No Amendment After Final Adjudication: Montana’s Strict Bar on Successive Post‑Conviction Petitions and the Narrow Actual‑Innocence Exception

Nonprecedential Note: This is a memorandum opinion under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules, Section I, Paragraph 3(c). It is noncitable and does not serve as precedent. Nonetheless, it offers a clear application of settled law governing post‑conviction relief in Montana.

Introduction

In D. Standley v. State, 2025 MT 205N (DA 24-0513), the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Judicial District Court’s denial of inmate Donnie Lee Standley’s “Notice of Intent to Amend Post‑Conviction.” The central questions were whether Standley’s new filing could be treated as a permissible amendment to his first petition for post‑conviction relief (PCR) and, if not, whether it qualified as a timely and permissible second or successive PCR petition under Montana law. The Court held that once Standley’s first PCR proceeding was fully adjudicated, there was nothing left to amend; any new filing was necessarily a second or subsequent petition subject to the strict statutory bar in § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA. The Court further concluded that Standley’s new allegations did not qualify for the “newly discovered evidence” exception of § 46-21-102(2), MCA, because they were not new and, crucially, did not establish actual innocence.

Parties: Appellant was self‑represented (pro se). The State was represented by the Montana Attorney General and county prosecutors. The case arises out of a 2016 incest conviction, a 100‑year sentence with a 25‑year parole restriction, a direct appeal (Standley I), a first PCR petition and appeal (Standley II), and a later attempt to “amend” PCR that the courts treated as a successive filing.

Summary of the Opinion

Standley’s “Notice of Intent to Amend Post‑Conviction” could not amend his already fully adjudicated PCR case; the filing functioned as a second or successive PCR petition.
Under § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, a successive petition must be dismissed unless it raises grounds that could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an amended original petition.
Standley’s allegations—ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), delayed charging to coincide with expungement of records, withholding of a medical examiner’s report, denial of presence at critical stages, and transcription issues—were either previously raised or could have been raised earlier. They were not “newly discovered evidence” under § 46-21-102(2), MCA.
The “newly discovered evidence” exception is narrow: it requires evidence which, if proven and considered with the entire trial record, shows the petitioner did not commit the crime. Standley did not meet this threshold.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial as an untimely and successive petition.

Case Background and Procedural History

2016: Standley was charged and later convicted by a jury of incest; sentenced to 100 years with a 25‑year parole restriction.
2019 (Standley I): On direct appeal, the Court declined to invoke plain error to revisit jury instructions, noting the jury was fully and fairly instructed. Conviction affirmed.
Finality for PCR purposes: November 18, 2019 (90 days after the August 20, 2019 decision, reflecting the time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court).
2020: Standley filed a timely first PCR petition alleging IAC (trial and appellate), prosecutorial misconduct, and district court errors. The district court denied relief.
2023 (Standley II): The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of PCR on February 14, 2023. Without certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the first PCR became fully adjudicated on May 15, 2023 (90 days later).
2024: Standley filed a “Notice of Intent to Amend Post‑Conviction.” The district court treated it as a successive petition and denied it on August 1, 2024.
2025: The Supreme Court affirmed the denial (this opinion).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion relies on a tight cluster of statutory provisions and established Montana precedents governing timeliness and the permissibility of successive PCR petitions:

Mascarena v. State, 2019 MT 78, ¶¶ 4, 6, 395 Mont. 245, 438 P.3d 323.
Mascarena sets the standard of review (clear error for findings; correctness for legal conclusions) and underscores a petitioner’s “heavy burden” to overturn a denial of PCR. It also explains the actual‑innocence gateway under § 46-21-102(2), MCA: the new evidence, viewed in light of the whole record, must show the petitioner did not commit the offense.
Wilkes v. State, 2015 MT 243, ¶ 15, 380 Mont. 388, 355 P.3d 755.
Wilkes further articulates the actual‑innocence standard for newly discovered evidence and ensures that “new” evidence means genuinely exonerating proof, not merely recharacterized or speculative contentions.
State v. Root, 314 Mont. 186, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d 1035.
Root is invoked to emphasize that claims that could have been raised in the original (or an amended original) petition cannot be revived in a subsequent petition. It complements § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, which mandates dismissal of successive petitions absent genuinely unavailable grounds.
Standley I (2019 MT 204N) and Standley II (2023 MT 28N).
Though nonprecedential, these prior rulings frame the procedural posture: the jury‑instruction challenge was rejected on direct appeal; the first PCR denial was affirmed; certain claims (e.g., delayed prosecution) were abandoned on appeal and thus could not be resurrected later.

Governing Statutes and Their Application

§ 46-21-102(1)–(2), MCA (One‑Year Limit and “Newly Discovered Evidence” Exception).
A petitioner has one year from finality of the conviction to file PCR. Finality occurs when the time to petition the U.S. Supreme Court expires (90 days after the Montana Supreme Court’s decision if no petition is filed). A later filing is permitted only if it relies on newly discovered evidence that, if proven and assessed with the trial record, shows the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct. Even then, the petitioner must file within one year of discovery (or when it should reasonably have been discovered).
§ 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA (Bar on Successive Petitions).
The court must dismiss a second or subsequent PCR petition unless it raises grounds that could not reasonably have been raised earlier in the original or an amended original petition. This provision forecloses serial relitigation of issues under new labels or with speculative embellishments.

Legal Reasoning

Finality and posture: After Standley’s first PCR appeal (Standley II) was decided on February 14, 2023, the proceeding became fully adjudicated on May 15, 2023, when the 90‑day period to seek U.S. Supreme Court review expired. At that point, there was no pending PCR to “amend.”
Characterization of the 2024 filing: Even affording Standley every benefit of the doubt and treating his “Notice of Intent to Amend Post‑Conviction” as a new petition, it was necessarily a second or subsequent petition. That triggers § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA.
Successive‑petition bar: The statute requires dismissal of successive petitions unless they raise grounds that could not reasonably have been raised in the first petition (or an amendment to it). The district court found—and the Supreme Court agreed—that all of Standley’s current contentions either were actually raised before (IAC; delay; medical evidence insinuations) or could have been raised (presence at critical stages; transcription complaints). None depended on new, previously unavailable facts.
Newly discovered evidence and actual innocence: The Court emphasized that the only way around the timing and successive‑petition bars is the § 46-21-102(2) actual‑innocence exception. Standley’s filings did not present newly discovered, exonerating evidence; they consisted of legal theories or speculative assertions. As the opinion explains, “new” evidence must be proof that, if verified and considered with the entire record, shows the petitioner did not commit the crime. Allegations about expunged records, a supposedly withheld medical report, presence/transcript issues, or IAC do not, by themselves, satisfy that standard—particularly where they were available or knowable earlier and lack concrete new proof.
Footnote on “doctored transcripts”: Standley’s claim on appeal that the State altered transcripts is described as “far‑fetched.” The Court noted that, if such a claim were capable of proof, it could have been substantiated at the time of the direct appeal when transcripts were available—underscoring both the lack of novelty and the absence of exonerating force.
Standard of review: Applying Mascarena, the Court reviewed for clear error in findings and correctness in legal conclusions, reminding that reversing a PCR denial poses a “heavy burden” for petitioners. The district court’s determinations were supported and the legal conclusions correct.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although nonprecedential, this decision exemplifies Montana’s strict approach to PCR finality and successive petitions:

No amendments after final adjudication: Once a PCR proceeding is fully adjudicated (i.e., after the window to seek U.S. Supreme Court review has closed), there is nothing pending to amend. Any further filing will be treated as a second or subsequent petition and is presumptively barred.
The “actual innocence” gateway is narrow: The only viable path to a late or successive PCR is concrete, newly discovered evidence that, when weighed against the whole record, affirmatively shows the petitioner did not commit the offense. Legal theories, procedural complaints, or recycled/speculative allegations do not qualify.
One‑petition rule in practice: Root and § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, force petitioners to present all reasonably available grounds in their first (or a timely amended first) PCR petition. Omitting or abandoning a claim—such as Standley’s earlier “delay” argument—usually forecloses later revival.
Strategic takeaway for counsel and pro se litigants: - Preserve issues at trial and raise them on direct appeal where appropriate. - File the initial PCR within one year of finality and include all reasonably available claims, supported by affidavits and documentation. - If genuinely new, exonerating evidence emerges, file within one year of its discovery and explain why it could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence. - Avoid relying on speculation or argumentative inferences as “new evidence.”
Institutional interest in finality: The opinion illustrates the Court’s commitment to finality and the integrity of the post‑conviction process. Successive collateral attacks without truly new exonerating facts will not proceed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Finality of Conviction: A conviction becomes “final” for PCR purposes when the time to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court expires—90 days after the Montana Supreme Court’s decision if no petition is filed.
Post‑Conviction Relief (PCR): A procedure allowing a convicted person to challenge the conviction or sentence based on constitutional violations or other recognized grounds not properly raised on direct appeal. In Montana, the initial PCR must be filed within one year of finality.
Successive Petition Bar: After the first PCR is decided, any new filing is a “second or subsequent” petition. The court must dismiss it unless it raises grounds that could not reasonably have been raised before.
Newly Discovered Evidence of Actual Innocence: To bypass time and successive‑petition limits, the petitioner must present new evidence—unavailable despite reasonable diligence—that, if true and considered with the entire record, shows the petitioner did not commit the crime (not merely that the trial was unfair or that doubt exists).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC): Claims that defense counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial. These must be raised timely; they are not “newly discovered evidence” unless grounded in genuinely new facts that were previously unavailable and exonerating.
Plain Error Review (on direct appeal): An appellate doctrine allowing review of unpreserved errors in rare cases where failing to review would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. The Court declined to apply it in Standley I, finding the jury was fully and fairly instructed.

Conclusion

D. Standley v. State reinforces, in a nonprecedential yet instructive way, the rigor of Montana’s post‑conviction regime. Once a PCR case is fully adjudicated, there is nothing to amend; subsequent filings are presumptively barred under § 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, unless they rest on genuinely new, exonerating evidence that satisfies § 46-21-102(2), MCA. The Court’s application of Mascarena, Wilkes, and Root underscores the heavy burden on petitioners: successive, speculative, or re‑packaged claims—particularly those that could have been raised earlier—will not reopen closed cases. The decision is a clear reminder that the actual‑innocence gateway is narrow and factual, not argumentative; and that finality, efficiency, and the integrity of adjudications remain paramount in Montana’s PCR landscape.

Key Takeaways

There is no right to “amend” a PCR after it has been fully adjudicated; any new filing is successive and presumptively barred.
The only meaningful exception is newly discovered, exonerating evidence demonstrating actual innocence, filed within one year of discovery.
Legal theories (IAC, due process, transcription issues) are not “newly discovered evidence” unless anchored in new, previously unavailable, exonerating facts.
Raise all reasonably available claims in the original PCR, and do not abandon them on appeal if you intend to preserve them.