No‑Contact Means No‑Contact: Attempted Communication Through a Protected Party’s Lawyer Violates a Protection Order; Punitive Contempt and Protection‑Order Breaches Support Colo. RPC 8.4(b) Without a Criminal Conviction

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge’s opinion in The People of the State of Colorado v. Todd Frank Bovo, No. 24PDJ003 (Colo. O.P.D.J. May 7, 2025), imposing a six‑month suspension on a Colorado lawyer. The case sits at the intersection of professional‑responsibility doctrine and personal‑conduct restraints, and it addresses three central issues:

• What suffices to prove a knowing disobedience of a tribunal’s order under Colo. RPC 3.4(c) when other courts have already entered orders on overlapping facts under different burdens of proof.
• Whether violations of a civil protection order and punitive contempt proceedings constitute “criminal acts” reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s fitness under Colo. RPC 8.4(b) absent a criminal conviction.
• Whether publishing (or appearing to publish) false information about a protected party on a law firm website establishes dishonesty under Colo. RPC 8.4(c).

The parties were the People of the State of Colorado, represented by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), and Respondent Todd Frank Bovo, Colorado attorney registration no. 38691. A three‑member Hearing Board, presided over by PDJ Bryon M. Large, found violations of Colo. RPC 3.4(c) and 8.4(b) and imposed a six‑month suspension, fully served.

Summary of the Opinion

Following a March 2025 evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Board suspended Respondent for six months, effective upon issuance of the Order and Notice of Suspension. The court found:

• Colo. RPC 3.4(c): Proven as to two knowing violations of a temporary protection order (TPO)—an attempted communication via the protected party’s counsel (email with letter attached) and two text messages from an anonymous number—and as to a separate violation of a civil case order that only counsel could schedule depositions (Respondent personally noticed a deposition to harass the party). Not proven as to alleged non‑payment of child support and school expenses due to insufficient clear and convincing evidence, and not proven as to the law‑firm website “profile” because the record did not clearly show Respondent’s knowledge or publication on a live site.
• Colo. RPC 8.4(b): Proven. Respondent’s conduct constituted a criminal act reflecting adversely on fitness: violation of a protection order is a class‑two misdemeanor (C.R.S. § 18‑6‑803.5(2)(a)), and punitive contempt is “criminal” for discipline purposes because it is punishable by imprisonment; no criminal conviction is required to find a violation of Rule 8.4(b).
• Colo. RPC 8.4(c): Not proven. The evidence did not show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly published false credentials about the protected party on the live law‑firm website or that he created the faux profile, which may have been a vendor “mockup.”

Sanction was driven by ABA Standards 6.22 and 5.12, multiple aggravators (including selfish motive, pattern, discovery obstruction within the disciplinary case, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, and victim vulnerability), and limited mitigation (no prior discipline, personal/emotional stressors, some character and other penalties, limited remorse). The court emphasized “gamesmanship” and the weaponization of legal processes against protected or opposing parties.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited—and How They Shaped the Decision

• Burden of Proof in Discipline
  • People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654, 661 (Colo. 1988) and People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980): Reaffirm that attorney discipline must be proven by clear and convincing evidence—higher than a preponderance.
  • C.R.C.P. 242.30(b)(2): Orders from other tribunals are admissible but not conclusive proof of disputed facts; the disciplinary court must make independent findings under the clear‑and‑convincing standard. This principle led the Board to discount the domestic relations court’s arrearage findings, which were issued under the lower preponderance standard without a detailed factual explication.
• What Counts as a “Crime” Under Rule 8.4(b)
  • People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986): No criminal conviction is required to find a violation of Rule 8.4(b). The Board applied Morley to reject Respondent’s argument that 8.4(b) requires a conviction.
  • Independent Reservoir Co. v. Lichter, 2025 COA 13: Cited in resolving Respondent’s motion to dismiss; the PDJ concluded punitive contempt is a “crime” for disciplinary purposes because “crime” is any offense punishable by imprisonment (see C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4)), independently of whether there is a formal criminal conviction.
  • C.R.S. § 18‑6‑803.5(2)(a): Statutory violation of a protection order is a class‑two misdemeanor. The court relied on this as an independent, statutory path to a “criminal act” under Rule 8.4(b).
• Sanction Framework
  • ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: Standards 6.22 (knowing violation of court order) and 5.12 (criminal conduct adversely reflecting on fitness) set the presumptive suspension baseline; Standard 2.3 supports that suspensions generally should be six months or more; Standards 9.22 and 9.32 governed aggravation and mitigation.
  • Colorado discipline cases on support‑order disobedience and criminal conduct: People v. Primavera, People v. Tucker, People v. Hanks, People v. Green (child‑support noncompliance spectrum), and People v. Reaves, People v. Shipman, In re Hickox (criminal conduct cases), plus PDJ opinions People v. Saxon and People v. Scott. These authorities confirm that the sanction range widens with facts and aggravation, but knowing disobedience and criminal conduct typically warrant suspension.
  • Other jurisdictions: Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Plants (public censure for violating DV protective order) and Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers (suspension for communications violating protection order) demonstrate a similar range elsewhere.

Core Legal Reasoning

• Rule 3.4(c): Knowing Disobedience of Tribunal Orders
  • Domestic‑relations support order (child support and school expenses): Not proven. While the domestic relations court found arrears, its order rested on a preponderance and lacked detailed factual findings. In the disciplinary case, bank records showed $2,000 monthly deposits into a joint account November 2020–July 2021; Respondent credibly described the confusion inherent in using a joint account for support. On school expenses, the record did not clearly establish that Respondent received the contractually required notice/receipts. Given the clear‑and‑convincing standard and C.R.C.P. 242.30(b)(2), the Board would not treat the DR order as conclusive.
  • Civil case deposition‑scheduling order: Proven. A July 10, 2023 order required that only Respondent’s counsel could schedule depositions. Respondent personally noticed his ex‑spouse’s deposition anyway, and the civil court found a C.R.C.P. 11(a) breach and harassment. Respondent conceded the violation. The Board found knowing disobedience of a tribunal order.
  • Temporary protection order (TPO): Partially proven. The TPO stated no contact “of any kind” and no attempts through a third person “except [Respondent’s] attorney,” with no exceptions permitted.
    • Email to the protected party’s attorney forwarding a personal letter: Proven violation. Attempting to communicate through the protected party’s counsel is still an attempted contact with the protected party—prohibited by the plain text limiting third‑party communications to Respondent’s own lawyer. The “benign intent” argument or any alleged “welcome” by opposing counsel did not matter because the TPO disallowed exceptions.
    • Anonymous text messages: Proven violation. The county court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Respondent sent two texts. The disciplinary court relied on both that finding and the protected party’s testimony recognizing Respondent’s characteristic language.
    • Website “profile” featuring the protected party with false credentials: Not proven. The record did not clearly show the page was on the live site, accessible from the firm homepage, or posted with Respondent’s knowledge. Testimony suggested it may have been a vendor “mockup” created during site redesign long before the TPO dispute.
• Rule 8.4(b): Criminal Act Reflecting Adversely on Fitness
  • The Board found a qualifying “criminal act” on two independent grounds: (1) statutory violation of a protection order (class‑two misdemeanor), and (2) punitive contempt is an offense punishable by imprisonment. No conviction is required under Morley. The conduct adversely reflected on fitness, particularly against the backdrop of the protected party’s allegations of abuse and the lawyer’s repetition of violations.
• Rule 8.4(c): Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation
  • Not proven. The People did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly published a false profile or that the page was live. Without proof tying publication and knowledge to Respondent, the dishonesty claim failed.
• Sanction Determination
  • Presumptive sanction was suspension per ABA Standards 6.22 and 5.12. Aggravation included selfish motive, a pattern in ignoring court orders, multiple offenses across matters, bad‑faith obstruction within the disciplinary case (discovery noncompliance and deposition no‑show leading to C.R.C.P. 37 costs), refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, victim vulnerability, substantial legal experience, and illegal conduct (counted with minimal weight to avoid double‑counting). Mitigation included no prior discipline, significant personal and emotional problems rooted in ongoing high‑conflict litigation and bankruptcy, some character/reputation evidence through access‑to‑justice work, other penalties already imposed (C.R.C.P. 11 and punitive fine), and limited remorse.
  • Given the balance, a six‑month, fully served suspension was ordered. The court underscored that “gamesmanship for personal gain” and leveraging legal processes to burden protected or opposing parties corrodes public confidence and warrants stern discipline.

Impact and Forward‑Looking Consequences

• No‑contact orders in the hands of lawyers
  • Bright‑line application: An order that permits contact only “through Respondent’s attorney” is violated if the restrained lawyer attempts to communicate via the protected party’s attorney. Counsel should channel all communications through the restrained party’s lawyer or court processes. “Good intentions” or perceived receptivity from opposing counsel does not create an exception.
• 8.4(b) prosecutions do not hinge on convictions
  • OARC may proceed on 8.4(b) without a criminal conviction when the conduct itself is criminal (e.g., violating a CPO), or when punitive contempt applies. Expect more 8.4(b) charges in protection‑order cases and other contempt‑based settings.
• Proof standards meaningfully constrain collateral use of other courts’ findings
  • Disciplinary prosecutors must meet the clear‑and‑convincing standard independently. Orders entered under a preponderance standard, and even criminal‑like findings from other courts, are admissible but not conclusive. Expect more rigorous evidentiary development—bank records, payment audits, vendor logs, and technical proof of website publication—when Rule 3.4(c) or 8.4(c) violations are pleaded.
• Website “mockups” and vendor content pipelines
  • Absent proof of live publication and the lawyer’s knowing participation, 8.4(c) claims premised on draft or sandbox content may fail. Law firms should still institute vendor controls, approval workflows, and archives to demonstrate diligence and to quickly remediate errors.
• Litigation conduct as aggravation
  • Discovery noncompliance in the disciplinary matter itself can aggravate sanctions. Separate court sanctions (C.R.C.P. 11 fines, C.R.C.P. 37 costs) may be considered “other penalties,” but persistent procedural gamesmanship will push toward longer suspensions.
• Child‑support noncompliance claims in discipline
  • Where payment histories are muddied by joint accounts or shifting payment channels, OARC should independently reconstruct the ledger; otherwise, a Rule 3.4(c) charge may fail despite adverse domestic‑relations findings. Practitioners should favor transparent payment registries (e.g., FSR) to avoid ambiguity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Clear and Convincing Evidence vs. Preponderance of the Evidence
  • Preponderance means “more likely than not” (just over 50%). Clear and convincing means the fact is “highly probable.” Attorney discipline requires the latter, so findings from other courts using the lower standard do not automatically carry the day in a disciplinary hearing.
• Punitive vs. Remedial Contempt
  • Remedial contempt aims to coerce compliance (e.g., do X by date), while punitive contempt punishes past disobedience and can include jail or fines. For Rule 8.4(b), punitive contempt is treated as a “crime” because it is punishable by imprisonment, even if no criminal conviction is entered.
• Rule 3.4(c): Knowing Disobedience
  • This rule captures intentional violations of court rules or orders—such as ignoring a scheduling directive or flouting a no‑contact order. “Technical” violations still count if the lawyer knew the order and acted contrary to it.
• Rule 8.4(b): Criminal Acts Reflecting on Fitness
  • Conduct is sanctionable if it is criminal and adversely reflects on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness—whether or not there is a conviction. Violating a domestic‑violence protection order qualifies.
• Rule 8.4(c): Dishonesty
  • To prove dishonesty by publication (e.g., a website misstatement), OARC must show the lawyer knowingly made or maintained the misrepresentation. Draft or “mockup” content not published live, without proof of knowledge, will not suffice.

Key Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

• If you are subject to a protection order, do not communicate with the protected person “through their attorney” unless the order expressly allows it. “Except through your own attorney” means exactly that.
• Any attempt to contact a protected person—from an anonymous number or otherwise—can be used to show knowing disobedience. Content and context can establish authorship.
• Follow court directives to the letter in your own litigation. If an order says “counsel only” may schedule depositions, personal notices by a represented lawyer can be both sanctionable and an RPC 3.4(c) violation.
• In disciplinary discovery, cooperate promptly. Failure to produce documents or to attend depositions can be treated as bad‑faith obstruction and aggravate sanctions.
• When support payments are disputed, use registries and keep meticulous records. Joint accounts create evidentiary fog that can fuel proceedings on multiple fronts.
• Control your digital footprint. Require vendor change logs, approval gates, and a clear distinction between staging and live content. If an error is reported, document prompt remediation.

Conclusion

The People v. Bovo opinion delivers two clarifying messages with broader import. First, the phrase “no contact of any kind” in a protection order truly means no contact: routing a personal communication through the protected party’s attorney violates the order unless the text expressly permits it. Second, for Colo. RPC 8.4(b), neither a criminal conviction nor formal criminal charges are required; punitive contempt and statutory violations (like CPO breaches) qualify as criminal acts, and repeated violations—especially when coupled with litigation “gamesmanship”—adversely reflect on fitness to practice.

The opinion also reinforces discipline‑specific evidentiary rigor. Orders from other tribunals, especially those entered under lower burdens with sparse factual detail, are not conclusive in attorney‑discipline proceedings. OARC must meet the clear‑and‑convincing standard with independent evidence. On the other hand, when lawyers exploit process—issuing improper deposition notices, disobeying discovery orders, or multiplying proceedings against protected parties—sanctions will reflect not just the rule violations, but their corrosive effect on public confidence in the profession.

In sum, Bovo stands as a cautionary precedent: no‑contact orders are to be read strictly; disobedience can support both Rule 3.4(c) and Rule 8.4(b) findings; and “weaponizing” litigation for personal ends invites meaningful suspension. The decision’s disciplined approach to proof, coupled with firm sanctioning of order‑violations, will likely guide future Colorado disciplinary matters involving protection‑order breaches, contempt, and the collateral use of other courts’ findings.