Miscalculated Prison Law Library Deadlines Do Not Constitute “Cause” for Habeas Procedural Default:
A Detailed Commentary on Terence L. Jannke v. Michael Gierach, No. 23‑2485 (7th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025)

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I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jannke v. Gierach is, on its face, a straightforward habeas corpus case affirming dismissal for procedural default. Beneath that surface, however, the opinion performs two important functions:

• It reaffirms, and sharpens, the doctrine that mistakes by prison law librarians or postconviction “helpers” in calculating legal deadlines do not ordinarily constitute “cause” to excuse a federal habeas procedural default.
• It underscores the strictness of the rule against raising new theories of “cause” for the first time on appeal, even for pro se prisoners.

The petitioner, Terence L. Jannke, was convicted in Wisconsin state court of first-degree reckless homicide (for supplying heroin that led to a fatal overdose) and related drug offenses. After losing on direct review, he sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging primarily ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court dismissed his petition on the ground of procedural default: he had failed to properly exhaust his ineffective-assistance claim through a complete round of Wisconsin appellate review.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit (Judge St. Eve writing, joined by Judges Easterbrook and Rovner) addressed an antecedent question: whether a prison law librarian’s miscalculation of the deadline to file a petition for review in the Wisconsin Supreme Court (and the system of law-library access built around that calculation) could constitute “cause” to excuse procedural default. The court held that it could not, at least on the record and theories actually preserved in the district court.

In doing so, the court situates Jannke squarely within the modern habeas framework anchored by Coleman v. Thompson, Murray v. Carrier, and O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, while extending prior Seventh Circuit cases such as Johnson v. Foster and Harris v. McAdory to a concrete (and common) scenario: prisoners relying on a law librarian’s calculation of state postconviction deadlines.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Overview

In 2016, Wisconsin prosecutors charged Terence Jannke with:

1. First-degree reckless homicide for selling heroin on which H.N. fatally overdosed;
2. Maintaining a drug trafficking place; and
3. Possession with intent to deliver less than three grams of heroin.

The homicide count is the only one relevant to the federal habeas appeal. At trial:

• The State’s main witness, Gabriel Brandl, testified that:
  • Jannke sold heroin to Brandl and H.N. in a park;
  • Brandl injected H.N. with the heroin in a car; she soon lost consciousness;
  • Brandl and Jannke spent hours driving around while H.N. remained unconscious;
  • Later, when Brandl realized H.N. had stopped breathing, he returned to Jannke, who:
    • urged him to fabricate a story that would not implicate Jannke; and
    • told him to delete Jannke’s phone records from H.N.’s phone.
• The medical examiner, Dr. Kristinza Giese, testified that H.N. would not have died but for heroin ingestion.
• The State introduced deleted text messages between Jannke and H.N., suggesting she had requested heroin from him.
• The defense called only one witness, toxicologist Dr. Richard Tovar, in an attempt to counter the causation narrative.

The jury convicted on all counts; in January 2018, the state court sentenced Jannke to 20 years’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release.

B. State Postconviction and the Missed Deadline

On direct review, appointed appellate counsel filed a “no-merit” report under Wisconsin Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 809.32(1), concluding:

• The evidence was sufficient;
• The sentence was not unreasonable; and
• Trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally adequate.

Jannke responded pro se, contesting the report and insisting his trial counsel was ineffective. His appellate counsel filed a supplemental no-merit response, doubling down on the conclusion that there was no viable ineffective-assistance claim.

On March 11, 2021, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and concluding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. Under Wisconsin law, Jannke then had 30 days to file a petition for review in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Because day 30 fell on a Saturday, the deadline was extended to Monday, April 12, 2021.

However:

• Jannke’s petition for review was dated April 14 and received April 19, after the deadline.
• The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the petition as untimely and denied reconsideration.

C. Federal Habeas Petition and the “Cause” Story

On June 1, 2022, Jannke filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Western District of Wisconsin. He argued:

• Insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and
• Ineffective assistance of trial counsel (the claim that ultimately matters here).

Because it was clear he had not obtained timely review from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the district court sua sponte ordered him to show cause why his procedural default should be excused. In response, Jannke:

• Primarily argued “actual innocence”; and
• Also asserted that a law clerk / librarian at Redgranite Correctional Institution had given him the wrong filing date, leading to the untimely petition.

He explained that:

• Inmates get meaningful access to the law library only if they present a court decision and have a deadline verified by the law librarian (a state employee);
• The librarian calculated his deadline as April 16 instead of April 12; and
• His special library access began the evening of April 12—too late to prepare and file a timely petition.

He attached a library-access schedule reflecting the miscalculated April 16 deadline and showing that his scheduled library access for that week began on April 12. Notably, he provided no evidence of what access, if any, he had in the weeks before April 12.

The district court held that:

• Jannke’s ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted because of the untimely petition for review; and
• He had not established “cause and prejudice,” nor actual innocence, to overcome the default.

The court dismissed the petition and denied a certificate of appealability (COA).

D. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding

The Seventh Circuit granted a COA limited to the ineffective-assistance issue and the antecedent procedural question: whether the librarian’s deadline miscalculation, and the resulting library-access restrictions, could qualify as an “event external to the defense” sufficient to establish “cause” for procedural default.

The court:

1. Limited Jannke to the argument he made in the district court. It refused to consider a newly refined “library-access” theory of cause that was distinct from his initial “they gave me the wrong date” theory.
2. Held that, even on the argument preserved below, the miscalculation by the prison law librarian did not constitute cause. Because Jannke could have calculated the deadline himself and was not entitled to postconviction legal assistance, the miscalculation was not an “external impediment” that made compliance “impracticable.”

Having found no cause, the court did not reach prejudice or actual innocence, and did not reach the underlying ineffective-assistance claim. It affirmed the district court’s judgment.

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III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Habeas Framework: Exhaustion and Procedural Default

The opinion begins from first principles under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal courts may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner has properly exhausted state-court remedies. Section 2254(b)(1)(A) requires that a state prisoner “exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal relief.

The Supreme Court has interpreted this exhaustions requirement to mean that the prisoner must give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims. In O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999), the Court held that, in a system like Illinois’s (and Wisconsin’s), this means pursuing one complete round of the state’s appellate process, including a petition for discretionary review in the state’s highest court, where that process is part of the ordinary appellate structure.

The Seventh Circuit repeats that principle through Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2004), emphasizing that a petitioner must present his claim “at each level of the state court system before seeking federal relief.” Failure to do so results in what’s called procedural default.

Here:

• Jannke raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal;
• The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the claim, applying Strickland;
• But Jannke’s subsequent petition for review in the Wisconsin Supreme Court was rejected as untimely.

Because the petition was untimely, Wisconsin never gave the ineffective-assistance claim its final, discretionary review. Under O’Sullivan and Seventh Circuit precedent (e.g., Wilson v. Cromwell, 69 F.4th 410, 418 (7th Cir. 2023)), that is a procedural default of the claim.

Procedural default bars federal review unless the petitioner can show:

• Cause for the default, and prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation; or
• (In some cases) a fundamental miscarriage of justice, typically via an “actual innocence” gateway.

The court focuses here on the “cause” requirement, because without cause, there is no need to discuss prejudice or actual innocence. See Booker v. Baker, 74 F.4th 889, 894 (7th Cir. 2023).

B. Preservation of Arguments: Waiver, Forfeiture, and Pro Se Litigants

Before turning to cause, the panel addresses a threshold issue: whether it can consider the refined argument Jannke presents on appeal. The opinion distinguishes between:

• The argument made in the district court: essentially, “The law clerk gave me the wrong date, and my petition was untimely.”
• The argument on appeal: “Because Redgranite’s system conditions meaningful library access on the librarian’s calculated deadline, the miscalculation itself deprived me of meaningful access until it was too late; therefore, my lack of access caused the default.”

The Seventh Circuit reiterates its general rule that it “does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal” (Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 785 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc)), a rule equally applicable in habeas cases (Love v. Vanihel, 73 F.4th 439, 449 (7th Cir. 2023)). It characterizes the failure to raise an argument below as waiver or forfeiture, depending on the circumstances, but notes that even forfeited arguments are normally not considered on appeal in civil cases.

Applying that standard, the court carefully reads Jannke’s pro se filings in the district court. Those filings:

• Mention the librarian’s miscalculation of the deadline;
• Describe the general policy by which the librarian assigns library time based on a verified deadline; but
• Do not allege any specific facts about:
  • How much library access he had in the month before the deadline;
  • Whether he tried to get earlier access and was denied;
  • Whether he attempted to compute or verify the date himself;
  • Any concrete way the librarian restricted him from filing on time.

Thus, though the general topic of the late filing was before the district court, the specific “library-access-structure” theory was not. Citing Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009), and Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d 258, 262–64 (7th Cir. 2016), the panel underscores that a new, materially distinct theory—even on the same “general issue”—cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Even under the more liberal construction owed to pro se litigants (Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Ward v. Jenkins, 613 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2010)), the court will not transform a simple miscalculation allegation into a fully fledged “denial of meaningful library access” claim. The latter is deemed “separate and independent” from the former, following the logic in McGhee v. Watson, 900 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2018).

Accordingly, the court:

“limit[s] Jannke’s argument to the one he advanced in the district court.”

That is, it considers only whether reliance on the librarian’s miscalculated date, by itself, is enough to establish cause.

C. Defining “Cause” Under the Cause-and-Prejudice Standard

The “cause” requirement arises from Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s that attempted to strike a balance between fairness to prisoners and respect for state procedural rules and finality.

Key precedents include:

• Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) – first articulating the “cause and prejudice” standard for defaulted claims;
• Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) – elaborating that cause requires an “external impediment” such as:
  • a novel legal basis not reasonably available; or
  • interference by officials that makes compliance impracticable.
• Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) – holding that attorney error in postconviction proceedings generally does not constitute cause because there is no constitutional right to counsel at that stage.

The Seventh Circuit distills these holdings through its own cases, especially:

• Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 2004): cause is “ordinarily established by showing that some type of external impediment prevented the petitioner from presenting his federal claim to the state courts.”
• Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2015): the question is whether the cause is “something that cannot fairly be attributed to the petitioner,” i.e., state interference that makes compliance impracticable.
• Harris v. McAdory, 334 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2003): ignorance of filing deadlines is not cause; “something that comes from a source within the petitioner is unlikely to qualify as an external impediment.”

“Prejudice,” in turn, is established by showing that the violation worked to the petitioner’s “actual and substantial disadvantage” (United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)), meaning it is not enough that the error created a merely conceivable effect; it must have undermined the fairness of the proceeding in a significant way (Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 379–80 (2022)).

In Jannke, the court never reaches prejudice because it finds that cause is absent.

D. Why the Librarian’s Miscalculation Is Not “Cause”

Focusing on the preserved theory—miscalculation of the deadline by the law librarian—the court holds that this does not constitute cause. Several strands of reasoning converge here:

1. There is no right to postconviction counsel or legal advice.

The court cites Pettis v. United States, 129 F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that a prisoner is “not entitled to post-conviction counsel or legal advice.” Under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987), there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in state collateral or postconviction proceedings. Following Coleman and Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012), negligence by postconviction counsel (or counsel-like helpers) is generally attributable to the prisoner, not the state, and thus does not supply cause.

The court extends this logic to a prison law librarian: even if the librarian miscalculated the deadline, the petitioner was not legally entitled to rely on that calculation as a substitute for his own diligence.

2. The miscalculation did not “concretely impede” his ability to file.

The panel relies on Johnson v. Foster, where a prisoner claimed procedural default was caused by the prison business office’s refusal to grant a legal loan to cover filing costs. In Johnson, the court concluded that even if the office misapplied its rules, the prisoner was not actually prevented from filing; he could still have filed a petition and attempted to resolve the fee issues separately.

In the same spirit, the Jannke court reasons:

• Even though the librarian gave him a wrong deadline, “Jannke was still capable of calculating the deadline himself.”
• The miscalculation did not make compliance with the state’s rules “impracticable” in the way envisioned by Murray v. Carrier.

The court cites Henderson v. Cohn, 919 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1990), to support the view that litigants are responsible for understanding and complying with procedural deadlines; reliance on bad advice from prison staff or other non-lawyers does not automatically shift responsibility away from them.

3. Negligent or erroneous assistance is not “state interference.”

Cause can exist where “state officials interfere with compliance.” But the court makes a critical distinction:

• On one hand, active obstruction or denial of access to legal materials or the courts may constitute cause.
• On the other hand, erroneous advice or negligence by individuals who are not constitutionally required to provide assistance (such as postconviction counsel or a law librarian) generally does not.

The opinion cites:

• Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. at 280 – negligence by postconviction counsel is not cause.
• Booker v. Baker, 74 F.4th at 894 – no cause where postconviction counsel erred; no right to such counsel.
• Parkhurst v. Shillinger, 128 F.3d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir. 1997) – misleading legal advice by state officials in postconviction matters does not create cause where there is no right to counsel.

By aligning with Parkhurst, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejects the notion that a state employee’s mis-advice—in the context of a prison law library—amounts to “state interference” that can overcome procedural default.

Thus, the librarian’s mistake, though unfortunate, is treated as part of the background risks inherent in proceeding without counsel. It is not a constitutionally significant impediment.

E. Relationship to and Use of Precedents

The opinion is rich with citations, and each plays a distinct doctrinal role:

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Sets the ineffective-assistance standard (deficient performance + prejudice). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied Strickland to reject Jannke’s claim; the Seventh Circuit never reaches the merits under Strickland because of procedural default.
• O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) – Establishes the need for one complete round of state appellate review. It underlies the finding that failure to obtain timely review in the Wisconsin Supreme Court = failure to exhaust = procedural default.
• Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) – Provides the key principle that attorney error in postconviction proceedings is attributable to the defendant and does not constitute cause, because there is no right to counsel in those proceedings. Jannke applies that logic to law librarians.
• Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) – Defines cause as something external to the defense, such as novel law or state interference that makes compliance impracticable. Jannke concludes that the librarian’s miscalculation is not such an external impediment.
• Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) – Origin of the cause-and-prejudice standard in the context of state procedural defaults. Cited by the Seventh Circuit as the foundational source.
• United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) – Defines “prejudice” as an “actual and substantial disadvantage.” It is cited for completeness, although the court does not reach prejudice given the lack of cause.
• Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022) – More recent Supreme Court case reinforcing the strictness of habeas review, particularly in evidentiary development and the prejudice inquiry. Again, referenced in the exposition of prejudice, but not substantively applied.
• Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2004) – Clarifies exhaustion and procedural default within the Seventh Circuit. The court draws from Lewis to describe the need to present claims at every level of state review and to outline the cause-and-prejudice framework.
• Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2015) – Plays a central role. It articulates that cause must be something that “cannot fairly be attributed to the petitioner” and that interference by officials must make compliance “impracticable.” Its holding that a refused legal loan was not cause is closely analogized to Jannke’s reliance on the law librarian.
• Harris v. McAdory, 334 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2003) – Establishes that ignorance of the law or deadlines is not cause. Together with Henderson v. Cohn, it reinforces that prisoners bear responsibility for understanding deadlines.
• Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2009), Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2016), and McGhee v. Watson, 900 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2018) – These cases are used to enforce the rule that arguments not developed in the district court, even by pro se litigants, are not preserved and cannot be saved by liberal construction.
• Love v. Vanihel, 73 F.4th 439 (7th Cir. 2023) – Reaffirmed that new arguments or distinct theories of cause can’t be raised for the first time on appeal; Jannke uses it as recent authority on forfeiture in habeas.
• Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) – Recognized a narrow exception where counsel effectively abandoned the prisoner, leaving him unrepresented without notice. But Maples also reiterates that ordinary negligence is not cause. Jannke leans on the negligence portion, not the abandonment exception.
• Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and Parkhurst v. Shillinger, 128 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) – Reinforce the absence of a right to counsel in postconviction proceedings and deny that failings in such assistance (including misleading advice) can be cause.
• Booker v. Baker, 74 F.4th 889 (7th Cir. 2023) – Cited as a recent Seventh Circuit application of the “no right to postconviction counsel = no cause from counsel’s errors” rule.

By weaving these cases together, the panel makes clear that Jannke is not a doctrinal revolution so much as a precise application and slight extension of existing law to the niche context of law librarian miscalculations.

F. Impact and Practical Consequences

1. For Prisoners and Habeas Petitioners

Jannke sends a blunt message: prisoners cannot safely rely on prison law librarians or other institutional helpers to manage or calculate critical filing deadlines for them, at least when it comes to:

• State petitions for review that are required for exhaustion; and
• Other procedural steps whose failure will cause federal procedural default.

Even where the institution itself has built a system in which law-library access is scheduled by the librarian based on their calculation of deadlines, this opinion suggests that, absent explicit proof of genuine obstruction (such as documented denial of access despite timely requests), courts will treat miscalculations as:

• Non-constitutional mistakes; and
• Internal to the defense rather than external impediments.

This increases the practical burden on incarcerated, usually untrained, litigants to:

• Independently verify deadlines directly from statutes or rules;
• Document their efforts to secure timely access to legal materials;
• Raise any “access to courts” theories clearly and factually in the district court record.

2. For Prison Law Library Policies

Many institutions have policies like Redgranite’s: law library access is rationed, and “priority” access is given to inmates with legal deadlines verified by a librarian or legal aide. Jannke implicitly warns that:

• If librarians miscalculate, that mistake will not ordinarily shield the prisoner from the consequences of a missed deadline.
• To the extent prisons want to avoid later litigation or due-process challenges, they may wish to:
  • Provide clearer disclaimers that librarians cannot give legal advice or guarantee deadline accuracy;
  • Offer written instructions on how to compute deadlines; and
  • Keep detailed records of library-access requests and approvals.

3. For Federal Habeas Litigation Strategy

Defense lawyers representing habeas petitioners—and prisoners litigating pro se—should draw at least three strategic lessons:

1. Fully develop “cause” theories in the district court.
   If a petitioner wants to argue that limited law-library access or institutional interference caused a default, he must:
   • Plead specific, concrete facts (dates, requests made, denials received);
   • Provide documentary evidence where possible; and
   • Articulate a theory that shows how the interference rendered compliance impracticable, not just more difficult.
2. Avoid introducing a new “cause” theory for the first time on appeal.
   Jannke shows that even a refined and arguably stronger theory (e.g., denial of meaningful law-library access, rather than just miscalculation) will not be considered if it was not adequately raised below, even for a pro se litigant.
3. Preserve an actual innocence gateway argument explicitly and with new evidence.
   While the Seventh Circuit notes that Jannke mentioned actual innocence in the district court, the opinion does not pursue that route. This underscores that “actual innocence” requires a distinct showing and evidentiary basis; casual references are insufficient.

4. For the Law of Access to Courts

The case stops short of a broad pronouncement about the constitutional right of access to courts. It does not say that law-library access policies are irrelevant. Rather, it says that in the specific context of habeas procedural default, a miscalculated deadline by a law librarian—without more—does not meet the high threshold for cause.

If prison policies or actions outright prevent timely filings, or systematically deny inmates the ability to prepare legal materials, those scenarios might still qualify as state interference. But Jannke indicates that courts will demand specific, well-developed evidence to support that kind of claim.

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IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

is a legal mechanism allowing a prisoner to ask a federal court to review whether his custody violates the U.S. Constitution or federal law. For state prisoners:

• § 2254 governs the process;
• Federal courts are limited and must defer heavily to state-court determinations;
• Before seeking federal relief, the prisoner must give state courts the first opportunity to correct any constitutional errors.

B. Exhaustion vs. Procedural Default

• Exhaustion means the prisoner has:
  • Raised his federal claim (e.g., ineffective assistance) in the state trial or postconviction courts;
  • Pursued all available appeals, including discretionary review in the state’s highest court, where required.
• Procedural default occurs when:
  • The prisoner fails to follow a state procedural rule (like a filing deadline); and
  • The state court rejects his claim on that procedural ground, not on the merits.

In Jannke, the default occurred because his petition for review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court was untimely.

C. Cause and Prejudice

• Cause is a legally acceptable reason for the prisoner’s failure to comply with a state rule. It must usually be:
  • External to the prisoner (e.g., state interference, a legal basis that did not previously exist); and
  • Serious enough that compliance was impracticable.
• Prejudice means the underlying constitutional violation (like ineffective assistance or a due-process violation) actually harmed the fairness of the proceeding in a significant way.

Without cause, courts do not need to reach prejudice.

D. Actual Innocence Gateway

Even if a claim is procedurally defaulted, a prisoner can sometimes have it heard if he:

• Presents new, reliable evidence (e.g., DNA, credible recantations) that was not available at trial; and
• Shows that, in light of that evidence, no reasonable juror would have convicted him.

This is known as the “actual innocence” or “miscarriage of justice” gateway. In Jannke, the petitioner tried to invoke actual innocence in the district court, but the Seventh Circuit does not rely on that doctrine, and the opinion does not detail any new evidence meeting this very demanding standard.

E. No-Merit Reports (Wisconsin Procedure)

In Wisconsin, a court-appointed appellate lawyer who believes an appeal lacks any arguable merit can file a no-merit report (Rule 809.32(1)), explaining why. The defendant can respond; the court then independently reviews the record to determine whether any non-frivolous issues exist.

In this case:

• Appellate counsel filed a no-merit report;
• Jannke objected, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
• The Court of Appeals applied Strickland and rejected the ineffective-assistance claim.

This procedural history matters because it shows that Jannke did, in fact, raise his claim to the intermediate appellate court, but defaulted only at the final step (the untimely petition for review).

F. Waiver vs. Forfeiture vs. Liberal Construction

• Waiver (in the appellate sense) often refers to an intentional relinquishment of a known right or argument.
• Forfeiture usually means a failure to make a timely assertion, often unintentionally.
• Either way, the Seventh Circuit’s practice in civil and habeas cases is to refuse to consider arguments not raised in the district court, unless rare exceptions apply.
• Liberal construction means courts read pro se filings generously, not hyper-technically, to capture reasonably implied arguments. But it does not allow courts to invent entirely new theories that the litigant never articulated or supported with factual allegations.

In Jannke, liberal construction could not rescue the new “library access” theory where the record was silent about his specific access and behavior before the deadline.

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V. Conclusion: The Significance of Jannke v. Gierach

Jannke v. Gierach reinforces several core principles of modern federal habeas law:

1. Strict Enforcement of Procedural Default.
   Failure to comply with state procedural rules—especially filing deadlines—will generally bar federal review, even when serious constitutional claims like ineffective assistance are at stake.
2. Narrow View of “Cause” Where Postconviction Assistance Is Concerned.
   Miscalculations by prison law librarians (or similar non-lawyer helpers) about deadlines do not, without more, constitute an “external impediment” sufficient to excuse default. The prisoner remains responsible for understanding and complying with deadlines, despite the obvious practical difficulties this imposes on incarcerated pro se litigants.
3. Importance of Preserving Theories in the District Court.
   The decision is a cautionary tale on issue preservation. A more sympathetic “library access” argument was discarded because it was not adequately developed below. Habeas petitioners and their counsel must ensure that all viable theories of cause, with supporting facts, are clearly presented in the district court.
4. Continued Deference to State-Court Merits Decisions (By Default).
   Because of the procedural default and lack of cause, the Seventh Circuit does not reach the merits of Jannke’s ineffective-assistance claim. This is emblematic of the modern habeas regime, in which procedural obstacles often prevent federal courts from ever addressing the substance of constitutional allegations.

In doctrinal terms, the case does not create a brand-new rule; rather, it leverages and extends existing precedents—Coleman, Murray, Johnson, Harris, and others—to clarify that:

Miscalculated postconviction deadlines by prison law librarians, and a prisoner’s reliance on them, do not ordinarily constitute “cause” to excuse a § 2254 procedural default.

For practitioners, prisoners, prison administrators, and lower courts alike, Jannke stands as a concrete, fact-specific illustration of just how narrow the cause-and-prejudice gateway remains—and how careful one must be to preserve both arguments and evidence at every stage of habeas litigation.