No “Illegal Sentence” Escape Hatch for Case-Specific ACCA Errors: Fourth Circuit Enforces Broad Appeal Waiver in United States v. Lubkin

Introduction

In a published opinion authored by Judge Wilkinson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal of Stanley Ray Lubkin, who challenged his Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) sentence notwithstanding a broad, explicit appeal waiver in his plea agreement. The court held that a defendant’s allegation that the district court erred in applying ACCA does not render the sentence “illegal” for purposes of bypassing an otherwise valid appellate waiver. The decision clarifies the scope of the so-called “illegal sentence” exception recognized in United States v. Marin and limits the reach of United States v. Cornette to cases involving unconstitutional sentencing provisions, not case-specific application errors.

The case arises from a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In exchange for significant concessions, including dismissal of a carjacking count and a § 924(c) charge that carried a consecutive 10-year mandatory minimum, Lubkin agreed to a plea deal containing a sweeping waiver of appellate and collateral rights (with narrow exceptions). After sentencing him to the ACCA mandatory minimum of 15 years, the district court’s judgment was appealed. The Fourth Circuit enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal, declining to reach the merits of whether three South Carolina methamphetamine manufacturing convictions qualified as ACCA predicates.

Summary of the Opinion

The appeal waiver is valid: The plea agreement clearly waived the right to appeal both conviction and sentence, the district court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, and Lubkin repeatedly affirmed his understanding of the waiver and potential ACCA exposure.
The appeal falls within the waiver’s scope: The waiver covered “any direct appeal” of the sentence, subject to three narrow exceptions (ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, and future changes in law affecting the sentence). None applied.
No “illegal sentence” exception: The Marin exception for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum does not apply where the sentencing provision itself (here, ACCA) is valid and authorizes the imposed sentence. Cornette’s allowance for bypassing waivers involved a universally invalid residual clause (post-Johnson) and does not extend to alleged, case-specific misapplications.
Policy and contract principles: Enforcing the waiver preserves the parties’ bargain, conserves judicial resources, and promotes the finality and economy of plea agreements. Defendants can either refuse to waive or negotiate targeted carve-outs if they wish to preserve appellate rights on specific issues such as ACCA applicability.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed without reaching the merits of whether South Carolina methamphetamine convictions are ACCA “serious drug offenses.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

The court’s reasoning draws on a well-developed line of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court authorities concerning the enforceability of appeal waivers and the narrow circumstances in which such waivers do not bar review:

United States v. Blick (4th Cir. 2005): Establishes the two-part inquiry—(1) validity of the waiver and (2) whether the issue falls within its scope—and emphasizes that defendants must keep their side of the bargain.
United States v. Thornsbury (4th Cir. 2012): Confirms appellate waivers in valid plea agreements are enforceable and reviewed de novo, and that the defendant assumes the risk of unforeseen legal errors.
United States v. Manigan (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. General (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Adams (4th Cir. 2016): Clarify that a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy typically establishes a knowing and intelligent waiver under the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Boutcher (4th Cir. 2021): Directs courts to construe the plain language of the waiver to determine scope.
United States v. Marin (4th Cir. 1992): Recognizes narrow exceptions to enforceability, including where a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, is based on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such as race), or where proceedings violate the Sixth Amendment.
United States v. Attar (4th Cir. 1994): Confirms a Sixth Amendment violation can overcome a waiver.
United States v. Taylor-Sanders (4th Cir. 2023): Distinguishes between “illegal sentences” and claims of mere “legal error,” reinforcing that the latter do not circumvent valid waivers.
United States v. Cornette (4th Cir. 2019): Permits bypassing a waiver where the sentencing provision itself is unconstitutional (the ACCA residual clause after Johnson v. United States), meaning the court had no authority to impose the sentence at all. The Fourth Circuit confines Cornette to that unique context.
United States v. Wiggins (4th Cir. 1990): Notes that even fundamental constitutional rights are waivable; a fortiori, the statutory right of appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 is waivable.
United States v. Brown (4th Cir. 2000): A defendant who wishes to preserve appellate review may refuse to waive the right to appeal.
United States v. Edgell (4th Cir. 2019): Describes plea agreements in contract terms, requiring that each party receive the benefit of its bargain.
United States v. Anderson (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished): An example where the court refused to disregard an appeal waiver to reach guideline issues.
United States v. Worthen (7th Cir. 2016): Cited persuasively to explain why letting defendants always litigate merits despite waivers would render waivers meaningless.
BLACKLEDGE v. ALLISON (U.S. 1977): Supports the systemic virtues of plea bargaining—speed, economy, and finality.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in three steps: validity of the waiver, the scope of the waiver, and the inapplicability of the Marin/Cornette exception to this case.

Validity: The waiver was clear and comprehensive, expressly relinquishing the right to appeal the “conviction or the sentence in any direct appeal or other postconviction action,” with specified exceptions. During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court confirmed Lubkin’s competency, his education level, his understanding of the charges and potential penalties—including the possibility of an ACCA enhancement, with a 15-year mandatory minimum and life maximum—and his repeated acknowledgment that he understood and accepted the appellate waiver. Under the totality of circumstances, the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Scope: The issue on appeal—challenging the ACCA designation and the corresponding 15-year sentence—falls squarely within the waiver’s broad language covering “any direct appeal” of the sentence. The three textual exceptions (ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, future change in law affecting the sentence) do not apply. Nor are the non-textual, narrow Marin exceptions (race-based sentencing, Sixth Amendment violation, miscarriage of justice involving actual innocence) implicated.
No “Illegal Sentence” Exception: The crux of Lubkin’s argument is that an alleged ACCA misclassification makes his 15-year sentence “illegal” because, absent ACCA, the unenhanced § 922(g) maximum would have been 10 years for a 2018 offense. The court rejects this as a misreading of Marin and Cornette:
- Marin’s “illegal sentence” exception applies when a court imposes a sentence “in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute.” Here, ACCA itself authorized a 15-year-to-life range, and the district court imposed the minimum 15 years. On its face, the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.
- Cornette is limited to cases where the sentencing provision itself is unconstitutional (Johnson invalidated ACCA’s residual clause). In that scenario, the court lacks authority to impose the sentence at all, rendering any such sentence “illegal.” By contrast, Lubkin challenges a case-specific application of a concededly valid ACCA provision (serious drug offense predicates). That is, at most, a claim of legal error—not an illegal sentence.
- Taylor-Sanders confirms that “legal error” does not equate to an “illegal sentence” for waiver purposes. Adopting Lubkin’s approach would nullify appeal waivers, since any defendant could recast a guideline or enhancement dispute as an “illegal sentence” to force merits review.

Impact

The decision has important, immediate consequences for plea practice, ACCA litigation, and appellate case-management in the Fourth Circuit.

Plea bargaining and appellate practice: Defendants who wish to preserve the right to challenge an ACCA enhancement must refuse a broad appellate waiver or negotiate a targeted carve-out. Courts will enforce clear waivers and will expect defendants to live with the risk of legal error inherent in bargain-based dispositions.
ACCA challenges under waivers: Case-specific disputes about predicate offenses—such as categorical mismatches between state and federal drug definitions—will ordinarily be barred by valid appellate waivers. The merits will not be reached unless a recognized exception applies or there is a qualifying future change in law that “affects the sentence” and fits within the plea’s textual exception.
Johnson/Cornette limited to unconstitutional provisions: The pathway opened by Johnson and Cornette remains available where a sentencing provision is unconstitutional and thus incapable of authorizing any sentence. But Cornette does not permit bypassing waivers for ordinary disputes over how valid statutes apply to a given record.
Government motions to dismiss: The court signals that when a waiver clearly forecloses an appeal, the government should move to dismiss rather than brief the merits. Expect more early motions to dismiss and fewer full merits briefs in waiver-bound cases.
District court colloquies: The opinion reinforces best practices for Rule 11 colloquies—explicitly reading appeal waivers, confirming the defendant’s understanding multiple times, and ensuring the defendant is on notice of potential enhancements (like ACCA). Thorough colloquies will be decisive in upholding waivers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Appeal waiver: A defendant may, as part of a plea agreement, waive the right to appeal the conviction and/or sentence. The waiver is enforceable if the defendant enters it knowingly and intelligently, as established through a clear written waiver and a careful Rule 11 colloquy. The waiver can include limited, negotiated exceptions.
ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)): Enhances penalties for § 922(g) offenses when the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense,” imposing a mandatory minimum of 15 years and up to life imprisonment. Whether a prior state offense qualifies often turns on a categorical analysis comparing statutory elements to federal definitions.
“Illegal sentence” vs. “legal error”: An “illegal sentence” is one the court had no authority to impose (e.g., above the statutory maximum or based on an unconstitutional provision). A “legal error” is a mistake in applying a valid law to the case (e.g., misclassifying a prior offense). Appeal waivers generally bar review of legal errors but not truly illegal sentences.
The Marin exception: Allows an appeal despite a waiver if, for example, the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, rests on a constitutionally impermissible factor (like race), or arises from a Sixth Amendment violation. It does not permit appellate review for every alleged misapplication of sentencing law.
Cornette’s narrow reach after Johnson: When the Supreme Court declares a sentencing provision unconstitutional (as with ACCA’s residual clause in Johnson), any sentence relying on that clause is unauthorized and “illegal,” permitting review despite waivers. Cornette does not extend to alleged errors under valid statutory provisions.
Statutory maximums and timing: For offenses committed before June 2022, a felon-in-possession (§ 922(g)) conviction carried a 10-year maximum under § 924(a)(2), absent ACCA. Congress later raised that maximum to 15 years (now § 924(a)(8)) for offenses after June 2022. Here, because the offense occurred in 2018, the pre-amendment maximum would have been 10 years if ACCA did not apply—but once ACCA applied, the controlling range was 15 years to life.
Rule 11 colloquy: A mandatory procedure where the district court ensures that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Courts inquire about the defendant’s competency, understanding of rights, the nature of the charge, the consequences of the plea (including enhancements and maximum penalties), and any waivers.

Conclusion

United States v. Lubkin cements a critical boundary in appellate waiver doctrine in the Fourth Circuit: a defendant’s challenge to a case-specific ACCA designation is a claim of legal error, not an “illegal sentence,” and therefore remains within the scope of a valid appeal waiver. The court faithfully applies Marin, cabins Cornette to its unique constitutional context, and reinforces that the integrity of plea bargaining depends on holding parties to their promises. The opinion’s practical message is equally clear—if a defendant wants to preserve appellate review of ACCA eligibility (or any enhancement), that right must be protected at the negotiating table, not sought after the fact through exceptions that do not fit.