Minimum Wage Act Claims Borrow the Wage Claim Act’s Two-/Three-Year Limitations Period

I. Introduction

By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez, 2025 CO 56, resolves a recurring gap in Colorado wage-and-hour litigation: the Minimum Wage Act (“MWA”), § 8-6-118, C.R.S. (2024), creates a private right of action for unpaid wages (including unpaid compensation tied to required meal and rest breaks), but it contains no express statute of limitations.

The dispute arose after Samuel Perez sued By the Rockies, LLC (“BTR”) in 2022, alleging MWA violations from 2016–2017. BTR moved to dismiss as untimely. The district court applied the Wage Claim Act (“WCA”) limitations period in § 8-4-122 (two years for non-willful violations; three years for willful violations) and dismissed. A split court of appeals reversed, applying the default six-year period for actions to recover a “liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money” under § 13-80-103.5(1)(a). The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide which limitations period governs MWA private actions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court held that the WCA’s two-/three-year statute of limitations, § 8-4-122, applies to claims brought under the MWA. Because Perez sued roughly five years after the alleged violations, his claim was time-barred. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and remanded with directions to reinstate the district court’s dismissal.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1995)
Voss supplies the Court’s familiar hierarchy for selecting among potentially applicable limitations periods: (1) later-enacted over earlier-enacted; (2) more specific over more general; (3) longer over shorter because limitations statutes derogate presumptively valid claims—though this third rule is a “rule of last resort.” The Court treated Voss as the central doctrinal tool but resolved the case primarily on specificity (rule two), making the “longer period” rule unnecessary.
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 185 P.3d 811 (Colo. 2008)
The Court invoked BP Am. Prod. Co. to reinforce that the “apply the longer limitations period” principle is not automatic; it applies only when other interpretive tools fail. This supported rejecting the court of appeals’ effective default to six years.
Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1987)
Persichini provides the lens that limitations analysis should track “the nature of the right sued upon” rather than the “form of action.” The Court used this principle to recharacterize the dispute: irrespective of whether plaintiffs plead under article 4 (WCA) or article 6 (MWA), the right asserted is the right to recover unpaid wages, favoring a uniform wage-law limitations period.
Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029 (Colo. 2003)
The Court relied on Martinez for the proposition that statutes within a single scheme or addressing the same subject should be construed harmoniously absent clear contrary intent, and that the legislature intends parts of a comprehensive scheme to operate consistently without cross-referencing each other explicitly. This became the bridge for “borrowing” § 8-4-122’s limitation into the MWA.
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, 442 P.3d 379
McCoy is cited for baseline interpretive method: start with plain meaning, read provisions harmoniously, and avoid absurd results; if ambiguous, use additional aids. The Court’s “scheme as a whole” framing tracks McCoy and underlies its rejection of a literalist reading that would isolate § 8-4-122 within “this article” only.
Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050 (Colo. 2004)
The Court cited Morrison for the policy purposes of limitations periods—promoting justice, avoiding delay, and preventing stale claims— which supported skepticism toward a six-year lookback for wage disputes in a regulatory environment built around shorter record retention.
Godinez v. Williams, 2024 CO 14, 544 P.3d 1233
Godinez is used for the definition of ambiguity (“reasonably susceptible of multiple interpretations”). The Court’s ultimate approach suggested that, even if competing readings exist, the “comprehensive scheme” and “specificity” tools resolve the question.
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2024 CO 5, 543 P.3d 371
This case grounded the standard of review: where facts are undisputed, which limitations period applies is reviewed de novo. That posture allowed the Court to decide the issue as a pure legal question.
Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15, 414 P.3d 700
Hernandez supported the Court’s broader harmonization story: Colorado wage law has been interpreted in ways that align with federal wage-and-hour structures and time limits, and the Court referenced Hernandez to underscore the incongruity a six-year period would create, including tension with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
Pilmenstein v. Devereux Cleo Wallace, 2021 COA 59, 492 P.3d 1059
The district court relied on Pilmenstein for the idea that related statutory provisions within a broader scheme should be considered together when a statute is silent (here, the MWA’s silence on limitations). The Supreme Court’s scheme-based approach is consistent with that move.
Balle-Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc., No. 21-cv-03106-NRN, 2022 WL 1521767 (D. Colo. May 13, 2022)
The Court used Balle-Tun as persuasive authority reflecting a practical wage-law understanding: these claims seek “some form of allegedly unpaid wages,” and harmonizing the wage scheme points to applying § 8-4-122. The Supreme Court echoed this “nature of the right” view.
Sোবolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1178 (D. Colo. 2018)
Perez leaned on Sobolewski to argue legislative “ratification”: after a federal court applied six years to MWA claims, the legislature amended the MWA without adding a limitations period. The Supreme Court did not accept that as dispositive, implicitly prioritizing structural coherence of Colorado’s wage statutes over inferred acquiescence from unrelated amendments.
Larimer Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. 1303 Frontage Holdings LLC, 2023 CO 28, 531 P.3d 1012
Cited to support interpretive use of regulatory/recordkeeping context. The Court relied on record retention requirements (three years) as a signal of expected liability horizons, reinforcing the appropriateness of the WCA’s two-/three-year framework.
Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC, 2023 COA 109, 543 P.3d 1054
The Supreme Court directly rejected the court of appeals’ reasoning that § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) “would seem clear” because the MWA is silent. The Supreme Court treated that approach as overly literal and insufficiently attentive to statutory scheme, specificity, and practical consequences (including “illogical” statute shopping).

B. Legal Reasoning

Framing the problem: statutory silence does not mandate the general default.
The MWA’s lack of an express limitations period created an interpretive choice, not an automatic reversion to the civil “liquidated debt” statute. The Court treated the question as one of legislative intent in context: how does the wage-enforcement system in title 8 operate as a whole?
Title 8 wage statutes form a “comprehensive scheme,” and the Court reads them harmoniously.
Relying on the presumption that the legislature intends an “effective” statute and coherent statutory schemes, the Court reasoned that the WCA and MWA both address wage payment and both enable recovery of unpaid wages. Absent clear contrary intent, the Court construed them together and treated the WCA limitations rule as the scheme’s governing limitations policy for wage-recovery claims.
The “nature of the right” controls over pleading form.
The Court emphasized that limitations should track the “nature of the right sued upon” (Persichini). Here, the right is to recover unpaid wages. Allowing plaintiffs to obtain six years simply by styling the case as an MWA claim would elevate form over substance and undermine scheme coherence.
Applying the Voss hierarchy: specificity decides.
The Court found the “later enacted” factor unhelpful (as the dissent in the court of appeals explained), and resolved the conflict under Voss rule two: the WCA limitations period is more specific because it sits within title 8’s labor-and-industry framework, while § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) is a broad civil-debt limitations rule in title 13. With specificity dispositive, the “longer limitations period” rule (the last resort) never applies.
Practical fit: recordkeeping and administrative complaint deadlines align with a short wage limitations period.
The Court treated wage-law infrastructure as confirmatory context. Employers must retain payroll records for three years under wage orders, and agency complaint registration for non-willful violations is limited to two years. A six-year private action period would mismatch these systems, increasing stale-claim risk and creating evidentiary problems the legislature appears to have avoided.
Consistency with the FLSA.
The Court found additional support in legislative history suggesting an intent to align Colorado wage laws with the FLSA. The FLSA uses the same two-year baseline and three-year willful-violation period. A six-year MWA period would put Colorado’s minimum-wage enforcement “in direct tension” with federal wage-and-hour limitation design.
Rejecting a narrow reading of “pursuant to this article.”
Perez’s textual argument relied on § 8-4-122’s phrase “[a]ll actions brought pursuant to this article.” The Court acknowledged the surface appeal but concluded that treating those words as an exclusivity command would frustrate coherent operation of title 8’s wage scheme and enable illogical outcomes—most notably different lookback periods for closely related wage injuries.
Illogic and “statute shopping” concerns.
The Court expressly flagged the practical distortion that would follow if WCA claims were capped at two years but MWA claims at six: litigants could re-label wage disputes to capture a longer period, producing arbitrary differences in liability exposure for functionally similar wage underpayment conduct.

C. Impact

Uniform limitations period for private wage recovery under title 8.
The decision establishes a clear rule: MWA wage-recovery actions are governed by § 8-4-122’s two-/three-year period, reducing uncertainty and forum-by-theory selection among overlapping wage statutes.
Earlier filing pressure for employees and counsel.
Plaintiffs cannot rely on § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) to reach back six years for MWA underpayment claims; timely investigation and filing becomes critical, especially for break-based wage claims that can be record-dependent.
Greater predictability for employers and alignment with retention rules.
The decision aligns private exposure with payroll record retention expectations (three years) and agency processes (two-year registration for non-willful violations), lowering the risk that liability will turn on records employers are not required to maintain.
Doctrinal signal: scheme coherence can “supply” omitted procedural details.
Even where a statute is silent, Colorado courts may treat related statutes within the same title and regulatory program as providing the governing procedural rule, especially where the claim’s “nature” matches the more specific statute’s subject matter.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statute of limitations: the deadline to file suit. Missing it usually ends the claim, regardless of merit.
“Liquidated debt” / “unliquidated, determinable amount of money” (§ 13-80-103.5(1)(a)): civil claims for money that is fixed (liquidated) or can be calculated from known facts (determinable), such as a contract balance.
Comprehensive statutory scheme: a set of statutes designed to work together to regulate a subject (here, wage payment and enforcement in title 8).
Specific vs. general statute (the Voss rule): when two deadlines could apply, courts prefer the one targeted to the subject matter (wage claims) over a broad, catch-all civil deadline (debt-like claims).
“Nature of the right sued upon” (Persichini): courts look at what right is being enforced (recovery of unpaid wages), not how the plaintiff labels the cause of action.
Willful violation: a higher-culpability wage violation. Under § 8-4-122 and the FLSA, willfulness extends the limitations period from two to three years.

V. Conclusion

By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez establishes that MWA private actions for unpaid wages are subject to the WCA’s two-/three-year limitations period in § 8-4-122, not the general six-year “liquidated debt/determinable money” period in § 13-80-103.5(1)(a). The Court’s reasoning is anchored in (1) harmonizing title 8’s wage statutes as a coherent scheme, (2) applying the specificity rule from Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Voss, and (3) focusing on the wage-recovery nature of the right asserted under Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc..

Practically, the decision tightens filing timelines for minimum-wage and break-related wage claims, curbs statute-shopping across wage statutes, and aligns private enforcement with recordkeeping and administrative time limits—bringing Colorado’s minimum-wage enforcement architecture into closer symmetry with the FLSA’s limitations structure.