Minimal FTCA Presentment and Marshals’ Duty to Assist IFP Service: The Third Circuit’s Freeman v. Lincalis Precedent

Introduction

In a precedential opinion, the Third Circuit in Rocky L. Freeman v. J. Lincalis et al. (No. 23‑1566, Oct. 29, 2025) clarifies two important procedural rules that will reverberate across federal tort litigation and prisoner civil rights practice:

First, the court holds that Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) “presentment” is satisfied when a claimant submits an SF‑95 to a component office of the appropriate federal agency—here, a local United States Probation Office (USPO)—and that the FTCA does not require routing to a particular headquarters lawyer or office.
Second, adopting the majority approach of sister circuits, the court holds that when an indigent (in forma pauperis) litigant sufficiently identifies current or former government employees for service, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) must take reasonable steps to locate and serve them; failure of service under those circumstances is per se “good cause” precluding dismissal under Rule 4(m).

The case arises from a profound error: Freeman’s presentence report (PSR) incorrectly stated he committed two murders despite his acquittal on one. Although a judge ordered the error corrected in 1998, it was not. Nearly two decades later, Freeman discovered the mistake and sued. He brought an FTCA negligence claim against the United States for transmitting and failing to correct the erroneous PSR, and a Bivens due process claim against individual probation officials. The district court dismissed both. The Third Circuit revives the FTCA claim and remands for discovery, but affirms dismissal of the Bivens claim on alternative grounds.

Summary of the Opinion

FTCA Presentment: Presenting an FTCA claim to a component office of the “appropriate Federal agency” satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)’s presentment requirement. Here, sending the SF‑95 to the Brooklyn Heights USPO sufficed; the statute does not require submission to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) General Counsel.
PLRA and Presentment: The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) “physical injury” requirement is a limitation on recovery, not a prerequisite to FTCA presentment. An SF‑95 need not detail a prisoner’s physical injuries to be properly presented.
FTCA Merits and Discovery: Dismissal on the merits was premature. Freeman plausibly alleged injury and causation from the false PSR, and the government’s refusal to produce discovery left gaps that must be developed on remand. The district court should also consider the discretionary function exception in the first instance.
Service of Process: For IFP litigants, where defendants are sufficiently identified but addresses are not accessible, USMS must take reasonable steps to locate and serve—especially for current or former government employees involved in a plaintiff’s incarceration. Dismissing Freeman’s Bivens claim for failure to serve was an abuse of discretion, though ultimately harmless.
Bivens Claim: The court affirms dismissal of the Bivens claim on the alternative ground that post-Egbert v. Boule and Third Circuit precedents (Fisher and Kalu) foreclose extending Bivens to PSR-related due process claims or conditions-of-confinement contexts.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinion: Judge Matey would affirm dismissal of the FTCA claim for lack of presentment to the AOUSC and emphasizes the FTCA as a “special factor” counseling against new Bivens remedies.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Tucker v. U.S. Postal Service, 676 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1982): Anchors the “minimal notice” standard for FTCA presentment—enough information to permit investigation, not a perfected settlement package. The court relies on Tucker to reject heightened presentment formalities.
Ortiz-Rivera v. United States, 891 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2018): Supports the principle that the FTCA does not specify a particular recipient within the agency. The Third Circuit aligns with this common-sense reading.
Lightfoot v. United States, 564 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2009): On the evidentiary posture for factual challenges to presentment/receipt. Because the government offered no evidence contesting receipt and raised the issue late at oral argument, the court declined dismissal.
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523 (3d Cir. 2003), and Allah v. Al‑Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000): Explain PLRA’s “physical injury” requirement as a limitation on recovery for mental/emotional injury, not a pleading or presentment prerequisite. The court uses these to correct the district court’s grafting of PLRA onto FTCA presentment.
Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002), and Burchfield v. United States, 168 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1999): Reinforce that FTCA presentment does not require specifying all legal theories or exhaustive factual detail. The Third Circuit tracks this permissive approach.
Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301 (1992): Confirms that FTCA liability is governed by “the law of the place,” framing the negligence elements the court applies.
S.R.P. ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2012) and Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2018): Identify the discretionary function exception as jurisdictional and place the burden of establishing it on the government. The court flags this as a live issue on remand.
Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1991): Establishes that USMS failure to complete service for an IFP litigant constitutes per se “good cause” under Rule 4(m). The court extends this principle to require reasonable efforts to locate government defendants.
Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), and Graham v. Satkoski, 51 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 1995): Persuasive authority holding that Marshals must assist in locating and serving where the plaintiff has sufficiently identified defendants, particularly government employees. Adopted by the Third Circuit here.
Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), and Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017): Provide the modern framework all but foreclosing new Bivens contexts absent compelling reasons. The court follows this to affirm dismissal on the Bivens claim.
Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024), and Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2024): Third Circuit precedents post‑Egbert rejecting extensions of Bivens to prison conditions and related due process contexts; they are dispositive of Freeman’s Bivens theory.
Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986), and Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987): Clarify quasi‑judicial immunity for probation officers. The court distinguishes between protected judicial functions (drafting PSRs) and unprotected ministerial actions or failures to obey a court order (transmitting a corrected PSR).

Legal Reasoning

1) FTCA Presentment—“Minimal Notice” to a Component Office Is Enough

The FTCA requires that “the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The Third Circuit reaffirms that presentment is a “minimal notice” standard: a claimant must give the agency enough information to investigate, not a perfected claim or settlement-ready dossier. Nothing in the statute or regulations requires mailing the SF‑95 to a specific headquarters attorney. Because the USPO’s Brooklyn Heights office was a component of the relevant agency involved in creating and transmitting the PSR, sending the SF‑95 there satisfied § 2675(a).

The court also underscores practical considerations: the government did not dispute receipt in briefing, raised a non‑receipt theory for the first time at oral argument, and offered no evidence. In the face of an evidentiary vacuum and a belated contention, the court declined to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.

Importantly, the court notes that where multiple agencies are implicated, presentment to any one suffices; agencies then must coordinate (28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(2)). This reduces trap‑door dismissals in multi‑agency events.

2) PLRA’s Physical Injury Rule Does Not Heighten FTCA Presentment

The district court had demanded that Freeman describe physical injuries in the SF‑95 because the PLRA bars recovery for purely mental/emotional injuries without physical injury. The Third Circuit corrects this: § 1997e(e) is a limitation on recovery at trial, not a presentment requirement. Presentment asks only whether the agency had enough information to investigate negligence; it does not require a preview of all injuries or trial proof. The court cautions, however, that a plaintiff cannot present one factual claim administratively and then sue on a different set of facts—physical injuries must be plausibly connected to the administratively presented event. Freeman’s allegations meet that threshold.

The court also flags that prisoners who are later released may amend to avoid certain PLRA limitations going forward (Garrett v. Wexford; Downey v. Pennsylvania DOC), an issue the district court can sort out on remand.

3) Negligence Merits—Discovery First, Summary Judgment Later

The parties agreed negligence turns on duty, breach, causation, and injury. The government did not contest duty or breach for the USPO’s transmission of an uncorrected PSR, and did not dispute injury if Freeman’s conditions of confinement were heightened by the error. The fight centered on causation: whether the false “double‑murder” label proximately caused Freeman’s dangerous placements, solitary confinement, and restraints.

The Third Circuit concludes that causation could not be decided against Freeman before discovery, particularly because the government refused to produce information about classification and transport policies that might illuminate the link between the inaccurate PSR and Freeman’s conditions. The court reverses the merits dismissal as premature and allows discovery; it also directs the district court to address any discretionary function exception arguments in the first instance on a fuller record.

On immunity, the court draws a clean line: quasi‑judicial immunity protects probation officers for judicial functions like drafting PSRs, but not for ministerial failures such as disregarding a court’s order to correct a PSR or transmitting the wrong version to BOP.

4) Service of Process—USMS Must Help IFP Litigants Locate Government Defendants

Rule 4(m) ordinarily permits dismissal for failure to serve within 90 days, but IFP litigants are entitled by statute to USMS service. The Third Circuit formally adopts the majority view: where an IFP plaintiff sufficiently identifies defendants (especially current or former government employees involved in the plaintiff’s incarceration), USMS must take reasonable steps to locate and serve them. If Marshals fail to do so, that failure is automatically “good cause,” and dismissal under Rule 4(m) is improper.

Applying the rule here, Freeman provided the most recent information he had, diligently sought counsel, and requested USMS assistance in retrieving addresses from the National Personnel Records Center. Dismissing for non‑service was an abuse of discretion. That said, the error was harmless, because the Bivens claims fail as a matter of law.

5) Bivens—No Extension to PSR/Due Process or Prison Conditions

The court reaffirms that Bivens remedies are exceptional and effectively closed to new contexts after Egbert and Ziglar. Freeman’s PSR‑based due process claim is a new context—not one of the three recognized Bivens settings (Bivens search‑and‑seizure, Davis employment discrimination, or Carlson prison medical deliberate indifference). Post‑Egbert Third Circuit cases (Fisher and Kalu) bar extension to failure‑to‑protect, due process, or general prison‑conditions claims. The court thus affirms dismissal on the merits, using the IFP screening authority (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)), without requiring prior service.

Judge Matey’s partial dissent underscores a complementary point: the FTCA itself is a “special factor” counseling hesitation in creating new Bivens remedies, an argument other courts have increasingly embraced post‑Egbert (and in light of the Supreme Court’s per curiam in Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025)). While not necessary to the majority’s holding, the dissent’s emphasis signals that FTCA negligence—not Bivens—is the available path for damages in cases like this.

Impact

A. FTCA Practice

Presentment Simplified: Claimants can satisfy § 2675(a) by sending the SF‑95 to a component office of the agency whose activities gave rise to the claim. For multi‑agency events, presentment to any one agency suffices; inter‑agency coordination is then the government’s responsibility.
PLRA Not Imported Into Presentment: Agencies cannot demand granular descriptions of physical injury at the SF‑95 stage. Presentment is about enabling investigation, not litigating the PLRA’s recovery limitations.
Discovery Gatekeeping: District courts should avoid merits dismissals on causation before allowing reasonable discovery into classification systems, PSR usage, and transport protocols where these are central to alleged harm.
Immunity Boundaries: Quasi‑judicial immunity will not shield ministerial disobedience of a court order or the transmission of an incorrect PSR. This incentivizes rigorous post‑sentencing corrections and accurate PSR routing.
Watch the Discretionary Function Exception: On remand, BOP decisions about classification and transport may raise discretionary function issues. But failures to forward or correct a PSR as ordered may be ministerial and non‑discretionary.

B. IFP Litigation and Service of Process

USMS Duties Expanded in the Third Circuit: Marshals must take reasonable steps to locate and serve sufficiently identified government defendants, including retrieving last‑known addresses from government repositories (e.g., NPRC) under protective arrangements that protect privacy and security.
Fewer Rule 4(m) Dismissals Against Prisoners: Courts should hesitate before dismissing IFP suits for non‑service where the shortfall is attributable to the Marshals’ inability or unwillingness to locate addresses. Plaintiffs should not be penalized for failures beyond their control.

C. Bivens Litigation

Closing the Door, Again: The Third Circuit reiterates that Bivens is not available for due process challenges tied to PSRs or conditions of confinement. Negligence under the FTCA is the primary damages vehicle in such cases.
FTCA as a “Special Factor” (Dissent): Expect increased reliance on the FTCA’s availability to argue against recognizing any new Bivens contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

FTCA Presentment (28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)): Before suing the United States for a federal employee’s tort, you must notify the relevant agency via an administrative claim (usually SF‑95) with enough information to let the agency investigate. You do not need to identify every legal theory or list all injuries.
Component Office: A local or regional unit of a larger agency (e.g., a district USPO). Sending your claim there counts as presentment to the “appropriate Federal agency.”
PLRA Physical Injury Rule (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)): A prisoner cannot recover compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or a sexual act. This limits recovery at trial; it is not part of FTCA presentment.
Bivens: Judge‑made damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations. After Egbert and Ziglar, courts almost never extend Bivens to new contexts.
USMS Service for IFP Litigants (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)): If you proceed in forma pauperis, USMS serves your complaint. If you sufficiently identify a defendant but cannot locate them, Marshals must make reasonable efforts to do so.
Quasi‑Judicial Immunity: Protects probation officers performing judicial functions (like drafting PSRs). It does not cover purely ministerial acts or disobedience of a court’s order to correct a PSR.
Discretionary Function Exception (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)): Bars FTCA claims challenging discretionary policy judgments grounded in public policy. Ministerial tasks or mandatory duties typically fall outside the exception.
PSR and SENTRY: A Presentence Report informs sentencing and is used by the Bureau of Prisons. SENTRY is BOP’s inmate management database; erroneous PSR data can influence classification, placement, and restraints.

Conclusion

Freeman v. Lincalis delivers two consequential holdings for federal practice in the Third Circuit. It confirms that FTCA presentment is a low‑friction notice process that can be satisfied by submitting claims to a component office of the relevant agency, without PLRA‑based embellishments at the administrative stage. And it adopts a robust duty for the U.S. Marshals Service to assist IFP litigants in locating and serving current or former government employees, foreclosing dismissals that penalize plaintiffs for obstacles they cannot overcome from prison.

On the merits, the court preserves a viable FTCA negligence pathway for harms traceable to the transmission of an uncorrected PSR, while firmly closing the door on Bivens expansion in prison‑conditions or PSR‑based due process contexts under Egbert, Fisher, and Kalu. The opinion also delineates the boundary of quasi‑judicial immunity for probation officers: protected for judicial functions, unprotected for ministerial failures to obey a court‑ordered correction.

For practitioners, the takeaways are practical and immediate: file SF‑95s with any appropriate agency component and track receipt; do not over‑plead injuries at presentment; demand discovery tied to classification and restraint decisions before causation determinations; and, for IFP clients, press courts to direct USMS to undertake reasonable, documented steps to locate and serve government defendants. On remand, the district court’s resolution of causation and any discretionary function defenses will further shape the contours of FTCA liability for PSR‑related harms. The broader signal, however, is clear: access to the FTCA remains open for well‑pleaded negligence rooted in ministerial failures, while new Bivens terrain remains closed.