Nexus, Particular Social Groups, and Government Acquiescence in Gang‑Related Claims: Commentary on Jose Antonio Silva del Aguila v. Bondi

Nexus, Particular Social Groups, and Government Acquiescence in Gang‑Related Claims: Commentary on Jose Antonio Silva del Aguila v. Bondi

I. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit immigration decision, Jose Antonio Silva del Aguila v. Bondi (No. 25‑3249, Dec. 15, 2025), addresses the increasingly common scenario of a Central American youth fleeing gang violence—here, MS‑13 in Guatemala—and seeking protection in the United States through asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Although the opinion is expressly “not recommended for publication” and thus non‑precedential under Sixth Circuit rules, it is legally significant in at least three respects:

  1. It reinforces the stringent “nexus” requirement between persecution and a protected ground in gang‑related asylum and withholding cases.
  2. It clarifies how conflicting evidence about state corruption and law‑enforcement efforts is weighed when assessing “government acquiescence” under CAT.
  3. It underscores that due process in removal proceedings concerns procedural fairness, not mere disagreement with evidentiary or legal conclusions.

For practitioners, the case is a reminder that:

  • How a particular social group (PSG) is framed and preserved through the administrative process is critical.
  • A petitioner’s own testimony can decisively undermine a claimed nexus.
  • CAT claims will struggle where the record shows both corruption and some genuine governmental efforts against gangs.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

Jose Antonio Silva del Aguila is a native and citizen of Guatemala from Mixco. He grew up in a large, locally well‑known family. Both parents died before he turned fifteen, leaving him a young orphan.

The critical events revolve around MS‑13’s efforts to expand its ranks:

  • At age fifteen, Silva del Aguila was attacked by MS‑13 members, beaten unconscious, and suffered a broken leg. This followed an earlier incident in which his sister had been threatened and pressured to join the gang; she refused.
  • After the first attack, he went into hiding for a year at home, then stayed with another sister in a different city before returning to Mixco.
  • On returning, MS‑13 again tried to recruit him. When he declined, six gang members beat him unconscious, breaking his nose and leaving permanent scars.
  • He twice sought hospital treatment but never reported either attack to police.
  • He then fled Guatemala and entered the United States near San Luis, Arizona, as an unaccompanied minor in August 2016. After a credible fear interview, he was released.

MS‑13 also targeted other family members:

  • The gang attempted to recruit four of his twelve siblings, including his sister.
  • One sister, Zoila, was threatened and had her business extorted; she reported this to police, who, according to the record, did nothing.

B. Procedural History

  • In September 2017, DHS commenced removal proceedings, serving a Notice to Appear (NTA). Silva del Aguila conceded removability.
  • He applied for:
    • Asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158;
    • Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and
    • Protection under the Convention Against Torture.
  • He advanced two particular social groups (PSGs):
    • “Guatemalan males between the ages of 18 and 25 without parental protection”; and
    • “Immediate family members of the Silva del Aguila family in Mixco, Guatemala.”
  • The Immigration Judge (IJ) held a merits hearing in December 2021. The IJ:
    • Found Silva del Aguila credible; but
    • Denied asylum and withholding, finding no nexus between the claimed PSGs and the harm suffered; and
    • Denied CAT relief, finding insufficient proof of:
      • Likelihood of future torture if returned; and
      • Government acquiescence.
  • The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed in December 2021, adopting the IJ’s reasoning on nexus and CAT.
  • Silva del Aguila petitioned the Sixth Circuit for review, challenging:
    • The nexus determinations (asylum and withholding);
    • The CAT acquiescence finding; and
    • Alleged due process violations.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Jane B. Stranch denied the petition for review. The key holdings are:

  1. Asylum: Substantial evidence supported the IJ’s finding that there was no nexus between the harm and any protected ground. MS‑13 targeted Silva del Aguila for general recruitment, not because of his proposed PSGs. Attempts to redefine the PSGs on appeal were rejected as unexhausted.
  2. Withholding of Removal: Even under the more lenient “a reason” nexus standard, there was still “no nexus at all,” so withholding failed for the same basic reason.
  3. CAT Protection: Although the attacks amounted to torture, substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that:
    • Guatemalan authorities did not acquiesce in his torture (no actual or constructive knowledge and failure to intervene); and
    • He did not show it was “more likely than not” that he would be tortured again if removed, especially given that his siblings remained in Guatemala without further attacks.
  4. Due Process: The court found no procedural defect in the immigration proceedings. Silva del Aguila’s complaints related to how the IJ and BIA evaluated the facts and law, which are substantive disagreements, not constitutional violations.

IV. The Legal Framework

A. Standards of Review

The court reiterates established principles:

  • Final agency decision: The court reviews the BIA’s opinion as the final agency determination, and also reviews the IJ’s reasoning to the extent the BIA adopts it. Zometa‑Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970, 976 (6th Cir. 2021).
  • Legal questions: Reviewed de novo.
  • Factual findings: Reviewed under the “substantial evidence” standard; they are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.
  • Nexus determination: Characterized as a factual finding, and thus subject to substantial evidence review. Turcios‑Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2023).

This deference is central: the court’s role is not to re‑weigh evidence but to determine whether the record compels a contrary result.

B. Asylum

To qualify for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) incorporates the definition of a “refugee” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A): the applicant must be unable or unwilling to return to the home country “because of” persecution or a well‑founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or a particular social group.

In the particular social group context, the applicant must:

  • Identify a cognizable PSG: one that is
    1. Based on a common immutable characteristic,
    2. Defined with particularity, and
    3. Socially distinct in the relevant society.
    See Turcios‑Flores, 67 F.4th at 354.
  • Show nexus: the protected ground must be “one central reason” for the persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

C. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) requires the applicant to show that his “life or freedom would be threatened” in the home country on account of a protected ground. It has:

  • A higher burden on future harm (a clear probability standard: “more likely than not”); but
  • A somewhat lower nexus standard: the protected characteristic need only be “a reason” (not “one central reason”) for the persecution. Mazariegos‑Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 677 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Guzman‑Vazquez).

D. CAT Protection

Under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture, an applicant must show:

  1. It is more likely than not that he will be subjected to torture if removed. Vasquez‑Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 911 (6th Cir. 2024).
  2. The torture is inflicted by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

“Acquiescence” requires that:

  • The public official knows of the torture beforehand; and
  • Fails to intervene despite a legal duty to do so.

See Mateo‑Esteban v. Garland, 125 F.4th 762, 768 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7)). Willful blindness—deliberate failure to see what is obvious—can qualify as acquiescence. Sabastian‑Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923, 931 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 2006)).

V. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Nexus and Particular Social Groups in the Asylum Claim

1. The Proposed Social Groups

Before the IJ, Silva del Aguila advanced two PSGs:

  1. Age‑ and vulnerability‑based group: “Guatemalan males between the ages of 18 and 25 without parental protection.”
  2. Family‑based group: “Immediate family members of the Silva Del Aguila family in Mixco, Guatemala.”

The IJ apparently treated these as cognizable for purposes of analysis but found the claim failed on nexus. The BIA likewise resolved the claim solely on nexus grounds and did not reach full PSG cognizability questions.

On appeal:

  • In the BIA appeal, he tried to modify the first group from ages 18‑25 to 15‑25, aligning the group with his age at the time of the attacks (15). The BIA rejected the amendment.
  • In the Sixth Circuit, he offered entirely new PSGs:
    • “Family members of individuals who have resisted gang recruitment”; and
    • “Individuals who have refused to join gangs in El Salvador” (an apparent drafting error, as he is Guatemalan).

The Sixth Circuit refused to entertain these new PSG formulations, relying on Gonzalez‑Valencia v. Barr, 764 F. App’x 510, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2019), which holds that PSGs must be presented to the agency first; new groups raised for the first time in court are unexhausted and cannot be considered.

2. The Nexus Finding: Recruitment vs. Persecution “On Account Of”

The core of the asylum analysis is the nexus question: were the attacks inflicted “on account of” the proposed PSGs, or were they inflicted for reasons wholly independent of any protected ground?

The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that the MS‑13 gang was:

  • “Seeking to increase their power and ranks in the community”;
  • Targeting Silva del Aguila for recruitment rather than because of animus toward his family or his status as a young, parentless male.

Two aspects of the record were critical:

  1. Mixed recruitment targets:
    • MS‑13 attempted to recruit several of Silva del Aguila’s siblings, including his sister, undermining his theory that the gang targeted him because he was a male within a specified age range.
    • The gang also recruited people outside his family, undermining the claim that being a member of the Silva del Aguila family itself triggered the persecution.
  2. Petitioner’s own testimony: When the IJ asked him why he thought the gang targeted him, he responded (paraphrased):
    The gangs are an organization that want you to join whether you want to or not.
    When asked if there was any other reason, he said “no.”

The panel viewed this as direct evidence that:

  • The gang’s motive was broad‑based recruitment, not a targeted campaign against him because of his youth, orphan status, or family membership.
  • No additional, protected‑ground‑based motive was articulated.

The court aligned this with its prior reasoning in Sabastian‑Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923, 930 (6th Cir. 2024), where testimony that gangs target “everyone” or simply want “more people to join” has been found insufficient to meet the nexus requirement. In such cases, the persecutor’s generalized, criminal objective (expanding ranks, exerting territorial control, extorting money) is not equivalent to targeting a protected class.

The court emphasized that the senior fact‑finder—the IJ—gave the petitioner a clear opportunity to link his harm to a protected ground and that he explicitly denied any motive beyond forced recruitment. That affirmative testimony significantly constrained later legal arguments about nexus.

3. Misapplication of Nexus? The Court’s Rejection

In his brief, Silva del Aguila argued that the IJ and BIA “misapplied the nexus requirement” and that “refusal to join a gang is a protected characteristic.” He attempted to reframe his PSGs around “family members of individuals who have resisted gang recruitment” and “individuals who have refused to join gangs.”

The Sixth Circuit rejected this strategy on two levels:

  1. Procedural: These groups were never properly presented to the IJ or BIA, so they were unexhausted. Under Gonzalez‑Valencia, the court declined to consider them.
  2. Substantive: Even if “refusal to join a gang” might be part of a cognizable PSG under some circumstances, the record evidence in this case—including petitioner’s own testimony—did not support that his refusal was a protected ground rather than merely the triggering event for the gang’s criminal conduct. The protected ground must be the reason for the harm, not simply temporally related to it.

The court concluded that the record did not compel any factfinder to reach a different view on nexus. Therefore, under substantial evidence review, the asylum claim failed.

B. Withholding of Removal: “No Nexus at All”

For withholding, the nexus requirement is formally lower: the protected characteristic need only be “a reason” for the harm, not “one central reason.” Mazariegos‑Rodas, 122 F.4th at 677.

However, the panel stressed—citing Sabastian‑Andres, 96 F.4th at 931—that this lower standard is irrelevant where the record shows “no nexus at all.” In other words:

  • If there is some evidence that the protected trait partially motivated the persecutor, the difference between “one central reason” and “a reason” matters.
  • But if the record supports the finding that the gang’s only motive was recruitment—with no protected ground playing any role whatsoever—the claim fails equally under both asylum and withholding frameworks.

Here, the IJ found exactly that: the gang acted solely to coerce him into joining, not because of hostility toward his family or any PSG. The court held that substantial evidence supported this finding. Thus, the withholding claim failed for the same core reason as the asylum claim.

C. CAT Protection and Government Acquiescence

1. Acknowledging Torture but Rejecting Acquiescence

The IJ expressly found that the gang’s beatings—leaving him unconscious, breaking bones, and causing permanent injury—rose to the level of torture under CAT standards. The dispute concerned:

  1. Whether he had shown that MS‑13 was more likely than not to torture him again if he returned; and
  2. Whether Guatemalan authorities would acquiesce to such torture.

The IJ (and BIA) answered both in the negative. The Sixth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported each conclusion.

2. Failure to Report: Not Dispositive, but Significant

On acquiescence, one central fact was that Silva del Aguila never reported the attacks to police or other authorities. As the court noted (citing Sabastian‑Andres, 96 F.4th at 932):

  • This tends to show that the authorities had no chance to respond and therefore did not knowingly turn a blind eye.
  • Accordingly, it weighs against a finding of acquiescence.

At the same time, the court carefully reiterated that failure to report is not dispositive. Many asylum applicants reasonably fear that reporting will be futile or dangerous, especially when law enforcement is corrupt or infiltrated by gangs. Thus, the inquiry must also examine:

  • The applicant’s reasons for not reporting; and
  • Other evidence of government practices and attitudes toward similar abuses.

3. Conflicting Country Conditions Evidence

The record contained extensive country reports regarding Guatemala, showing:

  • Widespread impunity for serious crimes;
  • Serious corruption within the police, including collusion with organized crime;
  • Weak reporting and documentation systems for torture and abuse;
  • Insufficient staffing and training of police; and
  • Loss of effective governmental control to gangs in some areas.

These facts supported the petitioner’s fear that reporting gang violence might be futile or even dangerous. They also lent credibility to his belief that police “have been bought” by gangs and might inform MS‑13 of any complaint.

However, the same reports showed:

  • Some prosecutions and imprisonments of gang members; and
  • At least some meaningful efforts by Guatemalan authorities to combat gang activity, even if only partially successful.

The panel placed weight on precedent emphasizing that where a government is struggling but genuinely attempting to control private violence, it is generally not considered “willfully blind”:

  • Sabastian‑Andres, 96 F.4th at 931–32: recognition that the existence of actual gang prosecutions indicates some meaningful response, cutting against a finding of willful blindness.
  • Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d at 502 (6th Cir. 2016): when a country is making real but imperfect efforts to curb private violence, public officials are not typically found to acquiesce under CAT.

The court described the evidence as supporting “two narratives”:

  1. A narrative of state failure and corruption, suggesting that police are effectively controlled by gangs and are unwilling or unable to protect victims; and
  2. A narrative of a weak but engaged state, making imperfect and uneven efforts to punish gangs and protect citizens.

Under the substantial evidence standard, the question is not which narrative the court finds more persuasive, but whether a reasonable adjudicator could adopt the agency’s view. Because the record contained evidence of at least some genuine governmental response to gang violence, the court held that a reasonable adjudicator could conclude there was no “willful blindness” or acquiescence in this case.

4. Likelihood of Future Torture

In addition, the IJ and BIA found that Silva del Aguila had not shown it was more likely than not that MS‑13 would torture him again if he returned. Among other factors:

  • Several of his siblings, including some previously targeted or pressured by gangs, continue to live in Guatemala without subsequent attacks.
  • There was no direct evidence that MS‑13 was currently searching for him specifically or had maintained a specific vendetta.

While not conclusive, such evidence supported the agency’s determination that future torture, while possible, had not been shown to be “more likely than not.”

D. Due Process and the Limits of Judicial Review

Silva del Aguila alleged that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated because:

  • The IJ and BIA narrowly construed his PSGs;
  • Misapplied the nexus requirement;
  • Failed to consider country conditions adequately; and
  • Made factual findings without substantial evidence.

The Sixth Circuit, relying on cases like Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 296 (6th Cir. 2016), and Sebastian‑Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 853 (6th Cir. 2023), emphasized that:

  • Due process in removal proceedings guarantees a full and fair hearing, not a right to a correct outcome.
  • A due process claim requires:
    1. A procedural defect (e.g., denied opportunity to present evidence, bias, lack of notice); and
    2. Resulting prejudice.

Here, the petitioner pointed only to disagreements with the IJ’s and BIA’s interpretation of evidence and law—issues that are ordinarily addressed through the normal appellate review framework, not through the Constitution. The court saw no procedural irregularity (e.g., no bar on presenting evidence, no improper exclusion of testimony) and therefore rejected the due process claim.

E. The BIA’s Ability to Bypass Unnecessary Issues

Silva del Aguila also argued that the BIA effectively conceded certain points because it did not expressly address each of his arguments. The panel rejected this, quoting the BIA’s statement that, having affirmed the IJ’s finding of no nexus, it “need not address [Silva del Aguila’s] additional arguments regarding his eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal.”

The panel cited:

  • Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2025), reaffirming that the BIA need not decide issues unnecessary to the result; and
  • INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam), for the principle that a “court and agency are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”

Thus, the BIA’s choice not to discuss alternative or subsidiary theories is not a concession of their merit; it is a permissible exercise of adjudicatory economy.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Although the opinion rests largely on straightforward application of established law, it draws on and reinforces several key precedents:

  • Turcios‑Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347 (6th Cir. 2023)
    Provides the current Sixth Circuit articulation of what constitutes a cognizable PSG (immutability, particularity, social distinction) and confirms that nexus is a factual question subject to substantial evidence review. The court relies on this for framing but not to dispute PSG cognizability in this particular case.
  • Sabastian‑Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923 (6th Cir. 2024)
    This case plays a prominent role. It:
    • Holds that testimony admitting the gang sought recruits broadly is insufficient to show nexus to a protected ground.
    • Clarifies that where there is “no nexus at all,” claims fail under both asylum and withholding standards.
    • Elaborates on CAT acquiescence, emphasizing that willful blindness requires more than general evidence of crime and corruption, especially where some enforcement against gangs exists.
    The present opinion heavily borrows its analytical structure from Sabastian‑Andres.
  • Mazariegos‑Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655 (6th Cir. 2024)
    Clarifies the “a reason” nexus standard for withholding, as derived from Guzman‑Vazquez. The court cites it to explain that a looser nexus standard does not save a claim where the record shows no nexus whatsoever.
  • Vasquez‑Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903 (6th Cir. 2024)
    Cited for the basic CAT requirement that an applicant show a “more likely than not” probability of torture if removed.
  • Mateo‑Esteban v. Garland, 125 F.4th 762 (6th Cir. 2025)
    Used for a concise definition of official acquiescence under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a), including the requirement of pre‑torture knowledge and failure to intervene. The present opinion incorporates this standard directly.
  • Zaldana Menijar, 812 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2016)
    Reiterates that a government actively—if inadequately—combating private violence is generally not “willfully blind” under CAT, even amid corruption and impunity. This principle strongly influences the court’s reading of the country reports.
  • Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2016) and Sebastian‑Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838 (6th Cir. 2023)
    Both underscore that noncitizens in removal proceedings are entitled to due process (a full and fair hearing), but that disagreements with factual or legal outcomes, without procedural flaws, do not amount to constitutional violations.
  • Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399 (6th Cir. 2025) and INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976)
    Support the BIA’s practice of not deciding issues unnecessary to the disposition, countering any suggestion that silence equals concession.
  • Gonzalez‑Valencia v. Barr, 764 F. App’x 510 (6th Cir. 2019)
    Reinforces exhaustion: PSG definitions must be raised before the agency. New or substantially different PSG theories cannot be presented for the first time in court.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For Asylum and Withholding Practice

This opinion contributes to a line of Sixth Circuit decisions that are skeptical of gang‑recruitment‑based claims absent a clear link to a protected ground. The key practical implications:

  1. PSG Definition Must Be Strategically and Early Fixed.
    Applicants and counsel must carefully craft PSGs at the IJ level, anticipating both:
    • Doctrinal requirements (immutability, particularity, social distinction); and
    • The factual record needed to connect those PSGs to the persecutor’s motive.
    Late reframing of PSGs—especially to “resistance to gang recruitment” or similar concepts—will likely be deemed unexhausted and ignored on judicial review.
  2. Petitioner Testimony Is Crucial and Potentially Decisive.
    Statements that the gang “just wants people to join” or targets “everyone” are frequently fatal to nexus. Counsel must prepare applicants to:
    • Explain, if true, how their specific characteristics (e.g., family ties, gender, age, prior resistance, known political views) made them distinct targets as opposed to interchangeable recruits.
    • Avoid confirming that there is no motive other than generic recruitment, if there is evidence to the contrary.
  3. Family‑Based and Vulnerability‑Based PSGs Are Not Self‑Executing.
    Even if a family or youth‑based group is cognizable, applicants must show gangs attack them because of that status, rather than simply due to opportunistic criminality. The fact that gangs target multiple family members may help, but only if the record supports that family membership itself is the reason, not just that the family lives in a gang‑controlled area.

B. For CAT Litigation

On CAT claims, the opinion illustrates:

  • Corruption Plus Enforcement Efforts Is a Double‑Edged Sword.
    Country evidence showing both:
    • Deep police corruption and collusion with gangs; and
    • Actual prosecutions and some enforcement;
    can lead courts to conclude that the government is struggling, but not willfully blind. Applicants should:
    • Develop specific, localized evidence of police non‑response or complicity (e.g., repeated ignored complaints, documented collusion in their region).
    • Explain why the limited prosecutions cited in reports do not meaningfully protect similarly situated individuals.
  • Failure to Report Must Be Carefully Justified.
    Not reporting crimes weakens the argument that officials acquiesced, but it does not automatically defeat CAT claims. Practitioners should:
    • Present detailed testimony on why reporting would be dangerous or futile; and
    • Corroborate with reports showing retaliation against complainants or police‑gang collusion.
  • Family Remaining in the Country Can Undermine Future‑Torture Predictions.
    Where similarly situated relatives remain unharmed, adjudicators may infer that personalized risk is lower than alleged, unless the applicant can differentiate his circumstances (e.g., he personally testified against the gang, or is widely known as a resister).

C. For Due Process and Appellate Strategy

The decision reiterates:

  • Due process challenges must identify specific procedural flaws (e.g., improper exclusion of evidence, inability to present witnesses, bias, inadequate interpretation). Mere disagreement with outcomes belongs in ordinary substantial‑evidence arguments.
  • The BIA’s failure to address every argument is not a concession; appellate strategy should instead:
    • Focus on demonstrating that the issues the BIA did address were resolved in a way that contradicts the record; and
    • Preserve any issues the BIA expressly declined to reach by showing why they were necessary to a lawful disposition.

D. Non‑Precedential but Persuasive Value

Because the opinion is “not recommended for publication,” it is not binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit. Nonetheless, it:

  • Faithfully applies and synthesizes binding decisions like Turcios‑Flores, Sabastian‑Andres, Zaldana Menijar, and Bi Qing Zheng;
  • Illustrates how panels are likely to evaluate similar records; and
  • Provides practitioners a realistic view of how mixed country‑conditions evidence and generic recruitment‑based harm will be treated on review.

VIII. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

To make the opinion more accessible, several central concepts bear brief, plain‑language explanation:

1. Particular Social Group (PSG)

A PSG is one of the five protected grounds for asylum/withholding claims. It is a group of people who share:

  • A characteristic they cannot—or should not be required to—change (e.g., family ties, gender, past experience);
  • A clear, narrow definition (not vague or overly broad); and
  • A recognized identity in the home society (society “sees” them as a group).

Being harmed by gangs or living in a dangerous neighborhood is not itself a PSG; the group has to be defined independently of the persecution.

2. Nexus

Nexus asks: why did the persecutor harm the applicant? Was it because of:

  • Race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or PSG membership; or
  • Some other reason, such as money (extortion), generalized recruitment, revenge, or opportunistic crime?

For asylum, the protected ground must be “one central reason” for the harm; for withholding, it must be “a reason.” If no protected ground is a reason at all, both claims fail.

3. Substantial Evidence Standard

Under this deferential standard, the court must uphold the agency’s factual findings if they are supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative” evidence, unless the record compels a contrary conclusion. It is not enough that the court might have decided differently; the evidence must be so one‑sided that no reasonable judge could agree with the agency.

4. Torture and Government Acquiescence under CAT

“Torture” is severe pain or suffering inflicted for purposes such as intimidation, punishment, or coercion. To obtain CAT protection, the applicant must show:

  • Torture is more likely than not if he returns; and
  • A public official will either:
    • Inflict it; or
    • Know about it in advance and fail to stop it, despite a legal duty.

Acquiescence can be shown if officials deliberately ignore a known pattern of torture, i.e., through “willful blindness.” General law‑enforcement ineffectiveness or high crime, by itself, is usually not enough.

5. Due Process in Removal Proceedings

Noncitizens are entitled to:

  • Notice of the charges;
  • An opportunity to present evidence and argument;
  • An impartial decisionmaker; and
  • A decision based on the record, explained in terms that allow meaningful review.

They are not guaranteed a particular outcome, and routine legal or factual errors—without more—do not automatically equate to constitutional violations.

IX. Conclusion

Jose Antonio Silva del Aguila v. Bondi typifies a challenging class of cases: credible young asylum seekers fleeing brutal gang violence, yet unable to satisfy the precise legal demands of asylum, withholding, and CAT law as currently interpreted.

Doctrinally, the opinion:

  • Reaffirms that generic gang recruitment and violence, without more, do not establish the required nexus to a protected ground.
  • Confirms that differences between “one central reason” and “a reason” matter only where there is at least some nexus; where there is “no nexus at all,” both asylum and withholding claims fail.
  • Clarifies that conflicting evidence of corruption and enforcement can support a finding of no government acquiescence under CAT, particularly under deferential review.
  • Emphasizes that due process claims must target true procedural defects, not simply adverse outcomes.

In the broader landscape of immigration law, the case underscores both the power and the limits of current protections for those fleeing gang‑dominated environments. It highlights the importance of careful PSG definition, meticulous development of motive evidence, and strategic use of country conditions. Even as a non‑precedential opinion, it offers a detailed window into how the Sixth Circuit is likely to analyze similar claims in the future—and thus serves as an important guidepost for advocates, adjudicators, and scholars alike.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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