Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Appellate Jurisdiction and FRAP 3

• Smith v. Barry (U.S. 1992) and JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture (6th Cir. 2008): Historically, strict compliance with FRAP 3(c) was treated as jurisdictional. An appeal had to designate the correct judgment or order.
• FRAP 3(c) – 2021 Amendments: Rule 3(c)(7) now states an appeal “must not be dismissed” for failure to designate the correct judgment if the notice was filed after entry of judgment and designates an order that merged into that judgment.
• Christian Separatist Church Soc’y of Ohio (6th Cir. 2018) (mem.): Recognized the merger principle—interlocutory orders merge into final judgments.
• Brock v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2024) (mem.) and Killoran v. Westhampton Beach UFSD (2d Cir. 2023) (mem.): Sister-circuit applications of Rule 3(c)(7) to preserve appellate jurisdiction despite a misdesignated notice.
• James v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. (6th Cir. 2025): The Sixth Circuit’s recent interpretation of Rule 3(c)(6) that a notice does not limit appellate jurisdiction to designated orders unless expressly limited—harmonizing with the court’s approach here under Rule 3(c)(7).

Influence: The panel “takes the provision to mean what it says,” ensuring that appeals are not lost over technical misdesignations where the final judgment subsumes earlier orders. This lowers the risk of jurisdictional dismissal for clerical missteps and signals a pragmatic, text-driven reading of amended Rule 3.

Standing

• Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (U.S. 1992): Establishes that “some day intentions” without concrete plans cannot establish imminent injury for equitable relief.
• TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (U.S. 2021): Reaffirms the need for concrete harm, noting traditional tangible harms (like monetary loss) satisfy Article III injury-in-fact.
• Bannister v. Knox County Bd. of Educ. (6th Cir. 2022): Distinguishes between past injuries (supporting damages) and forward-looking injuries (requiring imminence) for equitable relief.
• Tennessee Conference of NAACP v. Lee (6th Cir. 2025): Emphasizes the need for specificity—identifying the who/what/where of intended future activity to show imminent injury.

Influence: The panel applies Lujan rigorously in the land-use context. BTB’s desire to return, without identified properties or concrete acquisition plans, is not enough to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief. Conversely, the failed RS‑1 acquisition constituted a past economic injury sufficient to support damages.

FHAA/ADA and Facial Discrimination

• Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor (6th Cir. 1993) and Anderson v. City of Blue Ash (6th Cir. 2015): Confirm FHAA and ADA apply to zoning laws.
• Larkin v. Mich. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (6th Cir. 1996): Ordinance that singles out facilities for the disabled (e.g., spacing and notice requirements) is facially discriminatory.
• MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington (6th Cir. 2002): Population-based cap targeting addiction treatment facilities was a facially discriminatory “blanket prohibition.”
• Get Back Up, Inc. v. City of Detroit (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam): When residential substance-abuse facilities are treated the same as many other residential uses, facial discrimination is not established.
• 431 E. Palisade Ave. Real Estate, LLC v. City of Englewood (3d Cir. 2020): No facial discrimination where disabled status is not the trait singled out for different treatment.
• Quality of Life, Corp. v. City of Margate (11th Cir. 2020): Distinguishes MX Group; categorical residential bans do not necessarily equate to citywide prohibitions if other zones permit the use.

Influence: The opinion draws a bright line between (a) laws that expressly target disability-linked uses and (b) neutral single-family schemes that exclude all multi-residential/institutional uses. RS‑1 falls into the latter category; thus, no facial discrimination.

RLUIPA – Substantial Burden

• Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township of Meridian (6th Cir. 2007): “Mere inconvenience” is not a substantial burden; the inquiry is context-specific.
• Livingston Christian Schools v. Genoa Charter Township (6th Cir. 2017): Availability of suitable alternatives and absence of interference with core religious functions defeat substantial-burden claims.
• Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck (2d Cir. 2007): Expansion needs can create substantial burdens, but the burden must be demonstrated and tied to religious functions.
• Catholic Healthcare International, Inc. v. Genoa Charter Township (6th Cir. 2023): Two-year administrative blockage preventing religious displays on a prayer trail was a substantial burden.
• Love Church v. City of Evanston (7th Cir. 1990): Cost and marketplace constraints alone do not equate to an unlawful burden where constraints are generally applicable.

Influence: The panel synthesizes these authorities to hold that BTB’s inability to acquire its preferred RS‑1 site, coupled with successful ongoing operations and a nearby alternative property, does not amount to a substantial burden on religious exercise.

Equal Protection – Class of One

• Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture (U.S. 2008): Class-of-one claims require showing different treatment from similarly situated entities without a rational basis.
• Green Genie, Inc. v. City of Detroit (6th Cir. 2023): Comparator analysis requires “relevant similarity,” typically entities of the same type undergoing the same process.
• Warren v. City of Athens (6th Cir. 2005) and Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano (6th Cir. 2011): Government action survives rational-basis review if any conceivable legitimate purpose supports it.

Influence: BTB’s comparators—lodges, camps, duplexes—are materially dissimilar to a long-term residential recovery facility, and the ordinance serves legitimate residential-planning goals, thus defeating the class-of-one claim.

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate Jurisdiction Under Amended FRAP 3(c)

The court adopts a straightforward textual reading of Rule 3(c)(7): when a notice of appeal filed after final judgment designates an interlocutory order, the appeal is still effective because that order has “merged” into the final judgment. This avoids jurisdictional traps caused by clerical reuse of a prior notice, fosters appellate efficiency, and aligns Sixth Circuit practice with the updated rule and other circuits’ applications.

2) Article III Standing: Damages vs. Equitable Relief

The court separates standing by relief sought and by zone challenged:

• R‑2 Zone: No past injury because BTB never pursued an R‑2 property or rezoning; no imminent injury because there were no concrete plans—no identified property or timeline.
• Equitable Relief in RS‑1 or R‑2: BTB’s general desire to return to Coffee County is a prototypical “some day intention” under Lujan. Without concrete plans or identified properties, imminence is lacking.
• Damages in RS‑1: Concrete past economic injury flows from the County’s denial of BTB’s proposed amendment/special exception for the contracted RS‑1 property. That suffices for Article III injury in fact for damages claims.

3) FHAA/ADA – Neutral RS‑1 Zoning Is Not Facially Discriminatory

The RS‑1 scheme permits only single-family dwellings (and duplexes by special exception). It does not single out disability-related group homes; it excludes all multi-residential and institutional uses alike. Absent text targeting disability or group recovery housing—and in the absence of permitted analogous uses that receive preferential treatment—facial discrimination is not established.

The court distinguishes:

• MX Group: A population-based cap uniquely burdened addiction treatment facilities, effectively a citywide prohibition—unlike RS‑1’s neutral, uniform limits tied to use type.
• Larkin: Spacing and notice rules applied only to disabled group homes—express disability-based differentiation, not present here.

4) FHAA/ADA – Abandonment of As‑Applied Theories

The record shows BTB consistently pursued two FHAA/ADA theories: facial discrimination and reasonable accommodation. It did not develop an as‑applied disparate-treatment or disparate-impact claim at summary judgment when the County moved against “all claims.” Under Sixth Circuit law, failing to defend a claim at summary judgment constitutes abandonment. The jury’s defense verdict on reasonable accommodation (which BTB did not challenge on appeal) therefore ended the only preserved as‑applied theory.

5) RLUIPA – No Substantial Burden

Applying Sixth Circuit factors:

• More than “mere inconvenience”? No. BTB’s preference for consolidation and particular residential settings is understandable, but its ministry continued unabated, with an extraordinary success rate.
• Interference with core religious functions? No. BTB’s faith-driven rehabilitation program operated continuously; there is no evidence its core religious activities were impeded.
• Suitable alternatives available? Yes. BTB obtained a comparable former school site roughly four miles away in a neighboring county.
• Delay, uncertainty, or expense? The record does not show the type of prolonged, categorical preclusion of religious exercise seen in Catholic Healthcare International. The burdens here are of ordinary land-use friction, not substantial suppression of religious practice.

Thus, the burdens are real but not “substantial” under RLUIPA.

6) Equal Protection – Class of One

BTB failed to identify similarly situated comparators (e.g., long-term residential facilities seeking identical zoning relief). Its proposed comparators—lodges, camps, duplexes—are materially different uses. Even if comparators were identified, rational-basis review is satisfied because the RS‑1 framework rationally advances residential character and public-safety objectives.

Impact and Implications

1) Appeals Practice: FRAP 3(c)(7) as a Safety Net

The Sixth Circuit’s clear embrace of Rule 3(c)(7)’s merger cure reduces the risk of jurisdictional dismissal due to a misdesignated notice. Appellants should still carefully designate final judgments and relevant orders, but this decision confirms that, if filed after final judgment, a notice identifying an interlocutory order will not ordinarily doom the appeal.

Relatedly, the court’s citation to James v. Norfolk Southern (interpreting Rule 3(c)(6)) reinforces that a notice does not limit appellate jurisdiction to listed orders unless it expressly says so. Together, these rulings promote merits-based review over technical forfeiture.

2) Standing in Land‑Use/Disability Litigation

Plaintiffs seeking forward-looking relief in zoning cases should expect rigorous application of Lujan’s imminence requirement. Generalized interest in returning to a jurisdiction will not suffice. Plaintiffs should be prepared to:

• Identify specific properties (or a narrowed set of properties) under active consideration.
• Show concrete timelines and steps toward acquisition or use, sufficient to demonstrate a non-speculative imminent injury.
• Distinguish between past damages claims (where a foregone transaction may suffice) and equitable relief (which demands imminence).

3) FHAA/ADA: Neutral Single‑Family Zoning Schemes

Municipalities employing traditional single-family zoning, with narrow exceptions like duplexes, do not facially discriminate under FHAA/ADA if they exclude all analogous multi-residential and institutional uses equally. Plaintiffs alleging disability-based discrimination must either:

• Show textually targeted burdens (e.g., spacing or caps that single out disability-linked facilities), or
• Demonstrate as‑applied disparate treatment with evidence of dissimilar treatment of similar uses or animus—claims that must be clearly preserved at summary judgment.

4) RLUIPA: The “Substantial Burden” Threshold

The decision reinforces that:

• “Mere inconvenience,” cost, or preference for a particular environment or consolidation does not equal a substantial burden.
• Continuing the same core religious ministry without interruption or diminishment weighs against finding a substantial burden.
• Proximity of feasible alternative sites—even in neighboring jurisdictions—undercuts substantial-burden claims.
• Substantial-burden findings (like in Catholic Healthcare International) are more likely when prolonged proceedings effectively prevent religious exercise altogether.

5) Equal Protection – Comparator Discipline and Rational Basis

Class-of-one claims in zoning settings demand tight comparator matching: same type of facility, similar regulatory posture, and comparable process posture. Absent such comparators and clear animus, rational-basis review will typically validate residential-use classifications linked to neighborhood character and safety.

6) Litigation Strategy and Preservation

The case is a cautionary tale on claim preservation. Plaintiffs should:

• Expressly brief all intended FHAA/ADA theories (facial discrimination, disparate treatment, disparate impact, and reasonable accommodation) at summary judgment.
• Present concrete evidence of comparators, animus, or unique burdens to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial.
• For RLUIPA, document how zoning restrictions impede core religious functions, the lack of viable alternatives, and any prolonged delays or categorical prohibitions.