Introduction

In Matter of T.W., 2025 MT 225, the Montana Supreme Court delivered a significant decision clarifying two recurring issues in civil commitment litigation: (1) whether res judicata (claim preclusion) or collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) can bar a second petition filed days after a jury denies commitment; and (2) whether, after a valid waiver of presence, a court may compel a respondent to appear at trial via two‑way audio‑video over her objection so that jurors can observe her behavior.

The case involved a respondent, T.W., who was the subject of two commitment petitions filed less than two weeks apart. After a jury in the first proceeding found that T.W. suffered from a mental disorder but did not require commitment, the State filed a second petition grounded in worsening conduct that occurred over the following weekend. At the second jury trial, over T.W.’s waiver of presence and her objection to two‑way audio‑video, the district court required T.W. to appear on Zoom with her camera and microphone on. The jury then found commitment was warranted, and the district court ordered a 90‑day commitment to the Montana State Hospital (MSH).

On appeal, the Court affirms the availability of successive petitions and the admissibility of certain pre‑verdict evidence, but holds that compelling a respondent to appear remotely on video and audio after a valid waiver of presence, and over her objection, violates Montana’s civil commitment statutory scheme and the constitutional values of due process, privacy, and dignity embedded in it. The commitment order is reversed.

Summary of the Opinion

• Issue 1 — Preclusion: The Court holds that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel barred the State’s second commitment petition. The statutes contemplate the dynamic nature of mental illness and allow subsequent petitions so long as statutory criteria are met. The Court further holds the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of pre‑verdict events (e.g., mid‑August contacts and evaluations) to contextualize and support the professional person’s opinions about diagnosis, decompensation, and need for treatment; this evidence was relevant, and any danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value.
• Issue 2 — Compelled remote appearance: The Court holds that after a valid waiver of presence under § 53‑21‑119, MCA, and an objection under § 53‑21‑140(5)(b), MCA, the district court lacked authority to compel T.W. to appear via two‑way audio‑video with her camera and microphone on. The right to be present is personal and protects the ability to participate, not the State’s desire for the jury to observe a respondent’s demeanor. The statutes require strict adherence, and the “two‑way” modality “may not” be used if the respondent objects. The Court reverses the September 2022 commitment order.

Justice Bidegaray wrote for the Court. Chief Justice Swanson, joined by Justice Rice, concurred on Issue 1 but dissented on Issue 2, arguing that the statutory text required presence absent a waiver under § 53‑21‑119(2), MCA, and that the majority unnecessarily constitutionalized the analysis.

Background and Procedural Posture

The State filed an initial petition on August 17, 2022, supported by professional person Mavis Vaillancourt, asserting severe psychosis with hallucinations, delusions, suicidal ideation, and self‑starvation. At that jury trial, T.W. validly waived presence and observed remotely with her camera and microphone off; the jury found a mental disorder but no need for commitment, and the petition was dismissed on Friday, August 26, 2022.

Over the weekend, T.W. decompensated, prompting another 911 call, hospitalization, and further evaluations. On Monday, August 29, 2022, the State filed a second petition. Before the second jury trial, T.W. moved to dismiss on preclusion grounds and requested, again, to waive presence and observe remotely without being seen or heard. The district court denied the preclusion motion; permitted remote observation; but required T.W.’s camera and microphone to be on, over defense objection and the appointed friend’s agreement that audio and video should be off. Throughout trial, T.W.’s on‑screen conduct became a focal point, and the State highlighted it during closing. The jury returned a commitment verdict for 90 days.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• In re Mental Health of L.C.B., 253 Mont. 1, 830 P.2d 1299 (1992): Foundational precedent recognizing that civil commitment cases differ from ordinary civil suits because mental health conditions are fluid. Successive petitions are not categorically barred, and court‑ordered inquiry can focus on new developments. The Court here confirms L.C.B. and emphasizes that Montana’s statutory scheme contains no numeric limit on petitions so long as statutory content and probable cause exist (§§ 53‑21‑121, -122, -126, -127, MCA).
• In re S.E., 2022 MT 205, 410 Mont. 345, 519 P.3d 11: Demands strict adherence to the civil commitment statutes and discusses the importance of being able to observe witnesses when testimony is provided by electronic means. In T.W., that observation principle is cabined to witnesses, not the respondent, and respect for the respondent’s dignity remains paramount.
• In re S.D., 2018 MT 176, 392 Mont. 116, 422 P.3d 122: Distills § 53‑21‑119, MCA, into a practical framework for waivers; confirms broad personal waiver capability under § 53‑21‑119(1), MCA, subject to safeguards.
• In re P.A.C., 2013 MT 84, 369 Mont. 407, 298 P.3d 1166: Holds a respondent may personally waive presence (if capable of a knowing and intentional decision) and cannot be forced to attend against her will; informs T.W.’s holding that a court cannot compel presence by another modality after such a waiver.
• In re J.D.L., 2023 MT 64, 412 Mont. 25, 526 P.3d 1096: Emphasizes that “two‑way” audio‑video is discretionary and “may not” be used if the respondent objects (§ 53‑21‑140(5)(b), MCA). Also recognizes that erratic behavior is precisely why waiver exists to preserve dignity and due process—not to stage it for the factfinder.
• In re Mental Health of L.K., 2008 MT 169, 343 Mont. 366, 184 P.3d 535: Allows a court to mute a remotely appearing respondent to maintain decorum. In T.W., the Court contrasts this proper use of trial administration with the district court’s error of compelling on‑screen, unmuted presence that invited disruption.
• In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485, and In re J.S., 2017 MT 214, 388 Mont. 397, 401 P.3d 197: Ground the civil commitment statutes in Montana’s constitutional rights of due process, privacy, and dignity; support viewing the process as therapeutic, not punitive.
• Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979): Reaffirms the civil and non‑punitive nature of commitment proceedings; undergirds Montana’s jurisprudence emphasizing due process and dignity rather than punishment.
• State v. Hartsoe, 2011 MT 188, 361 Mont. 305, 258 P.3d 428: Although criminal, cited by analogy regarding the prejudicial impact of courtroom spectacle (shackling) on juror impartiality; supports the majority’s concern about prejudice from compelled, on‑screen disruptions.

2) Legal Reasoning

Issue 1 — Successive petitions and pre‑verdict evidence

The Court applies de novo review to the preclusion questions. It emphasizes that both claim and issue preclusion require a final judgment—and their purpose is to protect the finality of judgments—not to limit legislatively authorized, dynamic assessments of mental health status. Montana’s statutes carefully structure how petitions are initiated (§ 53‑21‑121), how probable cause is assessed (§ 53‑21‑122), what qualifies as “requires commitment” (§ 53‑21‑126), and what dispositions are available (§ 53‑21‑127). Nothing in the text restricts the number of petitions; the only constraints are content, probable cause, and proof at hearing.

The Court further rejects the argument that L.C.B. turned on the lower court’s evidentiary limitation to post‑ruling developments. Instead, L.C.B.’s teaching is broader: because mental health status is fluid, determinations are not intended to be “final and irrevocable” as to a person’s status beyond the point in time they address. Thus, a second petition alleging subsequent deterioration is not the “same claim” or “same issue” as the first; collateral estoppel does not apply.

On evidence, the Court affirms admission of pre‑verdict events (the mid‑August contacts and evaluations) because they were relevant to the professional person’s diagnosis, to explaining decompensation, and to the urgency for treatment. The district court correctly concluded that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice (Rule 403). Notably, the Court underscores that this evidence was admitted for a limited, contextual purpose—to assist the jury in evaluating the credibility and weight of medical opinions regarding a change in condition—not to relitigate the earlier verdict.

Issue 2 — Presence, waiver, and compelled remote appearance

The Court grounds its analysis in Montana’s statutory scheme and constitutional values. Under § 53‑21‑119(1), MCA, a respondent capable of an intentional, knowing decision may personally waive statutory rights, including the right to attend. If not capable, counsel and the friend of the respondent may effect waivers under conditions prescribed by statute. Separately, § 53‑21‑119(2), MCA, provides a structured method for waiving the “right to be physically present” at a hearing via third‑party agreement with concurrences and findings.

Section 53‑21‑140, MCA, permits courts to protect the right to presence by allowing two‑way audio‑video appearances in lieu of physical presence, but this modality “may not be used” when the respondent objects (§ 53‑21‑140(5)(b), MCA). The statute further does not abrogate the rights and waiver provisions in §§ 53‑21‑115, -116, -117, and -119, MCA.

Applying these rules, the Court holds that after T.W. validly waived presence and expressly objected to two‑way audio‑video, the district court lacked authority to force her to appear visibly and audibly on Zoom. The “right to be present” safeguards participation—ability to consult with counsel, offer and test evidence—not the State’s asserted need for jurors to observe the respondent’s demeanor. Section 53‑21‑126, MCA, specifies the elements of “requires commitment” and relies on expert medical testimony to a reasonable medical certainty; it does not elevate in‑court demeanor to a statutory factor.

The Court is particularly troubled that the forced on‑screen exposure produced exactly the disruptions T.W. feared and sought to avoid (moving about, crying, interacting with others, even the court noting “saw her tattoo”), distractions the court intermittently tried to manage by muting her. The Court explains that civil commitment proceedings are meant “to help, not punish,” and a respondent “is a human being, not a spectacle.” Intentionally staging “erratic, unpredictable, and unconventional behaviors” before the jury is antithetical to the dignity protections embedded in Montana law and risks substantial unfair prejudice.

Remedy: Because the court lacked authority to compel remote appearance after a valid waiver and objection, the commitment order is reversed.

3) The Concurrence and Dissent (Swanson, C.J., joined by Rice, J.)

The dissent agrees with the majority on Issue 1 but parts ways on Issue 2. It emphasizes statutory text and cautions against constitutionalizing the analysis:

• Presence is required “unless the respondent's presence has been waived as provided in 53‑21‑119(2)” (§ 53‑21‑126(1), MCA). In the dissent’s view, § 53‑21‑119(2) is the exclusive vehicle for waiving presence at a contested hearing (specific provision controls over general; § 1‑2‑102, MCA).
• Two‑way audio‑video under § 53‑21‑140 is an authorized alternative presence mechanism, not a right. If the respondent objects, she must either appear physically or obtain a § 53‑21‑119(2) waiver (with professional concurrence and judicial findings). The dissent reads the statutes together to mean that one‑way spectating is not a permissible way to satisfy the “must be present” mandate.
• The dissent underscores that current behavior observed in court can be probative under § 53‑21‑126(1)(a)–(d), MCA, and rejects comparison to the inherently prejudicial use of shackles in criminal trials.
• Finally, the dissent notes that the Legislature amended §§ 53‑21‑119 and -140 in 2025 (SB 435, 2025 Mont. Laws ch. 609, § 2), and urges restraint in constitutional pronouncements in a heavily statutory field.

4) Practical Impact

• Successive petitions: Prosecutors and professional persons may file subsequent petitions when new facts show decompensation or changed risk, even shortly after a prior no‑commitment verdict. The petitions must meet statutory content and probable cause requirements, and the State should be prepared to articulate how the subsequent claim differs in time and circumstances from the prior adjudication.
• Use of pre‑verdict evidence: Trial courts may admit earlier events to contextualize expert opinions (diagnosis, trajectory, need for treatment), with careful Rule 403 balancing and clear articulation that the evidence is not admitted to relitigate the prior outcome.
• Presence after waiver: If a respondent validly waives presence under § 53‑21‑119 (personal waiver if capable; third‑party waiver otherwise) and objects to two‑way audio‑video under § 53‑21‑140(5)(b), the court may not compel on‑screen, unmuted appearance. Courts should facilitate private attorney–client communication and observation of proceedings without requiring the respondent to be seen or heard.
• Trial management and prejudice: Courts should avoid creating or showcasing a respondent’s involuntary or distress‑driven behavior for jurors. Closing arguments should not exploit compelled on‑screen behavior. Jurors do not need to see the respondent to decide whether statutory criteria are met; their focus should be on admissible evidence, especially professional testimony to a reasonable medical certainty.
• Anticipating legislative developments: The dissent references 2025 amendments to §§ 53‑21‑119 and -140. Practitioners should review the amended text closely. T.W. interprets the pre‑amendment framework and sets a strong baseline emphasizing personal waiver rights and the prohibition on compelled two‑way video over objection.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Res judicata vs. collateral estoppel: Res judicata (claim preclusion) bars relitigation of the same claim between the same parties after a final judgment on the merits. Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars relitigation of a specific issue actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior action between the same parties. In civil commitment, these doctrines are tempered by the inherently changing nature of mental health; petitions assess the person’s condition at particular points in time.
• Decompensation: Worsening of psychiatric symptoms after a period of relative stability, often evidenced by increased delusions, paranoia, insomnia, failure to eat, and impaired insight. Decompensation can justify a new commitment petition even if a prior petition failed days earlier.
• Professional person: A mental health professional designated by statute to evaluate respondents and provide expert opinions to a reasonable medical certainty on diagnosis and need for commitment.
• Friend of the respondent: A court‑appointed lay advisor who assists the respondent during the process and may participate in certain waivers when the respondent is not capable of making an intentional and knowing decision.
• Two‑way audio‑video communication: A statutory tool to satisfy presence requirements by allowing participants to see and converse with each other in real time. It is discretionary and, under § 53‑21‑140(5)(b), MCA, “may not” be used if the respondent objects.
• “Requires commitment” findings: Under § 53‑21‑126(1), MCA, the factfinder must determine whether the respondent is suffering from a mental disorder and, because of that disorder, is unable to meet basic needs, has injured self or others, or presents an imminent threat of such injury; expert testimony to a reasonable medical certainty is central to this determination.

Key Takeaways and Practice Pointers

• Do not assume a prior no‑commitment verdict precludes a new petition; build the record around subsequent events and decompensation.
• When introducing pre‑verdict events, make a clear proffer tying those facts to diagnosis and change in condition; request a limiting instruction if necessary.
• For presence waivers:
  • Document the respondent’s capacity if invoking a personal waiver under § 53‑21‑119(1), MCA.
  • If capacity is uncertain, use the structured third‑party waiver under § 53‑21‑119(2), MCA, ensuring the professional person’s concurrence and the judge’s findings are on the record.
  • Respect objections to two‑way audio‑video under § 53‑21‑140(5)(b), MCA.
• If a respondent chooses to observe remotely after a waiver, facilitate confidential attorney–client communication without compelling the respondent to be seen or heard.
• Avoid arguments that invite jurors to base their verdict on a respondent’s courtroom demeanor rather than admissible evidence mapped to § 53‑21‑126, MCA.
• Review the 2025 amendments to §§ 53‑21‑119 and -140 for future cases; this decision interprets the pre‑amendment framework.

Conclusion

Matter of T.W. provides two clarifying pillars for Montana commitment practice. First, successive petitions are permissible where new facts demonstrate decompensation; courts may admit limited pre‑verdict evidence to contextualize professional testimony about diagnosis and change, provided it is not used to relitigate the prior outcome. Second—and most significantly—the Court holds that a respondent who validly waives presence cannot be compelled to appear via two‑way audio‑video over objection. The right to presence protects participation, not the State’s desire to put a respondent’s distress on display. The ruling centers the statutory and constitutional commitments to dignity, privacy, and due process, and will guide courts to structure proceedings that are therapeutically intended, procedurally fair, and scrupulously faithful to the Legislature’s commands.