Night Blindness Can Qualify as an ADA Disability: Sixth Circuit Affirms Broad ADAAA Standard and Protects Good‑Faith Accommodation Requests

Introduction

In Rebecca Edwards v. Shelby County, Tennessee (No. 24-5730, 6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for a public health employee who alleged ADA disability discrimination (night blindness), retaliation (for requesting a night-shift accommodation), and failure to accommodate (asthma). The County argued that Edwards was not “disabled” under the ADA because she could sometimes drive at night and because her asthma was episodic and generally controlled with medication. The court rejected these arguments, emphasizing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)’s directive to interpret “disability” broadly and to conduct individualized, fact-specific assessments.

This published decision is significant for several reasons:

• It expressly rejects categorical rules that would exclude night blindness from ADA coverage and holds that night blindness can substantially limit the major life activity of seeing, depending on the facts.
• It clarifies that driving itself is not the major life activity at issue; rather, the correct focus is on seeing, and night-driving difficulties can be probative of a substantial limitation in seeing.
• It confirms that episodic conditions like asthma can qualify as disabilities when active, and that mitigating measures (e.g., medication) are not considered in determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting.
• It reiterates that an employee’s protected ADA activity includes a good-faith request for accommodation, even if the employee is later found not to be disabled.
• It underscores the highly deferential post-verdict standard of review: courts do not reweigh credibility on a Rule 50 motion and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Case Background

Edwards joined the Shelby County Health Department during the COVID-19 pandemic, was promoted to Environmentalist Inspector, and later reassigned to a Care Coordination Team serving individuals quarantined at an Econo Lodge. She reported safety concerns about working alone at night at the motel and disclosed night blindness that made night driving difficult and dangerous. Separately, she suffered an asthma flare-up in September 2021 when she temporarily lost access to her medications, severely limiting breathing, sleep, and mobility.

On October 4, 2021, Edwards was reassigned to a solo 3 p.m.–11 p.m. shift at the Econo Lodge. She objected, citing night blindness and safety concerns, and offered to obtain a doctor’s note. The next day, she emailed her supervisor and an administrator documenting safety concerns. Internal discussions about removing her from the team had already begun. The County changed Edwards’s schedule the following day but notified her after the new start time. On October 8, HR recommended termination; Edwards was discharged on October 11 for “insubordination,” “attendance,” and “falsification.”

Edwards filed administrative charges and then sued, alleging ADA discrimination (night blindness), retaliation (night-blindness accommodation request), and failure to accommodate (asthma). A jury returned a verdict for Edwards on all three ADA claims. The County appealed, arguing principally that Edwards was not disabled as a matter of law and that the evidence was insufficient.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the County’s Rule 50 motions and the entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict. Applying the ADAAA’s broad, individualized disability analysis and the deferential post-verdict standard, the court held:

• Disability Discrimination (Night Blindness): There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Edwards’s night blindness substantially limited the major life activity of seeing. The court rejected reliance on pre-ADAAA authority to the contrary and aligned with sister circuits recognizing night-vision impairments as potentially disabling.
• Retaliation: The jury could reasonably conclude that Edwards engaged in protected activity by making a good-faith request for an accommodation related to night blindness, and that the County retaliated by terminating her shortly thereafter.
• Failure to Accommodate (Asthma): Edwards’s episodic asthma, when active, substantially limited major life activities such as breathing, sleeping, and walking. Under the ADAAA, mitigating measures (like medication) do not negate disability status in the threshold inquiry.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Standards of Review and Trial Posture
  • Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2012); Wallace v. FedEx Corp., 764 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2014); Debity v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 134 F.4th 389 (6th Cir. 2025); Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co., 334 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2003)
  These authorities underscore that Rule 50 review is de novo as to law and sufficiency, but courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, draw all reasonable inferences for the non-movant, and may not reweigh evidence or assess credibility. The court also emphasized that after a trial, the focus shifts from McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting to the ultimate question of discrimination, per Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000); Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co., 973 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2020); and Skalka v. Fernald Env’t Restoration Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1999).
• ADA Definitions and the ADAAA
  • Statutes and Regulations: 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1), (2), (4)(A), (4)(D), (4)(E)(i); 12112(a); 12203(a); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(1), (i)(1)(i), (i)(2), (j)(1)(i)–(iv), (j)(1)(viii), (j)(4); 1630.12; and 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. C.
  • Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2018); Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2019); Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2019)
  These sources collectively embody the ADAAA’s broad coverage mandate, the lowered “substantially limits” threshold, and the individualized, context-specific assessment of limitations relative to the general population. They were central to rejecting Shelby County’s narrow reading of disability.
• Night Blindness and Major Life Activity of Seeing
  • Wade v. General Motors Corp., 165 F.3d 29, 1998 WL 639162 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table)
  • Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2005)
  • Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App’x 738 (9th Cir. 2010)
  • Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010)
  The court deemed Wade’s pre-ADAAA analysis superseded by statute and regulations. It aligned with Capobianco, Livingston, and Colwell in holding that night-vision impairments may substantially limit seeing and that night-driving difficulties can be powerful evidence of such a limitation. The court emphasized avoiding categorical exclusions and focusing on individual functional impact.
• Retaliation and Protected Activity
  • Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025 (6th Cir. 2014); Hurtt v. Int’l Servs., Inc., 627 F. App’x 414 (6th Cir. 2015); Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, 414 F. App’x 764 (6th Cir. 2011)
  These cases establish that requesting an accommodation in good faith is protected activity under the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision, whether or not the employee ultimately proves an ADA disability.
• Failure to Accommodate Framework
  • Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007); Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004); Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805 (6th Cir. 2020)
  The “direct evidence” framework places the burden on the plaintiff to show disability and qualification, and then on the employer to demonstrate essential job criteria or undue hardship. The court applied ADAAA principles to hold that Edwards’s asthma was a qualifying disability on this record.
• Distinguishing Contrary Authority
  • Andrews v. Tri Star Sports & Ent. Grp., Inc., No. 23-5700, 2024 WL 3888127 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2024)
  The court distinguished Andrews, where the plaintiff’s own testimony revealed a highly active lifestyle with only minor, situational effects from asthma, unlike Edwards’s evidence of significant limitations in breathing, sleeping, and walking during exacerbations.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

• Disability Discrimination (Night Blindness)
  • Impairment and Major Life Activity: Night blindness qualifies as an “impairment” affecting the visual system (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)). The proper major life activity is “seeing,” expressly listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The court declined to decide whether “driving” is a major life activity; instead, it treated night-driving difficulties as evidence of a limitation in seeing.
  • Substantially Limits: The ADAAA requires a generous standard: impairments need not “significantly or severely restrict” activities, and the comparison is to the general population (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii)). Edwards testified to halos and glare from lights, difficulty reading signs, impaired depth perception, and persistent post-exposure visual effects that also interfered with reading, television, and menus. The jury could reasonably find a substantial limitation in seeing.
  • Occasional Performance Does Not Defeat Disability: The fact that Edwards sometimes drove at night out of necessity did not compel a defense verdict. The ADA recognizes substantial limitations even where the activity is technically possible but unsafe, arduous, or performed with pain or anxiety.
  • Individualized Inquiry and Post-Verdict Deference: Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is fact-intensive and committed to the jury in this posture. The record, viewed favorably to Edwards, was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
• Retaliation (Night-Blindness Accommodation Request)
  • Protected Activity: A good-faith accommodation request is protected, even if disability status is unresolved. The County argued Edwards’s complaint was about crime rather than a disability. But testimony showed she told her supervisor she had “nyctalopia” (night blindness), could not safely work the night shift, and offered a doctor’s note.
  • Employer Knowledge and Causation: The timing and internal documentation referencing her complaints supported the jury’s finding that the County knew of the protected activity and that termination days later was retaliatory.
• Failure to Accommodate (Asthma)
  • Episodic Impairments Qualify When Active: Under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D), conditions that are episodic are disabilities if they substantially limit a major life activity when active. Edwards described severe limitations in breathing, sleeping, and even walking short distances during a flare when she lacked medication.
  • Mitigating Measures Irrelevant to Threshold Disability: The ADAAA forbids considering ameliorative effects of medication when deciding whether an impairment is substantially limiting (42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). The County’s reliance on medication control therefore failed at the disability stage.
  • Sufficiency of the Evidence: Edwards’s testimony about triggers, reliance on a rescue inhaler, and the acute September 2021 episode provided a reasonable basis for the jury to find a qualifying disability. Andrews was distinguishable on dramatically different facts.
• Standard of Review After Trial
  • Once a case is tried, courts ask whether a reasonable jury could reach the verdict based on the record, not whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case. Credibility determinations belong to the jury. This posture heavily influenced the affirmance across all claims.

3) Impact

• Recognition of Night Blindness Within ADA Coverage: This decision is the Sixth Circuit’s published acknowledgment that night blindness can, depending on the record, substantially limit seeing. Employers should avoid categorical denials of disability status for night-vision impairments and instead engage in individualized assessments.
• Refocusing on “Seeing” Rather Than “Driving”: By centering the analysis on seeing, the court harmonizes ADA doctrine with practical proof: night-driving difficulties can be persuasive evidence of a visual limitation without making “driving” a protected “major life activity.” This reframing will likely influence jury instructions and summary judgment analyses within the Circuit.
• Episodic Conditions and Mitigating Measures: For conditions like asthma, migraine, epilepsy, or other intermittent disorders, this opinion reinforces that the disability inquiry asks whether, when active, the condition substantially limits major life activities. Medication control is not counted against the plaintiff at this threshold stage.
• Protected Retaliation Activity: Employers should treat accommodation requests as protected, even if they question the employee’s underlying disability. Adverse actions in close temporal proximity and lacking prior discipline—especially when embedded in documentation that omits the accommodation request—pose heightened retaliation risk.
• Trial Strategy and Proof: The opinion underscores that a plaintiff’s detailed, credible testimony about functional limitations can sustain a verdict. After a jury verdict, appellate courts will not reweigh credibility, making contemporaneous testimony and fact development at trial paramount.
• Operational Guidance for Employers:
  • Use the interactive process promptly when an employee raises limitations related to night work or driving; consider schedule modifications, carpooling, escorts, or route adjustments.
  • Document accommodation discussions, not just performance concerns; include the employee’s stated medical limitations in disciplinary forms when relevant.
  • Apply attendance policies consistently, but be cautious when illness-related absences follow timely notice in compliance with policy.
  • Avoid assigning a unique adverse shift to a single employee immediately after an accommodation request without exploring alternatives and undue hardship.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Disability” under the ADA: A person is disabled if they have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; have a record of such an impairment; or are regarded as having such an impairment. The ADAAA instructs courts to interpret this broadly.
• “Major life activities”: Everyday activities like seeing, breathing, sleeping, walking, thinking, and working. “Driving” is not listed; instead, limitations in driving can be evidence of limits in listed activities (e.g., seeing).
• “Substantially limits”: Post-ADAAA, this is not a demanding standard. The person’s abilities are compared to most people in the general population. The activity need not be impossible; doing it with difficulty, pain, risk, or significant anxiety can still be substantially limiting.
• Episodic conditions: Conditions that flare up (like asthma) are disabilities if, during episodes, they significantly limit major life activities. Whether medication typically controls the condition doesn’t negate disability status at the threshold stage.
• Protected activity (retaliation): Asking for a reasonable accommodation in good faith is protected. An employer cannot punish an employee for asking, even if the request is later denied or the disability status is contested.
• Post-trial review (Rule 50): After a jury verdict, the question is whether any reasonable jury could reach that result based on the evidence. Courts do not make new credibility calls or reweigh the testimony.

Conclusion

Edwards v. Shelby County cements several ADAAA-era principles in a published Sixth Circuit decision. First, night blindness, while not a per se disability, can substantially limit the major life activity of seeing, and evidence of unsafe night driving may compellingly demonstrate that limitation. Second, episodic conditions such as asthma are analyzed based on their impact when active, and the ameliorative effects of medication are not considered at the disability threshold. Third, a good-faith accommodation request is protected activity under the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision. Finally, after a full trial, the appellate lens is deferential: credibility determinations belong to the jury, and individualized, fact-rich narratives often carry the day.

For employers, the opinion is a clear prompt to abandon categorical approaches to visual impairments, to document and engage in the interactive process earnestly, and to treat accommodation requests as protected. For employees, it underscores the value of detailed testimony about functional limitations and the availability of ADA protection for conditions that become substantially limiting in real-world contexts—even intermittently. The Sixth Circuit’s affirmance thus reinforces the ADAAA’s core purpose: broad, individualized coverage focused on whether discrimination occurred, not on erecting stringent definitional barriers at the courthouse door.