Narrowing Interlocutory Venue Appeals in Multi‑Plaintiff Cases under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.003(b):
A Commentary on Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. & Blue Bird Body Co. v. Sayre

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. and Blue Bird Body Company v. Sayre addresses a fundamentally procedural but practically crucial question: when, if ever, can parties take an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s venue ruling in a multi‑plaintiff case?

For decades, the Legislature has made clear that venue determinations are ordinarily not immediately appealable. The 2003 amendment to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.003(b) was widely read by most courts of appeals to have punched a very large hole in that rule for any case involving multiple plaintiffs. The Supreme Court here firmly rejects that expansive interpretation and “closes the loophole.”

The Court holds that:

The mere existence of multiple plaintiffs does not automatically confer a right to an interlocutory appeal of a venue ruling.
Section 15.003(b) permits an interlocutory appeal only when the trial court actually makes a determination “under Subsection (a)”—that is, when it decides whether a particular plaintiff has independently established proper venue or satisfied the specific joinder/necessity factors in § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).
When all plaintiffs share identical claims, facts, and venue grounds—what the Court calls a “homogenous venue dispute”—§ 15.003(b) does not apply, and the general statutory prohibition on interlocutory venue appeals in § 15.064(a) controls.

This opinion is less about the underlying products‑liability controversy—arising from the tragic death of a six‑year‑old child—and more about appellate jurisdiction and statutory interpretation. It reshapes Texas practice in multi‑plaintiff litigation by sharply limiting interlocutory review of venue orders.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying tragedy and the lawsuit

In April 2022, six-year-old Emory Sayre was fatally injured by her school bus in Parker County, Texas, as she exited and crossed in front of it. The bus:

was manufactured by Blue Bird Body Company in Georgia; and
was sold by Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P., an authorized Blue Bird dealer, to Brock Independent School District (ISD).

Rush Truck maintained its principal office in Comal County but also operated a facility in Dallas County under the name “Rush Bus Centers of Dallas” or “RBC–Dallas.”

In September 2022, Emory’s parents, Sean and Tori Sayre, sued in Dallas County district court. Their defendants were:

Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P.;
Blue Bird Body Company; and
Brock ISD (later nonsuited).

The Sayres asserted multiple products-liability and negligence-based claims against Blue Bird (including strict liability, design defect, manufacturing defect, failure to warn, negligence, and gross negligence) and strict liability, failure-to-warn, negligence, and gross negligence claims against Rush Truck.

B. The venue dispute

The Sayres alleged that venue was proper in Dallas County under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.002(a)(1), which allows suit in the county where “all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” They relied on evidence that Rush Truck, from its Dallas facility:

proposed, negotiated, and entered the sales agreement with Brock ISD;
issued billing for the bus;
handled registration of the bus;
inspected the bus; and
passed title to Brock ISD.

If venue was proper in Dallas County as to Rush Truck, § 15.005 would permit the lawsuit against Blue Bird to remain there as well, so long as venue was proper as to at least one defendant.

Rush Truck and Blue Bird moved to transfer venue to either:

Parker County, where the accident and death occurred, or
Comal County, where Rush Truck’s principal office is located.

They argued that Dallas‑based activities were “clerical and administrative,” while the “heart of the dispute” lay in Parker County (where the sales employee’s home office and final delivery were located) or Comal County.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to transfer venue. Rush Truck and Blue Bird took an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas.

C. Proceedings in the court of appeals

The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to transfer, holding that a “substantial part” of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in Dallas County, especially those related to the “supply” of the bus. See Rush Truck Ctrs. of Tex., L.P. v. Sayre, 704 S.W.3d 857, 864–65 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023).

Critically, the court of appeals assumed it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal under § 15.003(b) simply because the case involved multiple plaintiffs—the Sayres.

D. The Supreme Court’s intervention and focus on jurisdiction

Rush Truck and Blue Bird sought review in the Supreme Court of Texas, principally to challenge the court of appeals’ venue analysis. After merits briefing on venue, the Supreme Court sua sponte requested supplemental briefing on a threshold question: did the court of appeals have jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal at all?

Relying on its own precedents, the Court emphasized that:

Courts must always address their jurisdiction before reaching the merits.
The Supreme Court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction and that of the lower courts.

Thus, the case transformed from a substantive products‑liability venue battle into a pure question of appellate jurisdiction and statutory construction of §§ 15.003 and 15.064.

III. Statutory Framework: Venue and Interlocutory Appeals in Texas

A. The general rule: no interlocutory appeals of venue determinations

Texas adheres to the “final judgment rule,” under which appellate courts ordinarily review only final judgments that dispose of all parties and claims. The Legislature has carved out limited exceptions for certain interlocutory orders (for example, some immunity rulings, certain injunctions, etc.), but those exceptions are narrow and strictly construed.

Venue determinations are generally governed by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.064(a):

“The court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits. No interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination.”

Thus, the baseline rule is unequivocal: venue rulings may not be immediately appealed; they are reviewable only after final judgment (or in rare cases via extraordinary writ, such as mandamus, under demanding standards).

B. Multi‑plaintiff suits and § 15.003(a): the “independent venue” requirement

Section 15.003 addresses the problem of “tag‑along” plaintiffs in multi‑plaintiff suits. Subsection (a) provides:

“In a suit in which there is more than one plaintiff, … each plaintiff must, independently of every other plaintiff, establish proper venue. If a plaintiff cannot independently establish proper venue, that plaintiff’s part of the suit … must be transferred to a county of proper venue or dismissed … unless that plaintiff, independently of every other plaintiff, establishes that:

joinder or intervention is proper under the Rules of Civil Procedure;

maintaining venue in the county of suit does not unfairly prejudice another party;

there is an essential need to have that plaintiff’s claim tried in the county of suit; and

the county of suit is a fair and convenient venue for that plaintiff and all defendants.

The purpose is to prevent plaintiffs with no connection to a chosen county from piggybacking on another plaintiff who can legitimately sue there. Every plaintiff must either:

prove that, standing alone, they could have filed suit in that county; or
meet all four “safety valve” criteria in § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).

C. Interlocutory appeals in multi‑plaintiff cases: § 15.003(b)

In 2003, the Legislature amended § 15.003 to broaden interlocutory review in certain multi‑plaintiff situations. Subsection (b) provides (in relevant part):

“An interlocutory appeal may be taken of a trial court’s determination under Subsection (a) that:

a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue; or

a plaintiff that did not independently establish proper venue did or did not establish the items prescribed by Subsections (a)(1)–(4).

That text explicitly links the right to an interlocutory appeal to a particular type of trial‑court ruling: a determination under Subsection (a) regarding a plaintiff’s independent venue or satisfaction of the § 15.003(a)(1)–(4) factors.

The interpretive dispute in Rush Truck is whether:

the mere presence of multiple plaintiffs automatically triggers § 15.003(b) (the “majority” view in the courts of appeals); or
§ 15.003(b) applies only when the trial court actually needed to, and did, make an independent-venue determination for each plaintiff under § 15.003(a) (the Fourth Court of Appeals’ narrower view).

IV. Summary of the Opinion and Holding

The Supreme Court unanimously (as reflected in the opinion) holds that:

Section 15.003(b) does not authorize interlocutory appeals in every multi‑plaintiff case. The “key phrase” is “determination under Subsection (a),” which limits appealability to decisions about a plaintiff’s independent venue status or whether they satisfy the § 15.003(a)(1)–(4) criteria.
When all plaintiffs share identical claims, facts, and venue grounds—“homogenous venue disputes”—the trial court has no need to make a § 15.003(a) independent‑venue determination for each plaintiff. In such cases, § 15.003(b) is never triggered.
The general prohibition in § 15.064(a) therefore applies, and no interlocutory appeal lies from such a venue ruling.
In this specific case, Sean and Tori Sayre assert identical claims, arising from identical facts, and rely on identical venue grounds. The trial court did not need to decide whether one parent could “tag along” on the other’s venue; both stand in the same posture.
The Dallas Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of the motion to transfer venue.
The Supreme Court vacates the court of appeals’ judgment and remands the case to the district court, expressly declining to reach the merits of the venue dispute.

The new rule can be succinctly stated:

The presence of multiple plaintiffs does not, by itself, create a right to interlocutory appeal of a venue ruling. Section 15.003(b) allows such an appeal only when the trial court actually determines, under § 15.003(a), whether a particular plaintiff independently established venue or met the statutory joinder/necessity factors.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction first: why the Court never reached venue

The Court begins by reaffirming the basic principle that jurisdictional issues must be addressed before reaching the merits, citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and Texas decisions such as Lehmann v. Har‑Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), and Abbott v. Mexican American Legislative Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2022).

Because the Legislature tightly cabins interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and courts strictly construe statutes that create such jurisdiction (Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. 2007)), the Court asks: Does any statute actually grant jurisdiction for this interlocutory appeal?

The only plausible candidate is § 15.003(b). That statute must be read in context with § 15.064(a)’s broad prohibition on interlocutory appeals of venue determinations.

B. Textual focus: “determination under Subsection (a)”

The opinion centers on the phrase “determination under Subsection (a)” in § 15.003(b). The logic is:

Subsection (a) governs the requirement that “each plaintiff” independently establish venue or satisfy the joinder/safety‑valve criteria in § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).
Subsection (b) authorizes an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s determination that:
- a plaintiff did or did not independently establish venue, or
- a plaintiff who lacked independent venue did or did not meet the § 15.003(a)(1)–(4) tests.
Therefore, the right to interlocutory appeal is tightly linked to and conditioned upon the trial court actually deciding a plaintiff’s status under § 15.003(a).

In other words, the statute does not speak in terms of “all venue determinations in cases with more than one plaintiff.” It speaks in terms of a specific class of determinations: those regarding independent venue or the joinder factors of § 15.003(a).

C. Harmonizing § 15.003(b) with § 15.064(a): avoiding an exception that swallows the rule

Many courts of appeals had reasoned that § 15.003(b), being more specific, should “trump” § 15.064(a)’s general bar against interlocutory appeals whenever there are multiple plaintiffs. The Supreme Court emphatically rejects that approach.

Invoking the general/specific canon as explained by Scalia & Garner in Reading Law, the Court notes that the canon is used only when two provisions truly conflict and cannot be reconciled. Here, the provisions can be harmonized:

Section 15.064(a) sets the baseline: no interlocutory appeals from venue determinations.
Section 15.003(b) creates a narrow, specific exception for determinations under § 15.003(a) concerning a plaintiff’s independent venue status.
So long as § 15.003(b) is confined to those specific determinations, it does not “gut” § 15.064(a), but instead coexists with it as a limited carve‑out.

The majority‑view reading in the courts of appeals would have made almost any venue ruling in any multi‑plaintiff case immediately appealable, effectively overriding § 15.064(a) by implication. The Supreme Court refuses to infer such an extensive repeal without clear legislative command, especially given the consistent policy against piecemeal appeals.

D. Context and structure: reading § 15.003 as a tag‑along control mechanism

The Court situates § 15.003 in context, drawing on:

Its own earlier decision in American Home Products Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000); and
The 2003 legislative amendments that responded to American Home.

In American Home, only one of eleven plaintiffs resided in the county of suit. The Court characterized § 15.003 as addressing the “tag‑along” problem—plaintiffs without venue ties trying to ride on the coattails of a properly‑venued plaintiff. There, the Court held that § 15.003’s prior version did not create a general right of interlocutory appeal for all venue decisions in multi‑plaintiff cases; instead, it only permitted appeals from decisions about whether to allow or deny joinder or intervention.

The 2003 amendment broadened the scope of interlocutory review but preserved the focus on individual plaintiffs’ venue status. The Supreme Court in Rush Truck emphasizes that, even as amended, § 15.003 is “not a venue statute” in the general sense. It is a statute about:

whether each plaintiff can independently establish venue; and
whether non‑independently‑venued plaintiffs can nevertheless remain in the suit via the four specific tests in § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).

The “concern apparent from the text,” the Court explains, is to prevent tag‑along venue abuse, not to open the floodgates to interlocutory appeals of every venue ruling whenever there are two or more plaintiffs.

E. Application to the Sayres’ case: a “homogenous venue dispute”

The Court’s application is straightforward but important. Sean and Tori Sayre:

are both parents of the deceased child;
assert the same types of claims (wrongful death and survival, via the estate);
base those claims on the same operative facts; and
rely on the exact same venue facts and legal venue grounds.

Had there been only one plaintiff—say, a single parent—nothing in the venue analysis would change. There is no plaintiff piggybacking on another’s venue. There is no plaintiff who might need § 15.003(a)(1)–(4) to remain in Dallas County. As the Court puts it, “the venue analysis wouldn’t be any different had young Emory been raised in a single‑parent household.”

Therefore:

The trial court had no need to conduct a § 15.003(a) “independent venue” determination for each plaintiff as distinct individuals.
Consequently, it made no “determination under Subsection (a)” within the meaning of § 15.003(b).
Without a § 15.003(a) determination, § 15.003(b) is never triggered, and the general bar in § 15.064(a) applies.

Hence, there is no statutory basis for the interlocutory appeal the defendants pursued.

F. Adopting the Fourth Court of Appeals’ approach

The Court explicitly endorses the narrower reading of the San Antonio Court of Appeals in:

Basic Energy Services GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.); and
Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied).

Those decisions held that:

Interlocutory appeals under § 15.003(b) are available “only to plaintiffs who are unable to independently establish venue apart from the joinder factors set out in Section 15.003(a).”

Rush Truck elevates that interpretation to statewide precedent, implicitly disapproving the contrary line of cases from eleven other courts of appeals that treated any multi‑plaintiff venue ruling as interlocutorily appealable.

G. Disposition: vacatur and remand

Having found a lack of appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court does not weigh in on whether Dallas County is or is not a proper venue under § 15.002(a)(1). Instead, invoking the “fundamental rule” against reaching merits without jurisdiction (Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2023)), the Court:

vacates the Dallas Court of Appeals’ judgment;
declines to address the underlying venue questions; and
remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. General jurisdiction and final‑judgment principles

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) – federal case cited for the proposition that courts must determine jurisdiction before addressing the merits.
Lehmann v. Har‑Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) – clarifies what constitutes a final judgment in Texas and notes that courts of appeals generally have appellate jurisdiction only over final judgments.
Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) – emphasizes that statutes allowing interlocutory appeals are strictly construed as narrow exceptions.
Abbott v. Mexican American Legislative Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2022) – reaffirmed that the Supreme Court always has jurisdiction to determine its own and the lower courts’ jurisdiction.
Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2023) – reiterates the rule that a court may not reach the merits if a single valid basis defeats jurisdiction.

B. The role and scope of § 15.003: American Home Products and its aftermath

American Home Products Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2000) – key pre‑amendment case interpreting § 15.003. The Court held that:
- § 15.003 was not a general venue statute; and
- it did not make every venue ruling in a multi‑plaintiff case immediately appealable.
The Legislature later amended § 15.003, broadening interlocutory appeal rights but still tying them to determinations about specific plaintiffs’ venue status under § 15.003(a).
Basic Energy Services GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) – interpreted § 15.003(b) narrowly, limiting interlocutory appeals to cases where a plaintiff cannot independently establish venue and must rely on § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).
Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) – reinforced the same limited interpretation.

C. Contrary courts of appeals decisions now implicitly rejected

The Court identifies a broad swath of appellate decisions that had taken the opposite view—that interlocutory appeals are available whenever there are multiple plaintiffs and a venue ruling. These include:

Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto Int’l Grp., 398 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2012, pet. dism’d)
Ryan Marine Servs., Inc. v. Hoffman, 668 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)
Jackson v. Jackson, No. 02‑15‑00102‑CV, 2016 WL 5220069 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2016, pet. denied)
Clear Diamond, Inc. v. Zapata, No. 03‑20‑00057‑CV, 2021 WL 3572725 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 13, 2021, no pet.)
Flare Air, L.L.C. v. Burton, No. 06‑18‑00097‑CV, 2019 WL 166834 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 11, 2019, no pet.)
Nguyen v. Nguyen, No. 07‑24‑00093‑CV, 2024 WL 5049984 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 9, 2024, no pet.)
Brown v. Health & Med. Prac. Assocs., Inc., No. 09‑13‑00192‑CV, 2013 WL 5658605 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 17, 2013, no pet.)
In re AAA Bros. Holdings, LLC, No. 12‑23‑00210‑CV, 2023 WL 6631952 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 11, 2023, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])

While the Supreme Court does not expressly “overrule” these intermediate decisions (since they are from other courts), it plainly states that they rest on a misreading of § 15.003(b). After Rush Truck, those cases are no longer good guidance on appellate venue jurisdiction.

D. Statutory interpretation authorities

Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) – cited for principles that:
- context is a “primary determinant of meaning”; and
- the general/specific canon applies only when provisions are irreconcilable.
Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2017) – emphasizes that statutes must be read “as a whole.”
McClane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2023) – underscores that words must be read in statutory context, not in isolation.

VII. Practical Impact on Texas Litigation

A. Limiting interlocutory venue appeals in multi‑plaintiff cases

The most direct effect is to sharply reduce the number of venue rulings that can be challenged via interlocutory appeal when more than one plaintiff is involved. Under Rush Truck:

Defense counsel cannot simply rely on the presence of multiple plaintiffs to take an immediate appeal from an adverse venue decision.
Interlocutory review will be available only if:
- at least one plaintiff cannot independently establish venue; and
- the trial court has actually decided that plaintiff’s status under § 15.003(a) (either denying independent venue or denying/allowing retention under the four statutory factors).

In cases where all plaintiffs share the same venue facts and grounds, appeals must await final judgment, as in single-plaintiff suits.

B. Clarifying the role of § 15.003: focus on “tag‑along” plaintiffs

The decision realigns § 15.003 with its original purpose: preventing plaintiffs without a legitimate venue connection from leveraging another plaintiff’s venue. Practically, this means:

Plaintiffs’ lawyers in multi‑plaintiff suits must be prepared to show independent venue for each client, or else meet the four statutory factors.
Defendants can still challenge “tag‑along” plaintiffs and seek transfer or dismissal of those plaintiffs’ claims; § 15.003 remains a powerful tool in that respect.
However, the consequence of an adverse ruling on those determinations is now clearly defined: an interlocutory appeal is permitted, but only as to those specific determinations.

C. Procedural strategy for litigators

For practitioners, several strategic implications emerge:

Pleading and proof of venue: Plaintiffs should carefully plead venue facts for each plaintiff and, where appropriate, build a record that supports independent venue across the board to reduce exposure to § 15.003 challenges and appeals.
Framing motions to transfer: Defendants seeking an interlocutory appeal must structure their motions to transfer in a way that squarely puts § 15.003(a) independent‑venue issues before the trial court. Generic challenges to “venue as a whole” in homogenous plaintiff settings will not suffice.
Trial‑court orders: Trial courts handling multi‑plaintiff venue disputes should consider making explicit findings as to whether any plaintiff:
- lacks independent venue; and
- does or does not satisfy § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).
Such clarity will help define when § 15.003(b) is triggered and avoid unnecessary jurisdictional disputes on appeal.

D. Impact on mass‑tort and complex multi‑plaintiff litigation

The decision is especially significant for mass‑tort, toxic‑tort, and other complex multi‑plaintiff cases where plaintiffs from various counties (or states) are joined in a single forum:

Tag‑along plaintiffs: Where some plaintiffs lack any venue connection, trial courts must apply § 15.003(a) and may be subject to interlocutory review for those determinations.
Uniform plaintiff groups: In contrast, where all plaintiffs share the same operative facts and venue connections (for example, co‑owners of damaged property in the same county), interlocutory appeals of general venue rulings will be foreclosed.
Forum choice stability: Plaintiffs will have somewhat greater stability in their initially chosen venue in homogenous multi‑plaintiff cases, at least until final judgment.

E. Potential for increased mandamus?

Although the Court does not address mandamus directly, Rush Truck makes clear that ordinary appeals are unavailable in homogenous multi‑plaintiff venue disputes. In theory, litigants might consider seeking mandamus relief in extreme cases, but:

Mandamus requires a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal—a far higher threshold than an ordinary appeal.
The Legislature’s explicit prohibition on interlocutory venue appeals (§ 15.064(a)) will weigh heavily against routine mandamus relief.

Thus, while mandamus remains theoretically possible, Rush Truck reinforces that most venue disputes—even in multi‑plaintiff cases—are intended to be addressed, if at all, only after final judgment.

VIII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Venue vs. jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is a court’s legal power to hear a type of case or bind particular parties. If jurisdiction is lacking, the court cannot act at all.
Venue is the proper location within a judicial system where a case may be tried (which county, for example). Venue can often be waived or cured, unlike subject‑matter jurisdiction.

B. Final judgment rule and interlocutory appeal

A final judgment disposes of all parties and all claims. Most appeals can only be taken from such judgments.
An interlocutory appeal is an appeal from a ruling made before final judgment (e.g., a ruling on venue, immunity, or certain injunctions). Texas law strictly limits when these are allowed.

C. Multi‑plaintiff venue and “independently establishing proper venue”

In a case with multiple plaintiffs:

Each plaintiff must show that the county of suit would be a proper venue for that plaintiff alone (for example, where that plaintiff resides, was injured, or where a substantial part of the events occurred).
If a plaintiff cannot make that showing, their claims must be transferred or dismissed unless they prove all four special factors in § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).

D. “Tag‑along” plaintiffs

A “tag‑along” plaintiff is one who:

has no independent venue connection to the county of suit;
joins a plaintiff who does have a proper venue connection; and
attempts to stay in that county by virtue of the joinder, even though the plaintiff could not have filed there alone.

Section 15.003 is designed to ensure that such plaintiffs cannot remain in the suit unless the statutory tests are satisfied.

E. “Homogenous venue disputes” vs. independent‑venue disputes

A homogenous venue dispute is one where all plaintiffs’ claims and venue facts are essentially identical. In such cases, the court does not need to perform a separate § 15.003(a) analysis for each plaintiff.
An independent‑venue dispute arises when some plaintiffs have different venue facts than others, so the court must determine whether each plaintiff individually meets venue requirements or qualifies under § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).

Rush Truck holds that § 15.003(b) interlocutory appeals are available only in the latter type of dispute.

F. “A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” – § 15.002(a)(1)

Although the Court does not reach this issue, it underlies the venue arguments:

Section 15.002(a)(1) allows suit in a county where “all or a substantial part” of the relevant events or omissions occurred.
Parties often dispute:
- what counts as “events or omissions giving rise to the claim” (e.g., sales negotiations, design decisions, the accident itself); and
- whether those events in a particular county are “substantial.”

Those questions remain open for resolution at trial and, if necessary, on appeal from a final judgment in this case.

IX. Unresolved Questions and Future Litigation Issues

A. How distinct must venue facts be to trigger § 15.003(b)?

Rush Truck clearly covers cases where all plaintiffs are identically situated. But gray areas remain:

What if spouses bring related but not identical claims (e.g., one wrongful‑death plaintiff plus a consortium claim)?
What if some plaintiffs reside in the county of suit while others do not, but all are injured by the same event?
Is a formal, explicit § 15.003(a) determination required, or can one be implied from the structure of the trial court’s order?

Future cases may refine how distinct plaintiffs’ venue facts must be before appellate courts treat a ruling as a “determination under Subsection (a)” that can be appealed under § 15.003(b).

B. Interaction with joinder rules (Texas Rules of Civil Procedure)

Section 15.003(a)(1) references the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing joinder and intervention. In complex cases:

Courts may need to consider both joinder propriety (Rule 40, etc.) and venue under § 15.003 simultaneously.
Whether an appealable “determination under Subsection (a)” has been made may depend on how explicitly the trial court addresses those issues.

C. Legislative response?

If the Legislature concludes that more (or less) interlocutory review of venue is desirable in multi‑plaintiff cases, it could:

amend § 15.003(b) to expressly authorize broader appeals; or
further clarify the interplay between §§ 15.003 and 15.064(a).

For now, however, Rush Truck fixes the meaning of the current text statewide.

X. Conclusion

Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. & Blue Bird Body Co. v. Sayre is a significant procedural decision with far‑reaching consequences for Texas civil practice. The Court:

reaffirms the strong legislative policy against piecemeal appeals of venue decisions;
clarifies that § 15.003(b) is a narrow exception aimed at “tag‑along” plaintiffs, not a broad license for interlocutory venue appeals in every multi‑plaintiff case; and
harmonizes §§ 15.003 and 15.064(a) by tying interlocutory review strictly to trial‑court determinations about a plaintiff’s independent venue status under § 15.003(a).

In practical terms, the decision:

substantially reduces interlocutory venue appeals in homogenous multi‑plaintiff suits;
ensures that most venue disputes will be resolved once, in the trial court, and reviewed (if at all) only after final judgment; and
provides clearer guidance to litigants and courts on when § 15.003(b) can be invoked.

Although the underlying facts involve a devastating loss and a hard‑fought venue battle, the Supreme Court confines itself to jurisdiction and statutory interpretation, leaving the merits of venue—and the substantive products‑liability claims—to be addressed in the ordinary course before the trial court and, if necessary, on appeal from a final judgment.

Note: This commentary is an academic analysis of the opinion and does not constitute legal advice.

Narrowing Interlocutory Venue Appeals in Multi‑Plaintiff Cases under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.003(b): A Commentary on Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. & Blue Bird Body Co. v. Sayre