No Acquittal Without a Ruling: First Circuit Clarifies that Post‑Trial Juror Statements Cannot Trigger Double Jeopardy and Endorses Holistic Review of Deadlock Mistrials

Introduction

In Read v. Norfolk County Superior Court, No. 25-1257 (1st Cir. Mar. 27, 2025), the First Circuit affirmed the denial of pretrial habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to a state criminal defendant who sought to bar her retrial on Double Jeopardy grounds after a state-court mistrial was declared for jury deadlock. The panel (Judges Gelpí, Montecalvo, and Aframe) confronted two core questions:

Whether the trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial was supported by “manifest necessity,” thereby permitting reprosecution on the deadlocked counts; and
Whether post-trial juror statements that the jury had unanimously favored acquittal on two counts amounted to an “acquittal” under the Double Jeopardy Clause, or warranted a post-trial juror inquiry.

The court held that the state judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial after repeated, emphatic deadlock notes and a Tuey‑Rodriquez (“Allen-type”) instruction, particularly in light of a Massachusetts statute that precluded compelling further deliberations without juror consent. It further held that private, post-trial juror communications do not constitute a final acquittal for Double Jeopardy purposes because no “ruling” or public, finalized verdict occurred. The court also declined to authorize a post-trial hearing to probe deliberations.

Parties: Petitioner-Appellant Karen Read; Respondents-Appellees Norfolk County Superior Court and Massachusetts Attorney General Andrea Joy Campbell. The appeal was from the District of Massachusetts (Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV).

Summary of the Opinion

After a 37-day Massachusetts state trial on multiple homicide-related counts, the jury deliberated approximately 28 hours and sent three increasingly definitive deadlock notes. The judge first declined and later gave a Tuey‑Rodriquez instruction. Upon receiving a third note stating that further deliberations would be futile, the judge immediately declared a mistrial without first conferring with counsel, and discharged the jury. Defense counsel later received communications from individuals identifying themselves as jurors claiming unanimity for not guilty on two counts (second-degree murder and leaving the scene resulting in death), with deadlock only on the lesser-included offenses in Count Two. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds; the Massachusetts SJC affirmed; the federal district court denied § 2241 relief. The First Circuit affirmed.

Holdings:

Manifest necessity: Evaluated holistically across the entire course of deliberations, the trial judge acted within sound discretion in declaring a mistrial due to jury deadlock. No “clear alternative” to mistrial was apparent at the time, and the judge was not obliged to solicit a partial verdict or poll jurors.
No acquittal absent a ruling: Post-trial juror statements do not amount to an acquittal for Double Jeopardy purposes. An acquittal requires a final ruling or verdict; private deliberative votes or after-the-fact reports are insufficient under federal law, particularly in light of Blueford v. Arkansas.
No post-trial juror inquiry: Without a threshold showing of a final ruling of acquittal, there is no basis for a post-trial hearing to question jurors; juror deliberation secrecy and anti-harassment principles counsel strongly against it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Manifest necessity framework: The court relied on United States v. Perez (1824) (origin of “manifest necessity”), United States v. Jorn (1971) (scrupulous exercise of discretion), Arizona v. Washington (1978) (great deference to trial judge; but reviewing courts must ensure “sound discretion”), Renico v. Lett (2010) (deadlocked jury as classic example), and Downum v. United States (1963). Within the First Circuit, it cited Brady v. Samaha (1981) (avoid “precipitate” mistrial) and United States v. Toribio‑Lugo (2004) and United States v. Candelario‑Santana (2020) (no mechanical steps required; court must take “some step” to ensure actual deadlock; consider alternatives, counsel input, and the time taken).
Double Jeopardy “acquittal” doctrine: The opinion centers on McElrath v. Georgia (2024) (what counts as an acquittal is a matter of federal law; focus on substance and whether the factfinder acted on a conclusion of insufficiency), Evans v. Michigan (2013) and United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977) (judge’s rulings on insufficiency can be acquittals even if legally erroneous), Smith v. Massachusetts (2005), and United States v. Scott (1978) (substance over labels).
Finality and public verdict requirement: Blueford v. Arkansas (2012) is dispositive: even an in‑court report by a foreperson of unanimous votes on some counts does not constitute a final verdict where deliberations continue and no verdict is returned in open court. Read’s evidence was weaker than Blueford (private post-trial communications rather than an in-court statement), reinforcing the absence of any “ruling” or finality.
Juror-deliberation secrecy: Tanner v. United States (1987) supports preserving the confidentiality of deliberations and protecting jurors from harassment, counseling against intrusive post-trial inquiries absent compelling necessity.
Habeas posture and standards: Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon (1984) (pretrial release is “custody” for § 2241), Marshall v. Bristol Superior Court (1st Cir. 2014) and Gonzalez v. Justices of the Municipal Court of Boston (1st Cir. 2004) (on § 2241 review, defer to the SJC’s factual findings; legal issues receive plenary review; district court’s § 2241 disposition reviewed de novo). Martinez v. Illinois (2014) confirms jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn.
Massachusetts-specific authorities: Commonwealth v. Rodriquez (1973) and Commonwealth v. Jenkins (1994) (Tuey‑Rodriquez instruction and “due and thorough” deliberations), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 68C (after “due and thorough” deliberations and a renewed report of deadlock, the court cannot compel further deliberations absent juror consent), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(b) (court may, but need not, take partial verdicts).

These authorities shaped two pivotal conclusions: (1) the mistrial was within the trial judge’s wide discretion given the full deliberations record and state law constraints; and (2) post-trial juror statements do not create a federal “acquittal” because no final, public ruling occurred.

Legal Reasoning

1) Manifest Necessity for a Deadlock Mistrial

The First Circuit evaluated the entire deliberations history rather than the brief two-minute interval between the judge’s announcement of the third note and the declaration of mistrial. This holistic approach accords with Arizona v. Washington and First Circuit cases (Candelario‑Santana; Toribio‑Lugo): reviewing courts consider whether the judge explored options, heard counsel, and acted after sufficient reflection—without imposing a rigid checklist.

Key points in the record:

The jury deliberated roughly 28 hours over several days and sent three notes escalating from difficulty to “consensus [being] unattainable,” then to an “impasse” where continued deliberation would be “futile” and would “force [jurors] to compromise” deeply held beliefs.
After the first note, the judge consulted counsel and, accepting the Commonwealth’s position that more time was needed, declined to give a Tuey‑Rodriquez instruction and sent the jury back.
After the second note, the judge again consulted counsel, found “due and thorough” deliberations had occurred, and gave the Tuey‑Rodriquez instruction.
After the third note, the judge declared a mistrial without additional consultation. The note’s language implied the jury would not consent to further deliberations.

Massachusetts law mattered: having found “due and thorough” deliberations when giving the Tuey‑Rodriquez instruction, the judge was then constrained by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 68C not to compel further deliberations after a renewed deadlock report unless the jury consented. The third note’s express futility and principles-based impasse reasonably signaled non-consent. Against that backdrop, declaring a mistrial was a sound exercise of discretion.

The court rejected the argument that the judge was obliged to pursue a partial verdict inquiry under Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(b) or poll jurors. Rule 27(b) is permissive. Nothing in the three notes suggested that the jury had reached unanimity on any count; indeed, the third note referred to division over “the charges,” which on its face cuts against the presence of a partial verdict. Moreover, defense counsel never requested a partial-verdict procedure either after the first two notes or when the third note arrived.

Importantly, the manifest-necessity inquiry looks to what the judge knew at the moment of the mistrial decision, not post hoc developments (Arizona v. Washington; United States v. Elliot; United States v. Cameron). At the time, there was no “clear alternative” (Toribio‑Lugo) to mistrial. While “the more prudent course” might have been to confer with counsel upon receiving the third note, the First Circuit agreed with the SJC that the decision not to do so remained within the judge’s discretion on these facts.

2) No “Acquittal” Based on Post‑Trial Juror Statements

Double Jeopardy bars reprosecution once a defendant has been acquitted. Under McElrath v. Georgia and Evans v. Michigan, the baseline question is whether the factfinder acted on a determination that the prosecution failed to carry its burden—i.e., there was a “ruling” tied to guilt or innocence. The First Circuit held there was none here.

Blueford v. Arkansas controlled: even an in-court report that jurors unanimously favored acquittal on certain counts was not a final verdict when deliberations continued and no verdict was recorded in open court. Read’s proof was weaker: private, post-trial juror communications relaying claimed unanimity on two counts, with no indication of a formal, final vote or announcement in open court before discharge. Thus, even assuming the jurors privately favored acquittal, they did not “act[] on [that] view” in any way that constitutes a ruling or verdict. There was no acquittal for Double Jeopardy purposes.

3) No Post‑Trial Hearing to Probe Juror Deliberations

Because there was no colorable showing of a final acquittal, the court declined to order a juror inquiry. Tanner v. United States underscores the strong policy of preserving juror deliberation secrecy and protecting jurors from harassment. The district court properly gave weight to these interests, and the First Circuit agreed: a hearing would be inappropriate on this record.

4) Habeas Standards in the § 2241 Pretrial Context

The court reiterated that a pretrial detainee is “in custody” for § 2241 purposes (Lydon). Reviewing a state pretrial Double Jeopardy claim on § 2241, the First Circuit defers to the SJC’s factual findings but reviews legal issues de novo (Marshall; Gonzalez). The district court’s disposition of the § 2241 petition is reviewed de novo as well. Applying those standards, the panel found no Double Jeopardy violation.

Impact and Practical Implications

Clarifies the “no acquittal without a ruling” principle in the First Circuit: Defense efforts to convert post‑trial juror conversations into Double Jeopardy bars will find no purchase. Absent a public, finalized verdict or a judicial ruling on insufficiency, private indications—even of unanimity—do not amount to an acquittal.
Holistic review of deadlock mistrials: Trial judges’ deadlock determinations are reviewed in context, including earlier consultations with counsel and prior use of non-coercive unanimity instructions. Courts need not take any specific, sequential steps; what matters is that some meaningful step establishes actual deadlock and that no clear, non‑coercive alternative was available at the time.
Partial verdicts remain discretionary: Neither the Constitution nor Massachusetts law requires a partial-verdict inquiry before declaring a deadlock mistrial, particularly when jury communications indicate pervasive division and counsel never requested such a procedure.
Weight to state law constraints: Where state law (here, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 68C) bars compelling further deliberations absent juror consent once “due and thorough” deliberations have been found and a renewed deadlock reported, that constraint supports manifest necessity and favors a prompt mistrial without risking coercion.
Guidance for trial counsel:
- If a partial verdict might protect a client’s Double Jeopardy interests, expressly and timely request a Rule 27(b) inquiry before a mistrial is declared. Silence can undermine later claims that the judge ignored a clear alternative.
- Be mindful that urging a deadlock instruction (Tuey‑Rodriquez/Allen) may, under state law, limit a judge’s ability to send the jury back again following a second deadlock, making a mistrial more likely.
- Advise clients that post-trial juror outreach—beyond ethical and privacy concerns—cannot retroactively create an acquittal barrier to retrial.
Juror confidentiality reinforced: The opinion fortifies the longstanding shield around jury deliberations, discouraging post-verdict fishing expeditions absent a robust constitutional trigger.
Harmony with Supreme Court doctrine: The decision aligns the First Circuit with Blueford and McElrath, contributing to national uniformity on finality and the meaning of “acquittal.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Double Jeopardy (Fifth Amendment): Protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Once jeopardy “attaches” (typically when the jury is sworn), a defendant generally has a right to have the case resolved by that jury.
Manifest Necessity: An exception permitting a mistrial without barring retrial when a “high degree” of necessity exists, such as a genuinely deadlocked jury. Judges must exercise sound discretion; reviewing courts look for reasoned decision-making, not adherence to a rigid script.
Tuey‑Rodriquez (Allen) Instruction: A supplemental charge encouraging jurors to re-examine their views in the interest of reaching unanimity, without coercing any juror to abandon a conscientious conviction. Massachusetts’ version traces to Commonwealth v. Rodriquez.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 68C: Under Massachusetts law, once the court finds “due and thorough” deliberations and a jury again reports deadlock, the court cannot force continued deliberations without the jury’s consent. This protects against coercion and shapes the mistrial calculus.
Partial Verdict: A court may accept verdicts on any counts upon which the jury agrees and declare a mistrial on the rest. In Massachusetts, this is discretionary (Mass. R. Crim. P. 27(b)), not mandatory.
Acquittal for Double Jeopardy: Not every indication of not guilty counts as an acquittal. There must be a final ruling—such as a verdict announced in open court and recorded, or a judge’s grant of acquittal. Preliminary votes or private juror statements are not final.
Blueford Finality Principle: Even an in‑court report of unanimous votes to acquit on some counts does not bar retrial if deliberations continue and no verdict is returned; jurors may revisit their views until a verdict is finalized in open court.
Juror Deliberation Secrecy: To ensure candid debate and protect jurors, courts tightly limit post-trial probing of deliberations. Absent specific, recognized exceptions, courts will not inquire into how or why jurors voted.
§ 2241 Pretrial Habeas: A pretrial detainee (including someone on bail) is “in custody” for habeas purposes. Federal courts defer to state factual findings but review pure legal questions de novo in this posture.

Conclusion

Read v. Norfolk County Superior Court reinforces two core Double Jeopardy doctrines. First, manifest necessity to declare a mistrial for jury deadlock is assessed in context: across the sequence of deliberations, the court’s interactions with counsel, the use of supplemental unanimity instructions, and state-law constraints designed to prevent coercion. Where the record shows diligent, incremental steps and no clear alternative at the time, a mistrial falls within the trial judge’s broad discretion.

Second, an “acquittal” for Double Jeopardy purposes requires a final ruling. Private juror statements, even if unanimous, are not a substitute for a verdict returned and recorded in open court or for a judicial ruling on insufficiency. Extending Blueford’s finality principle, the First Circuit holds that post-trial juror communications cannot retroactively convert a deadlock into an acquittal, and courts should not pierce jury deliberations absent a compelling, recognized basis.

Together, these holdings promote the integrity of jury deliberations, guard against coercion, and clarify the limits of pretrial habeas relief grounded in Double Jeopardy claims following a mistrial for deadlock. The decision offers concrete guidance to trial judges and litigants in Massachusetts and beyond: seek partial verdicts expressly and timely if appropriate, build a contemporaneous record of alternatives considered, and do not expect post hoc juror reports to create constitutional bars where no final ruling exists.