No Clearly Established Fourth Amendment Bar to Trousers-Down Gun Search or 20‑Minute Seclusion in Schools; Sixth Circuit Affirms Interlocutory Review of Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff’s Facts

Introduction

This published decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addresses the scope of qualified immunity for public-school educators facing Fourth Amendment claims in a high‑risk school-safety context. Cheyenne Johnson, on behalf of her sixth-grade son, X.M., sued special education teacher Jason Russell after two discrete incidents: (1) a search for a suspected firearm in which Russell allegedly directed X.M. to pull down his trousers and lift his shirt, and (2) a later, 20‑minute seclusion of X.M. in a windowless “breakroom” during an in-school suspension. The district court denied qualified immunity, citing disputed facts that it believed required a jury’s resolution. A divided Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that even taking the student’s account as true, Russell did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The dissent would have dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction, arguing that Russell’s appeal relied only on factual disagreements and that he forfeited “clearly established” arguments.

The decision makes two principal contributions. First, on jurisdiction, it reiterates that appellate courts may decide qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal by assuming the plaintiff’s version of events and resolving the purely legal “clearly established” question, notwithstanding factual disputes identified by the district court. Second, on the merits, it holds there was no clearly established Fourth Amendment rule, as of 2021, prohibiting a teacher from requiring a student suspected of having a gun to lower his pants (without removing underwear) or from briefly secluding the student for approximately 20 minutes—particularly in light of recent gun-related threats and a violent incident.

Summary of the Opinion

Jurisdiction: The court exercised interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity to the extent the appeal raised legal questions (whether the conduct violated clearly established rights), even though the parties disputed certain facts. The court analyzed the case by accepting the student’s version of the facts for appellate purposes.
Fourth Amendment search: The majority noted that the complaint and briefing did not clearly plead a “search” claim of the kind the district court analyzed (ordering removal of pants), but even if such a claim were considered, it was not clearly established in 2021 that directing a student to lower his trousers to check for a possible gun in a school setting exceeded the scope of a permissible search. The search was justified at inception given credible gun-related threats, and the scope was not clearly prohibited by precedent.
Fourth Amendment seizure: The court held that it was not clearly established in 2021 that secluding a student for about 20 minutes in a breakroom during an in-school suspension, after violent behavior and amid ongoing gun-related concerns, constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Disposition: The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims against Russell.
Dissent: Judge Bloomekatz would have dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction because Russell’s briefs disputed the facts rather than conceding them and did not advance a “clearly established” argument under the plaintiff’s facts. She also read Sixth Circuit precedent (Schulkers) as recognizing Fourth Amendment protections for students seized at school.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Interlocutory Jurisdiction and Qualified Immunity

Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985): A denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable to the extent it raises a legal question. The majority relies on Mitchell to frame its jurisdiction to decide whether Russell violated clearly established law.
Johnson v. Jones (1995): Bars interlocutory appeals that challenge only “evidence sufficiency” (purely factual disputes over what happened). The dissent views Russell’s appeal as one such prohibited factual quarrel. The majority distinguishes Johnson by “excising” factual disputes and resolving the legal question on the plaintiff’s version of events.
Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014): Clarifies that appellate courts may review certain legal aspects intertwined with facts and may consider whether lower courts misapprehended incontrovertible record evidence. The majority treats Plumhoff as cabining Johnson to purely factual issues and as authorizing legal review on plaintiff-assumed facts.
Scott v. Harris (2007): Permits courts to reject a party’s version of facts if “blatantly contradicted” by the record. The majority does not invoke Scott to overwrite facts; the dissent uses Scott’s standard to reject Russell’s reliance on ambiguous video/texts and to insist on the plaintiff’s account for summary judgment.
Behrens v. Pelletier (1996): Denial of summary judgment often identifies factual disputes, but not all such denials are unappealable; legal questions about qualified immunity remain reviewable. The majority quotes Behrens to underscore that the presence of factual disagreements does not automatically defeat appellate jurisdiction.
DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville (6th Cir. 2015) and Roberson v. Torres (6th Cir. 2014): Sixth Circuit decisions instructing courts to separate reviewable legal determinations from unreviewable factual ones; courts can ignore the defendant’s factual disputes and decide the legal issue on the plaintiff’s facts.
Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit (6th Cir. 2005): Endorses resolving legal issues based on the plaintiff’s asserted facts when defendants try to relitigate factual disputes. The majority leans on this method to reach clearly established law.
Lindke v. Tomlinson (6th Cir. 2022) and FBI v. Fikre (2024): Cited for the court’s independent duty to confirm jurisdiction and to resolve questions properly before it.

Fourth Amendment Searches in Schools

New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985): Establishes the two-part reasonableness test for school searches: (1) justified at inception (reasonable suspicion; here framed as a “moderate chance of finding evidence”), and (2) scope reasonably related and not excessively intrusive considering age, sex, and nature of infraction. The majority applies T.L.O. to accept the inception and focus the dispute on scope.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding (2009): A strip search for ibuprofen without particularized suspicion is excessive; but the Court recognized that suspicion of danger, such as weapons, may justify more intrusive searches. The majority distinguishes Safford: weapons present acute danger, and Safford does not clearly prohibit a trousers-down check for a gun.
Wofford v. Evans (4th Cir. 2004) and Cuesta v. School Board of Miami-Dade County (11th Cir. 2002): Persuasive authority that reasonable suspicion exists when there are reports or threats involving weapons or violence. The majority cites these to reinforce the justification at inception.
Wesby (2018), Rivas-Villegas (2021), Pearson v. Callahan (2009), Bell v. City of Southfield (6th Cir. 2022), Rafferty v. Trumbull County (6th Cir. 2019): Authorities on the stringent “clearly established” standard and the plaintiff’s burden to identify controlling precedent that places the constitutional question “beyond debate.” The majority uses these to hold that no case from the Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit clearly forbade the specific search here.

Fourth Amendment Seizures in Schools

Bell v. City of Southfield (6th Cir. 2022) and City of Tahlequah v. Bond (2021): Reinforce that “clearly established” rights must be defined with specificity and grounded in published, controlling authority within the circuit or a robust out-of-circuit consensus.
Shields ex rel. Crochran v. Columbus City Schools (6th Cir. 2018) (unpublished): The majority finds it insufficient to clearly establish law in the Sixth Circuit; at most it offers a general formulation for when school restraint rises to a seizure, which is inadequate under Wesby.
Couture v. Board of Educ. (10th Cir. 2008), Wallace v. Batavia School District (7th Cir. 1995): Out-of-circuit tests characterizing when school restrictions exceed ordinary school constraints; the majority finds no “robust consensus” establishing unlawfulness for the facts here.
A.T. ex rel. L.T. v. Baldo (9th Cir. 2019) and Vernonia v. Acton (1995): Ninth Circuit underscores the dearth of cases denying qualified immunity to educators for restraints/seclusion absent excessive corporal punishment; Vernonia notes schools’ “custodial and tutelary” responsibilities.
Schulkers v. Kammer (6th Cir. 2020): Dissent invokes Schulkers as recognizing students’ Fourth Amendment protections during in-school interviews; the majority views Schulkers as confirming the absence of clearly established law in this specific teacher/seclusion context and notes factual distinctions (social workers, not teachers; different purpose; different risk profile).

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdiction to reach qualified immunity

The majority frames its jurisdictional approach as fully consistent with Mitchell, Plumhoff, Roberson, and DiLuzio: An appellate court may decide the legal question whether the facts—assumed in the plaintiff’s favor—violate clearly established law. It “excises” factual disputes (e.g., whether Russell actually required X.M. to pull down his pants; whether the breakroom was jammed shut) and treats the plaintiff’s version as undisputed solely for this purpose. The court emphasizes the judiciary’s obligation to resolve legal questions properly before it and to prevent jurisdictional rules from insulating potentially dispositive qualified immunity issues from review.

The dissent counters that Russell did not make the necessary alternative “even under plaintiff’s facts” arguments, and thus the appeal presents only factual disagreements barred by Johnson v. Jones. It also argues that Russell forfeited any “clearly established” prong-two defense, and that the court should not construct it sua sponte to create jurisdiction. The majority responds implicitly by stressing that plaintiffs carry the burden to overcome qualified immunity; if the plaintiff cites no controlling precedent that clearly proscribes the conduct on the assumed facts, the defense succeeds.

2) Fourth Amendment “search” claim

Pleading posture: The majority notes that Johnson did not clearly plead or brief a stand-alone search claim predicated on ordering removal of pants; the district court “seemingly” reframed the claim. Nevertheless, the court proceeds to the merits in the alternative.
Justification at inception: The school had credible, proximate indicators of a gun threat: a report the day before; contemporaneous gun talk and a hallway statement by X.M. (“you’re lucky I don’t have my gun on me today”), and a known history of behavioral volatility. Under T.L.O. and Safford’s “moderate chance” formulation, reasonable suspicion existed.
Scope: The dispositive point is prong two of qualified immunity: no clearly established law forbade a trousers-down check (without underwear removal) for a suspected gun. Safford’s prohibition of a strip search for ibuprofen without particularized suspicion was tied to low-danger contraband; Safford itself contemplated greater intrusions when “reasonable suspicion of danger” exists. The absence of controlling Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent squarely forbidding this level of intrusion in weapon-search circumstances defeats the claim.

3) Fourth Amendment “seizure” claim

Threshold and clarity: The Sixth Circuit has not issued a published decision definitively delineating how the Fourth Amendment “seizure” analysis applies to ordinary school discipline/seclusion by educators. Some out-of-circuit formulations exist, but they are not aligned, and no “robust consensus” clearly prohibits the conduct alleged here.
Specificity requirement: Unpublished circuit cases (e.g., Crochran) and general propositions cannot carry the plaintiff’s burden under Wesby and Tahlequah. Schulkers was materially different (social workers investigating abuse; timing and purpose unlike school discipline for a violent incident and gun-related concerns) and, critically, itself ultimately found no clearly established right at the relevant time.
Result: Because it was not clearly established that directing or allowing a 20‑minute seclusion in a breakroom during an in-school suspension, following a violent act and contemporaneous gun-safety concerns, is an unreasonable seizure, Russell is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

Impact

On school safety and educator discretion

This decision strengthens qualified immunity protections for educators responding to credible school-safety threats. It confirms that, absent controlling precedent, courts will not second-guess intrusive but targeted clothing searches for weapons when reasonable suspicion exists.
Short-duration seclusion in disciplinary and safety contexts remains a legally unsettled area in the Sixth Circuit. Without published, on-point authority or a robust consensus, plaintiffs face a high bar to defeating qualified immunity for brief in-school sequestration.

On litigation strategy in the Sixth Circuit

Plaintiffs: Must plead and brief both the constitutional violation and the clearly established prong with circuit-controlling, published authority or a robust out-of-circuit consensus. Unpublished decisions, general propositions, or cross-context analogies will likely be insufficient.
Defendants: Should always present alternative arguments premised on the plaintiff’s facts to secure interlocutory review and avoid Johnson v. Jones dismissal. The dissent underscores that failure to do so risks jurisdictional defeat. Although the majority proceeded here, counsel should not assume similar leeway in future cases.
District courts: Should avoid reframing claims beyond what plaintiffs have pleaded and briefed. The majority’s citation to Greenlaw signals caution against stepping beyond the neutral-arbiter role.

On the law of student seizures

The panel’s statement that the Sixth Circuit lacks a published, controlling standard for Fourth Amendment seizures by educators invites future litigants to develop the doctrine with fact-specific cases. Until then, qualified immunity will likely attach to many short-term seclusions absent excessive corporal punishment or plainly arbitrary conduct.
The split with the dissent on jurisdiction and the reliance on Schulkers signals potential for en banc clarification, particularly about when and how the Fourth Amendment applies to non-police seizures of students by school officials.

Compliance and risk‑management guidance for schools

Weapon searches: Document the specific facts supporting reasonable suspicion (e.g., reports, threats, observations). Use the least intrusive means consistent with the perceived danger; avoid underwear removal absent extreme, articulable reasons. Involve administrators and consider same‑sex staff presence.
Seclusion: Align practices with state statutes and regulations on restraint/seclusion (duration limits, monitoring, documentation, parental notification). Keep durations brief, record reasons, and monitor the student’s condition continuously.
IEP and disability considerations: Integrate behavioral supports and de-escalation strategies into IEPs; train staff on crisis response that respects disability-related needs while maintaining safety.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A defense shielding government officials from suit unless they violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. It is designed to give “breathing room” for reasonable mistakes in unsettled areas of law.
Clearly established law: The plaintiff must identify controlling precedent (usually from the Supreme Court or the circuit) or a robust consensus of persuasive cases that specifically prohibits the conduct in the particular context. Broad generalities do not suffice.
Interlocutory appeal: An appeal before final judgment. Denials of qualified immunity are appealable to the extent they present legal questions; appeals that only dispute what facts a jury could find are generally not.
“Strip search” vs. clothing check: In Safford, a strip search involved searching underwear for pills without sufficient basis. Here, the alleged intrusion was directing the student to lower trousers and lift a shirt to look for a gun (no underwear removal). The level of danger matters to how much intrusion is reasonable.
Seizure in school: A student is “seized” when their freedom of movement is restrained beyond what is inherent in ordinary school attendance. How this applies to short seclusions by teachers is not yet clearly defined in Sixth Circuit published law.
Published vs. unpublished decisions: In the Sixth Circuit, only published opinions can “clearly establish” the law for qualified immunity purposes; unpublished decisions may be persuasive but are typically insufficient by themselves.

Conclusion

Johnson v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools (Russell) sets two important markers in the Sixth Circuit. Procedurally, it reaffirms that appellate courts may decide qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal by assuming the plaintiff’s facts and resolving the legal “clearly established” question, even when the district court flagged factual disputes. Substantively, it holds that, as of 2021, no clearly established Fourth Amendment rule prohibited (1) instructing a student suspected of carrying a gun to lower his pants (without underwear removal) to check for the weapon, or (2) briefly secluding that student for approximately 20 minutes in a classroom breakroom amid contemporaneous safety and discipline concerns.

The dissent highlights enduring tensions in interlocutory jurisdiction and warns defense counsel to argue qualified immunity in the alternative on the plaintiff’s facts to preserve review. It also underscores an emerging need for published, context-specific standards governing educator-imposed restraints and seclusions under the Fourth Amendment. Until such standards crystallize, this decision will make it difficult for plaintiffs to overcome qualified immunity in school-safety scenarios absent on-point, published authority or egregious facts.

Bottom line: The Sixth Circuit’s decision prioritizes school safety imperatives and the stringent “clearly established” requirement of qualified immunity, while leaving open—for another day—the precise constitutional contours of student searches and seizures by educators in less exigent circumstances.