No Absolute Nullity for Lack of Pre‑Sale Notice After Louisiana’s 2008 Tax Sale Revision; Dual Deadlines for Reconventional Nullity Actions

No Absolute Nullity for Lack of Pre‑Sale Notice After Louisiana’s 2008 Tax Sale Revision; Dual Deadlines for Reconventional Nullity Actions

Introduction

In Belaire Development & Construction, LLC v. Succession of Theodore Shelton Sr., the Supreme Court of Louisiana resolved two recurring questions in the post‑2008 tax sale regime:

  • Whether a tax sale conducted after the 2008 comprehensive revision to Title 47 can be attacked as an absolute nullity for failure to provide pre‑sale notice; and
  • What prescriptive period governs an action to annul a tax sale when brought as a reconventional demand in response to a petition to quiet title.

Writing for the Court, Justice Guidry held that after the 2008 revision (effective January 1, 2009), the failure to provide pre‑tax sale notice no longer renders the tax sale an absolute nullity; the Legislature confined nullity actions to three relative nullities enumerated in La. R.S. 47:2286. The Court further harmonized La. R.S. 47:2287 and 47:2266 to hold that a nullity action asserted as a reconventional demand must be filed within the applicable prescriptive period in 47:2287 and within six months of service of the quiet title petition under 47:2266 to avoid entry of a judgment quieting title.

Applying these rules, the Court found the property owner’s reconventional demand timely because the earlier post‑redemption notice misinformed her of the applicable deadline and thus did not constitute “due notification.” The Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal on prescription, reversed its absolute‑nullity ruling, and remanded. Justice Griffin dissented, warning that the majority’s approach imperils the federal due process requirement of pre‑sale notice.

Case Background and Procedural Timeline

  • June 6, 2017: Belaire purchased a 99% tax sale interest in immovable property in St. Martin Parish due to unpaid property taxes; the City of Breaux Bridge held the remaining 1% and later conveyed it to Belaire.
  • Redemptive period: The applicable redemptive period ran after the 2017 tax sale. (For many immovables, Louisiana’s constitution provides a three‑year redemptive period from recordation.)
  • August 11, 2020: After the redemptive period ended, Belaire mailed a La. R.S. 47:2157 notice to the Independent Executrix, Dehlice Shelton, at the succession address. The notice stated she had “60 days” to sue, although fewer than five years had elapsed since recordation—meaning the statute required a “six months” period.
  • October 26, 2021: Belaire filed a petition to quiet title, naming the Succession (through Ms. Shelton) and Patricia Brooks Shelton.
  • June 6, 2022: Ms. Shelton was personally served with the petition to quiet title.
  • November 29, 2022: Ms. Shelton, pro se, filed a reconventional demand to annul the tax sale for lack of adequate pre‑ and post‑sale notice; she also brought the City in as a third‑party defendant.
  • Trial court: Sustained prescription exceptions by Belaire and the City; dismissed Ms. Shelton’s reconventional demand with prejudice.
  • Third Circuit: Reversed, finding the reconventional demand timely under La. R.S. 47:2266 and that absolute nullity remained available for lack of pre‑sale notice.
  • Louisiana Supreme Court: Granted certiorari; affirmed in part (no prescription), reversed in part (no absolute nullity for lack of pre‑sale notice after 2008), remanded.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Post‑2008 regime: For tax sales occurring on or after January 1, 2009, failure to provide pre‑sale notice does not render the sale an absolute nullity. Under La. R.S. 47:2286, only a payment nullity, redemption nullity, or a nullity under La. R.S. 47:2162 (sale to a prohibited buyer) can set aside a tax sale, and all are relative nullities.
  • Prescription for reconventional nullity claims: When a nullity action is asserted as a reconventional demand in a quiet title suit, it must be filed (a) within the prescriptive period in La. R.S. 47:2287 (e.g., six months after being “duly notified” for redemption nullities) and (b) within the six‑month window following service of the petition to quiet title under La. R.S. 47:2266 to avoid entry of judgment quieting title.
  • Application to this case: The August 11, 2020 notice under La. R.S. 47:2157 misstated the time to sue (60 days instead of six months) and thus did not satisfy due process or the statute; it did not constitute “due notification.” Ms. Shelton was “duly notified” by service of the quiet title petition on June 6, 2022 and filed her reconventional demand within six months. Therefore her redemption nullity claim was timely.
  • Result: Affirmed the appellate reversal of the trial court’s prescription ruling; reversed the appellate holding that lack of pre‑sale notice yields absolute nullity; remanded for further proceedings on the relative nullity claim(s).

Legal Framework

Constitutional Due Process Baseline

Due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of proceedings that affect property rights and an opportunity to be heard. See:

  • Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“notice reasonably calculated” standard);
  • Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (mail or equivalent notice is the constitutional minimum when a party’s name and address are reasonably ascertainable);
  • La. Const. art. I, § 2 (due process) and art. VII, § 25(A) (tax collectors must give notice “in the manner provided by law” to all record owners).

The 2008 Revision to Title 47 (effective January 1, 2009)

Act 819 of 2008 overhauled Louisiana’s ad valorem tax collection and tax sale procedures (Title 47, Subtitle III, Chapter 5) to streamline collection, centralize rules, and emphasize return of property to commerce. Key features:

  • La. R.S. 47:2286: “No tax sale shall be set aside except for a payment nullity, redemption nullity, or a nullity under R.S. 47:2162, all of which are relative nullities.”
  • Official Revision Comments (2008) to 47:2286: the “important notice” is the post‑sale notice of the right to redeem; minor procedural defects in pre‑sale notice or sale conduct no longer set aside the sale.
  • La. R.S. 47:2122(4)(a): defines “duly notified” as an effort consistent with due process to identify and provide a person with notice that meets La. R.S. 47:2156, 2157, 2206, 2236, or 2275, or via service of petition and citation per 47:2266—regardless of actual receipt.
  • La. R.S. 47:2156: post‑sale redemption notice by the tax sale purchaser/collector while the redemptive period is still open.
  • La. R.S. 47:2157: post‑redemptive period notice by the purchaser warning that the recipient has a limited time to sue to challenge the sale (six months if fewer than five years have elapsed since recordation; 60 days if more than five years).
  • La. R.S. 47:2266: procedure and timeline for quieting title; a judgment must be entered if no proceeding to annul is instituted within six months after service of petition and citation.
  • La. R.S. 47:2287: prescriptive periods for nullity actions—distinct tracks for redemption nullities (47:2287(A)) and payment nullities (47:2287(B)), and a reconventional/intervention timing rule (47:2287(C)).

2012 Amendment to La. R.S. 47:2153 and 2026 Update

  • 2012 Acts No. 836 amended La. R.S. 47:2153(C)(1) to require the tax collector to cancel a sale and refund the price in the absence of actual notice or a reasonable effort to notify certain “tax sale parties.” The Supreme Court held this amendment did not revive an action for absolute nullity based on pre‑sale notice; it provides an administrative cancel/refund directive without changing 47:2286’s exclusive list of relative nullities.
  • 2025 Acts No. 411 (effective Jan. 1, 2026) adds 47:2153(D): failure to properly advertise a tax lien auction “shall not be a basis to annul the tax lien auction under La. R.S. 47:2286,” underscoring the Legislature’s continued emphasis on limited grounds for nullity.

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

  • Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, 925 So. 2d 1172 (La. 2006): Under pre‑2008 law, lack of pre‑sale notice rendered a tax sale an absolute nullity. The majority recognizes Lewis as describing the prior regime that the 2008 revision replaced.
  • Central Properties v. Fairway Gardenhomes, LLC, 225 So. 3d 441 (La. 2017): This Court validated the new scheme’s emphasis on post‑sale notice, holding that a private tax sale purchaser’s provision of post‑sale notice can satisfy due process, even if the collector failed to give post‑sale notice. While Central Properties did not squarely resolve pre‑sale notice’s effect, it cited with approval appellate decisions interpreting the 2008 revision as de‑emphasizing pre‑sale notice as a nullity trigger.
  • Adair Asset Management, LLC v. Turney, 195 So. 3d 501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2016), writ denied, 209 So. 3d 97 (La. 2016): Emphasized that after the 2008 revision, post‑sale redemption notice is the “important notice” for due process; defects in pre‑sale notice do not nullify the sale if proper post‑sale notice is given in time.
  • Alpha Capital US Bank v. White, 268 So. 3d 1124 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2018), writ denied, 2019-0034 (La. 3/18/19): Held that failure to give pre‑sale notice does not render a post‑2008 tax sale absolutely null; post‑sale notices can cure deficiencies.
  • Stow‑Serge v. Side by Side Redevelopment, Inc., 302 So. 3d 71 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2020), writ denied, 302 So. 3d 1120 (La. 2020): Similar reading of 47:2286 limiting nullities to relative grounds.
  • Mullane and Mennonite: The federal due process cornerstones for adequate notice, cited to frame what “duly notified” must entail in content and method.
  • Tietjen v. City of Shreveport, 36 So. 3d 192 (La. 2010); Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 94 So. 3d 750 (La. 2012): Louisiana due process cases underscoring the need for notice reasonably calculated to reach interested parties in the tax sale context.
  • M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16 (La. 2008): Used for interpretive principles (legislative awareness of existing law; harmonizing statutes).
  • Campo v. Correa, 828 So. 2d 502 (La. 2002): Explains burden of proof on prescription exceptions; if not prescribed on the pleadings’ face, the exceptor bears the burden.
  • Huber v. Midkiff, 838 So. 2d 771 (La. 2003) and Caddo‑Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Comm’n v. Office of Motor Vehicles, 710 So. 2d 776 (La. 1998): Procedural rules for constitutional challenges (must be pleaded below and served on the Attorney General); courts avoid de facto constitutional rulings where not properly presented.

Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) No Absolute Nullity for Lack of Pre‑Sale Notice After 2008

The Court grounded its holding in the plain text of La. R.S. 47:2286 and the Official Revision Comments. The statute confines nullity actions to three relative nullities: payment nullity, redemption nullity, and sale to a prohibited buyer. The Comments explain the legislative choice to shift the “important notice” to the post‑sale redemption notice and to abandon pre‑revision practice of annulling sales for “minor procedural violations” surrounding the pre‑sale phase.

The Court aligned itself with the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits (Alpha Capital, Adair, Stow‑Serge), and recognized that Central Properties had already validated key elements of the post‑sale notice construct. It rejected the argument that the 2012 amendment to La. R.S. 47:2153 resurrected an absolute nullity remedy for lack of pre‑sale notice, noting the Legislature left 47:2286’s exclusive list of relative nullities untouched and did not expressly revive an absolute nullity.

Importantly, the Court expressly did not decide any constitutional challenge to the 2008 revision, emphasizing that Ms. Shelton had not properly pleaded or noticed such a challenge. It therefore decided the case on statutory grounds, as required by Louisiana’s constitutional challenge protocols.

2) Dual Deadlines When the Nullity Claim is a Reconventional Demand

The Court harmonized La. R.S. 47:2287 and 47:2266:

  • 47:2287 sets the substantive prescriptive periods for nullity actions (e.g., for a redemption nullity, suit must be brought within six months after a person is “duly notified,” subject to other timing rules).
  • 47:2266 governs quiet title procedure and imposes an independent six‑month window after service of petition and citation; if no annulment proceeding is filed within six months, the court must render a judgment quieting and confirming title.

Reading the provisions together and relying on the 2008 Comments to 47:2287, the Court held that a reconventional nullity claim must meet both:

  • the prescriptive period under 47:2287 (e.g., six months from “due notification” for redemption nullities), and
  • the six‑month post‑service window under 47:2266 to avoid entry of judgment quieting title.

This reading prevents the procedural timeline in quiet title actions from superseding (or rendering superfluous) the substantive prescriptive limits the Legislature set for nullity claims.

3) “Due Notification” Requires Accurate, Legally Correct Content

“Duly notified” is defined by 47:2122(4)(a) as an effort that both meets due process and complies with one of the specified notice provisions (including 47:2157) or service under 47:2266. The August 11, 2020 47:2157 notice told Ms. Shelton she had “60 days” to sue when, under the statute, she had six months (because five years had not elapsed since the tax sale certificate’s filing). The Court reasoned that providing the wrong deadline is not notice “reasonably calculated” to afford an opportunity to be heard; it therefore fails both due process under Mullane and statutory compliance with 47:2157.

Because the 2020 notice was defective, the six‑month 47:2287(A)(1) prescriptive period did not begin to run then. Ms. Shelton was “duly notified” by service of the quiet title petition on June 6, 2022 (a method expressly recognized by 47:2122(4)(a) and 47:2266). Filing her reconventional demand on November 29, 2022, was within six months of service, satisfying both 47:2287(A)(1) and 47:2266(A).

The Dissent (Griffin, J.)

Justice Griffin would have held the tax sale absolutely null for failure to provide pre‑sale notice, invoking federal due process precedent and this Court’s jurisprudence:

  • He emphasized Mennonite’s requirement of mail or equivalent notice to reasonably ascertainable interested parties before a sale that affects property rights.
  • He cited Quantum Resources Management, L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 112 So. 3d 209 (La. 2013), and Hamilton v. Royal Int’l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25 (La. 2006), to argue that lack of pre‑sale notice is a constitutional defect rendering the sale void, not merely voidable.
  • He rejected the idea that state statutes can dilute federal due process minima, urging that post‑sale notice cannot cure a complete absence of pre‑sale notice.
  • On prescription, he read 47:2287(C) as providing an alternative timing path for reconventional demands (six months post‑service under 47:2266), not a cumulative requirement, and warned that the majority’s dual‑deadline reading produces superfluity and constitutional concerns about time‑barring due process claims.

Impact and Practical Guidance

1) Doctrinal Impact

  • Governing rule for post‑2008 sales: Failure to provide pre‑sale notice is not a ground for absolute nullity. Parties challenging tax sales must fit within the three relative nullities in 47:2286.
  • Notice content matters: Post‑sale notices must state the correct statutory deadlines. An incorrect deadline (as here) will not qualify as “due notification,” will not trigger prescription, and may support a redemption nullity if not cured in time.
  • Dual timing constraints for reconventional demands: Nullity claims asserted in response to a quiet title petition must be filed within (i) the applicable 47:2287 prescriptive window and (ii) six months of service under 47:2266 to avoid a quiet title judgment. Counsel must track both clocks.
  • Constitutional question left open: The Court did not decide whether the 2008 regime is constitutional insofar as it downplays pre‑sale notice as a nullity trigger. Parties wishing to press that issue must plead and notice a constitutional challenge in the trial court and serve the Attorney General.

2) Guidance for Tax Sale Purchasers and Collectors

  • Send a 47:2156 post‑sale redemption notice early enough to be “at least six months before” the end of the redemptive period; track delivery efforts to meet the “duly notified” standard. Consider redundant methods (regular and certified mail, electronic means where authorized) and document all efforts.
  • After the redemptive period, send a 47:2157 notice that scrupulously tracks the statutory form—including the correct time to sue (six months if fewer than five years have elapsed from recordation; 60 days if more than five years). An error will likely fail due process and not start prescription.
  • When ready, file a quiet title action under 47:2266 with the required content; ensure timely and proper service. Track the six‑month post‑service window for potential reconventional annulment claims.

3) Guidance for Property Owners, Heirs, and Executors

  • Maintain accurate addresses with the assessor and in any succession filings; successors and executors are “tax sale parties.”
  • If you receive a 47:2156 or 47:2157 notice, check whether it lists the correct deadline and identify whether it was sent at a time and in a manner consistent with the statute. A defective notice may not trigger prescription.
  • If served with a quiet title petition, calendar the six‑month period from the date of service to file a reconventional demand; failure to do so risks entry of a judgment confirming full ownership.
  • If pursuing a constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme, plead it in the trial court and serve the Attorney General to preserve the issue.

4) Systemic Effects and Policy Considerations

  • Finality and commerce: The decision reinforces the 2008 policy to reduce annulments based on pre‑sale procedural defects, increasing certainty for investors and taxing bodies.
  • Due process safeguards remain: Notices must still be “reasonably calculated” to reach parties and must be statutorily compliant. Content accuracy is now a litigated due process dimension.
  • Future litigation horizon: The dissent maps out a path for federal due process challenges centered on pre‑sale notice; such issues may return in a properly postured case.
  • Statutory drift continues: The 2026 amendment to 47:2153(D) further narrows annulment bases (advertising defects not actionable under 47:2286), signaling ongoing legislative commitment to the relative‑nullity model.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Key Terms

  • Tax sale certificate: The recorded instrument evidencing the tax sale purchaser’s interest.
  • Redemptive period: The time within which an owner can redeem the property by paying amounts specified by law (often three years for immovables). The end of this period is a key milestone for notice and litigation timelines.
  • “Duly notified” (47:2122(4)(a)): An effort consistent with due process to identify and notify the person via one of the listed statutory notices (e.g., 47:2156, 47:2157) or by service of petition and citation under 47:2266. Actual receipt is not required, but the content must comply with the statute and due process.
  • Payment nullity: The taxes were paid, or the sale occurred notwithstanding payment (relative nullity).
  • Redemption nullity: The owner was not duly notified at least six months before the redemptive period ended (relative nullity).
  • Nullity under 47:2162: Sale to a prohibited buyer (relative nullity).
  • Quiet title action (47:2266): A post‑redemption suit by the tax sale purchaser to confirm full ownership; triggers a six‑month deadline for any proceeding to annul.
  • Reconventional demand: A counterclaim filed by the defendant in response to the plaintiff’s suit (here, to annul a tax sale within a quiet title action).

How the Deadlines Work in Practice

  1. Identify the ground for nullity:
    • Redemption nullity: Filing window typically opens upon “due notification” and must be filed within six months (47:2287(A)(1)).
    • Payment nullity: Different prescriptive scheme (47:2287(B)).
  2. Determine whether and when the owner was “duly notified”:
    • Through a compliant 47:2156 or 47:2157 notice, or
    • By service of the quiet title petition per 47:2266.
  3. If the nullity is asserted as a reconventional demand in a quiet title action:
    • File within the 47:2287 prescriptive period (e.g., six months from due notification for redemption nullities), and
    • Also file within six months after service of the quiet title petition (47:2266), to prevent a quiet title judgment.

Worked Example Using This Case

  • Tax sale certificate recorded in 2017; redemptive period ends in 2020.
  • 2020 47:2157 notice erroneously states “60 days” to sue (should have been “six months”). Because of this defect, it is not “due notification” and does not trigger 47:2287(A)(1)’s six‑month clock.
  • Service of quiet title petition on June 6, 2022 is “due notification” (via 47:2266).
  • Reconventional demand filed November 29, 2022—within six months of June 6, 2022—satisfies both 47:2287(A)(1) and 47:2266.

Conclusion

Belaire v. Succession of Shelton definitively answers two questions that have divided litigants and lower courts since Louisiana’s 2008 tax sale overhaul. First, after the 2008 revision, lack of pre‑sale notice does not render a tax sale an absolute nullity; nullity grounds are confined to the three relative nullities listed in La. R.S. 47:2286. Second, when an owner asserts a nullity as a reconventional demand in a quiet title proceeding, the claim must satisfy both the applicable prescriptive period in La. R.S. 47:2287 and the six‑month post‑service deadline in La. R.S. 47:2266 to avoid entry of a quiet title judgment.

At the same time, the decision underscores that “due notification” is not a mere formality. Notices must be accurate and compliant; a misstatement of the time to sue, as occurred here, fails due process and does not trigger prescription. The Court left unresolved—because it was not properly raised—broader constitutional challenges to the 2008 regime’s de‑emphasis of pre‑sale notice. That question may return in a case properly framed to test the intersection of Mennonite’s federal due process requirements and Louisiana’s statutory architecture.

For now, the governing message is clear: post‑2008, finality and return of property to commerce are advanced by a relative‑nullity framework anchored in rigorous post‑sale notice practice, while owners retain meaningful protections through accurate, timely notices and dual litigation timelines that, when properly observed, preserve their ability to challenge defective sales.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

Judge(s)

Guidry, J.

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