No § 3E1.1 Reduction for Post‑Sentencing Remorse After Trial: Sixth Circuit Clarifies Acceptance‑of‑Responsibility Is Timely and Process‑Focused; Rehabilitation Belongs Under § 3553(a)

Introduction

In United States v. Stanford Ray Coleman (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), the Sixth Circuit, in a published opinion by Judge Thapar, resolves four procedural challenges to a resentencing that followed the defendant’s successful 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Coleman had originally received an above‑Guidelines sentence as a career offender for conspiring to distribute oxycodone in Appalachian communities. After the en banc Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Havis removed inchoate drug crimes from the Guidelines’ controlled‑substance definition, Coleman no longer qualified as a career offender; the district court resentenced him within a lower, recalculated range.

On appeal, Coleman argued procedural error in four respects: (1) refusal to award a § 3E1.1(a) acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction based on remorse expressed years after trial; (2) failure to account for disparities between his sentence and his coconspirators’ sentences; (3) failure to consider mitigating evidence of childhood adversity; and (4) inadequate explanation for three supervised‑release conditions. He also sought a remand for consideration of retroactive U.S.S.G. Amendment 821 and requested reassignment to a different judge.

The panel affirms the sentence but remands for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to consider Amendment 821’s retroactive change to “status points.” The opinion is significant for its published, post‑Kisor treatment of § 3E1.1(a): the court holds that the guideline’s text, history, and purpose foreclose granting a two‑level reduction for acceptance of responsibility based on remorse first expressed years after trial and initial sentencing; post‑conviction rehabilitation is instead properly weighed under § 3553(a).

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirms Coleman’s within‑Guidelines 168‑month sentence (with a $15,000 fine and six years of supervised release) imposed at resentencing. It rejects each claimed procedural error:

Acceptance of responsibility (§ 3E1.1(a)): No error. The guideline requires a timely and consistent acknowledgement of culpability; remorse appearing years after trial and initial sentencing does not qualify. Rehabilitation belongs under § 3553(a), compassionate release, or supervised release modification—not § 3E1.1(a).
Sentencing disparities (§ 3553(a)(6)): No plain error. The disparity factor targets nationwide disparities, not codefendant‑level comparisons. Any differences with coconspirators were warranted by plea/cooperation, role, and criminal history.
Mitigation: No plain error. The district court considered the mitigating record but reasonably assigned diminished weight because Coleman failed to show a causal nexus between childhood adversity and his adult drug‑trafficking offenses.
Supervised‑release conditions: No plain error. The record made the reasons for search and financial‑monitoring conditions evident, and the court conducted an individualized assessment tethered to deterrence, abstinence, and fine repayment.

The court remands for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to consider whether retroactive Amendment 821 warrants removing two criminal‑history “status points,” potentially reducing Coleman’s criminal‑history category. The court denies reassignment, finding no basis to question the original judge’s fairness or flexibility.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam) and United States v. Cordero, 973 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2020): Removed inchoate drug offenses from the § 4B1.2(b) definition, making some defendants—including Coleman—no longer “career offenders,” thus necessitating resentencing.
Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019) and United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021): Limit deference to Guidelines commentary to situations of genuine ambiguity after exhausting traditional tools of construction. Coleman invoked Kisor to argue the district court “reflexively” deferred to Application Note 2 to § 3E1.1; the panel instead resolves § 3E1.1(a) as unambiguous, relying on text, structure, history, and purpose.
Sixth Circuit acceptance‑of‑responsibility line: United States v. Williams, 940 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Whitman, 209 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Trevino, 7 F.4th 414 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Prater, 2024 WL 3634526 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Roche, 321 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cadieux, 846 F. App’x 389 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Castillo‑Garcia, 205 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Knuuttila, 2025 WL 2506607 (6th Cir. 2025): Collectively emphasize timeliness and consistency as prerequisites for § 3E1.1(a); inconsistent conduct or post‑trial remorse does not qualify.
Guidelines history: 1987 Supplementary Report; 1991 Working Group; 1992 addition of § 3E1.1(b). Establishes that § 3E1.1 rewards process‑based efficiencies (e.g., prompt guilty pleas and truthful admissions) and “timely” assistance.
United States v. Pepper, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Post‑sentencing rehabilitation may be considered at resentencing under § 3553(a).
United States v. Kennedy, 595 F. App’x 584 (6th Cir. 2015): Acceptance‑of‑responsibility focuses on process economy; rehabilitation is distinct.
United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008): § 3553(a)(6) addresses nationwide disparities among similar offenders, not disparities among codefendants; differences may be justified by criminal history, role, plea and cooperation.
United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc): Establish the “Bostic question” and plain‑error review when no contemporaneous objection is made post‑sentencing.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): Explains the adequacy of explanation for within‑Guidelines sentences.
United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 2001) and United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2012): Reasons for supervised‑release conditions may be evident from the record; custodial‑sentence analysis can justify supervised‑release lengths and conditions.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Requires individualized assessment at sentencing.
United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024): Cited by Coleman to warn against blanket search conditions; the panel distinguishes it based on individualized findings in this case.
White v. Plappert, 131 F.4th 465 (6th Cir. 2025) and Thornell v. Jones, 602 U.S. 154 (2024): Support assigning diminished weight to mitigating evidence lacking a causal nexus to the offense conduct.
U.S.S.G. Amend. 821 (Nov. 1, 2023) and United States v. Sanders, 2024 WL 4579446 (6th Cir. 2024): Amendment 821 retroactively modifies “status points.”
United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909 (6th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Jackson, 678 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2012): Permit appellate remand to consider retroactive amendments without requiring the defendant to first file a § 3582(c)(2) motion if judicial efficiency is served.
United States v. Maxwell, 800 F. App’x 373 (6th Cir. 2020) and Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2006): Set the high bar and factors for reassignment on remand; not met here. Distinctions drawn from United States v. Domenech, 63 F.4th 1078 (6th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590 (6th Cir. 2022).

Legal Reasoning

1) Acceptance of responsibility after trial and initial sentencing

The court holds that § 3E1.1(a) is unambiguous: the two‑level reduction requires a “clear[]” demonstration of acceptance that is both timely and consistent. Timeliness goes to sincerity and the core purpose of § 3E1.1—to reward defendants who conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources by admitting guilt and cooperating with the process before or during litigation, not years later after a trial and sentencing. Consistency means the defendant’s words and deeds must align; minimization, blame‑shifting, or defiance (especially pre‑sentencing) defeats the showing.

This construction does not rely on Application Note 2 (which disfavors post‑trial remorse) as a matter of deference; rather, it flows from the text “clearly demonstrates,” the provision’s structure (including the 1992 addition of subsection (b), which itself uses the word “timely”), and historical materials showing the guideline’s process‑efficiency rationale. The panel thus sidesteps Kisor’s deference framework by concluding that no “genuine ambiguity” exists to trigger commentary deference. The Note remains consistent with, and illustrative of, the plain meaning.

The court distinguishes acceptance of responsibility from post‑conviction rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is real and important, but it is accounted for elsewhere: at resentencing under § 3553(a) (Pepper), through compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)), or in supervised‑release modifications/early termination (§ 3583(e)(1)). Indeed, the district court credited Coleman’s rehabilitation to reject the government’s requested upward variance and to impose a within‑Guidelines sentence. But § 3E1.1(a) cannot be repurposed to retroactively reward after‑trial remorse.

Finally, the court highlights a policy concern: allowing post‑sentencing acceptance at resentencing would introduce new disparities based on the happenstance of who obtains resentencing (as Coleman did via Havis), contrary to the Guidelines’ aim to reduce unwarranted national disparities.

2) Disparities with coconspirators’ sentences

Applying plain‑error review (because counsel did not object when invited under Bostic), the court finds no error in the district court’s focus on nationwide disparity under § 3553(a)(6). Sixth Circuit precedent confines that factor to national comparisons among similarly situated offenders, not codefendant‑to‑codefendant comparisons. Although district courts may consider codefendant sentences as a matter of discretion, they are not required to. In any event, the record explains the differences here: Coleman went to trial, did not cooperate, led the conspiracy, and had a longer criminal record; his coconspirators pleaded guilty, cooperated, and had lesser roles.

3) Mitigation based on childhood adversity

Also under plain‑error review, the panel concludes that the district court considered Coleman’s mitigating evidence—including age, health, discipline record, and rehabilitation—but reasonably assigned diminished weight to evidence of childhood poverty, lack of guidance, and adolescent drug use because Coleman failed to show a causal nexus to his adult drug‑distribution conduct at age 44. “Mitigation isn’t the same as explanation”: hardship can explain a life trajectory without meaningfully mitigating the culpability of later, large‑scale drug trafficking. The court further finds the sentencing explanation adequate for a within‑Guidelines sentence under Rita.

4) Supervised‑release conditions (search; financial information; credit lines)

Again under plain‑error review, the court upholds three conditions. The reasons are “evident from the record” and tied to the court’s broader § 3553(a) analysis:

Search condition: Supported by individualized deterrence concerns, Coleman's recidivism history, chronic substance abuse, and abstinence/testing conditions. The court connected these specifics to ensuring compliance and preventing relapse, satisfying Gall’s individualized‑assessment requirement and avoiding any “blanket” rule criticized in Oliveras.
Financial‑monitoring conditions: Imposed in the context of a reduced but still unpaid fine and Coleman’s indigence upon reentry. Monitoring income, credit, and debt serves the twin aims of ensuring fine repayment and discouraging reoffending to meet financial pressures.

The panel reiterates that a district court’s rationale for the custodial sentence can, and here does, justify supervised‑release terms and conditions (Zobel).

5) Amendment 821 and appellate remand

Coleman had eight criminal‑history points at resentencing—six for prior convictions and two “status points” for committing the federal offense while under a criminal‑justice sentence. Amendment 821 retroactively removes those two status points for defendants who, like Coleman, had six or fewer points before adding status points. Although defendants typically seek such relief via a § 3582(c)(2) motion before the sentencing judge, the panel, invoking Ralston and Jackson, remands sua sponte in the interest of judicial efficiency to let the district court decide whether to reduce Coleman’s sentence in light of the § 3553(a) factors and his history and characteristics.

6) Reassignment request

Reassignment is an “extraordinary” remedy reserved for rare cases. Applying Solomon’s three factors, the court finds none supports reassignment. The district judge demonstrated the ability to set aside earlier views by granting § 2255 relief, recalculating the Guidelines, crediting rehabilitation, and imposing a substantially reduced sentence within the new range. Unlike Domenech (repeated Guidelines errors) or Johnson (serious errors tied to courtroom conduct), there is no indication of bias or intractability here; reassignment would not enhance the appearance of justice and would waste judicial resources.

Impact

Clarified, published rule on acceptance‑of‑responsibility post‑Kisor: In the Sixth Circuit, § 3E1.1(a) cannot be used to reward remorse first expressed after trial and sentencing, even at resentencing. Defendants should channel post‑conviction progress into § 3553(a) mitigation, compassionate‑release requests, or supervised‑release adjustments—not § 3E1.1.
Guidance on preserving sentencing arguments: The court’s reliance on plain‑error review underscores the importance of specific, contemporaneous objections after the Bostic inquiry. Counsel should: (a) articulate precisely how codefendant comparisons are relevant and why differences are unwarranted; (b) explain the causal nexus between mitigation and offense conduct; and (c) object with specificity to supervised‑release conditions (and propose narrower alternatives).
Supervised‑release conditions: The opinion affirms that “reasons evident from the record” can suffice; however, district courts should make their individualized reasoning clear on the record to forestall challenges, especially for search and financial conditions.
National vs. codefendant disparity: The panel reinforces that § 3553(a)(6) is primarily about national uniformity among similarly situated offenders. Codefendant disparities remain discretionary considerations, not grounds for procedural error absent more.
Retroactivity practice for Amendment 821: The court streamlines practice by permitting appellate remand for consideration of retroactive changes without requiring a separate § 3582(c)(2) motion first—where judicial efficiency is served. Counsel should evaluate whether pre‑status points were six or fewer, as that threshold controls eligibility for removing the two status points.
Sentencing advocacy: The opinion offers a template for presenting rehabilitation effectively. Here, rehabilitation helped avoid an upward variance and secure a within‑range sentence; it just could not retroactively “buy back” a § 3E1.1 reduction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Acceptance of responsibility vs. rehabilitation:
- § 3E1.1(a) rewards timely, consistent acceptance that saves resources (e.g., pleading guilty, truthful admissions). It is process‑focused.
- Rehabilitation (programming, contrition years later) is real but is considered under § 3553(a) at sentencing/resentencing, via compassionate release, or in supervised‑release modifications—not under § 3E1.1.
Kisor and Guidelines commentary:
- Courts defer to commentary only if the guideline text is genuinely ambiguous after using traditional interpretive tools.
- Here, the court found § 3E1.1(a) unambiguous; it reached the same result as Application Note 2 without needing deference.
Plain‑error review and the Bostic question:
- After pronouncing sentence, the district court asks for objections (the “Bostic question”). Failure to object specifically triggers plain‑error review on appeal—a steep hill requiring a clear error that affected substantial rights and seriously impacted the proceedings.
§ 3553(a)(6) disparity:
- This factor targets nationwide disparities among similar offenders, not merely differences among codefendants in a single case. Differences owing to role, criminal history, and (non)cooperation are usually warranted.
Supervised‑release conditions:
- Courts must make an individualized assessment. Reasons can be “evident from the record” (e.g., search conditions tied to abstinence and deterrence; financial monitoring tied to fine repayment and reentry stability).
Amendment 821 (status points):
- Retroactively removes two “status points” for defendants who had six or fewer criminal‑history points before adding status points. May lower the criminal‑history category.
- Relief is typically via § 3582(c)(2) but, in the Sixth Circuit, appellate courts may remand for consideration in the interest of judicial efficiency.

Conclusion

United States v. Coleman is a significant, published affirmation of how § 3E1.1(a) operates in the post‑Kisor era: the acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction is anchored in timeliness and consistency and cannot be revived by remorse expressed only after trial and initial sentencing. The court carefully distinguishes acceptance from rehabilitation and points advocates to the proper vehicles for the latter. The opinion also reiterates the Sixth Circuit’s national‑disparity focus under § 3553(a)(6), confirms that individualized reasons for supervised‑release conditions can be evident from the record, and offers a pragmatic pathway to consider retroactive relief under Amendment 821 on remand without procedural detours. Practically, Coleman provides clear guidance to district courts and litigants alike on preserving issues, framing mitigation, and allocating post‑conviction improvements to the right parts of the sentencing framework. In short, it tightens the linkage between the Guidelines’ text, history, and purpose and the everyday mechanics of federal sentencing.