No “Drive Home” Safe Harbor: Eleventh Circuit Upholds K-9 Deployment Where Motorist Fails to Promptly Stop and Resists Commands

Introduction

This appeal arose from a late-night traffic stop that escalated into a K-9 apprehension and subsequent criminal charge for fleeing and eluding under Florida Statutes section 316.1935. Plaintiff-Appellant Martinezz Bowman sued Deputies David Harvey and Jayme Gohde under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force (including a failure-to-intervene theory) and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment to the deputies on qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

The opinion addresses three central issues:

• Whether the district court properly applied the summary-judgment standard and Scott v. Harris to disregard Bowman's account where contradicted by dashcam audio.
• Whether the deployment and duration of a police K-9’s bite constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
• Whether probable cause existed for fleeing and eluding, thereby defeating Bowman's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

While unpublished, the decision fortifies several principles in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence: (1) drivers must promptly stop upon activation of police lights and siren—continuing to drive, even toward one’s home, supports probable cause for fleeing and eluding; (2) K-9 deployment is reasonable where a suspect refuses commands and resists, and the dog may remain engaged until the suspect is handcuffed; and (3) Scott’s “blatant contradiction” rule applies to audio recordings that undercut a plaintiff’s version of events.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Deputies Harvey and Gohde on all § 1983 claims on qualified immunity grounds:

• Excessive force (Deputy Harvey): The deployment of K-9 Drago was objectively reasonable given Bowman’s failure to promptly stop after lights and sirens and his refusal to comply with commands after stopping. The duration of the bite—no longer than 2 minutes and 12 seconds—was not excessive because Bowman resisted and was not yet secured; an officer may wait until a suspect is fully handcuffed before calling off the dog.
• Failure to intervene (Deputy Gohde): This derivative claim failed because there was no underlying Fourth Amendment violation.
• Malicious prosecution (Deputy Harvey): Probable cause existed for fleeing and eluding where Bowman continued driving nearly a minute after lights and sirens were activated. A later acquittal does not undermine probable cause. Conclusory assertions of falsehoods in the warrant affidavit were insufficient.

The court also rejected arguments that the district court was biased or misapplied Scott v. Harris, noting that it credited Bowman’s account except where audio evidence “utterly discredited” his claims of initial compliance.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Establishes that courts need not accept a party’s version of facts if “blatantly contradicted” by the record (originally video). Here, dashcam audio conclusively contradicted Bowman’s claim that he complied with early commands. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that Scott’s principle applies to clear audio evidence as well, citing Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023).
• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Provides the objective reasonableness framework for excessive force, focusing on the severity of the crime, immediate threat, and active resistance/flight. The court applied Graham to weigh the seriousness of fleeing and eluding, Bowman’s noncompliance, and the need for force in a tense, rapidly evolving encounter.
• Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2012): Recognizes that constitutional uses of police dogs can be reasonable. The deployment here was deemed a split-second judgment within Graham’s allowance, as Bowman was resisting.
• Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000): Held it was excessive to allow a dog to bite a compliant, non-threatening suspect for two minutes. The court distinguished Priester: Bowman resisted, attempted to avoid the dog, and did not comply with commands; the engagement ended upon handcuffing.
• Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009): It is not excessive to keep a K-9 engaged until the suspect is fully secured and handcuffed, even after resistance diminishes. This principle was decisive on the “duration” argument.
• Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2022): Officers had probable cause for fleeing and eluding where a driver failed to stop and continued at low speed for a short distance to a well-lit gas station. Manners squared with this case: continuing to drive after lights and siren reasonably supports probable cause for fleeing—there is no requirement that officers assume the driver is heading home.
• Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002): Explains qualified immunity and emphasizes it applies in close cases; subjective intent is irrelevant under Graham. The court here adhered to objective reasonableness and dismissed arguments based on subjective fear or officer motive.
• Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015): Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law; courts should not require officers to err on the side of caution. Reinforced deference to reasonable split-second judgments.
• Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010): A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails where probable cause exists. This was dispositive of Bowman’s malicious prosecution count.
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 1996): Summary-judgment standards; only material factual disputes preclude judgment. The court used these to discount immaterial disputes (e.g., whether Bowman first noticed lights on 441 versus Gerson Lane).
• Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2019): No failure-to-intervene liability absent an underlying constitutional violation. Applied to affirm summary judgment for Deputy Gohde.
• Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268 (11th Cir. 2023): Reinforces that the Fourth Amendment test is objective and judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. The court relied on Baker to reject arguments pinning liability on Bowman’s subjective fears or officers’ putative motives.
• Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015): Attempting to elude is a serious offense and signals potential danger. The court marshaled Sykes to weigh the Graham factors toward reasonableness of force.

Legal Reasoning

1) Qualified immunity framework and summary judgment

• There was no dispute that Deputies Harvey and Gohde acted within discretionary authority. The burden shifted to Bowman to show a constitutional violation of clearly established law.
• The court reviewed facts de novo, crediting Bowman where supported, but applied Scott to disregard claims “utterly discredited” by dashcam audio—specifically, his assertion of early compliance with exit-and-show-hands commands.

2) Excessive force: K-9 deployment

• Severity of crime: Fleeing and eluding is serious. The court emphasized that continuing to drive after lights and siren—even at low speed toward one’s home—allows a reasonable officer to believe the driver is attempting to evade a stop.
• Threat and resistance: Bowman engaged in a prolonged verbal standoff, refused to exit promptly, and, after exiting, refused commands to turn, face away, and walk backward. He explicitly dared release of the dog (“release the dog, bro”) and attempted to evade the dog by climbing on his hood.
• Need for force and proportionality: Warnings were issued repeatedly, including a K-9 warning. Given Bowman's continued noncompliance and the officers’ inability to see or control his hands and body positioning in a dark area, deploying a K-9 to gain control was objectively reasonable.

3) Excessive force: Duration of the bite

• The court bounded the maximum duration from audio and video timestamps at 2 minutes and 12 seconds, noting the actual bite time could be shorter because this interval included release, approach, control, handcuffing, and return to the cruiser.
• Unlike Priester, the suspect here was not compliant; he was resisting and attempting to stand while the dog was engaged. Crenshaw permits officers to maintain a K-9 engagement until handcuffs are applied, regardless of whether resistance is ebbing. That is what occurred.
• Given Bowman’s repeated noncompliance and active resistance, keeping the dog engaged until handcuffing was reasonable and not unnecessarily prolonged.

4) Failure to intervene (Deputy Gohde)

• Because the court found no underlying excessive-force violation, there was no constitutional wrong to interrupt, foreclosing failure-to-intervene liability per Sebastian.

5) Malicious prosecution (Deputy Harvey)

• A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires both the common-law elements and a Fourth Amendment violation; the existence of probable cause defeats the claim.
• The officers had probable cause (indeed, more than arguable probable cause) to believe Bowman committed fleeing and eluding when he failed to promptly stop after lights and siren, instead proceeding about 45 seconds (roughly a half-mile) before stopping. The court used Manners to confirm that even slow, short continuations to a “safer” location do not negate probable cause.
• Bowman’s later acquittal is immaterial to probable cause. Conclusory allegations that the warrant affidavit contained “fraudulent statements” failed for lack of specifics and, in any event, could not overcome the independent basis for probable cause.

Impact

On traffic stops and “safe location” arguments

• The opinion fortifies the principle that motorists must promptly stop when lights and siren are activated. The court’s emphatic statement—“To be clear, when an officer initiates lights and sirens to effectuate a stop, a driver should promptly stop (even if they just so happen to live nearby)”—undercuts “drive home” or “drive to safety” defenses when assessing probable cause for fleeing and eluding under Florida law.
• Officers are not required to assume that a vehicle is headed to its registered address simply because a tag check might show a nearby registration. This categorical rejection will likely be cited in future Florida and Eleventh Circuit cases addressing similar fact patterns.

On K-9 use-of-force law

• The decision confirms that K-9 deployment to gain control over a noncompliant, resisting suspect is reasonable under Graham, and that the dog may remain engaged until the suspect is handcuffed. Distinguishing Priester, the court signals that duration alone (even exceeding two minutes in a compressed, dynamic encounter) is not dispositive; compliance status and officer safety concerns dominate.
• Practically, departments should continue to emphasize warnings, clear commands, and recordings. Where audio/video captures warnings, noncompliance, and handcuffing timing, defendants are more likely to prevail at summary judgment.

On evidentiary use of recordings at summary judgment

• The court’s reliance on dashcam audio to apply Scott’s “blatant contradiction” rule is an important reinforcement for agencies with audio-only records or with body/dash cameras partially obstructed. Clear audio can be dispositive in countering testimony about compliance.

On malicious prosecution claims

• The opinion reiterates that a later acquittal does not retroactively negate probable cause and that conclusory allegations of falsity in affidavits are insufficient. Plaintiffs must identify specific misstatements or omissions and show materiality.

On policy violations vs. constitutional violations

• Alleged deviations from internal protocols (e.g., not using a public-address system, preferred stop locations) do not equate to Fourth Amendment violations. The constitutional analysis remains objective reasonableness under Graham, not departmental best practices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: Shields officers from suit when performing discretionary duties unless they violate clearly established constitutional rights. It protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law and applies especially in close calls.
• Objective reasonableness (Graham): Courts assess force from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with hindsight and not based on the suspect’s or officer’s subjective motives or fears. Key factors include the crime’s severity, immediate threat, and resistance/flight.
• Probable cause vs. arguable probable cause: Probable cause exists where facts would lead a prudent person to believe a crime has been or is being committed. Arguable probable cause (a qualified immunity concept) protects an officer who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that probable cause exists.
• Scott v. Harris rule: A court may disregard a party’s version of facts when contradicted by indisputable objective evidence like clear video or, as here, audio.
• Fleeing and eluding (Fla. Stat. § 316.1935): Willful refusal or failure to stop when ordered by a law enforcement officer in a marked vehicle with lights and siren activated. Continuing to drive after activation—even at low speeds toward home—can satisfy this element.
• Duty to intervene: An officer can be liable for failing to stop excessive force by another officer, but only if a constitutional violation is actually occurring and the officer has a real opportunity to intervene.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Bowman v. Harvey affirms key principles in the circuit’s Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity jurisprudence. First, a driver’s continuation after lights and siren—whether toward a gas station or home—gives rise to probable cause for fleeing and eluding under Florida law. Second, in the context of resistance and noncompliance, deploying a police K-9 to secure control is reasonable, and maintaining the engagement until handcuffing does not constitute excessive force. Third, Scott’s “blatant contradiction” doctrine extends with full force to audio recordings that undermine a plaintiff’s narrative at summary judgment. Finally, probable cause defeats § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, and later acquittals or vague assertions of affidavit falsity do not change that result.

While nonprecedential, the opinion will be persuasive authority in the Eleventh Circuit and beyond for cases involving slow-roll “drive to safety” scenarios, K-9 deployments amid resistance, and the evidentiary weight of audio recordings. The takeaways are straightforward: motorists must stop promptly; officers may rely on objective, recorded evidence; and courts will evaluate police uses of force through the lens of what a reasonable officer would do in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances.