Introduction

In State v. Reed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed convictions for aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and sexual assault based on conduct occurring when the complainant was a minor and the defendant, decades her senior, had assumed the roles of “father figure” and religious leader in her life. The decision clarifies the scope of “position of authority” under RSA 632-A:2, I(k) (2007), rejecting the argument that only “formal” or “official” positions qualify. The Court held that social or relational roles—such as a father figure or religious leader—can constitute a “position of authority,” and that the victim’s subjective perceptions of that authority are relevant to the inquiry.

The Court also rejected a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, concluding that the State presented overwhelming evidence that the defendant used his father-figure authority to coerce the victim’s submission, and deemed any potential errors related to an uncharged sexual act (“Manchester conduct”) and the religious-leader theory harmless given the strength of the case grounded in the father-figure role.

Reed thus establishes an important precedent on the meaning of “position of authority” and reaffirms that coercion under RSA 632-A:2, I(k) may be subtle and exerted through relational power—without physical force or overt threats.

Summary of the Opinion

The defendant challenged his AFSA convictions on three principal grounds:

• That “father figure” and “religious leader” cannot qualify as positions of authority under RSA 632-A:2, I(k) because they are not formal or official positions;
• That the evidence was insufficient to prove he was in a position of authority over the victim and used that authority to coerce her submission; and
• That the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about an uncharged sexual act (the “Manchester conduct”).

The Supreme Court rejected the first argument, holding that the statute does not require “formal or official” authority and that social/relational roles can qualify. It affirmed on sufficiency, finding ample evidence that the defendant assumed a father-figure role imbued with controlling authority and used that authority to coerce sexual activity. On the evidentiary challenge, the Court did not decide whether the uncharged act was properly admitted or whether the religious-leader theory was independently sufficient; it held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of guilt predicated on the father-figure role was overwhelming and the Manchester testimony was a small part of a lengthy trial record.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• RSA 632-A:2, I(k) (2007): Defines AFSA where, for victims aged 13–17, the actor is in a “position of authority” and uses that authority to coerce submission. The Court interprets the 2007 version applicable to the charged time period.
• RSA 21:2 and RSA 625:3: Statutory interpretation anchors. Words are construed in accordance with common usage (RSA 21:2), and the Criminal Code is construed by the fair import of terms to promote justice (RSA 625:3).
• L.C. v. W.C., 174 N.H. 355 (2021): Reiterates de novo review of statutory interpretation and the plain meaning rule—courts do not add words the legislature did not include.
• State v. Dunbar, 2025 N.H. 26: Cited for the method of turning to dictionaries to ascertain plain meaning; here, the Court uses the Oxford English Dictionary to define “position.”
• State v. Fortier, 146 N.H. 784 (2001): Found that a priest was in a position of authority over victims; defined “authority” as “the power to require and receive submission… the right to expect obedience… superiority derived from a status… to command and give final decisions.” Fortier also endorses considering the victim’s subjective beliefs when assessing authority and explains that coercion can be subtle and arise from the authority relationship itself.
• State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209 (1991): Recognized “head of household” as a qualifying position of authority. Reed emphasizes that nothing in Chase imposes a cohabitation requirement or “formal authority” prerequisite.
• State v. Hodges, 176 N.H. 751 (2024), 2024 N.H. 44: Articulates the de novo sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard—whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the State.
• State v. Rouleau, 176 N.H. 400 (2024), 2024 N.H. 2: Sets out the harmless-error standard and multi-factor analysis, requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any error did not affect the verdict.
• Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993): Cited for declining to discuss remaining arguments that do not warrant further treatment.

Legal Reasoning

1) Interpreting “Position of Authority” — No “Formal or Official” Requirement

The defense urged a narrow construction: that only formal, official, or legally recognized roles (e.g., teacher, coach with formal supervisory power) can be a “position of authority.” The Court began with the text and noted the absence of any “formal” requirement in RSA 632-A:2, I(k). It declined to “add words” to the statute (L.C. v. W.C.), turned to common usage under RSA 21:2, and adopted the Oxford English Dictionary sense of “position” as relational status or standing—“especially social position.”

This linguistic analysis carries significant doctrinal weight: it anchors “position” in social reality, not limited to official titles. From there, the Court reaffirmed Fortier’s definition of “authority” and emphasized that both objective circumstances and the victim’s subjective beliefs may be relevant to whether an actor possessed and exercised authority over the victim. In Fortier, the Court had considered the victims’ spiritual perceptions of the priest’s authority. Reed extends that approach: a father-figure role can be a social “position” that confers “authority” as defined in Fortier.

The Court also revisited Chase, which recognized “head of household” as a qualifying position without any indication of legal or formal power beyond domestic control. Reed underscores that cohabitation is not a prerequisite for a non-relative adult to assume a qualifying position of authority, and nothing in Chase imposes a “formal authority” threshold.

Holding: A “position of authority” under RSA 632-A:2, I(k) is not limited to formal/official roles. Social and relational roles—like “father figure” and religious leader—can qualify.

2) Sufficiency of the Evidence — Proving Authority and Coercion

Applying the Hodges standard, the Court canvassed substantial record evidence that the defendant assumed a father-figure role imbued with authority that he then used to coerce the victim’s submission:

• Relationship built from age nine; the victim’s biological father was distant; defendant was 45 years older.
• The victim repeatedly referred to the defendant as “dad,” “daddy,” and “surrogate dad,” while he called her his “daughter.” They shared a father–daughter dance at her wedding.
• She sought his advice, relied on his guidance, and at times “did not feel in a position to question an adult.” She was baptized into his church “without her mother’s knowledge” based on his direction.
• Family members perceived the defendant’s pervasive control: the mother testified everything he said “became gospel” to the victim; the sister testified the victim did not make decisions without his approval.
• He used that role to gain unsupervised access and normalize physical contact (e.g., massages, hugging, sitting on his lap), which she tolerated out of obedience and a desire for paternal affection.
• When sexual activity began, she believed such conduct was “normal between a father and a daughter,” and she refrained from disclosure for fear of “ruin[ing] his life” and “los[ing] him as a father.”

The Court tied this evidence to Fortier’s articulation of coercion: coercion may consist of subtle pressure arising from a position of authority, not necessarily overt force or threats. The defendant “employ[ed] a tactic of manipulation,” and the authority-relational context “makes it nearly impossible to divorce” his position from the sexual conduct. On this record, a rational jury could find the authority and its use to coerce submission beyond a reasonable doubt.

3) Evidentiary Challenge and Harmless Error

The defendant challenged admission of testimony concerning an uncharged sexual act (the Manchester conduct), asserting irrelevance, unfair prejudice, and that it was “another wrongful act.” Although the trial court had allowed it as “inextricably intertwined,” the Supreme Court did not decide whether admission was error. Instead, applying Rouleau’s harmless-error framework, it held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:

• The State’s case based on the father-figure theory was “overwhelming.”
• The Manchester testimony was brief within a 12-day trial featuring 21 witnesses and several days of the victim’s testimony. Its role was inconsequential relative to the State’s overall proof.

Likewise, the Court did not resolve whether the evidence independently sufficed to support a “religious leader” theory. It held that even if that theory failed, any error would be harmless given the strength of the father-figure theory.

Impact and Implications

A. Doctrinal Clarification of “Position of Authority”

Reed is a definitive repudiation of any perceived “formal authority” requirement under RSA 632-A:2, I(k). By rooting “position” in social and relational status, the Court broadens the statute’s reach to encompass dynamics often exploited in child sexual abuse cases:

• Non-familial father figures, mentors, faith leaders, and other adults with significant relational influence are within the statute’s ambit.
• The victim’s subjective belief in the actor’s authority is relevant evidence, alongside objective circumstances, to prove both the existence and the use of authority.

This aligns with the statute’s protective purpose and the Criminal Code’s instruction to construe terms by their fair import to promote justice.

B. Evidentiary Strategy in Child Sexual Assault Prosecutions

Reed suggests best practices for prosecutors and trial courts:

• Develop a robust evidentiary record of the relational dynamics—communications (nicknames like “dad”), family perceptions, decision-making control, and conduct that normalizes boundary crossings.
• When other-acts evidence is offered as “inextricably intertwined,” be prepared to show that it completes the narrative of the charged conduct. Although Reed does not resolve the admissibility question, it underscores that any error may be harmless if the core case is strong and the contested evidence is peripheral.

C. Jury Instructions and Trial Framing

The opinion’s articulation provides guidance for jury instructions:

• Define “position of authority” in terms of relational power and control consistent with Fortier’s definition of “authority.”
• Instruct that coercion may be subtle and need not involve physical force or overt threats; manipulation and undue influence related to the authority role can suffice.

D. Limits and Safeguards

Reed does not collapse the authority inquiry into pure age disparity or mere friendship. The State still must prove:

• The existence of a qualifying position of authority (i.e., relational status conferring power and an expectation of obedience); and
• That the defendant used that authority to coerce the victim’s submission.

The evidence in Reed crossed that threshold by demonstrating pervasive control, the victim’s reliance and obedience, and the use of that control to facilitate and normalize sexual activity.

E. Harmless Error in Complex, Multi-Witness Trials

Reed reaffirms that, under Rouleau, the State can meet the harmless-error burden where the contested evidence played a limited role and the remaining proof is overwhelming. Defense strategies should account for the risk that appellate courts may deem evidentiary errors harmless in the face of strong relational-authority evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Position of Authority (RSA 632-A:2, I(k)): Not limited to official roles. It includes social or relational roles where an adult has power over a minor—such as a father figure or religious leader—especially where the adult expects obedience or wields influence over decisions.
• Authority (per Fortier): The power to require submission and expect obedience; superiority linked to status allowing one to command. It can arise from relational dynamics, not just legal titles.
• Coercion (per Fortier): Not just force or threats. It includes subtle pressure, manipulation, and undue influence that restrain or dominate the victim’s will, especially in authority-laden relationships.
• Harmless Error: An appellate court will not reverse for an error at trial if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, considering the entire trial record and factors like the strength of the untainted evidence and the limited role of the challenged evidence.
• Statutory Interpretation Principles: Courts look first to the statute’s text, give words their common meaning, avoid adding words not chosen by the legislature, and construe criminal code provisions to promote justice.

Conclusion

State v. Reed makes two central contributions to New Hampshire criminal jurisprudence. First, it clarifies that a “position of authority” under RSA 632-A:2, I(k) need not be formal or official; social and relational roles—specifically, a father figure and religious leader—can qualify, consistent with the statute’s language and purpose. In doing so, it reaffirms the relevance of the victim’s subjective experience of the defendant’s authority. Second, it reinforces that coercion may consist of subtle pressures and manipulations arising from the authority relationship, not just physical force or explicit threats.

On the facts presented, the Court found overwhelming evidence that the defendant used his father-figure authority to coerce the victim’s submission, rendering any potential evidentiary or sufficiency errors regarding other theories harmless. The decision will influence how prosecutors charge and prove AFSA cases involving relational authority, how trial courts instruct juries, and how appellate courts assess evidentiary errors in the context of strong, multi-witness records. Reed thus stands as a significant precedent ensuring that RSA 632-A:2, I(k) captures the realities of authority-based exploitation of minors, even when that authority stems from social, not formal, roles.