Missouri Recognizes the State’s Right to Appeal § 547.031 Vacatur Judgments Under § 512.020(5)

Case: In re: Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Dunn (No. SC100878)
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri (en banc)
Date: April 15, 2025

1. Introduction

This decision resolves a recurring appellate-jurisdiction question arising from Missouri’s wrongful-conviction remedy in section 547.031. Christopher Dunn was convicted in 1991 of first-degree murder and related offenses and sentenced to life without parole plus consecutive terms. In February 2024, the St. Louis circuit attorney filed a motion under section 547.031 to vacate or set aside Dunn’s convictions based on information suggesting innocence.

After the required evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found “clear and convincing” evidence of “actual innocence” and vacated Dunn’s convictions. A related emergency dispute over the circuit court’s authority to order Dunn’s unconditional release while charges remained pending reached the Supreme Court in a writ action, producing State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. banc 2024). Subsequently, the circuit attorney entered a nolle prosequi, and Dunn was released. The attorney general nevertheless pursued an appeal of the vacatur judgment.

The circuit attorney moved to dismiss, arguing the State had no right to appeal from a judgment granting relief under section 547.031. The Supreme Court of Missouri took transfer to decide only this threshold issue: whether the State of Missouri has a statutory right to appeal a judgment sustaining a section 547.031 motion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held the State of Missouri may appeal a final judgment granting relief under section 547.031, relying on section 512.020(5), which permits an appeal by “[a]ny party to a suit aggrieved” by a final judgment in a civil cause (absent constitutional prohibition or a clear limitation in a special statutory proceeding). The Court reaffirmed that section 547.031 proceedings are civil, collateral attacks on criminal judgments; that the State is a party because the motion must be brought against the State; and that vacating convictions aggrieves the State due to its interest in finality.

The Court further held that section 547.031.4—which expressly grants prosecuting/circuit attorneys authority to appeal a denial or disposal of a section 547.031 motion—does not impliedly remove the State’s preexisting right to appeal under section 512.020(5). The case was retransferred to the court of appeals with instructions to deny dismissal and proceed on the merits.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

• State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser, 692 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. banc 2024)
  The majority used Sengheiser for two key propositions: (1) section 547.031 proceedings are civil and collateral, and (2) the controversy is not mooted by Dunn’s release because reversal could restore custody (supporting the continuing practical stakes of an appeal). Although Sengheiser arose as an extraordinary-writ case about interim release authority, it supplied foundational characterization and mootness logic.
• State v. Johnson, 617 S.W.3d 439 (Mo. banc 2021)
  Johnson is the opinion’s legislative-backdrop centerpiece. There, the Court dismissed an appeal because no statute authorized appellate review of a circuit attorney’s post-verdict effort (via motion for new trial) to litigate newly discovered innocence evidence in a non-capital case. The majority reads section 547.031 as the legislature’s response to Johnson: it created an express vehicle for prosecutors to seek vacatur and, critically for this case, added section 547.031.4 to grant prosecutors a right to appeal they previously lacked. The majority leverages that history to rebut the argument that specifying prosecutors’ appellate rights implies eliminating the State’s.
• State ex rel. Bailey v. Fulton, 659 S.W.3d 909 (Mo. banc 2023)
  Cited for the point that a section 547.031 motion “is not part of the original criminal case regardless of how it is docketed” and is civil/collateral. This classification is the analytic gateway to section 512.020(5), which governs civil appeals.
• Meadowfresh Sols. USA, LLC v. Maple Grove Farms, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 758 (Mo. banc 2019)
  Used for the canon that appeals are favored and statutes granting appeal are liberally construed. This supports the majority’s unwillingness to infer a forfeiture of the State’s appellate right from statutory silence.
• Prosecuting Att'y, 21st Jud. Cir., ex rel. Williams v. State, 696 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. banc 2024)
  The majority relies on Williams to establish party alignment: a section 547.031 motion must be brought against the State so the court can grant relief and to avoid an impermissibly “one-sided proceeding” in which the movant both advances and effectively “proves” the claim unopposed. This supplies the “party” element required for appeal under section 512.020(5).
• State ex rel. Kauble v. Hartenbach, 216 S.W.3d 158 (Mo. banc 2007)
  Cited analogically: courts cannot grant relief if the proper party is not before the court. This supports the conclusion that the State must be a party defendant in a section 547.031 action challenging convictions obtained by the State.
• Robinson v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 672 S.W.3d 224 (Mo. banc 2023), Hudson v. Joplin Reg'l Stockyards, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 862 (Mo. banc 2024), and Blanchette v. Blanchette, 476 S.W.3d 273 (Mo. banc 2015)
  These cases supply the meaning of “aggrieved” and confirm that a party is aggrieved when a judgment operates prejudicially and directly on its rights or interests. The majority uses them to frame the State’s interest in finality as a cognizable interest harmed by a judgment vacating convictions.
• Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys' & Cir. Att'ys' Ret. Sys., 694 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. banc 2024)
  Cited for de novo review on statutory interpretation, reinforcing that the dispute is purely legal: the existence and scope of a statutory right to appeal.
• State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. banc 2003)
  Provides historical context: prior to section 547.031, freestanding actual-innocence claims were recognized in habeas corpus at least for death-sentenced offenders, underscoring the patchwork nature of innocence remedies that the legislature sought to address after Johnson.
• State v. Onyejiaka, 671 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. banc 2023)
  Cited for the presumption that the legislature knows existing law when enacting a statute; the majority uses this to infer that section 547.031.4 intentionally cured the appellate-right deficit identified in Johnson.
• State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304 (Mo. banc 2015)
  Used to define nolle prosequi and to explain why Dunn’s release and dismissal of charges did not automatically foreclose the State’s asserted appellate interests.

Dissent’s key precedents: The dissent emphasizes that appeal rights are purely statutory and cannot be judicially created, relying on Fannie Mae v. Truong, 361 S.W.3d 400 (Mo. banc 2012), J.I.S. v. Waldon, 791 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. banc 1990), D.E.G. v. Juv. Officer of Jackson Cnty., 601 S.W.3d 212 (Mo. banc 2020), and Abmeyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 959 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. banc 1998). It treats Salcedo v. Salcedo, 34 S.W.3d 862 (Mo. App. 2001), superseded by section 632.495, RSMo Supp. 2009, as the closest analogue for finding a “special statutory proceeding” that “clearly limits” appeal rights beyond what section 512.020 otherwise provides.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The civil/collateral classification unlocks § 512.020(5)

The Court begins with an appellate-jurisdiction axiom: “The right to appeal derives solely from statute.” (State v. Johnson). It then identifies the controlling appeal statute by classifying the underlying proceeding. Drawing on State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser and State ex rel. Bailey v. Fulton, the Court treats a section 547.031 motion as a civil collateral attack, not a continuation of the criminal prosecution. That doctrinal move matters because it brings the case within section 512.020, the general civil appeal statute.

B. The State is a “party” and is “aggrieved”

Under section 512.020(5), the appellant must be an “aggrieved” party. Using Prosecuting Att'y, 21st Jud. Cir., ex rel. Williams v. State, the Court holds the State is a party because the motion must be brought against the State—otherwise the movant-prosecutor would occupy both sides of the case, producing a structurally defective “one-sided proceeding.” The Court then applies the “aggrieved” line of authority (Hudson v. Joplin Reg'l Stockyards, Inc.; Blanchette v. Blanchette) to hold the State suffers a direct, prejudicial effect when its convictions are vacated, because it has a legally cognizable interest in finality.

C. The attorney general is counsel; the State is the appellant

The opinion draws an institutional distinction: the “aggrieved party” is the State, not the attorney general personally. The attorney general’s participation is justified via section 27.060 (broad authority to appear where the State’s interests are involved) and section 27.050 (management and representation of the State in appellate courts). This framing allows the Court to treat the notice of appeal as filed on behalf of the State, consistent with the State’s aggrieved status.

D. Reconciling § 512.020(5) with § 547.031.4 (the central interpretive move)

The statutory conflict argument was straightforward: section 547.031.4 expressly mentions appeals by prosecuting/circuit attorneys and mentions the attorney general only as an intervener/movant to dismiss in “any appeal filed by the prosecuting or circuit attorney.” From this, the circuit attorney argued the State (via the attorney general) had no right to initiate an appeal.

The Court rejects that negative implication by emphasizing preexisting law and legislative purpose. Before section 547.031, prosecutors lacked a statutory right to appeal in analogous contexts; State v. Johnson is the key example. After Johnson, the legislature enacted section 547.031 and, in section 547.031.4, explicitly gave prosecutors a right to appeal they previously did not have. In the majority’s view, that explicit grant does not logically or textually withdraw the State’s already-existing, more general civil-appeal right under section 512.020(5). Indeed, the Court labels an explicit statement that “the State may appeal” as likely surplusage because, once the action is civil and the State is aggrieved, section 512.020(5) already supplies the right.

E. The “special statutory proceeding” limitation (raised by the dissent) is not triggered by silence alone

The dissent characterizes section 547.031 as a “special statutory proceeding” that “clearly limits” appeals to those authorized in section 547.031.4, invoking Abmeyer v. State Tax Comm'n, J.I.S. v. Waldon, and the court of appeals’ approach in Salcedo v. Salcedo.

The majority’s answer is twofold: (1) it need not decide whether section 547.031 is a special statutory proceeding, because even assuming it is, the statute does not “clearly limit” the State’s appeal right; and (2) the legislature’s silence about the State’s right to appeal is explained by the legislature’s need to address the Johnson problem—prosecutors’ lack of appeal rights—rather than any intent to strip the State of its general appellate authority.

3.3 Impact

• Appellate review is available in prosecutor-initiated innocence vacaturs even when the local prosecutor does not want an appeal. Because the State (represented by the attorney general) can appeal a granted section 547.031 motion, the decision prevents vacatur judgments from becoming effectively unreviewable when the moving prosecutor and the trial court agree.
• Institutionalizes a two-actor model in § 547.031 litigation: local prosecutors may initiate vacatur, but the attorney general may defend the State’s interest in conviction finality on appeal (and at hearings, per section 547.031.2).
• Clarifies party alignment and reduces procedural fragility. By insisting the State is the respondent party to the motion, the Court reinforces an adversarial structure that can support evidentiary testing and appellate records.
• Forecloses a common dismissal strategy. Parties can no longer rely on section 547.031’s silence to argue there is no State appeal right after a vacatur judgment—at least where the judgment is final and the State is aggrieved.
• Leaves open future “special statutory proceeding” disputes. The Court sidesteps a definitive holding on whether section 547.031 is a “special statutory proceeding,” inviting later litigation on what counts as “clearly limited” and when silence, structure, and specificity suffice to displace section 512.020.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Collateral attack”: a proceeding that challenges a conviction outside the direct criminal case (i.e., not a direct appeal from the conviction itself). Here, section 547.031 is treated as a separate civil mechanism to attack a criminal judgment.
• “Civil in nature”: even though the subject is a criminal conviction, the procedure is governed like a civil case for appeal-right purposes, meaning the civil appeal statute (section 512.020) can apply.
• “Aggrieved party”: someone whose legally protected interests are directly harmed by the judgment. The Court held the State is aggrieved when its convictions are vacated because finality is a legally recognized State interest.
• “Nolle prosequi” (defined via State v. Sisco): a formal prosecutorial entry ending prosecution of pending charges. Its use here did not eliminate the appellate-right question.
• “Writ of prohibition or mandamus”: emergency appellate tools used to stop (prohibition) or compel (mandamus) a lower court’s action. The earlier writ decision (State ex rel. Bailey v. Sengheiser) addressed interim release authority, not the appeal right decided here.
• “Special statutory proceeding”: a procedure created by a specific statute with its own rules, potentially limiting general appeal rights under section 512.020. The dissent says section 547.031 qualifies and limits appeals; the majority treats any limitation as not “clear” enough to defeat the State’s general right.

5. Conclusion

The Court’s central holding is doctrinally compact but institutionally significant: because section 547.031 proceedings are civil collateral attacks and the State is an aggrieved party to a final judgment vacating convictions, section 512.020(5) authorizes the State to appeal—despite section 547.031.4 explicitly addressing appeals by prosecuting/circuit attorneys.

The dissent warns that this reading risks judicially expanding appeal rights in a “special statutory proceeding” and argues the legislature’s text confines appeals to those initiated by local prosecutors. The majority, however, anchors its construction in harmonization: section 547.031.4 adds a right prosecutors lacked after State v. Johnson, while section 512.020(5) preserves the State’s preexisting civil-appeal authority as an aggrieved party.