident logs) can foreclose Franks claims at the pleadings stage.
• Malicious prosecution after Thompson:
  • The panel sidesteps whether, and to what extent, Thompson reshaped the availability of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit. The practical takeaway is that Thompson does not help a plaintiff who cannot plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment violation in the first instance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity:
  • An official is immune from suit unless the plaintiff plausibly alleges (1) a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that, at the time, the right was so clearly established that every reasonable official would have understood the conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted. Plaintiffs carry the burden to plead specific facts meeting both elements or show why the defense otherwise fails.
• “Clearly established” law:
  • Requires precedent from the Supreme Court or controlling circuit (or a robust consensus from other circuits) that puts the unlawfulness “beyond debate” in similar circumstances. A single, non‑binding district court case will almost never suffice.
• Franks v. Delaware:
  • To invalidate a warrant or state a claim for a seizure based on a faulty warrant, a plaintiff must show the affiant included a false statement or omitted critical facts knowingly or recklessly, and that the falsehood/omission was necessary to probable cause. Negligence or immaterial errors do not meet this standard.
• Exhibits control over allegations:
  • When documents attached to or incorporated in the pleadings contradict a complaint’s characterizations, courts accept the documents, not the contrary allegations. Plaintiffs should ensure their narrative aligns with incorporated exhibits.
• Texas criminal trespass (Penal Code § 30.05):
  • Criminal trespass occurs when a person enters or remains on property without effective consent after being given “notice”—which can be oral or written—by the owner or someone with apparent authority. Thus, verbal suspension from premises by the property’s manager can satisfy the statute’s notice element.
• Takings taxonomy:
  • Per se (physical) takings involve government-authorized physical occupation; regulatory takings involve restrictions on use. Whether a temporary exclusion from premises is a taking and, if so, of which type, can be a close question. This case does not decide that merits issue; it focuses on the lack of clearly established law for qualified immunity purposes.
• Texas “information” vs. “complaint” in criminal cases:
  • An “information” is the charging instrument in misdemeanors, typically based on a supporting “complaint.” The prosecutor’s selection of an offense date in an information is not the same thing as an affiant’s sworn facts in an investigative affidavit, and a defendant cannot impute the prosecutor’s chosen date to a non‑signing official for Franks purposes without more.

Conclusion

De Leon v. Munoz fortifies two practical rules for civil rights litigation in the Fifth Circuit. First, to overcome qualified immunity on a takings theory against an individual official, plaintiffs must identify controlling or robustly persuasive precedent addressing materially similar facts; isolated district court decisions are inadequate. Second, Franks-type Fourth Amendment claims cannot survive where incorporated affidavits and transcripts contradict the complaint’s assertions and demonstrate oral notice and a different operative date. The opinion also reaffirms the judiciary’s obligation to resolve qualified immunity at the earliest procedural opportunity, including at Rule 12(b)(6) when the incorporated record allows it.

On remand, the claims against Andrew Munoz must be dismissed. The decision leaves unresolved—and for future cases—the broader merits boundaries of temporary-access restrictions as takings and the precise contours of malicious prosecution claims after Thompson, but it sends a clear message on pleading rigor and the necessity of clearly established precedent to pierce qualified immunity.