Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) — Establishes that sentencing review is under a deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard and that district courts bear primary responsibility for weighing § 3553(a) factors. The panel leaned on Gall to reinforce deference to the district court’s balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
• United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) — Provides two pillars relevant here: (1) a within‑Guidelines sentence carries a presumption of substantive reasonableness; and (2) unpreserved procedural claims at sentencing are reviewed for plain error. Both themes appear explicitly in the opinion’s treatment of Smith’s arguments.
• United States v. Drake, 126 F.4th 1242 (6th Cir. 2025) — Clarifies that a substantive reasonableness challenge targets the “bottom‑line number” and does not contest the process or factual findings underlying the sentence. The panel uses Drake to frame Smith’s appeal and to explain why courts will not re‑balance the § 3553(a) factors on appeal.
• United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019) — Distinguishes between procedural and substantive reasonableness claims. The court invoked Parrish to explain that alleging reliance on an erroneous fact (e.g., misreading statistics) is procedural.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018) — Reiterates the breadth of district court discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors and cautions against appellate reweighing. Smith’s invitation to assign more weight to mitigation was rejected in light of Rayyan’s deference.
• United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022) — Confirms that how much weight to give mitigating factors is for the district court. The panel cited Gardner to show the sentencing judge recognized and weighed Smith’s mitigation but was not obliged to credit it as dispositive.
• Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020) — Holds that arguing for a lower sentence preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge. The panel used Holguin‑Hernandez to explain that while the substantive challenge was preserved, the alleged factual misreading of statistics remained a separate, unpreserved procedural claim.
• United States v. Holt, 116 F.4th 599 (6th Cir. 2024) — Confirms the need for a contemporaneous objection to procedural errors and applies plain‑error review absent preservation. The panel invoked Holt to set the standard for Smith’s statistics claim.
• United States v. Campbell, 2023 WL 3737506 (6th Cir. May 31, 2023) — Applies the “reasonable probability” standard under the third prong of plain error when evaluating whether an asserted error affected substantial rights, and highlights when ancillary considerations played only “a minor role.” The panel relied on Campbell to find no effect on substantial rights.
• United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2008) — States that a within‑Guidelines sentence itself reflects consideration of national sentencing disparity concerns under § 3553(a)(6). The panel used Houston to explain why the court’s selection within the range sufficiently addressed disparity even apart from any PSR averages.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning proceeded along two tracks: (1) a straightforward substantive reasonableness review of the “bottom‑line number”; and (2) a threshold preservation inquiry and plain‑error analysis of the PSR‑statistics argument.

1) Substantive Reasonableness

The district court’s sentence on the drug counts—136 months—sat in the middle of the 121–151‑month Guidelines range, to which the 60‑month mandatory consecutive § 924(c) term was added. Because that total is within the advisory framework, it triggered the presumption of substantive reasonableness (Vonner). The panel then assessed whether the district court abused its discretion in the § 3553(a) analysis.

On seriousness and nature of the offense (§ 3553(a)(1) and (2)(A)), the court emphasized:

• The “danger and deadliness” of fentanyl, aggravated by Smith’s packaging of fentanyl as “legitimate”‑looking pills—an aspect of the conduct that heightens deception and overdose risk.
• Smith’s own awareness of overdose danger, evidenced by his admission that he would not take a full pill himself.

On history and characteristics (§ 3553(a)(1)), the district court acknowledged both aggravation and mitigation:

• Aggravation: An offense history tracing back to age 14 with repeated criminal conduct; disciplinary violations while incarcerated, including fights; and a reported history of domestic violence against his fiancée.
• Mitigation: A difficult upbringing with financial hardship and exposure to violence; caregiving responsibilities for an autistic child and two stepchildren; completion of educational programs in custody; and surviving two shootings.

The court expressly recognized mitigation that Smith emphasized on appeal—e.g., no violent convictions, a lull in criminal history from 2018 to 2023, remorse, and good behavior during pretrial detention—but found those considerations offset by prior in‑custody misconduct (27 incidents) and evidence of violence in his background. Selecting the mid‑range term reflected that balance. Under Rayyan and Gardner, the appellate court declined to reweigh those factors and found no abuse of discretion.

2) The “National Averages” Argument: Procedural, Unpreserved, and Harmless

Smith’s second argument centered on the district court’s brief discussion of PSR‑reported national averages for similarly situated defendants. The PSR reflected mean and median terms (168 and 180 months) for defendants sharing Smith’s offense level, criminal‑history score, methamphetamine trafficking offenses, and “at least one” § 924(c) count. The sentencing judge remarked: “Here we have the 60 months, however, for the firearm, which is in addition to the time for the drug‑related offense.” Smith read this as the court mistakenly believing the national averages excluded the § 924(c) component.

The Sixth Circuit resolved the point in two steps:

• Classification as Procedural: Alleging reliance on an erroneous fact is a procedural attack (Parrish), not a substantive reasonableness challenge. Although Holguin‑Hernandez preserves substantive claims, it does not obviate the need to lodge contemporaneous objections to procedural misstatements at sentencing. Smith did not object when asked for final objections; thus, the claim was forfeited and subject to plain‑error review (Vonner; Holt).
• Plain‑Error Failure: Even assuming error, Smith could not show the asserted mistake affected substantial rights—a reasonable probability of a lower sentence in the absence of the error (Campbell). The statistics were mentioned only in passing and “played, at best, a minor role”; the sentencing judge grounded the decision in the seriousness of the drug‑firearm conduct and Smith’s record. Moreover, Houston teaches that a within‑Guidelines sentence already accounts for national disparity concerns under § 3553(a)(6).

This segment of the opinion is the clearest doctrinal takeaway: when a PSR statistics dispute is not raised in real time, it will be difficult for a defendant to satisfy plain‑error review, particularly if the district court’s primary rationale rests on individualized § 3553(a) factors and the sentence is within the Guidelines.

Impact and Implications

Although unpublished, Smith carries practical significance for Sixth Circuit sentencing practice in at least four respects:

• Preservation Matters: Defense counsel must contemporaneously object if a sentencing court appears to misread PSR “national average” statistics or other comparative data. Framing the objection on the record ensures de novo or at least preserved review, rather than the steep hill of plain error.
• Statistics Are Ancillary: The opinion signals that passing references to national averages are unlikely to drive sentences, and defendants will struggle to show that any misunderstanding about those averages affected substantial rights—especially where the court selects a within‑Guidelines sentence anchored to case‑specific facts.
• Within‑Guidelines Presumption Retains Force: Smith reaffirms that the Sixth Circuit presumes within‑Guidelines sentences are reasonable and will not reweigh mitigation. This is especially salient where fentanyl offenses and § 924(c) counts combine to elevate seriousness and mandatory minimum exposure.
• Domestic Conduct Without Conviction Can Be Considered: The district court’s reliance on unindicted domestic abuse and in‑custody misconduct illustrates that courts may consider reliable information about a defendant’s conduct, not limited to convictions, under § 3553(a)(1). Practitioners should be prepared to contest reliability and relevance, or to contextualize such information.

For future cases, Smith underscores the need to bifurcate appellate theories: keep “bottom‑line” substantive claims analytically distinct from alleged factual or procedural errors, preserve both at sentencing, and be ready to show concrete prejudice if plain‑error review applies.