No “Indirect Cleansing” of Discriminatory Statutes: Fourth Circuit Invalidates North Carolina’s Felony‑Voting Crime and Clarifies Mootness After Prospective Amendments

Introduction

In A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court ruling striking down North Carolina’s long‑standing criminal prohibition on voting by individuals with felony convictions whose rights had not been restored. The court held that the pre‑2024 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163‑275(5)—a statute first enacted in 1877 and reenacted in 1899—violates the Equal Protection Clause because it was enacted with racially discriminatory intent and continues to have a disparate racial impact. The court also rejected the State’s argument that a 2023 amendment adding a scienter element (effective January 1, 2024) mooted the case, emphasizing that prosecutions for pre‑2024 conduct remain possible and that an injunction affords effectual relief by preventing ongoing chill and confusion among voters.

Plaintiffs, the North Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute and Action NC (collectively, the Institute), sued the State Board of Elections, its members and executive director, and every elected district attorney in North Carolina (collectively, the Board). They challenged the 2019 version of § 163‑275(5) (the “Challenged Statute”), which made it a Class I felony for any person convicted of a disqualifying crime to vote “without having been restored to the right of citizenship,” without requiring knowledge that one was ineligible. While the case was pending, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 747, adding a knowledge requirement (the “Amended Statute”) prospectively as of January 1, 2024. The central issues on appeal were: (1) mootness—whether the prospective amendment extinguished the controversy over the prior law; and (2) equal protection—whether the unrevised, century‑old criminal statute could stand in light of its proven racist origins and present disparate impact.

Summary of the Opinion

Mootness: The case is not moot. Although the statute was amended prospectively, prosecutions for pre‑2024 conduct remain possible. Enjoining enforcement of the pre‑2024 law provides effectual relief by preventing continued prosecutions and by reducing voter confusion and chill, which the record shows burden the plaintiffs’ mission and resources.
Equal Protection: The 1877 enactment and 1899 reenactment of the felony‑voting crime were motivated by racial animus, and the statute continues to bear more heavily on Black North Carolinians. The State’s “indirect cleansing” theory—that later, separate changes to the state constitution’s felon‑disenfranchisement provision purged the earlier statute’s taint—fails. Under Arlington Heights and Abbott v. Perez, the presumption of good faith applies to new enactments of the challenged law; here, there has been no substantive reenactment or amendment of the criminal statute itself since 1899. The statute therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Disposition: The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs and the injunction against enforcing the pre‑2024 statute. The court declined to reach the district court’s independent Due Process holding.

Factual and Legal Background

The opinion traces North Carolina’s Reconstruction‑era expansion of the franchise in 1868, followed by a backlash culminating in the 1875 constitutional amendments and an 1877 law criminalizing voting by people with felony convictions whose rights were not restored. The 1899 General Assembly reenacted the crime. In 1931, the law’s phrasing was streamlined and extended to primaries. The core prohibition then remained essentially unchanged for nearly a century. The record showed that prosecutions under the law disproportionately impacted Black North Carolinians, with some district attorneys requiring proof of knowledge while others did not. In 2023, the General Assembly added a “knowing” requirement effective January 1, 2024, but did not make the change retroactive.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Arlington Heights framework (Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252): The court applied the familiar two‑step test. Step one asks whether discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor considering historical background, legislative history, sequence of events, departures from normal procedure, and impact. Step two shifts the burden to the State to prove the law would have been enacted absent discriminatory purpose.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630: Confirm that facially neutral laws with disparate impact can violate equal protection if motivated by discriminatory purpose.
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222: Provides the controlling principle that facially neutral disenfranchisement provisions motivated by racial animus and with continuing disparate impact violate equal protection, a template closely fitting this case.
Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, and N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295: Establish the presumption of legislative good faith for later legislatures and caution against treating past discrimination as an “original sin” that automatically condemns subsequent enactments. Crucially, those cases involve new legislative action on the challenged policy. The Fourth Circuit explains that the presumption attaches to a new enactment of the law at issue, not to tangential or “indirect” changes to other legal provisions.
United States v. Sanchez‑Garcia, 98 F.4th 90 (4th Cir. 2024): The court’s own recent application of Abbott. There, a later Congress enacted a new statutory scheme with substantial revisions; thus, the earlier discriminatory predecessor did not control the analysis. The decision underscores that only a direct reenactment of the challenged law earns the presumption of good faith.
Mootness line: Knox v. SEIU, 567 U.S. 298; Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165; Ketter, 908 F.3d 61; Grimm v. Gloucester County Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586; West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697: Together, these decisions guide the “effectual relief” standard and distinguish mootness from standing. The bar to maintain a concrete interest is low; a case is moot only if it is impossible to grant any effectual relief.
City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278: The State invoked City News to argue that plaintiffs’ fears were speculative. The Fourth Circuit distinguished that argument, relying on the record and the State’s own acknowledgments about potential prosecutions.
N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204: Cited for the standard of review and the treatment of discriminatory intent findings as factual determinations reviewed for clear error.

Legal Reasoning

1) Mootness: Prospective Amendments Do Not Extinguish Past Harms or Ongoing Relief

The Board argued that adding a scienter element in 2023 mooted the case because future prosecutions would proceed only under the Amended Statute. The court rejected that position for three interrelated reasons:

Effectual relief remains available: The Board acknowledged that prosecutions for pre‑2024 conduct under the prior law “may continue.” Enjoining such prosecutions is concrete, effectual relief that directly benefits the plaintiffs and the communities they serve.
Record evidence of chilling effects and resource diversion: The court credited extensive, unrebutted evidence that prosecutions under the pre‑2024 statute have deterred eligible voters—particularly in low‑income and minority communities—from registering and voting, and have forced the plaintiff organizations to divert resources to education and reassurance. The court also found it plausible that voters would be confused by simultaneous references to both the old and amended laws.
Low threshold for live controversy: Relying on Knox, Chafin, Grimm, and Ketter, the court emphasized that a case remains live so long as any effectual relief is available. The possibility of ongoing prosecutions and documented chill more than sufficed.

In short, the amendment’s prospective-only language did not moot the challenge to the pre‑2024 statute or the plaintiffs’ request for forward-looking relief against its enforcement for past acts.

2) Equal Protection: No “Indirect Cleansing”; the 1899 Criminal Statute Remains Tainted

Turning to the merits, the court applied Arlington Heights. The Board made two concessions that largely resolved step one: the 1877 enactment and 1899 reenactment were “indefensible,” and the statute has a disparate racial impact today. The State’s defense hinged on its “indirect cleansing theory,” which posited that the 1971 state constitution’s expansion of felon disenfranchisement and a 1973 statutory update created a “legally significant historical break” that purged the earlier discriminatory intent of § 163‑275(5).

The Fourth Circuit rejected that theory for doctrinal and factual reasons:

Abbott’s presumption attaches to new enactments of the challenged law: Abbott and Sanchez‑Garcia do not authorize courts to presume good faith for an unchanged statute merely because a later legislature altered separate, related provisions (here, the state constitution’s disenfranchisement clause). Past discrimination can become “historical background” only when a later legislature actually reenacts or substantively amends the same challenged law.
No reenactment or substantive amendment since 1899: The criminal statute at issue remained “virtually unchanged” despite the 1971 constitutional overhaul and a 1973 update to other election provisions. Nothing in the 1971–73 record suggests that the General Assembly considered, revisited, or repudiated the discriminatory criminal provision. Because there was “no subsequent, potentially lawful government action” re‑enacting § 163‑275(5), the 1899 discriminatory intent is not confined to background—it remains operative.
Continuing disparate impact: The court emphasized ongoing disproportionate prosecutions of Black North Carolinians, both relative to the general population and to the formerly incarcerated population—further satisfying the Arlington Heights inquiry.

Having found that discriminatory purpose motivated the law’s enactment and that the Board’s “indirect cleansing” defense failed, the court concluded the statute violates equal protection and affirmed the injunction without reaching Due Process.

Impact

Immediate effect in North Carolina: Enforcement of the pre‑2024 version of § 163‑275(5) is enjoined. District attorneys cannot prosecute individuals for pre‑2024 voting under that statute. Election officials should promptly update guidance to reflect that prosecutions under the invalidated version are barred.
Blueprint for “mootness after amendment” disputes: The decision clarifies that prospective statutory amendments do not moot challenges to prior versions where prosecutions for past acts remain possible and where injunctive relief will mitigate ongoing chill, confusion, or organizational resource diversion.
Limits of Abbott’s “presumption of good faith”: The opinion draws a bright doctrinal line: Abbott’s presumption applies when the challenged law itself is reenacted or substantively amended by a later legislature. Indirect or collateral legal changes—even constitutional amendments that broaden the class of disenfranchised people—do not “cleanse” the discriminatory intent of a separate, untouched criminal statute.
Guidance for legislatures seeking to cure tainted laws: To purge discriminatory taint, a legislature must directly reenact or substantively amend the challenged statute with a clean record and nonracial justifications. Updating related provisions elsewhere (e.g., a constitution’s disenfranchisement clause) is insufficient.
Broader voting rights implications: States with century‑old felony‑voting crimes should reassess their provenance and enforcement. This decision may encourage similar challenges where a law’s racist origins and present‑day disparate impact can be proven, particularly in jurisdictions within the Fourth Circuit (NC, SC, VA, MD, WV).
Criminal law and intent standards: While the Fourth Circuit did not pass on the constitutionality of the post‑2024 “knowing” version, its mootness analysis recognizes the real‑world effect of late‑added scienter requirements and the continuing need to remedy the legacy of older, intent‑less regimes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness vs. standing: Standing asks whether plaintiffs had an injury when they filed suit. Mootness asks whether, because of events occurring after filing (like a statutory amendment), there remains a live dispute. A case is moot only if no court can grant any effectual relief. Here, relief remained available because prosecutions for past conduct were still possible and an injunction could prevent chill and confusion.
Scienter: A scienter requirement means the State must prove the defendant acted with a particular state of mind—here, “knowing” that their right of citizenship had not been restored. The pre‑2024 statute lacked any scienter; some prosecutors nonetheless required knowledge in practice, while others did not.
Arlington Heights test: Courts assess discriminatory purpose by looking at a law’s history, sequence of enactment, departures from normal procedure, legislative history, and whether the law bears more heavily on one race. If plaintiffs show race was a substantial or motivating factor, the government must prove it would have enacted the law even absent that purpose.
“Presumption of legislative good faith” (Abbott): Later legislatures are generally presumed to act in good faith. But that presumption attaches to their enactments of the challenged law. It does not sanitize a centuries‑old statute that has never been reenacted or substantively amended.
“Indirect cleansing” (rejected here): The idea that separate, later legal changes—like a constitutional amendment affecting who is disenfranchised—can “cleanse” the discriminatory intent of a different, unchanged criminal statute. The Fourth Circuit firmly rejected this theory.
Felon disenfranchisement vs. criminalization of voting: Disenfranchisement determines who may lawfully vote. The challenged law went further by criminalizing the act of voting while disenfranchised. Changes to the disenfranchisement rule did not constitute changes to the criminal law itself.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion accomplishes two significant things. First, it clarifies the jurisdictional landscape: a prospective statutory amendment does not moot challenges to an older law where prosecutions for past conduct remain possible and where injunctive relief will reduce confusion and chill. Second, and more consequentially for equal protection jurisprudence, the court delineates the boundaries of Abbott’s presumption of good faith and rejects “indirect cleansing.” A later legislature’s collateral legal changes do not purge the discriminatory taint of an unchanged, racially motivated statute. To “cleanse” a law, a legislature must directly reenact or substantively amend the specific statute under challenge—and then defend that action under Arlington Heights on its own terms.

By affirming the invalidation of North Carolina’s pre‑2024 felony‑voting crime, the court not only remedies a law with racist origins and ongoing disparate impact, but also provides a roadmap for courts and legislatures confronting similar historical relics. The decision underscores that the Constitution demands more than cosmetic updates to adjacent legal frameworks; it requires a clear, intentional break from discriminatory enactments when they continue to inflict present-day harms.

Case Information

Case: A. Philip Randolph Institute v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, No. 24‑1512 (4th Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (published)
Panel: Judges Wynn, Harris, and Benjamin (opinion by Judge Benjamin)
Disposition: Affirmed; Equal Protection violation; not moot; Due Process not addressed