Nagle’s Rule: Corroboration of a CRI Tip Is a Factor—Not an Independent Requirement—But a Bare, One-Time Drug-Use Observation Within 72 Hours Does Not Establish Probable Cause

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Jennifer Lynn Nagle, decided October 22, 2025, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a recurring problem in warrant practice: what is required to translate a tip from a confidential reliable informant (CRI) into probable cause to search a home. The case arose from a narcotics investigation where a CRI reported observing people smoking methamphetamine and meth pipes inside Nagle’s residence at some unspecified time “within the last 72 hours.” Acting on a warrant supported by that tip, officers searched Nagle’s home and recovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia, leading to charges of third-degree possession in a school zone and storing meth paraphernalia in the presence of a child.

Two questions framed the appeal:

Must police corroborate a CRI’s tip as an independent prerequisite to probable cause?
Did the affidavit in this case—relying on the CRI’s limited, uncorroborated observation of apparent personal-use drug activity—provide probable cause to believe contraband would be in the home at the time of the search?

The court answered: no, corroboration is not a standalone requirement; but also no, the affidavit did not establish probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. The decision clarifies Minnesota law on the role of corroboration within the gatekeeping “totality” framework and sets a concrete sufficiency benchmark for drug warrants premised on thin, recent observations of personal-use activity.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the court, Justice McKeig announced two holdings:

Corroboration of a CRI tip is always a relevant factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, but it is not an independent, bright-line requirement for probable cause. Courts continue to evaluate veracity and basis of knowledge flexibly, allowing strengths in one area (or other indicia of reliability) to compensate for weaknesses in another.
The warrant at issue lacked probable cause. Despite adequately establishing the CRI’s reliability and first-hand basis of knowledge, the affidavit contained only a bare statement that people were seen smoking methamphetamine and that meth pipes were present within the prior 72 hours. The content of the tip indicated, at most, a single instance of apparent drug use by an unspecified number of people. Without additional facts suggesting ongoing criminal activity or any corroboration, there was no fair probability that contraband would still be present at the time of the search.

The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion situates its holdings within longstanding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and Minnesota’s own search-and-seizure cases:

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): The touchstone. Gates replaced rigid tests with a “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach. The court emphasizes that veracity and basis of knowledge are interrelated and that deficiencies in one can be offset by strengths in another or other indicia of reliability. Gates disclaims “rigid legal rules” and endorses “practical, common-sense” judgments about “fair probability.”
State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 1985): Minnesota’s adoption and application of Gates. Wiley upheld a warrant where a CRI reported repeated observations of weapons, narcotics, and stolen property—facts strongly indicating ongoing criminal activity. Wiley illustrates the kind of rich, specific, and temporally meaningful content that can sustain probable cause for a residential search.
State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 2023): Reinforces that corroboration—even of “easily obtained” details—“lends credence” to a tip and is part of the totality analysis. Mosley also recognizes that when an informant relays personal knowledge, police need not corroborate “significant details” for the tip to be potentially sufficient—underscoring that corroboration is not an independent rule but a factor.
State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 1990): Notes that even “minimal corroboration” can be relevant—again, consistent with a flexible totality assessment.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1999), and State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138 (Minn. 2024): Explain the CRI concept and what must be shown to establish a CRI’s reliability; require that the informant be expressly designated as a CRI, while recognizing that detailed track-record specifics are not always necessary in the affidavit.
State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 2016); State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 2014): Direct courts to consider the affidavit as a whole, not piecemeal, and to ask whether the issuing judge had a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause.
State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585 (Minn. 2024): Limits review to the four corners of the affidavit and reasonable inferences from it.
State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1999): Reminds that in close cases, courts defer to warrant issuance because of the preference for warrants—without altering the substantive test.
Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369 (2025): Cited for the standard of review—probable cause is reviewed de novo, with any factual findings reviewed for clear error.
The court also cites Wayne R. LaFave’s Search & Seizure treatise to confirm that the U.S. Supreme Court has not required corroboration as a categorical rule; rather, corroboration operates as a tool to compensate for weaknesses in veracity or basis of knowledge.

Against this backdrop, the court rejects the court of appeals dissent’s view that Minnesota law imposes a per se requirement of corroboration for informant-derived probable cause.

Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Clarifications

The opinion advances three important doctrinal clarifications:

Corroboration is a factor, not a rule. The court accepts that corroboration frequently matters and may in practice be necessary in some cases, but it refuses to constitutionalize a blanket corroboration prerequisite. This keeps Minnesota anchored to Gates’ flexible, fact-sensitive approach rather than a rigid checklist.
The substantive probable-cause test is the same for warranted and warrantless searches. The court takes care to correct any contrary implication in the lower court’s analysis: deference to a warrant in “doubtful or marginal” cases does not mean the underlying Fourth Amendment standard changes. Probable cause always asks whether there is a fair probability that evidence will be found in a particular place at the time of the search.
Content matters: personal-use versus ongoing activity. Even with a reliable informant and first-hand observation, the “what” and “when” of the tip must support a fair probability that contraband will be present when police arrive. Here, the affidavit’s content—a single observation that people were smoking meth and meth pipes were present at some point within 72 hours—signals a one-off personal-use episode, not a stash or a pattern of ongoing conduct likely to leave evidence behind.

Application to the Affidavit in This Case

The affidavit contained:

A CRI designation with a brief reliability statement: the informant had worked with the task force since February 2022, had provided reliable information, and had conducted multiple controlled buys; the CRI was paid and “had intimate knowledge of the controlled substances community.”
Basis of knowledge: recent, first-hand observation “within the last 72 hours” of “meth pipes” and “people smoking meth” inside Nagle’s residence.
No corroboration by police of any detail of ongoing drug activity; no surveillance; no controlled buy or trash pull; no predictive information; no description of quantities, packaging, scales, or other indicia of distribution; no report of multiple incidents; no admissions; no identification of the people using; no detail suggesting stash retention.

The court accepted that the CRI’s reliability and basis of knowledge were adequately shown. But it found the “content” insufficient to meet the fair-probability standard. Put differently, on these spare facts, there is no logical bridge from a one-time personal-use event to a fair probability that contraband or evidence would still be present when officers executed the warrant. The 72-hour window—without more—undermines the temporal link to evidence, especially for easily consumed contraband.

Comparing the case to Wiley highlights the deficiency: Wiley involved multiple observations and various categories of contraband suggestive of persistent criminal activity and durable evidence. Nagle involved a single, undetailed observation consistent with transient personal use. Because the record lacked any corroborative or persistence-indicating facts, the affidavit failed.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

The decision has several practical and doctrinal implications:

Warrant drafting and review will demand more content. Affidavits relying on CRI tips should include facts that show persistence or likelihood of ongoing criminal activity or the existence of retained contraband, such as:
- Multiple observations over time or recent controlled buys from the location;
- Descriptions of quantity, packaging, paraphernalia associated with storage or distribution (e.g., scales, baggies, ledgers), or admissions indicating a stash;
- Predictive details that can be corroborated (e.g., deliveries at specific times);
- Independent corroboration: surveillance showing short-stay traffic, trash pulls revealing residue/packaging, utility anomalies consistent with certain offenses, license-plate reads, or other innocuous details that nonetheless “lend credence.”
The “72-hour” boilerplate is not a safe harbor. The opinion effectively warns that generalized recency periods will not rescue thin affidavits involving perishable contraband and personal-use observations. Temporal proximity must be paired with facts that increase the probability that evidence persists.
The warrant preference is not a substantive shortcut. Although courts defer to warrants in close cases, Nagle underscores that deference does not dilute the Gates standard. Thin affidavits should not be insulated by the mere fact of judicial issuance.
Equal substantive test for warranted and warrantless searches. The court expressly reiterates that the Gates totality test governs both contexts. Deference concerns are procedural/posture-based, not alterations to the constitutional threshold.
Litigation posture on remand and the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court did not reach any “good-faith” exception issues. On remand, suppression is likely unless the State invokes and preserves a good-faith theory. Minnesota recognizes certain good-faith doctrines in limited contexts, but it has not adopted a broad, all-encompassing federal good-faith rule for every warrant defect as a matter of state constitutional law. The viability of any such argument will depend on preservation and case-specific precedent.
Effects on child-endangerment and school-zone enhancements. Where the underlying search falls for lack of probable cause, charges and enhancements predicated on its fruits may also fail absent independent evidence.
Training and policy. Agencies should adjust templates and training to avoid “bare-bones” CRI affidavits. Supervisors and prosecutors should require concrete details tying recent observations to a fair probability of present evidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: Not proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but a fair probability—based on practical, common-sense considerations—that evidence of a crime will be found in a specific place when the search occurs.
Totality of the circumstances: A holistic assessment of all relevant facts; courts do not demand that each component independently establish probable cause. Strength in one area may offset weakness in another.
CRI (Confidential Reliable Informant): An informant with a proven track record of reliability in prior work with law enforcement. The label alone is not enough to establish probable cause; courts still evaluate what the informant actually reported.
Veracity and basis of knowledge: Two classic axes for assessing informant tips: veracity refers to the informant’s reliability/credibility; basis of knowledge concerns how the informant came by the information (e.g., personal observation is stronger than rumor).
Corroboration: Police verification of details from a tip. It is not an absolute requirement, but it often strengthens an affidavit—especially when other indicia are weak or when the content suggests only a fleeting event.
Staleness: The idea that older information may no longer reflect current conditions. Time matters—to justify a search today, the affidavit must make it reasonably likely that evidence will be there now. Ongoing activity or durable evidence can reduce staleness concerns; one-time personal-use events heighten them.
“Substantial basis” and deference: Reviewing courts ask whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause and afford deference in close cases. But deference does not change the substantive probable-cause standard.

Practical Guidance for Future Cases

For law enforcement and affiants:
- Do not rely on a CRI label and a vague “within 72 hours” assertion alone. Add specifics: quantities seen, whether residue or packaged product remained after use, frequency of visits, identities/descriptions of users, and any statements about stashes.
- When feasible, conduct minimal corroboration: surveillance, trash pulls, controlled buys, or confirmatory checks of innocuous details tied to the tip.
- Articulate why evidence is likely still present now (e.g., distribution paraphernalia persists longer than consumed drugs; multiple recent observations; patterns of traffic).
For prosecutors:
- Vet affidavits for content showing persistence or ongoing activity. Where the tip is about a one-time use, supplement with corroboration or additional facts before seeking a warrant.
- Preserve alternative arguments (e.g., good-faith reliance) where supported by Minnesota law and the record.
For defense counsel:
- Scrutinize affidavits premised on CRI tips for absence of corroboration and lack of facts indicating ongoing activity or present contraband. Highlight staleness where the activity appears transient.
- Emphasize Nagle’s clarification that deference to warrants does not lower the substantive probable cause threshold.
For judges:
- Apply Gates’ totality analysis to both warranted and warrantless searches alike. Treat corroboration as a factor, not a mandate, but insist on sufficient content to show a fair probability of present evidence.

Conclusion

State v. Nagle refines Minnesota’s Fourth Amendment framework in two important ways: it confirms that corroboration of a CRI’s tip is an important but not independently required element of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, and it supplies a concrete insufficiency example—where a bare, uncorroborated tip of one-time drug use within 72 hours fails to establish a fair probability that contraband will be found in a residence.

The opinion tightens the nexus required between tip content and present evidence, particularly in cases centered on personal-use drug observations. It also clarifies that the substantive probable cause test is identical for warranted and warrantless searches, preserving Gates’ flexible, fact-specific approach while preventing deference to warrants from becoming a substantive shortcut. Going forward, Minnesota practitioners should expect more rigorous attention to the content of informant tips, the temporal link to evidence, and the presence (or absence) of corroboration when affidavits rest on observations of transient criminal activity.