Nexus, Not Relationship Status: First Circuit Reaffirms Causation Requirement in Domestic Violence–Based Asylum Claims

Commentary on De La Cruz‑Quispe v. Bondi, No. 25‑1421 (1st Cir. Dec. 5, 2025)

I. Introduction

In De La Cruz‑Quispe v. Bondi, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied a Peruvian woman’s petition for review after the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) rejected her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The petitioner, Alejandra Milagros De La Cruz‑Quispe, credibly described a years-long pattern of severe physical and sexual abuse by her former partner, Mauro, in Peru. She framed her claim through twelve proposed “particular social groups” (“PSGs”), all variations on gender, domestic relationships, lack of protection, and feminist identity.

Despite accepting her credibility and the severity of the violence, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), the BIA, and ultimately the First Circuit concluded that she failed on a critical legal element: nexus. They held that the record did not compel a finding that Mauro’s abuse was inflicted “on account of” her membership in any protected group, as opposed to stemming from their “personal relationship and history.” The court also rejected her arguments for withholding of removal, CAT protection, humanitarian asylum, and alleged due process violations.

This decision does not radically change asylum law, but it significantly reinforces and sharpens several principles that are especially important in domestic violence–based claims:

The statutory “nexus” requirement is central and demanding; even brutal intimate-partner violence will not suffice unless tied to a protected ground.
Where the persecutor is a private actor (like an abusive partner), courts will often characterize the harm as a “personal dispute” unless the record clearly shows broader, protected-ground motives.
Humanitarian asylum cannot be used to bypass the need to prove persecution “on account of” a protected ground.
For CAT relief, speculative fears and unproven chains of hypotheticals do not meet the “more likely than not” torture standard.
Post–Loper Bright, arguments about deference to the BIA’s interpretations must be timely raised and are irrelevant where the dispositive issues are factual, not interpretive.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lynch, held as follows:

Asylum: The petition was denied because substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that Mauro’s abuse stemmed from the couple’s personal relationship rather than from De La Cruz’s membership in any proposed PSG. She therefore failed the asylum “nexus” requirement, which demands that a protected ground be “at least one central reason” for the persecution.
Withholding of removal: Her withholding claim necessarily failed because it requires an even higher showing than asylum; a person who cannot satisfy the asylum nexus requirement cannot prevail on withholding.
CAT protection: Substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT relief. The court agreed that her fear of future torture in Peru was “purely speculative” because she did not know Mauro’s whereabouts and provided no concrete evidence that he would find, torture, or kill her upon return, or that Peruvian officials would acquiesce.
Humanitarian asylum: The court affirmed the BIA’s rejection of her humanitarian-asylum argument, emphasizing that humanitarian asylum is available only after the applicant has shown past persecution on account of a protected ground. Because she failed on nexus, she was categorically ineligible.
Loper Bright and deference: The court declined to entertain her late-raised argument that, after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, it should not defer to the BIA’s “skepticism toward gender based PSGs.” That argument was waived because raised only in a reply brief and, in any event, had “no bearing” on the issues, which turned on factual motive, not on deference to agency statutory interpretations.
Due process: The court summarily rejected her due process challenge as frivolous, finding no misstatement of controlling law, ignoring of material evidence, or deviation from prescribed procedures by the agency.

Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and left in place the removal order to Peru.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Personal History and Abuse in Peru

De La Cruz, a Peruvian national, met Mauro in 2005 or 2006 and began a relationship with him in October 2006. Over the years, the relationship became increasingly violent:

First physical assault (2009): Mauro hit her and bit her lip after hearing she had been with someone else.
Pregnancy and abuse (2009): When she became pregnant in June 2009 and refused his suggestion to have an abortion, he beat and kicked her. The abuse continued through the summer.
Escalation and sexual violence: In November 2009, after she left the home without his permission, he hit her with a sandal, slapped her, insulted her, and forced her to have sex several times, which she endured because she considered herself “his woman.”
Abuse after childbirth (2010): Their daughter was born in February 2010. Mauro did not want the child, beat De La Cruz when the baby cried, refused financial support, forced her to have sex two weeks after birth, and then kicked both her and the baby out of the home.
Separations and reconciliations: She left him twice (October 2010 and March/April 2011), both times staying with her parents, but later returned after his apologies—first in December 2010 and again in February 2012—after which abuse resumed.
Police involvement and threats (2012):
- In early 2012 she reported him to the police, but was later told there was no record of her complaint.
- In September 2012, she tried to file another report; Mauro confronted her at the police station and beat her once they left.
- The violence escalated further. When she again sought refuge at her parents’ home, Mauro arrived with his uncle, a police officer, and threatened to kill her and take their daughter if she did not return.

Eventually, De La Cruz decided to leave Peru and traveled alone to the United States, leaving her daughter behind due to financial constraints. She submitted country-conditions evidence showing pervasive violence against women in Peru, including problems of under-enforcement and impunity.

B. Entry into the United States and Removal Proceedings

Entry and credible-fear finding: She entered the United States without valid documents near Hidalgo, Texas, on February 10, 2013. On March 6, 2013, an asylum officer found she had a credible fear of persecution.
Notice to Appear: On August 27, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging her as removable under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (lack of valid entry documents).
Concession and applications: On October 17, 2019, represented by counsel, she admitted the allegations, conceded removability, and filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.
Merits hearing: She testified before the IJ on February 25, 2020, and submitted a written declaration. The IJ found her credible and her asylum application timely.

C. The Proposed Particular Social Groups

De La Cruz advanced twelve PSGs, all variations on gender, relationship status, lack of protection, and feminist identity:

Peruvian women
Peruvian women in a domestic relationship
Peruvian women unable to leave a domestic relationship
Peruvian women in a forced non-consensual relationship
Peruvian women viewed as property and as subordinate to men by virtue of their gender
Peruvian women viewed as property and as subordinate to men by virtue of their position within their family
Peruvian women viewed as property and unable to leave a non-consensual relationship because of their gender and their subordinate position in Peruvian society
Peruvian feminist women who oppose male domination, control by men, and who refuse to accept restrictive, gender-conforming social mores
Peruvian feminist women who believe in gender equality
Peruvian women without governmental protection
Peruvian women without familial protection
The family unit

Notably, neither the IJ, the BIA, nor the First Circuit reached the question whether any of these groups are legally cognizable PSGs. The case was decided entirely on the causation (“nexus”) and likelihood-of-harm questions.

D. Agency Decisions

Immigration Judge (IJ):
- Found De La Cruz credible and the asylum application timely.
- Denied asylum for lack of nexus: Mauro’s abuse was motivated by “his personal relationship to [De La Cruz],” not her PSG membership. Her proposed groups were not “at least one central reason” for the harm.
- Denied withholding of removal for the same reason, given the higher standard.
- Denied CAT protection, finding her fear of future torture “purely speculative” and lacking proof of likely torture by or with government acquiescence.
- Did not grant humanitarian asylum, implicitly because she had not established past persecution on a protected ground.
BIA (Apr. 3, 2025):
- Dismissed her appeal, holding that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Mauro’s motive was their “personal relationship and history,” not her membership in a PSG.
- Affirmed the denial of withholding and CAT protection on the same bases.
- Explicitly rejected her argument regarding humanitarian asylum, clarifying that she was ineligible because she had not shown persecution on account of a protected ground.

E. Petition for Review and First Circuit Decision

De La Cruz timely petitioned the First Circuit. The court:

Reviewed the BIA’s decision (not the IJ’s) because the BIA did not simply adopt the IJ’s reasoning but affirmed after its own analysis (Trejo v. Bondi).
Applied substantial evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions.
Denied the petition, concluding that the record did not compel a contrary finding on nexus or CAT likelihood, and finding no legal or due process error.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Asylum and the Nexus Requirement

To qualify for asylum, a noncitizen must meet the INA’s definition of a “refugee”: a person who is unable or unwilling to return to her home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” (INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13; Alves v. Bondi.)

As the court notes (citing Esteban‑Garcia v. Garland): establishing persecution requires three elements, one of which is the causal connection (nexus) between the harm and a protected ground.

Key aspects of the nexus requirement, as restated in this opinion:

The applicant must show “sufficient evidence of an actual connection between the harm [she] suffered and [her] protected trait” (Esteban‑Garcia, quoting Ivanov v. Holder).
She need not prove the persecutor’s exact motivation, but must establish facts “on which a reasonable person would fear that the danger arises on account of” a protected ground (citing In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988), and INS v. Elias‑Zacarias).
In mixed-motive situations (multiple reasons for harm), a protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution (INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Esteban‑Garcia).
The protected ground need not be the sole motive, but it cannot be “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate” to another reason (Barnica‑Lopez v. Garland, quoting Loja‑Tene v. Barr and Sanchez‑Vasquez v. Garland).

Critically for this case, the First Circuit reiterates that “personal disputes are generally not enough” to show the necessary nexus (Espinoza‑Ochoa v. Garland, quoting Barnica‑Lopez). The court also invokes Alves and Pojoy‑De León v. Barr for the requirement that persecution extend beyond a “personal vendetta.”

B. Withholding of Removal

Withholding of removal provides a separate, mandatory form of protection if an applicant demonstrates a “clear probability” that her life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal on account of a protected ground. The nexus requirement still applies, but the standard of risk is higher than for asylum.

The court summarizes the standard (citing Mendoza v. Bondi and Espinoza‑Ochoa):

The applicant must show a clear probability of persecution on a protected ground if returned.
A petitioner who fails to meet the “lower hurdle” for asylum necessarily fails to meet the “higher bar” for withholding (Vargas‑Salazar v. Garland, quoting Paiz‑Morales v. Lynch).

C. CAT Protection

CAT protection is distinct from asylum and withholding in several ways:

The applicant must prove that, if removed, she would “more likely than not” be subject to torture by or with the acquiescence (including willful blindness) of a public official.
No nexus to a protected ground is required (citing Mayancela v. Bondi).
The court cites Cano‑Gutierrez v. Bondi and Morgan v. Garland for the framework.

However, speculative fears and unsubstantiated chains of hypotheticals do not satisfy the burden of proof. The court relies on out-of-circuit authority—Gutierrez‑Alm v. Garland (9th Cir. 2023) and Pineda‑Teruel v. Garland (7th Cir. 2021)—to emphasize that wholly speculative fears of future torture do not warrant CAT relief.

D. Humanitarian Asylum

Humanitarian asylum is a discretionary form of relief provided in the regulations (8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)). It allows a grant of asylum even if there is no current well-founded fear of future persecution, but only if:

The applicant has already established past persecution “on account of” a protected ground; and
She shows either:
- “compelling reasons” arising from the severity of the past persecution, or
- a reasonable possibility of “other serious harm” if removed.

The First Circuit, relying on Barrera Arreguin v. Garland and Kanagu v. Holder (both Eighth Circuit decisions), underscores a key point often misunderstood in practice: humanitarian asylum cannot be used to bypass the nexus requirement. If the applicant cannot show that past persecution occurred on account of a protected ground, she is simply not eligible for humanitarian asylum at all.

E. Standards of Review and Institutional Roles

The opinion carefully delineates who decides what, and how:

BIA vs. IJ (administrative level): The IJ makes initial factual and legal findings. The BIA reviews:
- Factual findings (including motive) for clear error, and
- Legal questions de novo (fresh, independent judgment).
The court notes that the BIA here explicitly applied clear-error review to motive findings, which is appropriate (Lopez‑Quinteros v. Garland; Vargas Panchi v. Garland).
Court of appeals vs. BIA (judicial review):
- Factual findings (including nexus and likelihood of torture) are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard: the court must uphold the BIA unless the record compels a contrary conclusion (Esteban‑Garcia, Dorce v. Garland, Aldana‑Ramos v. Holder, quoting Elias‑Zacarias).
- Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo (Vargas‑Salazar v. Garland).

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Nexus and Personal Motives in Intimate‑Partner Violence

The cornerstone of the court’s decision is its conclusion that the record did not compel the BIA to find that Mauro’s abuse was inflicted “on account of” De La Cruz’s membership in any of her proposed PSGs. Instead, the court agreed with the BIA that:

“Mauro’s abuse arose from intensely personal disputes within the relationship.”

The IJ had found, and the BIA affirmed, that the harm was motivated by “his personal relationship to [De La Cruz]” and their “personal relationship and history.” Drawing on Alves and Pojoy‑De León, the court observed that the evidence did not compel a conclusion that “the scope of [any] persecution extends beyond a ‘personal vendetta.’”

This framing is crucial because domestic violence claims often involve overlapping motives:

Personal jealousy, control, and possessiveness within a specific relationship; and
Societal norms of female subordination and gender-based discrimination.

The First Circuit essentially holds that on this record—the petitioner’s testimony and declaration and the general country conditions—Mauro’s conduct could reasonably be viewed as driven by individualized, relationship-specific motivations rather than by animus against a broader group (e.g., “Peruvian women unable to leave domestic relationships” or “Peruvian feminist women”).

Because substantial evidence review is highly deferential, the key question was not whether another factfinder could have inferred a gender‑based or PSG‑based motive, but whether the record compelled such a conclusion. The court held it did not.

B. Mixed Motives and the “One Central Reason” Standard

De La Cruz argued a mixed-motive theory: even if Mauro’s abuse was partly personal, her gender and PSG membership were also motivating factors. Under the statute, a protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the persecution; it cannot be merely incidental or subordinate (Barnica‑Lopez, Sanchez‑Vasquez, Loja‑Tene).

The court responded in two steps:

Correct legal standard applied: The court emphasized that both the IJ and BIA “accurately recited and applied the ‘one central reason’ mixed motive standard.” There was no sign they “prematurely terminate[d] the analysis upon the finding of another motive” (quoting Lopez‑Quinteros and Sompotan v. Mukasey).
Factbound application: Substantial evidence supported the finding that any protected-ground motive was, at most, incidental. The abuse was explainable by jealousy, control, and personal conflict without needing to infer that Mauro targeted her because she was a member of any of the articulated PSGs.

Thus, the case illustrates how demanding the “one central reason” test can be in practice, particularly where personal dynamics provide a plausible alternative explanation for the persecutor’s actions.

C. Gender-Based PSGs, Nexus, and Loper Bright

In her reply brief, De La Cruz invoked the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which eliminated Chevron deference to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes. She argued that the First Circuit should no longer defer to what she characterized as the BIA’s “skepticism toward gender based PSGs.”

The court declined to engage this contention for two reasons:

Waiver: The argument was raised for the first time in the reply brief and was thus waived, following the First Circuit’s approach in Martinez v. Bondi.
No deference issue implicated: The court held that the Loper Bright issue had “no bearing on the issues presented.” It cited Fleurimond v. Bondi for the proposition that the question of what, if any, deference is owed arises only when an interpretive issue is actually before the court.

This is significant in two ways:

The case turns on facts, not on the definition of “PSG.” The First Circuit never evaluated whether the twelve proposed PSGs were cognizable, and so it had no occasion to consider the BIA’s legal standard for PSGs or to revisit them in light of Loper Bright.
The central dispute was causation, not group definition. The dispositive question was whether Mauro harmed her because she belonged to any of these groups. That is a factual motive question, not a statutory-interpretation question. Loper Bright does not change how courts review factual findings, which remain subject to the substantial evidence standard.

In short, De La Cruz‑Quispe is an early example of a post–Loper Bright immigration case where the court explicitly sidesteps deference questions because the case is resolved purely on factual grounds.

D. Withholding of Removal as Derivative of Asylum Nexus

Once asylum failed on nexus, the fate of the withholding claim was effectively sealed. The court applied a long-standing doctrinal shortcut: because withholding demands at least as strong (and in some respects stronger) proof as asylum, a person who cannot meet the lower asylum threshold necessarily cannot satisfy withholding.

Thus, without an independent analysis of evidence for withholding, the court held:

“As De La Cruz failed to show that the record compels a finding of the requisite nexus between her alleged persecution and any statutorily protected ground, her claim for withholding of removal necessarily fails as well.”

E. CAT Claim and the Problem of Speculative Future Harm

CAT claims do not require nexus to a protected ground, but they demand a high probability of future torture with government involvement or acquiescence. Here, the First Circuit focused on the speculative nature of De La Cruz’s fear:

She did not know Mauro’s current whereabouts.
She presented no evidence that Mauro remained interested in harming her or had made recent threats.
Her concerns that he would rape, torture, or kill her upon return rested on an “unproven chain of hypotheticals,” in the language of Pineda‑Teruel.

The court stressed that fears based purely on speculation and unsupported suppositions do not satisfy the “more likely than not” standard. It cited Gutierrez‑Alm and Pineda‑Teruel to confirm that such deficiencies justify denial of CAT relief.

Although the facts included prior failures of police protection and a threatening visit by Mauro and his police-officer uncle, the court viewed these episodes as insufficient, without more, to establish future torture with government acquiescence. In particular, there was no evidence that:

Peruvian authorities were currently seeking her out or would likely turn a blind eye to Mauro torturing her today; or
Country conditions alone made it “more likely than not” that she, personally, would be tortured upon return.

Again, the substantial evidence standard meant the court asked only whether a reasonable factfinder had to find a likelihood of torture; it held that this record did not compel such a conclusion.

F. Humanitarian Asylum and the Inescapable Nexus Requirement

De La Cruz argued that even if she could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, she qualified for humanitarian asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). The BIA and the First Circuit both rejected that contention because she had failed the initial prerequisite: showing past persecution on account of a protected ground.

The First Circuit summarized the humanitarian asylum framework:

First, the applicant must show past persecution on account of a protected ground.
Only then may she attempt to show either:
- “compelling reasons” arising from the severity of the past persecution; or
- a reasonable possibility of “other serious harm” on return.

By quoting Barrera Arreguin and Kanagu, the court underscores a critical doctrinal point: if persecution was not on a protected ground, humanitarian asylum is categorically unavailable. Humanitarian asylum is a second-stage inquiry, not an alternative route to skip the nexus requirement.

G. Due Process Challenge

Finally, De La Cruz asserted a general due process violation, alleging that the agency misstated law, ignored evidence, or short-circuited required factfinding. The court disposed of this argument briskly, calling it “frivolous” and reiterating that no such errors occurred. In effect, the court signaled that a disagreement with the outcome does not, without more, amount to a constitutional violation.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Substantial Evidence and Deferential Review

Several cases frame the First Circuit’s highly deferential approach to agency factfinding:

Esteban‑Garcia v. Garland, 94 F.4th 186 (1st Cir. 2024): Cited for the standard that factual eligibility determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence and that persecution requires (among other things) a causal nexus.
Dorce v. Garland, 50 F.4th 207 (1st Cir. 2022): Quoted for the proposition that the court must accept BIA findings unless the record compels a contrary conclusion.
Aldana‑Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2014): Reinforces that the BIA’s decision must be upheld if supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” on the record as a whole, echoing Elias‑Zacarias.
INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992): The foundational Supreme Court case on deference in asylum review, quoted for both the substantial evidence standard and the focus on the persecutor’s motive.

These precedents give the First Circuit little room to disturb the agency’s motive and likelihood-of-harm findings unless the evidence overwhelming points the other way, which the court found it did not.

B. Nexus, Personal Disputes, and Domestic Violence

The court leans on several First Circuit precedents to position domestic violence and other interpersonal harms within the broader nexus jurisprudence:

Alves v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 297 (1st Cir. 2025): Used for the proposition that persecution must extend beyond a “personal vendetta,” with Alves itself quoting Pojoy‑De León.
Pojoy‑De León v. Barr, 984 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020): Quoted for the “personal vendetta” concept and the limits of nexus in private disputes.
Espinoza‑Ochoa v. Garland, 89 F.4th 222 (1st Cir. 2023): Cited for the principle that “personal disputes are generally not enough” to show nexus.
Barnica‑Lopez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 520 (1st Cir. 2023): Provides the “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate” test for determining whether a protected ground counts as “one central reason.”
Sanchez‑Vasquez v. Garland, 994 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2021): Also addressing the “one central reason” mixed‑motive standard.
Ivanov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2013): Quoted for requiring “sufficient evidence of an actual connection” between the harm and the protected trait.
In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988): Cited for the principle that applicants need not show exact motive but must present facts indicating that the danger arises “on account of” a protected ground.

By tying De La Cruz‑Quispe to this line of authority, the court situates intimate-partner violence firmly within the category of cases where asylum relief is not automatically precluded, but where proving nexus is especially challenging if the abuse can plausibly be viewed as individualized and personal.

C. Humanitarian Asylum Precedents

Barrera Arreguin v. Garland, 29 F.4th 1010 (8th Cir. 2022): Quoted for the rule that humanitarian asylum requires a showing of past persecution; failure to prove persecution on a protected ground makes an applicant ineligible.
Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2015): Similarly underscores the necessary precondition of past, protected-ground persecution.

These cases anchor the First Circuit’s holding that humanitarian asylum cannot rescue an applicant who fails on the protected-ground nexus element.

D. CAT and Speculative-Fear Cases

Morgan v. Garland, 120 F.4th 913 (1st Cir. 2024): Cited for the core CAT standard: torture by or with the acquiescence of a government official.
Mayancela v. Bondi, 136 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025): Emphasizes that CAT lacks a nexus requirement, differentiating it from asylum and withholding.
Cano‑Gutierrez v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 26 (1st Cir. 2025): Cited both for the consequence of a no-nexus finding and the CAT standard.
Gutierrez‑Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th 1186 (9th Cir. 2023): Used to support the proposition that entirely speculative fears, unsupported by the record, justify denying CAT relief.
Pineda‑Teruel v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1216 (7th Cir. 2021): Provides the “unproven chain of hypotheticals” phrase, reinforcing the requirement of concrete, individualized proof of likely torture.

E. Post–Loper Bright Deference Decisions

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): While not analyzed in detail, it is acknowledged as potentially affecting agency deference; the court holds it irrelevant to this case.
Martinez v. Bondi, 132 F.4th 74 (1st Cir. 2025): Cited for holding that a Loper Bright–based deference challenge raised first in a reply brief is waived.
Fleurimond v. Bondi, 157 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025): The court cites it for declining to address “what, if any, deference” is owed where no issue implicating that question is raised.
Vargas‑Salazar v. Garland, 119 F.4th 167 (1st Cir. 2024): Cited for de novo review of legal conclusions.
Vargas Panchi v. Garland, 125 F.4th 298 (1st Cir. 2025): Reinforces that the BIA properly applies clear-error review to factual motive findings.

Together, these cases show a First Circuit that remains attentive to Loper Bright but is cautious about reshaping immigration doctrine unless the case squarely presents an interpretive issue requiring resolution.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Persecution: Serious harm (physical, psychological, economic, or a combination) inflicted by the government or by others whom the government is unwilling or unable to control, when that harm is linked to a protected ground. Not every crime or act of violence qualifies.
Particular Social Group (PSG): One of the five grounds for asylum, along with race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. A PSG generally must be a group of persons who share a common, immutable or fundamental characteristic and are perceived as a group in their society. This case assumed, but did not decide, that the petitioner’s various gender‑based and relationship‑based PSGs were cognizable.
Nexus (“on account of”): The causal connection between the persecution and a protected ground. The applicant must show that her protected characteristic was at least one central reason why she was harmed or fears harm. If the harm would have occurred for purely personal reasons unrelated to the protected ground, nexus is not established.
“One Central Reason” Standard: In mixed‑motive cases, a protected ground does not have to be the only reason for persecution, but it must be a main, non‑subordinate reason, not incidental or tangential.
Substantial Evidence Review: A deferential standard used by courts reviewing agency factfinding. The court must accept the agency’s findings unless the evidence is so strong that any reasonable factfinder would have to reach the opposite conclusion.
Clear Error Review: A standard used by the BIA when reviewing an IJ’s factual findings. The BIA may reverse only if firmly convinced a mistake has been made; it may not reweigh evidence simply because it would reach a different result.
CAT Protection: A separate protection under international and U.S. law that prohibits returning someone to a country where they are more likely than not to be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials. No nexus to a protected ground is required, but the risk must be concrete and individualized, not speculative.
Humanitarian Asylum: A discretionary form of asylum for applicants who suffered particularly severe past persecution on a protected ground, even if they no longer have a well‑founded fear of future persecution, or who face “other serious harm” upon return. It is not available to those who never establish persecution on a protected ground.

VIII. Practical Impact and Future Implications

A. Domestic Violence–Based Asylum Claims

De La Cruz‑Quispe reinforces a clear message: domestic violence, even when severe and repeated, is not automatically persecution “on account of” a protected ground. For future cases:

Evidence of motive is critical. Applicants must build a record showing that the abuser targeted them because of their gender, role in the family, or other protected characteristic—through statements by the abuser, patterns of violence tied to gender norms, or broader patterns of similar harm to similarly situated women.
“Personal relationship” framing is powerful. Where the adjudicator can plausibly attribute harm to jealousy, control, or disputes unique to the couple, courts may uphold a no‑nexus finding under substantial evidence review.
Proliferation of PSGs does not cure weak nexus. As illustrated by the twelve PSGs in this case, multiplying group formulations cannot substitute for concrete evidence that the persecutor acted because of group membership.

B. Humanitarian Asylum Strategy

The decision forecloses attempts to use humanitarian asylum as a fallback where nexus is unproven. Practitioners must understand that:

Humanitarian asylum is second-stage relief; it “kicks in” only after past persecution on a protected ground is established.
In cases like De La Cruz’s, where the agency concludes there was no protected-ground persecution, humanitarian asylum is off the table entirely.

C. CAT Litigation

For CAT claims, the court’s insistence on non-speculative evidence signals that:

Applicants should provide current, concrete evidence of ongoing threats, the persecutor’s whereabouts and capacity, patterns of official complicity, and statistical or qualitative data linking country conditions to their personal risk.
Past harm alone, absent a strong showing of likely repetition with government acquiescence, may be insufficient.

D. Post–Loper Bright Immigration Adjudication

Although De La Cruz‑Quispe does not resolve any deference questions, it signals two practical points:

Preservation matters. Litigants wishing to invoke Loper Bright must do so in their opening briefs; arguments raised only in reply will be deemed waived.
Many immigration cases will remain fact‑driven. Even after Loper Bright, where the dispositive issue is factual (e.g., persecutor’s motive, likelihood of future harm), the traditional substantial evidence framework will continue to govern.

IX. Conclusion

De La Cruz‑Quispe v. Bondi is a sobering illustration of the constraints of U.S. asylum and CAT law as applied to domestic violence survivors. The First Circuit fully credits the petitioner’s narrative of serious abuse, yet denies relief because:

The record did not compel a finding that the abuse was inflicted “on account of” a protected ground rather than arising from a personal relationship.
Her fears of future torture in Peru were too speculative to meet the CAT standard.
Without past persecution on a protected ground, humanitarian asylum was unavailable.

Legally, the opinion reinforces three central rules:

Nexus is indispensable and demanding. Even severe private harm, including domestic violence, will not qualify as persecution for asylum or withholding purposes without a clear causal link to a protected ground.
Speculation cannot sustain CAT relief. Applicants must show that torture is more likely than not, with concrete, individualized proof of risk and government acquiescence.
Humanitarian asylum cannot circumvent the nexus requirement. It presupposes past persecution on a protected ground; it is not a standalone remedy for past private harm.

In the broader legal landscape, De La Cruz‑Quispe fits squarely within the First Circuit’s line of cases insisting that personal disputes and vendettas usually fall outside the scope of refugee protection, while simultaneously illustrating the continuing reach of deferential review of agency factfinding. For advocates and adjudicators addressing domestic violence claims, it underscores the importance of developing robust, motive‑focused records and carefully distinguishing personal dynamics from group-based persecution.

Nexus, Not Relationship Status: First Circuit Reaffirms Causation Requirement in Domestic Violence–Based Asylum Claims – Commentary on De La Cruz‑Quispe v. Bondi