Miller v. State and the Sufficiency of Aggravated Assault Indictments Omitting “Recklessly” in Mississippi

I. Introduction

In Willis Miller v. State of Mississippi (Miss. Sup. Ct., Nov. 13, 2025), the Supreme Court of Mississippi addressed a recurring and technically difficult question in criminal procedure: what makes an indictment for aggravated assault legally sufficient when it omits an express mens rea term (“recklessly”) that appears in the statute?

The case arose out of a tragic incident in Oktibbeha County involving a highly intoxicated driver, an ATV carrying three children, and a fatal collision on a rural road. The driver, Willis Miller, was convicted as a habitual offender of:

Aggravated DUI resulting in the death of a nine-year-old child (Paige), and
Aggravated assault for causing serious bodily injury to a thirteen-year-old child (Adam).

On appeal, Miller did not contest the facts of the collision so much as the legal sufficiency of the charging document for Count II (aggravated assault). His core claim was that the indictment:

Omitted an essential statutory element (“recklessly”), and
Improperly mixed different culpable mental states (“willfully” and “recklessly”) such that the indictment was fatally defective and could not be cured mid-trial without prejudice.

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed the aggravated assault conviction. In doing so, it clarified how Mississippi courts evaluate:

The sufficiency of indictments under Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.1, particularly for aggravated assault under Mississippi Code section 97-3-7(2)(a)(i); and
When the State may amend an indictment during trial to add or clarify mental state language without violating the defendant’s right to fair notice or due process.

This commentary examines the opinion’s reasoning, its reliance on prior precedents, and its implications for future prosecutions and defenses in serious violent-crime cases in Mississippi.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Collision

The underlying facts were largely undisputed:

Three children—Adam (13), Paige (9), and Peter (1)—were riding on a four-wheeler (ATV) on Williams Road in Bethel.
Miller, driving a 2016 Dodge Ram owned by Jerunaous Boyd, struck the ATV from behind.
Witnesses testified that Miller’s truck was on the wrong side of the road when it hit the ATV.
All three children were thrown from the vehicle. Paige suffered cardiac arrest at the scene and later died. Adam sustained a traumatic brain injury.

Evidence of intoxication and speed was substantial:

Boyd testified that he and Miller had been drinking at Miller’s house and that he had asked Miller to slow down immediately before the crash.
A responding officer testified to a “heavy odor” of alcoholic beverage on Miller.
A blood draw at approximately 11:23 p.m. (roughly three hours after the 7:44 p.m. collision) showed a BAC of 0.131%; a urine sample showed 0.132%—both above the 0.08% legal limit.
Accident reconstruction showed the truck was traveling between 90 and 97 mph in the five seconds before impact, accelerating until one second pre-impact, with no braking. The vehicle was on the wrong side of the road.

B. The Charges

Miller was indicted as a habitual offender for:

Count I: Aggravated DUI resulting in death (Paige);
Count II: Aggravated assault of Adam under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i).

Count II alleged that Miller:

did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause serious bodily injury to [Adam] by operating a motor vehicle at a high rate of speed while intoxicated and running into the victim with said vehicle, thereby manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, in violation of [Mississippi Code Section] 97-3-7(2)(a)(i).

Notably, the indictment did not include the word “recklessly,” even though section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i) expressly references “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”

C. Mid-Trial Amendment of the Indictment

After the State rested, the prosecutor moved to amend Count II to add the word “recklessly,” labeling the omission a “scrivener’s error” and asserting that:

Miller had always been on notice that the State was proceeding on a reckless-aggravated-assault theory, and
The amendment would merely conform the indictment to the proof at trial.

Over defense objection, the trial court granted the motion to amend, finding no unfair surprise or prejudice.

D. Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal

The jury convicted Miller of both aggravated DUI (Count I) and aggravated assault (Count II). He received:

25 years for aggravated DUI, plus
20 years for aggravated assault, consecutive to the DUI sentence, as a habitual offender.

The trial court denied Miller’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, alternatively, for a new trial. On appeal, Miller’s primary argument was focused on Count II: that the aggravated assault indictment was fatally defective and that the mid-trial amendment to add “recklessly” was impermissible and prejudicial.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Court resolved the case in two principal steps:

The indictment was not defective. Even though the original indictment omitted the word “recklessly,” it:
- Cited the correct statute, section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i);
- Alleged that Miller caused serious bodily injury “thereby manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”; and
- Described the specific conduct (driving at a high rate of speed while intoxicated and striking the victim).
From a “fair reading,” this was enough to put Miller on notice that he was charged under the reckless variant of aggravated assault.
The amendment adding “recklessly” caused no prejudice and was permissible. The Court treated the amendment as one of form rather than substance because:
- Miller’s defense did not turn on whether he acted intentionally vs. recklessly;
- His core defense—that his driving was not the sole cause of the collision—remained fully available and unchanged; and
- The indictment had always alleged “extreme indifference to the value of human life,” making clear the nature of the culpability contested at trial.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed Miller’s conviction and sentence for aggravated assault. All justices concurred, with Presiding Justice King concurring in the result only, without a separate opinion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Procedural Framework

1. The aggravated assault statute

Section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i) provides, in pertinent part, that:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she . . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

Thus, for charged conduct like Miller’s, the State ordinarily must show that:

The defendant caused serious bodily injury to another person; and
Did so either:
- purposely,
- knowingly, or
- recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

The opinion treats “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference” as a concept akin to “culpable negligence” in homicide cases.

2. Indictment sufficiency under Rule 14.1

Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.1(a)(1) requires that an indictment:

shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts and elements constituting the offense charged and shall fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Under this framework, an indictment is:

Ordinarily sufficient if it tracks the language of the statute and
Includes enough detail to inform the accused of the specific offense and facts at issue.

The question in Miller was whether omitting the word “recklessly” while including “manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” and a citation to section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i) satisfies this requirement.

B. Precedents on Indictment Sufficiency and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

1. Standard of review – Brady and Forkner

The Court began by noting that “[w]hether an indictment is defective is an issue of law and therefore deserves a relatively broad standard of review, or de novo review.” It cited:

Brady v. State, 337 So. 3d 218 (Miss. 2022), and
Forkner v. State, 277 So. 3d 946 (Miss. 2019),

for the proposition that appellate courts independently review indictment-sufficiency questions without deference to the trial court’s conclusions.

2. “Fair reading” of the indictment – Harrison and Henderson

The Court relied on Harrison v. State, 722 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 1998), which in turn cited Henderson v. State, 445 So. 2d 1364 (Miss. 1984), for the rule that:

So long as from a fair reading of the indictment taken as a whole the nature and cause of the charge against the accused are clear, the indictment is legally sufficient.

This “fair reading” approach is critical: the Court refused to treat the absence of a single statutory word as dispositive where, taken as a whole, the document conveyed the charge and elements.

3. Use of statutory language – Quang Thanh Tran, Carll, and Hess

In Quang Thanh Tran v. State, 962 So. 2d 1237 (Miss. 2007), the Court reiterated longstanding federal principles from:

United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1882), and
United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888),

that:

It is generally sufficient for an indictment to track the words of the statute if those words fully and clearly set forth all necessary elements; but
Even when statutory language is used, the indictment must include enough facts and circumstances to inform the accused of the specific offense charged.

The Court in Miller applied these principles functionally. Although the indictment did not literally recite “recklessly,” it:

Cited the statute that includes “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,” and
Used the “manifesting extreme indifference” phrase itself, along with detailed factual allegations (driving intoxicated at a high rate of speed and striking the victim).

From this, the Court concluded that the indictment sufficiently embodied the elements, even without precise replication of every statutory term.

4. Context-dependent sufficiency – Jones (2003)

The opinion quoted Quang Thanh Tran, which cited Jones v. State, 856 So. 2d 285 (Miss. 2003), for the proposition that whether statutory language alone is sufficient depends on:

the nature of the offense and the terms in which it is described by the statute.

Thus, the Court acknowledged that in some contexts, omitting an express element might be fatal. Here, however, because aggravated assault under section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i) is framed in flexible mental-state alternatives (purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under extreme-indifference circumstances), and because the indictment supplied detailed conduct plus the “extreme indifference” language, the omission did not render the charge unintelligible or incomplete.

5. Equivalent language and non-literal charging – Gilmer and Price

To reinforce this, the Court quoted:

Gilmer v. State, 955 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 2007), quoting
Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 2005):

It is not essential, in an indictment for a statutory crime, that the exact descriptive language of the statute be used. Equivalent words of substantially the same meaning as those of the statute may be substituted. Where the language used in the indictment is sufficiently specific to give notice of the act made unlawful, and exclusive enough to prevent its application to other acts, it is sufficient.

This language underpins the Court’s conclusion that:

“Willfully . . . causing serious bodily injury . . . thereby manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” is, in substance, a reckless-extreme-indifference allegation within the statutory framework; and
The indictment’s wording was therefore not fatally defective.

C. The Court’s Treatment of “Recklessness” and “Willfulness” in Aggravated Assault

1. Recklessness “in the act itself” – Gilmore and Nobles

Miller argued that the indictment incorrectly linked a “willful” act with “a manifestation of extreme indifference to human life.” The State countered, and the Court agreed, that Mississippi precedent treats the “recklessness or negligence” in the aggravated assault statute as a characteristic of the act, rather than the subjective intent.

The Court cited:

Gilmore v. State, 119 So. 3d 278 (Miss. 2013), and
Nobles v. State, 464 So. 2d 1151 (Miss. 1985),

for the proposition that:

“The recklessness or negligence contemplated by the [aggravated assault] statute is in the act itself” and “does not refer to the subjective intent of the defendant.”

This is a crucial conceptual move. It means:

The State need not prove that the defendant intended harm in a subjective sense.
Rather, if the defendant willfully engages in conduct (e.g., driving at 90–97 mph, intoxicated, on the wrong side of the road) that objectively constitutes extreme-risk behavior, the recklessness lies in the choice to engage in that act, not in a desire to cause harm.

Thus, there is no inherent inconsistency between describing the conduct as “willful” (volitional) and also “reckless” as to its consequences; the defendant can deliberately perform a dangerous act while being recklessly indifferent to the likely harm it will inflict.

2. Analogy to culpable negligence – Nelson and Smith

The Court drew heavily on Nelson v. State, 361 So. 2d 343 (Miss. 1978), which held that the “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” language in the aggravated assault statute is:

analogous to our definition of culpable negligence in homicide cases.

“Culpable negligence” had been defined in Smith v. State, 197 Miss. 802, 20 So. 2d 701 (1945), as:

the conscious and wanton or reckless disregard of the probabilities of fatal consequences to others as a result of the [willful] creation of an unreasonable risk thereof.

Two key points arise from this analogy:

Willfulness and recklessness co-exist. The defendant can willfully create a dangerous situation (e.g., high-speed drunk driving in the wrong lane) and thereby act with culpable negligence or “reckless” indifference to the safety of others.
Focus on risk creation, not intent to harm. Liability attaches not because the defendant desired the outcome (serious injury or death), but because he consciously engaged in behavior that created an unreasonable risk of such consequences.

The Court noted that in Nelson, aggravated assault was affirmed where the defendant had pointed a pistol at the victim, “manifest[ing] an extreme indifference to the value of human life,” “[r]egardless of what [he] intended.”

By linking Miller to this line of cases, the Court positioned aggravated assault via extreme indifference as functionally similar to culpable-negligence manslaughter: the gravamen is the defendant’s conscious adoption of a deadly risk.

D. Application to Miller’s Indictment

The Court concluded that Miller’s original indictment:

Clearly alleged that he caused serious bodily injury to Adam;
Described that he did so by operating his vehicle at a high rate of speed while intoxicated and colliding with the victim;
Charged that this conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life; and
Expressly cited section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i).

Taken together, these features made it clear that the State was proceeding under the “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference” prong of the statute. The Court reasoned that Miller was “sufficiently on notice that his indictment was based on conduct falling under the reckless portion of the cited statute,” even if the word “recklessly” was missing.

Moreover, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it had to find that “Miller recklessly and unlawfully caused serious bodily injury to” Adam in order to convict on Count II. The instructions therefore tracked the correct statutory element and placed the proper burden on the State. This undercut any claim of confusion or lack of notice as to the required mental state at trial.

E. The Amendment Issue: Form vs. Substance and Prejudice

1. The legal standard for amending indictments

Miller further argued that he was prejudiced and denied a fair trial when the State was allowed to amend the indictment mid-trial to add the term “recklessly.”

The Court framed this issue using precedents such as:

Jones v. State, 912 So. 2d 973 (Miss. 2005);
Griffin v. State, 584 So. 2d 1274 (Miss. 1991);
Rhymes v. State, 638 So. 2d 1270 (Miss. 1994);
Pool v. State, 764 So. 2d 440 (Miss. 2000).

The overarching rule is:

Indictments may be amended to correct defects of form, but not defects of substance (which must be cured by the grand jury).
An amendment is one of form if:
- It is immaterial to the merits of the case, and
- The defense is not prejudiced.
The test for prejudice is whether “the defense as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made.”

2. Miller’s defense theory and absence of prejudice

The Court emphasized that Miller’s defense did not center on mental state. His trial strategy argued that:

The collision was not solely caused by his speed or intoxication, but by a combination of factors, including:
- the rocky condition of the road,
- the presence of an ATV in the roadway, and
- conduct of the ATV riders.

In other words, his defense focused on causation, not on whether he acted willfully or recklessly. That causation-based defense was equally available before and after the amendment. The Court therefore found no prejudice:

The amendment did not change the “essence” of the offense charged.
It did not introduce new factual allegations or a new theory of liability.
It simply made explicit what was already implicit in the statutory citation and “extreme indifference” language.

3. Compatibility of “willfully” and “recklessly” in the amended indictment

Miller also argued that because the State failed to remove the word “willfully” while adding “recklessly,” the amended indictment was legally incoherent. He maintained that “one cannot act both willfully and recklessly.”

The Court rejected this, implicitly relying on the earlier discussion of Gilmore, Nobles, Nelson, and Smith. The crux is:

“Willfully” refers to the voluntariness of the conduct (deciding to drive at 97 mph while intoxicated on the wrong side of the road), and
“Recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference” refers to the defendant’s disregard of the serious risks posed by that willful conduct.

Therefore, the presence of both words in the indictment is not inherently contradictory. A person can willfully perform an act (driving) while being recklessly indifferent to the potentially deadly consequences of performing that act in an extremely dangerous manner.

Because the indictment already alleged “extreme indifference to the value of human life” and cited the correct statute, the addition of “recklessly” merely clarified the mental-state theory without altering the factual or legal basis of the charge. Hence, the amendment was a permissible correction of form, not substance, and caused no unfair surprise or disadvantage to the defense.

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Prosecutors: Charging Practices in Aggravated Assault Cases

Miller signals a relatively pragmatic, non-formalistic approach to indictment sufficiency in Mississippi aggravated assault cases:

Prosecutors are not absolutely required to recite every mental-state adverb (e.g., “recklessly”) word-for-word, provided that:
- The indictment cites the correct statute;
- It includes statutory phrases like “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”; and
- It details the specific conduct alleged to constitute the offense.
Nevertheless, as a matter of best practice, prosecutors should continue to:
- Include the full statutory mental state language when drafting indictments;
- Avoid reliance on post hoc “scrivener’s error” amendments; and
- Ensure that jury instructions precisely track the statutory elements, as they did here.

The decision gives the State some leeway to fix omissions mid-trial when the defense has been clearly on notice from the outset, but it does not license sloppy drafting. A poorly drafted indictment that fails to make clear which prong of the statute the State is relying on (purpose, knowledge, or recklessness) might still be vulnerable to a successful challenge if the facts and language do not adequately inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation.

B. For Defense Counsel: Strategy and Preservation of Indictment Challenges

For defense attorneys, Miller underscores several points:

Indictment challenges based solely on the absence of a particular statutory word will be difficult to sustain if:
- The charge cites the statute,
- Uses closely related statutory language (“extreme indifference”), and
- Specifically describes the unlawful act in detail.
To defeat a mid-trial amendment, it is not enough to assert that an element was missing:
- Counsel must show actual prejudice—e.g., that the defense preparation or theory would have materially differed had the element been expressly pled.
Pretrial motions challenging an indictment should clearly articulate:
- How the indictment fails to provide notice of the specific statutory theory (purposeful, knowing, reckless), and
- How that uncertainty affects the ability to prepare a defense.

Miller strongly suggests that where the defense theory is independent of the precise mental state (e.g., contesting causation or identity of the driver), courts are unlikely to find prejudice from amendments that clarify mental-state language.

C. For Trial Courts: Managing Mid-Trial Amendments

The opinion provides trial courts with a roadmap for analyzing requests to amend indictments during trial:

Ask whether the indictment, as originally drafted, provided sufficient notice under a “fair reading” test.
Determine whether the proposed amendment:
- Alters the essential elements or factual basis of the offense, or
- Simply clarifies or corrects language (form).
Evaluate the defendant’s actual defense theory:
- If the defense is unaffected by the amendment (as in Miller, where it focused on causation), the amendment is more likely to be deemed one of form.
Ensure jury instructions track the correct elements, particularly if there has been any amendment to the indictment’s language.

By affirming the trial court’s decision here, the Supreme Court effectively endorsed this practical, prejudice-focused approach.

D. Broader Doctrinal Significance: Recklessness and Culpable Negligence

Doctrinally, Miller reinforces a line of Mississippi cases treating:

“Recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” in the aggravated assault statute as analogous to
“Culpable negligence” in homicide law.

This convergence has several implications:

It clarifies that serious vehicular misconduct (high-speed drunk driving, wrong-lane driving, etc.) can comfortably fall within aggravated assault via extreme indifference, even absent proof of a purpose to harm.
It harmonizes aggravated assault doctrine with homicide precedents, fostering consistency in how Mississippi treats high-risk conduct causing death vs. serious injury.
It confirms that the focus is on the risk-creating act itself—not the defendant’s desire for a harmful outcome.

This may have downstream effects on charging decisions in vehicular harm cases, where prosecutors could choose between:

Aggravated DUI statutes,
Aggravated assault under section 97‑3‑7(2)(a)(i), and/or
Homicide offenses (when death results), premised on culpable negligence or depraved-heart theories.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts Used in the Opinion

1. “Recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”

In practical terms, this means:

The defendant is aware, or should be aware, that their conduct creates a very high risk of serious injury or death to others;
They go ahead with that conduct anyway; and
The risk is so glaring that it reflects a virtual disregard for human life.

Driving nearly 100 mph on the wrong side of a rural road while intoxicated with other vehicles present is a textbook example.

2. “Culpable negligence”

Culpable negligence is more than ordinary carelessness. It is:

A conscious, wanton, or reckless disregard of a known, serious risk of death or serious injury; and
Often framed in terms of willfully creating an unreasonable risk of fatal consequences.

The Court equates this with the aggravated assault statute’s “recklessness under extreme indifference” language.

3. “Scrivener’s error”

A “scrivener’s error” is a drafting mistake—typically unintentional—such as omitting a word, misspelling, or misnumbering a statute. Courts are often more willing to permit corrections when:

The error is clearly clerical,
The intended meaning is obvious, and
No party has been misled or prejudiced.

4. “Habitual offender”

A “habitual offender” is a defendant who has prior qualifying felony convictions and therefore faces enhanced sentences under Mississippi law. The opinion notes that Miller was indicted as a habitual offender, which explains the severity and structure of his sentence.

5. “Judgment notwithstanding the verdict” (JNOV)

A motion for JNOV asks the trial court to set aside the jury’s guilty verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal instead, on the ground that no reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence. The trial court denied such a motion here, and the Supreme Court implicitly agreed by affirming the conviction.

VII. Conclusion

Willis Miller v. State of Mississippi establishes and confirms several important principles for Mississippi criminal law:

Indictment sufficiency is assessed by a “fair reading” in context, not strict formalism. An indictment that omits the exact word “recklessly” can still be valid for aggravated assault if it:
- Identifies the correct statute,
- Uses key statutory phrases (“manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”), and
- Sets out the specific acts giving rise to the charge.
Mental-state language may be clarified by mid-trial amendment if no prejudice results. Adding “recklessly” to the indictment was treated as an amendment of form—permissible because:
- It did not change the underlying theory or facts of the offense, and
- Miller’s chosen defense (lack of sole causation) remained fully intact.
“Recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference” is akin to culpable negligence and compatible with willful acts. The Court reaffirms that recklessness resides in the dangerous act itself, not in the desire to harm, and that a defendant may willfully engage in conduct that is recklessly indifferent to likely deadly consequences.

For prosecutors, the decision offers assurance that courts will look to the substance, not mere form, of indictments in serious violent-crime cases. For defense counsel, it signals that successful challenges to indictments or amendments will require a concrete showing of prejudice and lack of notice, not just technical defects in wording.

In the broader landscape of Mississippi criminal law, Miller knits together indictment doctrine, aggravated assault, and culpable-negligence principles into a more coherent whole. It confirms that extreme-risk conduct—such as severe intoxication combined with reckless driving—can validly be charged and tried as aggravated assault via extreme indifference, even where the charging language is not perfectly aligned with every statutory word, so long as the defendant has been fairly informed and fairly tried.