Nevada’s Employment‑Luring Statute After Field Effect: NRS 613.010 Covers Job Changes Without Residential Relocation

Nevada’s Employment‑Luring Statute After Field Effect: NRS 613.010 Covers Job Changes Without Residential Relocation

I. Introduction

In Field Effect Security Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Anderson), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 63 (Dec. 4, 2025), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed for the first time the scope of Nevada’s “employment‑luring” statute, NRS 613.010. The central question was whether a worker must physically relocate their residence to bring a civil claim, or whether it is enough that the worker was induced to change his or her place of employment within Nevada based on false or deceptive representations.

The petitioner, Field Effect Security Inc. (“Field Effect”), a cybersecurity company, had hired Eric Anderson away from a competing employer based on a written employment agreement promising him a specific sales role and compensation structure. Anderson alleged that the promised position did not actually exist and that he was instead placed into an entry‑level role. Importantly, Anderson never moved residences: he lived at the same Las Vegas address before, during, and after his employment with Field Effect.

Anderson sued under NRS 613.010, claiming that Field Effect unlawfully “lured” him from one employer to another based on false promises about his role and compensation. Field Effect moved for summary judgment, arguing that NRS 613.010 only applies where the employee changes their place of abode (i.e., physically relocates) and does not apply to lateral changes in employment without a move. After losing that motion, Field Effect later sought to enforce a jury‑trial waiver in the employment contract; the district court refused, finding Field Effect had waived the waiver by litigating for many months after Anderson’s jury demand without raising the issue.

Field Effect sought a writ of mandamus from the Nevada Supreme Court to overturn both rulings. The Court took the opportunity to clarify the meaning of NRS 613.010 as a matter of statewide importance and to examine the standards for finding waiver of contractual jury‑trial waivers in mandamus proceedings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture and Writ Review

  • Field Effect filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging:
    • the denial of its motion for summary judgment on Anderson’s NRS 613.010 claim; and
    • the denial of its motion to strike Anderson’s jury demand based on a contractual jury‑trial waiver.
  • The Nevada Supreme Court exercised discretionary writ jurisdiction, emphasizing:
    • the issue of how to interpret NRS 613.010 is one of first impression and statewide importance;
    • there was no factual dispute about whether Anderson had changed his residence (he had not); and
    • writ review is sometimes appropriate for denials of motions to strike jury demands, because there may be no adequate remedy by appeal.

B. Holding on NRS 613.010

The Court held that NRS 613.010 authorizes a civil cause of action where an employee is induced, through false or deceptive representations about the terms and conditions of employment, to change their place of employment, even if they do not change their place of abode. In other words, a physical relocation of the worker’s residence is not required.

The Court’s key interpretive moves:

  • NRS 613.010(1) makes it unlawful to induce workers “to change from one place to another in this state” by false or deceptive representations about employment.
  • NRS 613.010(3) provides a civil cause of action for damages incurred when the worker was induced “to change his or her place of employment, or place of abode” (emphasis added).
  • Reading these subsections together under the “whole‑text canon,” the Court concluded that “place” in subsection 1 encompasses both place of employment and place of abode, and that subsection 3 confirms that both kinds of changes are covered.

Accordingly, because Anderson had changed his place of employment in reliance on Field Effect’s alleged misrepresentations, the statute applied, and the district court correctly denied summary judgment.

C. Federal Cases Rejected

The Court explicitly rejected the interpretation of NRS 613.010 adopted by two federal district court decisions, Severson v. Absolute Dental Group, LLC and Turner v. Harvard MedTech of Nevada, LLC, which had held that physical relocation was required. Those decisions, the Court noted, did not grapple with subsection 3 and instead imported reasoning from California’s differently worded employment‑luring statute.

D. Holding on the Jury‑Trial Waiver

On the jury‑demand issue, the Court held that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by refusing to enforce the contractual jury‑trial waiver, where:

  • Anderson filed a jury demand;
  • Field Effect signed a joint case conference report that acknowledged the jury demand;
  • the district court set the case for a jury trial; and
  • Field Effect waited more than ten months after the demand—and about eight months after the scheduling of a jury trial—before invoking the contractual waiver.

On those facts, the district court reasonably concluded that Field Effect had waived its right to demand enforcement of the jury‑trial waiver provision, and thus mandamus relief was not warranted.

Result: The petition for writ of mandamus was denied in full.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Writ Standards and Advisory Mandamus

  • Smith v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 818 P.2d 849 (1991)
    • Establishes that writs of mandamus are extraordinary remedies and that the Supreme Court has sole discretion to entertain them.
    • Cited to reaffirm that mandamus is not a matter of right and is granted sparingly.
  • Pan v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 120 Nev. 222, 88 P.3d 840 (2004)
    • Holds that the petitioner has the burden to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief.
    • Used to underscore that Field Effect had to show more than mere error; it had to show error of a kind appropriate for mandamus.
  • Scarbo v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 125 Nev. 118, 206 P.3d 975 (2009)
    • Explains that mandamus can compel the performance of a legal duty or correct a manifest abuse of discretion.
  • Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 65, 556 P.3d 959 (2024)
    • Endorses “advisory mandamus” in limited situations: when a petition presents issues of statewide importance and where clarification would promote judicial economy.
    • The Court relies on this to justify reaching the merits of NRS 613.010 despite the general reluctance to review denials of summary judgment by writ.
  • ANSE, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 124 Nev. 862, 192 P.3d 738 (2008)
    • Reflects the Court’s usual practice of declining writ review of denials of summary judgment.
    • Distinguished here because Field Effect’s petition presents a pure question of law of first impression.
  • Clark County v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 31, 570 P.3d 135 (2025)
    • Recognizes that writ review of summary judgment denials may be appropriate where:
      • there is no factual dispute, and
      • the petition raises a clear legal question.
    • Cited to validate writ review here: the parties agree that Anderson did not change his residence; only the legal question of statutory interpretation remained.
  • Lowe Enterprises Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405 (2002)
    • Holds that writ review can be an appropriate vehicle to challenge a denial of a motion to strike a jury demand, because:
      • if a party is erroneously denied a jury (or erroneously compelled to a bench trial), an appeal after final judgment may not be an adequate remedy.
    • Invoked to justify the Court’s review of the jury‑demand ruling via mandamus.
  • State v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 267 P.3d 777 (2011)
    • Equates “manifest abuse of discretion” with a clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law.
    • Provides the standard by which the Court measured the district court’s refusal to enforce the jury‑trial waiver.

2. Statutory Interpretation Authorities

  • Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial District Court, 124 Nev. 193, 179 P.3d 556 (2008)
    • Confirms that issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo, even in writ proceedings.
  • Reif v. Aries Consultants, Inc., 135 Nev. 389, 449 P.3d 1253 (2019)
    • States the baseline rule: if a statute’s text is clear and unambiguous, courts give effect to its plain, ordinary meaning.
  • In re Estate of Murray, 131 Nev. 64, 344 P.3d 419 (2015)
    • Articulates the “whole‑text canon”: courts interpret statutory provisions as a whole, avoiding interpretations that render words or phrases superfluous or nugatory.
  • Cornella v. Justice Court of New River Township, 132 Nev. 587, 377 P.3d 97 (2016), and Wyman v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 217 P.3d 572 (2009)
    • Stand for the proposition that when the Legislature has not defined a term, courts presume that it uses words in their usual and natural sense, often aided by dictionary definitions.
    • Here, the Court relied on Merriam‑Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary definition of “place” as a “physical environment.”
  • Tough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott, 139 Nev. 459, 537 P.3d 883 (2023)
    • Reaffirms the whole‑text canon and the need to interpret statutes in a way that harmonizes related provisions.
  • Seput v. Lacayo, 122 Nev. 499, 134 P.3d 733 (2006)
    • Emphasizes that related statutory provisions should be interpreted together to form a consistent and coherent legal framework.
  • In re Cay Clubs, 130 Nev. 920, 340 P.3d 563 (2014)
    • Holds that courts should not resort to legislative history or external sources unless a statute is ambiguous after textual analysis.
    • Used here to justify the Court’s refusal to speculate about the Legislature’s intent by reference to California law, because NRS 613.010 was clear once subsections (1) and (3) were read together.

3. Federal and Out-of-State Authorities Distinguished

  • Severson v. Absolute Dental Group, LLC, No. 2:22‑cv‑01916‑GMN‑VCF, 2023 WL 2772004 (D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2023)
    • Federal district court case interpreting NRS 613.010 to require a physical relocation of the worker; the plaintiff worked remotely from Arizona and never moved to Nevada.
    • Relied heavily on California’s Labor Code § 970 and did not examine NRS 613.010(3).
    • The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed with Severson and declined to follow it, stressing differences in statutory language and criticizing its failure to read subsection (3) into the analysis.
  • Turner v. Harvard MedTech of Nevada, LLC, No. 2:22‑cv‑1264‑JCM (BNW), 2023 WL 9954982 (D. Nev. July 27, 2023)
    • Followed Severson and held that merely changing “place of employment” without a change in “place of abode” was insufficient under NRS 613.010.
    • Likewise rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court as inconsistent with Nevada’s statutory text.
  • California Labor Code §§ 970 and 972
    • California’s statute prohibits inducing workers “to change from one place to another in this State or from any place outside to any place within this State” by knowingly false representations.
    • Section 972 provides a civil remedy—liability “for double damages resulting from such misrepresentations.”
    • The Nevada Supreme Court noted that, unlike NRS 613.010(3), California’s statute does not contain explicit language referring to “place of employment” versus “place of abode.”
    • The Court therefore declined to assume that Nevada’s Legislature intended to mirror California’s approach and rejected the federal courts’ reliance on California law as a guide.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning on NRS 613.010

1. The Statutory Text

The heart of the opinion is a close reading of NRS 613.010:

  • NRS 613.010(1) (substance summarized):
    • Makes it unlawful for an employer to “induce, influence, persuade or engage workers to change from one place to another in this state” by false or deceptive representations, advertising, or pretenses concerning the terms and conditions of employment (including compensation).
  • NRS 613.010(2):
    • Classifies violations of subsection (1) as a gross misdemeanor.
  • NRS 613.010(3):
    • Creates a civil cause of action for any worker aggrieved by the conduct described in subsection (1), permitting recovery for all damages sustained as a result of the misrepresentations used to induce the worker to change:
      • his or her place of employment, or
      • place of abode in case the worker was not employed at the time of the inducement and hiring.

Field Effect’s argument hinged entirely on the phrase in subsection (1) “to change from one place to another in this state.” It contended that this phrase necessarily refers to a change in residence, and thus that NRS 613.010 does not apply where a worker merely shifts from Employer A to Employer B without a physical move.

2. The Meaning of “Place”

The Court began with the plain meaning of the word “place”:

  • Because “place” is undefined in the statute, the Court applied the principle that undefined terms are given their ordinary meaning, often informed by a reputable dictionary.
  • Using Merriam‑Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, the Court noted that “place” means a “physical environment.”
  • This definition is broad enough to encompass:
    • a worker’s place of abode (where they live) and
    • a worker’s place of employment (where they work).

Viewed in isolation, subsection (1)’s phrase “to change from one place to another in this state” could, therefore, reasonably refer to either:

  • moving one’s residence,
  • changing one’s workplace, or
  • both.

The key is that the statute further illuminates this term in subsection (3).

3. Harmonizing Subsections (1) and (3): The Whole-Text Canon

Applying the “whole‑text canon,” the Court emphasized that:

  • Statutory subsections must be read in harmony, not in isolation.
  • Interpretations that render language in one subsection meaningless or redundant are disfavored.

Subsection (3) explicitly states that a worker may sue for damages sustained due to misrepresentations used to induce them to change:

  • “his or her place of employment, or”
  • “place of abode in case such worker shall not be then employed at the time of such inducement and hiring.”

From this language, the Court drew two crucial conclusions:

  1. NRS 613.010 covers both job changes and residential moves.
    By listing both “place of employment” and “place of abode,” subsection (3) clarifies that the phrase “change from one place to another” in subsection (1) is not limited to changes in residence. Instead, it encompasses:
    • workers who are currently employed and are induced to change employers; and
    • workers who are not employed and are induced to move their residence (place of abode) in connection with a job opportunity.
  2. The meaning of “place” in subsection (1) must be broad enough to include both scenarios.
    A narrower reading that limited “place” to abode would conflict with subsection (3)’s express reference to “place of employment” and would undermine the coherence of the statute’s remedial scheme.

Thus, harmonizing subsections (1) and (3), the Court concluded that NRS 613.010 “contemplates both scenarios” and that a worker who changes his or her place of employment in reliance on false representations may sue even without a residential move.

4. Rejection of the Relocation-Only Interpretation

Field Effect’s primary textual argument—that “change from one place to another” must refer to a residential move—could not survive this holistic reading:

  • Such an interpretation would effectively read “place of employment” out of subsection (3) or reduce it to surplusage.
  • The Court refused to adopt an interpretation that would “render words or phrases superfluous” or make any provision “nugatory.”

Moreover, the Court underscored that the Legislature had explicitly distinguished between “place of employment” and “place of abode” in the civil‑remedy subsection, signaling a deliberate intention to protect workers in both situations.

5. Distinguishing California and Federal District Court Readings

The federal cases and California authorities upon which Field Effect relied were found unpersuasive for several reasons:

  • Omission of NRS 613.010(3): The federal district courts in Severson and Turner did not meaningfully engage with subsection (3), which is precisely where the Nevada Legislature spelled out the civil cause of action and defined the actionable “change” in terms of “place of employment” or “place of abode.”
  • Different statutory wording in California:
    • California’s statute refers only to a change “from one place to another,” without the explicit “place of employment / place of abode” dichotomy found in NRS 613.010(3).
    • California’s remedial provision (Labor Code § 972) simply provides for double damages and lacks Nevada’s clarifying language.
  • No need to infer legislative intent from California law:
    • Under In re Cay Clubs, the Court deemed the statutory text unambiguous when read as a whole.
    • As a result, importing California’s legislative intent or interpretive gloss was both unnecessary and inappropriate.

In short, the Court firmly disapproved the federal courts’ relocation‑only reading of NRS 613.010 and clarified that Nevada’s statute must be construed on its own textual terms.

C. The Court’s Reasoning on the Jury-Demand Issue

1. The Right at Issue and the Nature of the Waiver

The employment agreement between Field Effect and Anderson included a jury‑trial waiver—a contractual provision under which the parties agreed to waive their right to a jury trial and have disputes resolved by a judge alone (a “bench trial”).

Anderson nonetheless filed a jury demand, thereby invoking his constitutional right to a jury trial unless the contractual waiver was enforced. Field Effect did not immediately move to strike this demand.

2. Conduct Amounting to Waiver of the Jury-Waiver Provision

The record, as described by the Court, showed that:

  • Anderson filed a jury demand early in the case.
  • Field Effect later signed a joint case conference report that:
    • acknowledged the existence of the jury demand and
    • did not contest it based on the contractual waiver.
  • The district court then scheduled a jury trial.
  • Field Effect waited:
    • more than ten months after the jury demand, and
    • almost eight months after the trial was set as a jury trial,
    before raising the jury‑trial waiver provision in a motion to strike the jury demand.

On these facts, the district court found that Field Effect had waived its contractual right to insist on a non‑jury trial by:

  • failing to assert the contractual waiver in a timely way; and
  • implicitly accepting the jury‑trial posture through its litigation conduct (signing the report, participating in scheduling a jury trial, and remaining silent for an extended period).

3. Appellate Review: Manifest Abuse of Discretion

The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed this decision under the manifest abuse of discretion standard, as refined in Armstrong:

  • A manifest abuse of discretion occurs when the lower court’s ruling is based on a clearly erroneous application of the law.
  • Mandamus is appropriate only if such an abuse is shown; it is not a vehicle to second‑guess reasonable discretionary decisions.

The Court held that:

  • Under the circumstances—particularly the long delay and inconsistent conduct—it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Field Effect had forfeited its contractual protection.
  • The district court’s ruling was thus not clearly erroneous, and no manifest abuse of discretion occurred.

Result: The Court declined to disturb the district court’s refusal to strike the jury demand.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Expansion and Clarification of NRS 613.010’s Scope

The Court’s central holding—that NRS 613.010 covers changes in place of employment even without a change in residence—significantly clarifies and, in practical terms, likely expands the statute’s reach in modern employment disputes.

1. Coverage of Misrepresentations in Standard Job Changes

Under this decision, an employee in Nevada who:

  • is currently employed;
  • is recruited by a new employer; and
  • is induced to leave their existing job and join the new employer based on false or deceptive representations about job duties, compensation, or other terms and conditions,

can potentially bring a statutory civil claim under NRS 613.010—even if:

  • they do not move to a new city or change residences; and
  • their new job is in the same metropolitan area or even the same building.

This enhances statutory protection for employees who are enticed away from stable jobs by misrepresentations, aligning with the general remedial purpose of employment‑luring statutes: to prevent employers from gaining competitive advantage through deceitful recruiting practices.

2. Interplay with Common-Law Claims

While the opinion focuses on statutory interpretation, the clarified reach of NRS 613.010 will affect litigation strategies:

  • Employees lured by misrepresentations previously might have relied primarily on common‑law claims like fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of contract.
  • Now, they may additionally assert an NRS 613.010 statutory claim, which:
    • explicitly authorizes recovery of “all damages” sustained as a consequence of the misrepresentations; and
    • carries the moral and rhetorical force of a statutory violation, which also constitutes a gross misdemeanor under subsection (2).

3. Divergence from Earlier Federal “Erie Guesses”

Before this decision, federal courts sitting in diversity had made what amounted to “Erie guesses” about Nevada law in Severson and Turner, concluding that NRS 613.010 required physical relocation:

  • The Nevada Supreme Court has now made clear that those predictions were incorrect.
  • Going forward, both state and federal courts applying Nevada law must treat NRS 613.010 as covering changes in place of employment alone.

This ensures uniform application of Nevada law and mitigates the risk of divergent outcomes between state and federal forums.

B. Practical Consequences for Employers and Employees

1. Employers’ Recruiting and Onboarding Practices

Nevada employers—particularly those recruiting already‑employed workers—face heightened statutory risk if they:

  • exaggerate or misstate job responsibilities (e.g., promising a “lead” or “executive” role that does not exist);
  • misrepresent the compensation structure, benefits, or bonus eligibility; or
  • omit material facts that make otherwise accurate statements misleading in context.

Given that NRS 613.010 attaches both criminal consequences (gross misdemeanor) and civil liability, employers should:

  • ensure that job offers and descriptions are accurate and documented;
  • closely align written offers with the actual position to be filled; and
  • train recruiters and hiring managers against over‑promising or making unverifiable statements about future earnings or roles.

2. Employee Mobility and Remedies

For employees, this decision:

  • reinforces that statutory protection against employment‑luring is not confined to long‑distance moves or relocation scenarios;
  • permits recovery of “all damages” sustained, which can include:
    • lost wages or benefits from leaving the prior job;
    • foregone opportunities (e.g., loss of seniority or career trajectory); and
    • other economic damages causally linked to the misrepresentation.

Employees who feel they have been “baited and switched” into inferior or non‑existent roles in Nevada now have a clearly sanctioned statutory cause of action, even if they never moved houses.

C. Unresolved Questions and Future Litigation

While Field Effect clarifies the core scope of NRS 613.010, it leaves some issues for future cases:

  • Remote Work and Out‑of‑State Employees
    • NRS 613.010(1) refers to changes “from one place to another in this state.” How this interacts with remote workers located outside Nevada but working for Nevada employers remains open.
    • The Court did not resolve whether such workers are covered, particularly where the “place of employment” is virtual or multi‑jurisdictional.
  • Internal Transfers vs. Changes in Employer
    • The opinion relies on subsection (3)’s reference to “place of employment,” but does not define whether an internal transfer between departments, divisions, or locations within a single employer constitutes a change in “place of employment.”
      • employer or merely a substantial change in working environment or location.
  • Scope of Recoverable Damages
    • NRS 613.010(3) allows recovery of “all damages” sustained “in consequence” of the misrepresentations, but the opinion does not delineate:
      • whether emotional distress, reputational harm, or other non‑economic damages are available; or
      • how damages interact with other statutory or contractual remedies.

D. Implications of the Jury-Waiver Holding

On the jury‑trial issue, the opinion reinforces several practical points:

  • Contractual jury‑trial waivers remain enforceable in Nevada, but:
    • they must be timely and consistently asserted to be effective;
    • conduct inconsistent with insisting on a bench trial—such as acknowledging a jury demand and litigating under a jury‑trial framework for many months—may be treated as a waiver of the waiver.
  • Parties wishing to rely on such waivers must:
    • raise them promptly, typically at or near the outset of the litigation;
    • avoid stipulating to schedules and procedural orders that presuppose a jury trial; and
    • be aware that like any contractual right, enforcement can be lost through delay and acquiescence.

For litigants, this decision serves as a cautionary tale: even a clear contractual right can be forfeited if not diligently asserted. For trial courts, it confirms that they retain discretion to find waiver based on the totality of litigation conduct and that such discretionary determinations will be upheld absent clear legal error.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary order from a higher court (here, the Nevada Supreme Court) to a lower court (or government official) directing it to:

  • perform a duty required by law, or
  • correct a serious misuse of discretion (a “manifest abuse”).

It is not a routine appeal. It is granted only in rare situations, typically when:

  • there is no adequate remedy through ordinary appeal, and
  • the lower court’s error is especially serious or affects important legal questions.

B. Employment-Luring Statute (NRS 613.010)

Nevada’s employment‑luring statute, NRS 613.010, is designed to combat deceptive recruiting practices. It:

  • makes it unlawful (and criminal) for employers to induce workers to change locations (“from one place to another in this state”) through false or deceptive representations about employment terms; and
  • gives workers a civil cause of action for all damages they sustain when they are induced to:
    • change their place of employment, or
    • change their place of abode when they are not currently employed.

C. Whole-Text Canon of Statutory Interpretation

The whole‑text canon is a principle that requires courts to interpret all parts of a statute together, so that:

  • the interpretation of one subsection does not render another subsection meaningless;
  • words are not treated as surplusage if they can be given coherent effect; and
  • the statute operates as a consistent, integrated scheme.

In Field Effect, this canon was decisive: reading subsections (1) and (3) together led the Court to conclude that the phrase “change from one place to another” must include both changes in place of employment and in place of abode.

D. Manifest Abuse of Discretion

A manifest abuse of discretion is more than just a close call or minor error. It means:

  • the lower court’s decision reflects a clearly erroneous understanding or application of the law, or
  • the decision is irrational or arbitrary in light of the governing legal standards.

Mandamus relief is available only when such an abuse is shown. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that:

  • the district court’s reading of NRS 613.010 was correct (no error, let alone a manifest abuse); and
  • its finding of waiver of the jury‑trial waiver was at least reasonable, and thus not a manifest abuse of discretion.

E. Waiver of a Contractual Right

A party can waive a contractual right (such as a jury‑trial waiver clause) by:

  • failing to timely assert the right;
  • engaging in conduct inconsistent with the right (e.g., litigating as if a jury trial will occur); or
  • otherwise intentionally relinquishing or abandoning the right.

In Field Effect, signing joint case documents acknowledging a jury demand and waiting many months before invoking the contractual waiver justified the district court’s conclusion that Field Effect had waived its ability to rely on that provision.

VI. Conclusion

Field Effect Security Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court (Anderson) establishes a significant precedent in Nevada employment law and clarifies procedural expectations in civil practice.

On the substantive side, the Court:

  • held that NRS 613.010 authorizes a civil cause of action where an employee is induced to change his or her place of employment based on false or deceptive representations about job terms, even if the employee does not change residence;
  • harmonized subsections (1) and (3) through the whole‑text canon, reading “place” to include both “place of employment” and “place of abode”;
  • rejected prior federal interpretations that restricted the statute to cases involving physical relocation; and
  • confirmed Nevada’s independent interpretive approach, grounded in its own statutory text rather than borrowed California authority.

On the procedural side, the Court:

  • affirmed the use of advisory mandamus to resolve issues of statewide importance like the scope of NRS 613.010;
  • reiterated that denial of a motion to strike a jury demand can be reviewed via mandamus when no adequate remedy by appeal exists; and
  • held that a party may waive even a clear contractual jury‑trial waiver by delay and inconsistent conduct, and that a district court’s decision to find such waiver will be upheld absent a manifest abuse of discretion.

The decision thus strengthens statutory protections against deceptive recruiting in Nevada, clarifies employers’ exposure under NRS 613.010, and underscores the importance of timely, consistent assertion of contractual rights in civil litigation. It will serve as a key reference point for future employment disputes, statutory‑interpretation questions, and procedural challenges involving jury‑trial waivers in Nevada courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

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