Introduction

In State v. Manyhides, the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified the scope of probation home visits under Articles II, §§ 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. The Court held that probation officers’ entry into a probationer’s bedroom during a routine home visit—conducted pursuant to standard probation conditions—does not, by itself, transform the visit into a “search” requiring reasonable cause. Once contraband is observed in plain view during such a visit, officers may conduct a warrantless probation search supported by reasonable cause.

The case arose after probation officers, conducting a home visit, walked through the defendant’s apartment for officer-safety and compliance purposes and observed suspected drug paraphernalia on a bedroom nightstand. The defendant argued that entering “private areas” like a bedroom exceeded the permissible scope of a home visit and converted it into an unconstitutional search. The Court rejected that proposed rule as unsupported and unworkable, emphasizing longstanding precedent that a standard home visit is not a search and may include a walkthrough of the entire residence so long as officers do not rummage in closed spaces before reasonable cause arises.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, holding:

• A probation home visit conducted under express probation conditions is not a “search.”
• Probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy; once they are “unambiguously aware” of supervision conditions that authorize home visits, they lack a reasonable expectation of privacy that would bar such visits.
• During a home visit, officers may conduct a visual walkthrough of the premises for safety and compliance purposes, including entry into bedrooms, provided they do not open drawers, cabinets, closets, or otherwise rummage.
• When contraband is observed in plain view during the home visit, officers have reasonable cause to conduct a warrantless probation search of the residence or personal effects in the vicinity, as occurred with the defendant’s purse.
• The Court declined to adopt a proposed bright-line rule limiting home visits to “areas generally accessible to guests,” finding it inconsistent with existing precedent and impractical.

Factual and Procedural Background

In July 2020, Cissy Deen Manyhides was placed on probation following a guilty plea to Endangering the Welfare of a Child. Her standard conditions included (1) making her residence open and available for a home visit or for a search upon reasonable suspicion, and (2) abstaining from possessing or using illegal drugs.

In February 2022, Probation Officers Josh Green and Laura Jerome conducted a home visit. After two family members left at the defendant’s indication, the officers entered. Jerome spoke with Manyhides while Green conducted a walkthrough for officer safety and to visually inspect the premises. In the bedroom, Green saw a packet of small baggies associated with methamphetamine on a nightstand. Further visual observation revealed a plate beneath the nightstand containing more baggies, a scale, baking powder, and a hose extension used to smoke methamphetamine. Green then observed the defendant’s purse on the nightstand, emptied it, and found two baggies of a white crystalline substance. The officers detained the defendant and called the Great Falls Police Department, which conducted a more thorough search and found additional paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine.

The State charged Manyhides with felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. She moved to suppress, arguing the officers’ actions constituted an unlawful search. The district court denied the motion, concluding the activity was a home visit, not a search. Manyhides entered a guilty plea to the felony drug possession charge with a reservation of the suppression issue for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Montana’s constitutional framework: Articles II, §§ 10 and 11 — Montana guarantees both freedom from unreasonable searches (Section 11) and an express right of individual privacy (Section 10), providing broader protections than the federal counterpart (State v. Mefford, 2022 MT 185; State v. Staker, 2021 MT 151; State v. Peoples, 2022 MT 4). The Court acknowledges this backdrop while emphasizing probationers’ diminished privacy interests.
• Probationers’ diminished expectation of privacy — State v. Burchett, 277 Mont. 192 (1996), established that probationers have reduced privacy interests. This principle permits warrantless probation searches on “reasonable cause” to suspect a violation (Mefford; Peoples). The Court reiterates that reasonable cause is “substantially less than probable cause.”
• Home visits are not searches — State v. Moody, 2006 MT 305, is the cornerstone. Once a probationer is “unambiguously aware” of the home-visit condition, a standard home visit is not a search. Moody also set important limits: during a visit, officers may not open drawers, cabinets, closets, or rummage; they may conduct a visual inspection and observe for contraband.
• Recent confirmation and application — State v. Thompson, 2023 MT 194, held that officers lawfully present for a home visit who observe contraband in plain view gain reasonable cause to search areas like a dresser. Thompson underscores the two-step analysis applied here: (1) lawful home visit; (2) plain-view observation triggering reasonable cause for a search.
• Plain view doctrine and lawful vantage point — State v. Olson, 2002 MT 211, addressed seizure under the plain view exception where an officer exceeded a lawful vantage point by leaning through a doorway. The Court distinguishes Olson because the defendant there was not a probationer and because the officer’s vantage exceeded the lawful area; by contrast, probation conditions in Manyhides authorized the officers’ presence throughout the home for a visual walkthrough.
• Operational guidance — The Department of Corrections Operational Procedure PPD 6.3.201(IV)(C)(6) lists permissible purposes for home visits: visual inspection, officer safety assessment, observation of lifestyle factors, and observation for contraband; and reiterates no rummaging in closed spaces. The Court relied on this framework and noted the defense did not challenge it.
• Flexibility in supervision — State v. Conley, 2018 MT 83, supports a “degree of flexibility” for probation officers in supervising probationers, consistent with Burchett’s recognition that officers are best positioned to calibrate supervision for rehabilitation and public safety.
• Standards of review and briefing obligations — The Court applied clear-error review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions (Conley; State v. Summers, 2025 MT 109). It also declined to develop unsupported arguments for a party (State v. Cybulski, 2009 MT 70).
• Additional reaffirmations — State v. Fischer, 2014 MT 112, and State v. Greeson, 2007 MT 23, both apply Moody’s core principle that home visits are not searches.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a structured sequence:

1. Is there a “search” at all? A search occurs when government action intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. Because the defendant agreed—by signing probation conditions—to make her residence open for home visits, she did not retain an expectation of privacy that would preclude a visit. Under Moody, a home visit conducted pursuant to expressed conditions is not a search.
2. Scope of a home visit The visit must remain within the parameters recognized in Moody and the DOC manual: a visual inspection for officer safety, compliance, lifestyle factors, and observable contraband, without opening drawers, closets, cabinets, or rummaging through belongings. The Court held that a safety walkthrough that includes entering bedrooms is within those parameters; bedrooms are not categorically off-limits during a home visit.
3. Plain view and reasonable cause While lawfully present in the bedroom, Officer Green observed drug paraphernalia in plain view on the nightstand and below it. The defendant conceded that these observations provided reasonable cause to search her purse and the nightstand area. Thus, the subsequent search of the purse was lawful as a probation search supported by reasonable cause.
4. Rejection of a “private areas” exception The defendant proposed a new rule limiting home visits to areas generally accessible to guests. The Court declined, noting:
   • It conflicts with Moody and later applications like Thompson, Fischer, and Greeson.
   • It is unsupported by any cited legal authority; the Court will not craft arguments for parties.
   • It is unworkable, inviting confusion and litigation over what constitutes a “private area,” and undermines necessary officer discretion for safety and supervision goals recognized in Conley and Burchett.
5. Distinguishing Olson Olson turned on an officer exceeding a lawful vantage point in a non-probation context. Here, by contrast, lawful presence throughout the residence flowed from the probation conditions; therefore, the plain-view observation was from a lawful vantage.

Impact and Practical Implications

The decision does not announce a new rule so much as it solidifies Montana’s existing framework and clarifies its application to “private rooms.”

• For probationers: By agreeing to standard conditions, probationers should expect officers may visually inspect the entire residence—including bedrooms—during a home visit. Any contraband visible in plain view anywhere in the home can immediately supply reasonable cause for a more intrusive probation search. Keeping closed containers closed does not shield them from search once reasonable cause arises.
• For probation officers and agencies: The opinion validates safety walkthroughs encompassing all rooms. Adherence to the DOC procedure is critical: do not open drawers, closets, or containers and do not rummage before reasonable cause is established. Clearly articulate safety and compliance purposes for the walkthrough, and document plain-view observations that support subsequent searches.
• For prosecutors: Ensure the record shows the defendant’s signed acknowledgment of supervision conditions, that officers stayed within the visual-inspection limits until plain-view contraband was observed, and that any subsequent search was grounded in reasonable cause.
• For defense counsel: Viable suppression arguments will focus on whether officers exceeded a visual inspection before reasonable cause (e.g., opening closed containers, closets, or drawers), whether the “plain view” was truly from a lawful vantage point, and whether the defendant was “unambiguously aware” of the home-visit condition. Challenges to the DOC manual’s scope would need to be squarely raised and supported.
• Doctrinal stability: The Court’s adherence to Moody and Thompson promotes predictability: home visits are not searches; once contraband is observed in plain view from a lawful vantage during the visit, reasonable cause exists to search. The Court’s refusal to adopt a “guest-accessible areas” limitation averts a patchwork of ad hoc definitions and preserves supervisory flexibility.
• Montana’s protective baseline remains intact: The opinion operates within the broader privacy protections of the Montana Constitution, yet reiterates that probationers’ privacy is diminished and supervised by a reasonable-cause standard that remains less demanding than probable cause.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Search vs. home visit: A “search” triggers constitutional scrutiny and generally requires a warrant or an exception. A “home visit,” when authorized by probation conditions, is not a search. It allows officers to visually inspect the residence for safety and compliance without opening closed spaces or rummaging.
• Reasonable expectation of privacy: Normally, people have strong privacy rights in their homes. Probationers, however, have a diminished expectation of privacy due to supervision conditions they accepted, including home-visit provisions.
• Reasonable cause: In Montana probation law, “reasonable cause” is a lower standard than probable cause. It is akin to a sufficiently specific, articulable basis to suspect a probation violation, allowing a warrantless probation search.
• Plain view doctrine: Officers may seize or act upon evidence they see from a lawful vantage point without a warrant. In a home-visit context, the vantage is lawful if the officer is within the scope of a permitted visual inspection under the probation conditions.
• Scope limits during a home visit: Officers may enter rooms and look around, but may not open drawers, closets, cabinets, or containers, and may not rummage. These actions require reasonable cause (which may be triggered by plain-view observations).
• “Unambiguously aware” condition: If probationers clearly acknowledge and accept home-visit conditions, they cannot later claim a reasonable expectation of privacy that would preclude the visit.

Conclusion

State v. Manyhides reinforces Montana’s established approach to probation supervision: a standard home visit, conducted under clear probation conditions, is not a search—even when it includes a safety walkthrough of private rooms like bedrooms. The opinion confirms practical limits derived from Moody and the DOC manual: officers may not rummage or open closed spaces during a home visit, but they may lawfully observe and respond to contraband in plain view. Once contraband is observed, reasonable cause justifies a more intrusive probation search.

By rejecting a new, guest-accessibility-based limitation as unsupported and unworkable, the Court preserves a workable balance between a probationer’s reduced privacy interests and the supervisory needs of public safety and rehabilitation. The decision offers clear operational guidance for officers, stability for courts and litigants, and a reminder that, under Montana’s constitutionally protective framework, the special status of probationers nonetheless permits robust—but cabined—home supervision.