Nameplate Rating Controls: Interpreting “Connected Load for Initial Full Operation” Under Oklahoma’s One‑Megawatt Exception

I. Introduction

The decision in Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 2025 OK 43, 571 P.3d 729, marks a significant clarification of Oklahoma’s statutory regime governing exclusive electric service territories. At the center of the dispute is a single phrase in the Retail Energy Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA), 17 O.S.1971 § 158.25(E): the connected load for initial full operation of an electric-consuming facility.

The Oklahoma Corporation Commission had interpreted this phrase in a way that effectively protected incumbent rural electric cooperatives from competition by tying the one‑megawatt exception to a facility’s actual demand in service. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that under industry usage and statutory text, the phrase refers instead to the total nameplate ratings of all connected equipment at the moment the facility begins full operation, regardless of how much power the facility actually draws in practice.

This commentary examines the Court’s reasoning, the precedents it relied upon, and the broader impact of this decision on Oklahoma utility law, administrative law, and the balance between investor‑owned utilities and rural electric cooperatives.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The RESCTA Framework and the One‑Megawatt Exception

RESCTA, codified at 17 O.S.2011 §§ 158.21–158.32, divides Oklahoma into geographic service territories within which a designated retail electric supplier has the exclusive right to provide retail electricity. As a general rule, one utility cannot poach customers located in another utility’s certified territory.

However, RESCTA contains specific exceptions. The exception at issue here is the “large load” or “one megawatt” exception in § 158.25(E), which provides that the Act shall not preclude any retail electric supplier from extending its service:

(1) to its own property and facilities, in an unincorporated area, and
(2) subject to Section 5 D, to an electric-consuming facility requiring electric service, in an unincorporated area, if the connected load for initial full operation of such electric-consuming facility is to be 1,000 kw or larger.

In short, in unincorporated areas, a retail electric supplier may serve certain large-load customers—even if those customers are physically located in another supplier’s certified territory—if the facility’s connected load for initial full operation is at least 1,000 kilowatts (1 megawatt).

B. The Facilities: Bison and Cimarex Saltwater Disposal Sites

The dispute arose over two saltwater disposal facilities in Canadian County:

The Bison Oilfield Services facility; and
The Cimarex Energy facility.

Both facilities are located in the certified territory of CKenergy Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CKenergy), a rural electric cooperative.

Appellant Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company (OG&E), an investor‑owned utility, began furnishing retail electric service to:

the Cimarex facility in November 2017; and
the Bison facility in July 2018.

C. Proceedings Before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission

On August 7, 2019, CKenergy filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Commission), seeking an injunction to stop OG&E from serving these facilities. CKenergy argued that OG&E was unlawfully serving customers inside CKenergy’s certified territory in violation of RESCTA.

OG&E responded that both facilities qualified under the one‑megawatt exception in § 158.25(E). It argued that the connected load for initial full operation of each facility was at least 1,000 kW because the total nameplate rating of all equipment connected at the time each facility commenced full operations exceeded that threshold.

CKenergy, by contrast, took the position that connected load for initial full operation must be measured by the facility’s actual electrical usage when it first operates in a normal, full state, i.e., by demand (sometimes reflected in the concept of diversified load). On this view:

the focus is on what the facility in fact draws from the system, not the capacity of the installed equipment; and
the threshold would be keyed to the facility’s actual operational demand when it is first fully running.

The Commission sided with CKenergy. It held:

the phrase connected load for initial full operation was clear and unambiguous;
it refers to the purpose of the load and the operational demand of the load at the point in time when the facility is in initial full operation;
during the first eleven months of operation, the measured demand at both facilities never met or exceeded 1,000 kW; and
OG&E knew neither facility actually planned to use 1,000 kW.

On that basis, the Commission issued Order No. 714136, enjoining OG&E from serving the two facilities.

D. The Stay Pending Appeal

OG&E appealed the injunction (Supreme Court Case No. 119,088). While that appeal was pending, OG&E applied for a stay of the Commission’s order under Article 9, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution. On October 7, 2020, the Commission granted the stay (Order No. 714817), conditioned on OG&E’s posting a supersedeas bond in the amount of $456,396.00.

CKenergy and the Oklahoma Association of Electric Cooperatives (OAEC) then appealed the stay order (Case No. 119,173), arguing the Commission misapplied the constitutional stay provisions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court consolidated the appeals.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Kane authored the majority opinion. The Court framed the central legal issue as the proper interpretation of the phrase connected load for initial full operation in 17 O.S. § 158.25(E), a question of first impression for the Commission and the Court.

The Supreme Court held:

Under RESCTA’s large load or one megawatt exception, 17 O.S.1971 § 158.25(E), “the connected load for initial full operation” means the total nameplate values of all connected electrical equipment when full operation of the facility commences.

Applying this definition, the Court found it undisputed that the connected load at both the Bison and Cimarex facilities exceeded 1,000 kW when each began full operation. Therefore:

the one‑megawatt exception applied to both facilities;
OG&E was lawfully entitled to serve them in CKenergy’s certified territory; and
the Commission’s injunction in Order No. 714136 was contrary to law and must be reversed.

As to the second appeal (Order No. 714817 granting the stay and approving the appeal bond), the Court held that because it had determined OG&E could lawfully serve the facilities and reversed the underlying injunction, the challenge to the stay order was moot. There was no longer a live controversy regarding whether the Commission was constitutionally required to suspend its own order pending appeal.

The Court’s final disposition:

Order No. 714136 (injunction) — reversed.
Appeal of Order No. 714817 (stay) — dismissed as moot.

Justices Kuehn (Vice Chief Justice), Winchester, Combs, Darby, and Kane concurred. Chief Justice Rowe dissented. Justices Edmondson and Gurich were disqualified, and Justice Jett did not participate. The opinion does not reproduce or summarize the dissent, so further analysis of the dissenting rationale is not possible from the text provided.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Constitutional Standard of Review – Article 9, § 20

Article 9, § 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution governs judicial review of Commission orders. It creates a two‑tiered framework:

In appeals involving an asserted violation of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court exercises independent judgment as to both law and facts.
In all other appeals, review is limited to whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority and whether its findings and conclusions are supported by law and substantial evidence.

OG&E’s appeal of Order No. 714136 turned on the Commission’s interpretation of a statute—a legal question—so the Court applied de novo review to that legal conclusion.

B. The Standard of Review Cases: “People’s,” City of OKC, Dobson, Med. Park, American Airlines

The Court relied on a line of Oklahoma decisions emphasizing that legal interpretations by agencies are not binding on the judiciary and are reviewed de novo:

Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2025 OK 15, 565 P.3d 418 (People’s).
- Reaffirms that the Commission’s legal conclusions are not presumed correct.
- States that when the Commission ignores the plain language of a statute, or attempts to impose a meaning which is not supported by any recognized rule of statutory interpretation, its conclusion is not sustained by law.
- Emphasizes the judiciary’s role as the final arbiter of what the law means: This Court is under no constitutional edict to yield our duty … to determine on review what the law is, what the law means, and how the law applies.
- Explains that when a statute is ambiguous, the Court will give some regard to, and at least consider, the Commission’s interpretation, but that interpretation remains nonbinding.
City of Oklahoma City v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2024 OK 77, 558 P.3d 1231.
- Likewise applies de novo review to Commission orders raising constitutional issues.
Dobson Tel. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 2017 OK CIV APP 16, 392 P.3d 295 (approved for publication).
- Articulates that an administrative agency’s legal rulings are subject to plenary, independent, and non‑deferential review.
Med. Park Tel. Co., 2019 OK 21, 441 P.3d 113.
- Reaffirms plenary, independent, and non‑deferential review for issues raising constitutional claims.
American Airlines, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2014 OK 95, 341 P.3d 56.
- Provides the general rule that courts independently determine legal questions, including statutory meaning, when reviewing agency decisions.

These cases underscore that while the Commission has specialized expertise in utility matters, it is the judiciary’s role—not the Commission’s—to determine the meaning of statutes.

C. Deference to Agency Interpretations and Branch Trucking

The Court cited Branch Trucking Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1990 OK 41, 801 P.2d 686, in a footnote. That decision stands for the idea that:

courts may give greater weight to an agency’s longstanding and consistently applied statutory interpretation when industries have come to rely on it; but
that heightened deference is not warranted where an agency adopts an interpretation for the first time during litigation.

Here, the Commission had never before interpreted “connected load for initial full operation” in § 158.25(E). It did so for the first time in this very dispute. The Court pointedly noted this, underscoring that this was not a case of overturning an embedded, reliance‑inducing administrative construction of a statute.

D. Technical Terms and Industry Usage: Riffe Petroleum and City of Stillwater

The Court’s core interpretive move—treating “connected load” as an industry term of art—rests on:

Riffe Petroleum Co. v. Great Nat’l Corp., Inc., 1980 OK 112, 614 P.2d 576.
- Held that where a statute regulates a particular industry (there, the mining industry), technical terms such as development must be interpreted as they are generally used and understood in that industry.
- Emphasized that in the absence of a contrary definition, common words are presumed to carry their ordinary and usual meaning in context.
City of Stillwater v. Cent. Rural Elec. Co‑op., 1997 OK CIV APP 51, 945 P.2d 505.
- Reiterated that statutory language should be interpreted consistent with the plain meaning of the words, the context in which they are used, and the subject to which they refer.

Drawing on these precedents, the Court presumed that the Legislature used connected load in its industry‑specific sense when it adopted § 158.25(E) to regulate the retail electric industry.

E. The Commission’s Own Regulation: O.A.C. § 165:35‑1‑2

Although RESCTA itself does not define “connected load,” the Court noted that the Commission’s administrative rules define “load” in a materially different way:

“Load” is defined as the amount of electric power delivered or required at any specific point or points on an electric transmission and distribution system.
(O.A.C. § 165:35‑1‑2 (as amended by 35 Okla. Reg. 1030) (effective Sept. 12, 2014).)

This regulatory definition underscores that “load” (actual power required or delivered) differs from “connected load” (installed, nameplate capacity of connected equipment). The Commission’s interpretation of the statute essentially wrote “connected” out of the phrase, which the Court found impermissible.

F. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

The Court explicitly addressed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). It stated that Loper Bright is neither controlling nor instructive in this case (as it addresses federal administrative law), but observed that Oklahoma’s limited de novo review of Commission statutory interpretations under Article 9, § 20 is consistent with principles from Loper Bright:

Courts, not agencies, have the ultimate duty to say what the law is (quoting Marbury v. Madison).
Courts should give due respect to agency interpretations but remain free to adopt the best reading of the statute.
Agencies’ statutory interpretations may be persuasive but not binding.
Courts must deploy “every interpretative tool” to determine the best (not merely a “permissible”) reading of a statute.

Loper Bright thus serves as an external point of reference underscoring that the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s approach—declining to defer to the Commission’s legal interpretation of § 158.25(E)—aligns with modern trends away from strong deference doctrines like federal Chevron deference.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Standard of Review Applied

For the appeal of Order No. 714136 (the injunction), the Court clarified that:

Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
Under Article 9, § 20, the Court reviews the Commission’s legal conclusions de novo.
The Commission’s interpretation is neither binding nor presumed correct.

For the appeal of Order No. 714817 (the stay), the Court also applied de novo review, as that appeal raised a constitutional issue under Article 9, § 21 (relating to stays upon appeal from Commission orders).

B. Interpreting “Connected Load for Initial Full Operation”

1. The Competing Constructions

The dispute turned on how to understand the statutory language:

connected load for initial full operation

in the one‑megawatt exception.

OG&E’s position:

“Connected load” is a term of art in the electric industry, meaning the total electric power‑consuming rating (nameplate rating) of all equipment connected to the distribution system.
Thus, “connected load for initial full operation” must mean the sum of the nameplate ratings of all equipment connected at the time the facility commences full operation.
Actual demand, usage history, or “diversified load” are irrelevant to the statutory threshold.

CKenergy’s (and the Commission’s) position:

“Connected load for initial full operation” refers to the actual electrical usage (operational demand) of the facility when it first operates in a full, normal state.
This reading emphasizes the word “for”: the “load for initial full operation” is the load required to operate the facility in practice, not the theoretical capacity of its connected equipment.
In functional terms, CKenergy’s construction equates the phrase to “diversified load” or actual demand, rather than connected nameplate capacity.

The Commission agreed with CKenergy and held that the phrase was “clear and unambiguous,” yet defined it as actual operational demand at the time of full initial operation, measured by demand over the first eleven months.

2. Step One: Is “Connected Load” a Technical Term of Art?

The Court first determined that RESCTA regulates the retail electric industry, and the phrase “connected load” is a technical term in that industry. All parties, including CKenergy, agreed that:

“Connected load” in industry practice means the total nameplate ratings of all connected devices.
The actual power that the facility draws from the system (sometimes captured by “diversified load” or demand) is a distinct concept.

Under Riffe and similar cases, the Court reasoned that when the Legislature uses a technical term in a statute regulating a particular trade or industry, that term is presumed to bear its industry meaning absent contrary indication.

Accordingly, the Court held that in § 158.25(E), “connected load” must be understood as:

the total electric power‑consuming rating, or “nameplate rating,” of all devices connected to a distribution system.

3. Step Two: The Statutory Text Becomes Unambiguous

Once “connected load” is given its industry meaning, the Court concluded that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. The phrase connected load for initial full operation is not susceptible to multiple reasonable meanings:

“Connected load” specifies the metric: nameplate capacity.
“Initial full operation” specifies the time: when the facility commences full, normal operations.
“For” signals the purpose of the connected load: to operate the facility when it first runs in full operation.

On this reading, the one‑megawatt exception applies if, when the facility begins full operations, the sum of the nameplate ratings of all connected equipment is at least 1,000 kW. It does not hinge on how much power the facility actually draws in practice.

Because the language is unambiguous once “connected load” is properly understood, there was no occasion to resort to further rules of construction or to defer to the Commission’s interpretation.

4. Step Three: Rejecting the Commission’s Substitution of “Diversified Load”

The Court found that the Commission’s and CKenergy’s interpretation:

improperly substitutes “diversified load” or actual “load” for the statutory term “connected load”; and
renders the word “connected” meaningless, contrary to basic principles of statutory interpretation.

The opinion notes that the Commission’s own expert acknowledged that “connected load” and “diversified load” are entirely distinct concepts in the industry. Yet both the expert and CKenergy argued that “connected load for initial full operation” has “virtually the same meaning” as diversified load—effectively erasing the connected component.

The Court rejected this move for several reasons:

Textual fidelity: Courts cannot rewrite statutes. The Legislature chose “connected load,” not “diversified load,” “demand,” or “actual load.” The Court presumed that if the Legislature had intended to use a different concept, it would have done so.
Anti‑surplusage principle: By collapsing “connected load” into actual demand, the Commission’s interpretation makes the modifier “connected” functionally irrelevant. Courts avoid readings that render words surplus or meaningless.
Regulatory context: The Commission itself has defined “load” in O.A.C. § 165:35‑1‑2, reinforcing that “load” (actual power required) is conceptually distinct from “connected load” (installed capacity). To interpret “connected load” as if it meant mere “load” ignores the distinction the Commission has itself drawn.

5. Step Four: The Role of the Word “For”

CKenergy emphasized the term “for” in connected load for initial full operation, arguing that it signals a focus on the load required for the purpose of running the facility in full operation, i.e., actual operational demand.

The Court agreed only in part:

“For” does denote purpose, but the purpose is that the connected load exists to operate the facility in full operation.
All parties and the Commission agreed the relevant time is when the facility initiates full operations.
The real dispute is not about the timing, but about what type of load to measure at that time.

The Court resolved that dispute in favor of OG&E’s reading: the load to measure at that point in time is the connected load, i.e., the total nameplate values, not the diversified or actual usage.

C. Application to the Bison and Cimarex Facilities

Having defined the statutory phrase, the Court turned to the facts:

CKenergy conceded that in the electric industry, “connected load” means nameplate ratings.
It further admitted that the connected load at both facilities exceeded 1,000 kW when each began full operation.
OG&E stipulated that neither the diversified load nor the maximum demand ever reached or exceeded 1,000 kW during the first year of operation, but maintained these metrics were legally irrelevant.

Under the Court’s construction:

Because the connected load for initial full operation exceeded 1,000 kW at each facility, the one‑megawatt exception applies.
RESCTA therefore did not bar OG&E from providing retail electric service to these facilities in CKenergy’s territory.
The Commission’s injunction (Order No. 714136) ignored the statutory text, misconstrued the law, and thus was not sustained by law under Article 9, § 20.

The Court accordingly reversed the injunction.

D. The Constitutional Stay and Mootness

Article 9, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides in part:

Upon the giving of notice of appeal from an order of the Corporation Commission, the Commission, if requested, shall suspend the effectiveness of the order complained of until the final disposition of the order appealed, and fix the amount of suspending or supersedeas bond.

CKenergy and OAEC’s separate appeal (from Order No. 714817) challenged whether the Commission was constitutionally required to issue the stay and approve the bond as it did.

The Supreme Court reviewed that issue de novo but held the appeal to be moot. The reasoning is straightforward:

If OG&E’s appeal of the injunction succeeded—as it did—then the injunction would be reversed, and the Commission’s stay order would by its own terms cease to have any separate operative effect.
Order No. 714817 explicitly provided that if the Supreme Court ultimately determined OG&E could lawfully serve the facilities, the injunction would no longer be effective and the appeal bond would be exonerated.
Once the underlying order was reversed, there remained no practical relief regarding the stay for the Court to grant or deny.

Accordingly, the Court declined to address the merits of the constitutional stay question and dismissed that appeal as moot.

VI. Simplifying the Core Legal Concepts

A. “Connected Load,” “Nameplate Rating,” and “Diversified Load”

Connected load:
- The sum of the nameplate ratings (manufacturer-stated maximum power capacity) of all electrical devices connected to an electrical supply system at a facility.
- It measures installed capacity, not what is necessarily used at any given moment.
Nameplate rating:
- Each motor, pump, compressor, or other device typically has a metal “nameplate” specifying its maximum power draw (e.g., 250 kW).
- Connected load adds those values up for all devices that are physically connected and wired to the system.
Diversified load (or actual demand):
- Measures how much power the facility actually draws from the system at a given time or over a billing period.
- Because not all devices run simultaneously or at full capacity, diversified load is typically lower than connected load.

In this case, the Commission and CKenergy tried to interpret the statute as if it referred to diversified load (actual usage) instead of connected load (installed capacity). The Court said this was inconsistent with both industry practice and the statutory text.

B. Kilowatts and the One‑Megawatt Threshold

A kilowatt (kW) is a measure of power—1,000 watts.
A megawatt (MW) is 1,000 kW.
The statute sets the threshold at 1,000 kW, i.e., 1 MW, of connected load.

Thus, any unincorporated‑area facility whose connected load (total nameplate ratings of all equipment connected when full operation begins) is ≥ 1,000 kW qualifies for the exception.

C. De Novo Review

De novo review means the appellate court:

considers the legal issue from scratch, without deferring to the lower tribunal’s legal conclusions; and
makes its own independent judgment about what the law means and how it applies.

That is how the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the Commission’s statutory interpretation in this case.

D. Injunction, Stay, and Supersedeas Bond

Injunction: A court (or Commission) order requiring a party to do or stop doing something. Here, the Commission enjoined OG&E from providing service to the facilities.
Stay: A suspension of the effect of an order while it is being appealed. Under Article 9, § 21, the Commission must suspend its order (if requested) when a proper appeal is taken, conditioned on a bond.
Supersedeas bond: A bond posted by the appealing party to secure payment of any amounts that may ultimately be found due if the appeal fails. OG&E posted such a bond ($456,396) to obtain the stay.

E. Mootness

A claim is moot when events have so changed the situation that a court’s decision can no longer affect the rights of the parties. Here, once the Supreme Court reversed the injunction and confirmed OG&E’s right to serve the facilities, any dispute about whether the Commission was required to grant a stay became academic. There was nothing practical left for the Court to decide about the stay order.

VII. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying the One‑Megawatt Exception Under RESCTA

The central doctrinal contribution of this case is a clear, authoritative definition of connected load for initial full operation under 17 O.S. § 158.25(E):

It is the total nameplate values of all connected electrical equipment when full operation of the facility commences.

This rule has several immediate consequences for future cases:

Objective ex ante threshold: The one‑megawatt exception is evaluated using design‑stage engineering and installation data (nameplate ratings), not ex post billing records or historical usage patterns.
Predictability: Developers and utilities can determine in advance whether a planned facility will qualify by summing the nameplate ratings of all equipment that will be connected at start‑up.
Reduced disputes about demand data: Questions such as whether a facility reached 1,000 kW in any given month, or whether the customer ever intended to draw that much power, are no longer relevant to the statutory exception.
Potential shift in customer choice: Large industrial, oilfield, or commercial facilities located within cooperative territories may have greater practical ability to choose service from investor‑owned utilities if their installed equipment yields a connected load above 1 MW.

B. Boundary Between “Connected Load” and “Diversified Load” in Legal Context

The Court’s ruling also establishes a critical boundary between technical engineering concepts in legal analysis:

Connected load (nameplate capacity) is the legally relevant concept for § 158.25(E).
Diversified load, actual demand, and other operational measurements—even if relevant to system design, efficiency, or rate structures—are not relevant to whether the one‑megawatt exception applies.

This distinction prevents regulators or competitors from redefining statutory thresholds based on engineering practices that might better serve their policy preferences but are not reflected in the statutory text.

C. Implications for Competition Between Utilities and Cooperatives

RESCTA’s general structure protects the territorial exclusivity of existing suppliers (especially rural electric cooperatives) but allows exceptions for large loads. By confirming a capacity‑based rather than usage‑based threshold, the Court arguably makes the one‑megawatt exception:

more accessible to certain high‑capital, lower‑usage facilities; and
more susceptible to strategic design choices (e.g., sizing equipment so that total connected load exceeds 1 MW even if anticipated usage is lower).

From a policy standpoint, this could:

increase the ability of large industrial or oilfield customers in unincorporated areas to obtain service from utilities other than the incumbent cooperative; and
place economic pressure on cooperatives, whose cost structures often depend on capturing large loads to subsidize service to sparsely populated rural areas.

On the other hand, the decision:

enhances statutory clarity and reduces uncertainty for all stakeholders; and
respects the Legislature’s deliberate choice to use an industry term of art rather than a more policy‑flexible phrase like “actual demand” or “average load.”

If the Legislature concludes that a capacity‑based threshold improperly undermines the territorial integrity of cooperatives or other policy goals, it remains free to amend § 158.25(E) to specify a different metric.

D. Reinforcing Judicial Independence from Administrative Agencies

Doctrinally, the decision continues the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s line of cases emphasizing:

the non‑binding nature of the Commission’s legal interpretations;
the judiciary’s constitutional duty under Article 9, § 20 to decide what the law means; and
the limited role of deference even when a statute is ambiguous (agency views are considered but not controlling).

By explicitly referencing Loper Bright and reaffirming principles from People’s, the Court situates Oklahoma administrative law firmly in a post‑Chevron environment where courts independently adopt the best reading of a statute rather than asking whether an agency’s reading is merely permissible.

E. Constraints on the Commission’s Policymaking Through Interpretation

The opinion also serves as a caution to the Commission:

It cannot convert policy preferences—such as protecting cooperative territories—into binding law by reading additional conditions into statutory text.
Where the Legislature has used a specific technical term like “connected load,” the Commission must apply that term as written and understood in the industry, not swap it for a different concept like “diversified load.”
If existing statutes prove ill‑suited to contemporary policy goals, the remedy lies in legislative amendment, not expansive administrative interpretation.

The Court’s refusal to accept the Commission’s reading—even though the Commission and its expert may have had sound engineering or policy reasons for preferring a demand‑based threshold—reinforces the structural separation between legislative, executive (including regulatory), and judicial responsibilities.

VIII. Conclusion

OG&E Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission establishes a clear rule for applying RESCTA’s one‑megawatt exception: the connected load for initial full operation is the total of the nameplate values of all electrical equipment connected to a facility’s system when full operation begins. This capacity‑based interpretation rejects efforts to tie the exception to actual demand or diversified load.

The decision has three principal legal significances:

It clarifies the meaning of a pivotal statutory phrase in the Retail Energy Supplier Certified Territory Act, offering a predictable, objective standard for determining when a large facility in an unincorporated area may be served by a supplier other than the incumbent territorial utility.
It reinforces the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s commitment to independent judicial interpretation of statutes, even in highly technical regulatory fields, and aligns state administrative law with broader national developments limiting judicial deference to agency interpretations.
It underscores the importance of respecting technical terms of art and the Legislature’s word choices, while implicitly inviting legislative reconsideration if the capacity‑based threshold no longer reflects current policy goals for utility territory protection and competition.

In concrete terms, OG&E is permitted to continue serving the Bison and Cimarex saltwater disposal facilities located in CKenergy’s territory. In doctrinal terms, the Court has drawn a firm line: nameplate rating—not actual demand—controls the one‑megawatt exception under RESCTA. That rule will guide utilities, cooperatives, regulators, and courts in future disputes over large-load customers in Oklahoma’s unincorporated areas.