No §1983 End‑Run Around Habeas for McGirt‑Based Jurisdictional Challenges; Prospective Relief Against Judges Requires Ongoing Injury

Introduction

In Davison v. Smith, No. 24-6256 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sua sponte dismissal of an Oklahoma inmate’s sprawling civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens against a host of state, federal, and tribal officials. The plaintiff, Alonzo G. Davison, sought to recast a McGirt-based jurisdictional attack on his 2002 state convictions as a civil rights case centered on alleged “miscategorization” of “African-Descendant Native Americans.” The district court dismissed on two grounds: (1) Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 actions that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, and (2) absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity. The Tenth Circuit agreed and added two important clarifications: the claims also cannot be used to indirectly challenge the court of appeals’ denial of authorization for a second or successive habeas petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), and plaintiff lacked standing to obtain prospective relief against judges because he alleged no ongoing or future injury.

This unpublished order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but it may be cited for its persuasive value. Its contribution lies in its clear application of Heck to McGirt/Major Crimes Act jurisdictional theories framed as civil rights claims, and in its reminder that “prospective relief” against judicial officers still requires Article III standing grounded in an anticipated injury.

Summary of the Opinion

Heck v. Humphrey bars Davison’s § 1983/Bivens claims because success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of his state custody: his claims pivot on the premise that, as an “Indian,” he should have been prosecuted in federal court under the Major Crimes Act (MCA), and he even sought sentence adjustments to federal guidelines.
Attempts to repackage procedural-due-process and ex post facto complaints about state postconviction proceedings do not avoid Heck where the asserted injury is the denial of jurisdictional arguments that call into question the conviction’s validity.
To the extent Davison challenged the Tenth Circuit’s prior denial of authorization to file a successive habeas petition, § 2244(b)(3)(E) forecloses any such collateral attack.
Absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity bar claims against the judges and district attorney for actions taken in their judicial and prosecutorial capacities, respectively.
Davison’s argument that he sought only official-capacity, prospective relief fails for lack of standing: now that he has identified his own status, the alleged “miscategorization” policies have no future consequences for him, and he cannot seek relief on behalf of others.
Disposition: claims barred by Heck are dismissed without prejudice; claims against judges and the district attorney are dismissed with prejudice based on absolute immunity.

Background

Davison is serving a 45-year sentence based on 2002 Tulsa County convictions for lewd molestation and sexual abuse of a minor. After the Supreme Court decided McGirt v. Oklahoma in 2020, he conducted genealogical research and asserted that he qualifies as “Indian” under the MCA, contending his offenses occurred on the reservation of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. He filed a state postconviction application in 2020 arguing the State lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed the denial in 2021.

Davison then sought Tenth Circuit authorization for a second or successive federal habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In a 2022 order, the court denied authorization, explaining that McGirt did not announce a new rule of constitutional law, and that Davison could have discovered the factual predicate (his claimed Indian status) earlier through due diligence.

In 2024, Davison filed this civil action against 21 defendants—state and federal judges, state officials (including the Governor, Attorney General, and a district attorney), the state corrections director, federal Interior/BIA officials, a mayor, and tribal leaders—alleging a policy of “purposeful miscategorization” of “African-Descendant Native Americans,” which purportedly deprived him of “privileges associated with the status of Indigenous people,” chiefly the right to federal prosecution under the MCA. He also alleged due process violations in the handling of his state postconviction proceedings and claimed an ex post facto violation by the OCCA’s application of a supposed “new procedural rule” during his appeal.

The district court screened and dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, holding: (1) Heck barred the claims because they directly challenged the validity of the conviction and sentence; and (2) absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity barred claims against the judges and the district attorney. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): A state prisoner cannot use § 1983 to recover damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated; the doctrine likewise bars § 1983 claims that, if successful, would necessarily imply invalidity.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005): Clarifies the line between habeas and § 1983; prisoners may not pursue § 1983 relief that would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of custody, whether directly or indirectly.
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020): Held that the Muscogee (Creek) reservation remains “Indian country,” affecting state criminal jurisdiction; used here as context for Davison’s MCA argument.
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a): Vests exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain major offenses committed by “Indians” in “Indian country.”
Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 915 (10th Cir. 2017): Addresses MCA jurisdiction; cited to frame the MCA’s effect in federal courts.
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007): Standard for reviewing dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (failure to state a claim) is de novo; dismissal proper when amendment would be futile.
Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. Pluralsight, Inc., 45 F.4th 1236 (10th Cir. 2022): Articulates the Rule 12(b)(6) standard—accepting well-pleaded allegations and drawing reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.
Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008): Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, but the court does not act as an advocate.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991): Judges enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken in their judicial capacity, subject to limited exceptions.
Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990): Prosecutors have absolute immunity for actions intimately associated with the judicial process, including initiating and pursuing prosecution.
K.A. v. Barnes, 134 F.4th 1067 (10th Cir. 2025): Standing requirement for prospective declaratory relief; absent an anticipated future injury, plaintiff lacks standing.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E): Appellate authorization decisions for second or successive habeas applications are non-appealable and may not be challenged via rehearing or certiorari; used here to underscore that § 1983 cannot circumvent this bar.
Screening statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A: Authorize sua sponte dismissal of complaints by indigent and incarcerated plaintiffs that fail to state a claim or are otherwise barred.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Heck bar applies. The most consequential part of the court’s reasoning is its straightforward application of Heck and Wilkinson. Despite Davison’s attempt to characterize his suit as a challenge to “procedures” and “categorization,” his allegations and requested relief made clear that he was attacking the validity and duration of his state custody. His theory was that, as an “Indian” within the MCA, he had a substantive entitlement to federal—not state—prosecution; he likewise anchored his claimed injury to being denied an opportunity to press that jurisdictional argument in state postconviction proceedings. The panel also noted he sought an “adjustment” of his sentence to comport with federal guidelines, which squarely signals a challenge to custody.

Under Wilkinson, a claim is not rescued from Heck by being framed as a due process or ex post facto challenge if success would “necessarily imply” the unlawfulness of custody. Here, a finding that defendants’ policies deprived Davison of the “privileges associated with the status of Indigenous people”—in context, federal criminal jurisdiction under the MCA—would necessarily call into question the lawfulness of his state conviction and sentence. As a result, any such relief lies exclusively in habeas corpus, not in § 1983 or Bivens. The appropriate disposition is dismissal without prejudice, preserving the possibility of refiling if the conviction is ever invalidated.

2) No collateral attack on successive-petition authorization. The panel added that, to the extent Davison’s arguments sought to undermine the Tenth Circuit’s 2022 denial of authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition, § 2244(b)(3)(E) erects a categorical bar: such authorization decisions are not appealable and cannot be the subject of a petition for rehearing or writ of certiorari. A civil rights suit cannot be used to do indirectly what the statute forbids directly.

3) Absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity remain dispositive as to those actors. The district court dismissed with prejudice as to judges and the district attorney. The appellate panel saw no error. Judicial immunity, as articulated in Mireles, covers acts taken in a judicial capacity, and prosecutorial immunity, as in Snell, covers charging decisions and courtroom advocacy. Davison offered no theory fitting within the narrow exceptions to judicial immunity (e.g., nonjudicial acts or actions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction) and did not identify non-advocative conduct by the district attorney that would fall outside absolute immunity.

4) “Prospective relief” requires standing grounded in an ongoing or imminent injury. Davison attempted to bypass immunity by styling his claims as “official-capacity” suits seeking prospective relief. The panel rejected this not by recasting the immunity doctrines, but by applying Article III standing: to obtain prospective declaratory or injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show a real and immediate threat of future injury. Citing K.A. v. Barnes, the court held that Davison faces no such future injury because he now knows—and asserted—his identity and status. The alleged “miscategorization” policies could not prospectively harm him, and he cannot litigate on behalf of others. Accordingly, even apart from immunity, he lacks standing to seek the forward-looking relief he requests.

5) Clarification of the district court’s scope of dismissal. The panel addressed Davison’s confusion about the breadth of the district court’s order, clarifying that: (a) all claims against judicial defendants and the district attorney were dismissed with prejudice based on absolute immunity; and (b) all remaining claims against other defendants were dismissed without prejudice under Heck.

Impact

This opinion reinforces several practical and doctrinal points likely to guide future litigation:

McGirt/MCA claims must travel through habeas when they would invalidate a state conviction. Creative pleading—whether couched as “misclassification,” procedural due process, or ex post facto violations—will not avoid Heck when the practical effect is to negate the state’s authority to convict or to shorten the sentence.
Heck applies regardless of the defendant’s identity. Whether the target is a state judge, a federal official, a tribal leader, or a state executive, § 1983/Bivens cannot deliver relief that necessarily implies custody is unlawful. The exclusivity of habeas in this domain is dispositive.
Attempts to litigate around successive-petition bars can backfire. Section 2244(b)(3)(E) erects a jurisdictional wall around appellate authorization decisions. Plaintiffs cannot use civil rights suits to indirectly contest those determinations.
Prospective relief is not a magic key past immunity. Even when plaintiffs invoke official-capacity framing and ask for forward-looking orders, they must show a non-speculative, ongoing or imminent injury. Where the policy alleged can no longer affect the plaintiff personally, standing fails.
Immunity defenses remain robust at screening. Judicial and prosecutorial immunities can be resolved sua sponte under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A when the complaint itself shows the acts were taken in judicial or prosecutorial roles.
Persuasive, not binding—but anchored in controlling Supreme Court doctrine. Although this order is nonprecedential, its application of Heck and Wilkinson tracks settled Supreme Court authority. Consequently, district courts in the Tenth Circuit are likely to follow its reasoning in similar McGirt-related § 1983 filings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Heck bar: You cannot use a civil rights suit to attack your conviction or sentence unless that conviction has already been overturned through appeal, postconviction relief, or habeas. If winning your civil case would imply your conviction is invalid, your case is barred and typically dismissed without prejudice.
Habeas vs. § 1983: Habeas corpus is the exclusive path to challenge the fact or duration of custody; § 1983 addresses unconstitutional policies or actions that do not necessarily call custody into question.
Major Crimes Act (MCA): A federal law giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute certain serious crimes committed by “Indians” in “Indian country.” If it applies, states generally lack criminal jurisdiction.
McGirt v. Oklahoma: The Supreme Court confirmed that certain reservations, including the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, remained “Indian country,” which can shift criminal jurisdiction from the state to the federal government under the MCA.
Successive habeas petitions: After one federal habeas petition, filing another requires appellate authorization under stringent standards; the appellate court’s authorization decision cannot be appealed or collaterally attacked (§ 2244(b)(3)(E)).
Judicial and prosecutorial immunity: Judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages for actions taken within their judicial/prosecutorial roles. Exceptions are narrow (e.g., nonjudicial acts or total absence of jurisdiction).
Prospective relief and standing: To get an injunction or declaratory judgment about future conduct, you must show a likely future injury to you. Past harm alone is insufficient.
Sua sponte screening: Courts must dismiss, at the outset, prisoner and in forma pauperis complaints that fail to state a claim or are barred by clear doctrines like Heck or absolute immunity.
With prejudice vs. without prejudice: “With prejudice” ends the claim for good (e.g., where immunity applies). “Without prejudice” allows refiling if circumstances change (e.g., if the conviction is later invalidated).

Conclusion

Davison v. Smith underscores three interlocking principles. First, as a matter of Supreme Court doctrine, prisoners may not use § 1983 or Bivens to mount McGirt-based or MCA jurisdictional challenges that would necessarily invalidate their convictions or alter their sentences; habeas remains the exclusive vehicle. Second, the procedural dressing of a claim—due process, ex post facto, or “categorization” grievances—does not alter that outcome when the relief sought would undermine the lawfulness of custody. Third, immunity doctrines and Article III standing remain powerful threshold hurdles: judges and prosecutors are shielded for core judicial and prosecutorial acts, and a plaintiff seeking prospective relief must show a real prospect of future injury.

While nonprecedential, this decision cleanly applies Heck and related principles to the post-McGirt litigation landscape. Its practical message is simple: jurisdictional challenges to state convictions based on Indian status and reservation boundaries must proceed, if at all, through established habeas channels, not through civil rights suits against judges, prosecutors, or public officials. Plaintiffs who cannot satisfy the demanding gatekeeping standards for successive habeas petitions cannot use § 1983 to reopen those doors indirectly.