Mere Presence Is Not Corroboration: State v. Matt and Montana’s Strict Accomplice-Testimony Rule

I. Introduction

In State v. Matt, 2025 MT 264, the Montana Supreme Court reversed a drug-possession conviction that rested essentially on the testimony of a cooperating accomplice. The Court held that, under Montana’s accomplice-corroboration statute, § 46‑16‑213, MCA, the State’s independent evidence did not sufficiently “tend to connect” the defendant, Joseph Dwayne Matt, to the crime of criminal possession of dangerous drugs.

The decision is significant because it sharply reinforces a demanding standard: a defendant’s mere presence in proximity to contraband, even when combined with suspicious circumstances and surveillance footage, does not constitute the statutorily required corroboration of accomplice testimony.

Although Matt also raised a Fourth and Fifth Amendment–type challenge regarding the search of the vehicle and the questioning of the driver, the Court resolved the appeal solely on sufficiency grounds relating to accomplice corroboration and therefore did not reach the search-and-suppression issue.

The opinion sits squarely in the line of prior Montana decisions such as State v. Kemp, 182 Mont. 383, 597 P.2d 96 (1979), and State v. Rose, 187 Mont. 74, 608 P.2d 1074 (1980), and recent cases like State v. Tollie, 2022 MT 59, and State v. Black, 2003 MT 376. It clarifies that modern tools of proof—dash and body cameras, surveillance videos, phone records—do not loosen the statutory requirement that accomplice testimony be independently corroborated by evidence that connects the defendant to the commission of the offense itself, rather than merely raising suspicion.

II. Background of the Case

A. The parties and the charges

The State charged:

Levi Gadaire (the driver) with Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute and Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, after methamphetamine and paraphernalia were found in the center console of his vehicle.
Joseph Dwayne Matt (the front-seat passenger) with:
- Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute by Accountability, and
- Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

Both men were on supervision (probation / parole). Matt was also flagged as an absconder with an active warrant. Their association itself violated a condition barring association with other probationers/parolees.

B. The traffic stop and search

On January 31, 2023, Sergeant Buck of the Broadwater County Sheriff’s Office stopped Gadaire’s vehicle after a report of erratic driving. After learning that both occupants were on supervision and that Matt had an active warrant, Buck:

Arrested and handcuffed Matt, seating him in a patrol car.
Contacted parole officer Lamb regarding Gadaire, reported the erratic driving and association with Matt, and sought authorization for a vehicle search. Lamb initially declined.

Buck then told Gadaire, “at the end of the day, you know you’re going to let me search your car,” and, without administering Miranda warnings, questioned him about drug and alcohol use. When Gadaire admitted to using meth that morning, Buck re-contacted Lamb, who then authorized a search based on the violation of parole conditions.

The search of the center console yielded:

Two 30-gram bags of methamphetamine,
An additional container holding 11.4 grams of methamphetamine,
A digital scale and small plastic baggies—classic distribution paraphernalia.

C. Trial evidence

Matt’s jury trial took place in July 2023. The State’s case included:

Testimony of Andrea Flores, the civilian motorist who had reported the erratic driving.
Testimony and bodycam footage from Sgt. Buck showing:
- The initial stop, interaction with Matt and Gadaire, and
- Buck’s search of the vehicle and discovery of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the center console.
Surveillance footage from the Three Forks Town Pump complex:
- Showing Matt getting into the passenger seat of Gadaire’s car.
- Showing Gadaire then parking next to another vehicle (“Matt and Ashley’s” car) and entering that vehicle for several minutes while Matt remained in the passenger seat of Gadaire’s car.
- Showing both men later fueling up and entering the gas station.
Phone and text records from Gadaire’s phone, including calls and messages with contacts labeled “Matt and Ashley (Belgrade)” and other drug-related communications.
Testimony from Detective/Sergeant Reighard (Missouri River Drug Task Force):
- Interpreting the surveillance footage.
- Describing his interviews with both men. Importantly, Matt:
  - Denied any knowledge of the drugs in the car, and
  - Admitted only that he expected to be paid in cash for helping move items in Boulder and that, once back in Butte, he might convert that cash into a small personal-use quantity (“a quarter gram or something”).
Accomplice testimony from Gadaire, the linchpin of the State’s linkage of Matt to the drugs. At trial, he claimed that:
- He arranged to pick up methamphetamine from “Matt and Ashley” in Three Forks.
- He invited Matt (the defendant) to accompany him under the pretense of helping move heavy items at his mother’s house.
- He told Matt, while driving, of the real purpose: to pick up meth and avoid being robbed, and Matt agreed to “make sure [he was] okay.”
- At Town Pump, he met “Matt and Ashley,” weighed two one-ounce bags of meth in their vehicle, returned with the drugs, and placed both in the center console while Matt sat in the passenger seat, supposedly able to see what he was doing.

On cross-examination, however, Gadaire admitted to having given multiple, mutually inconsistent versions of events over time—what he himself called “lying testimony.” His narratives shifted about:

Where he picked up Matt,
Whether he knew about the drugs,
Who the drugs were for (including prior claims that one ounce was for Matt), and
Where exactly the transfer took place (in the bathroom vs. the parking lot, etc.).

He further admitted that the 11.4-gram container of meth in the console belonged to his girlfriend and was in the car before the Town Pump drug pickup.

After trial, he wrote a letter to the prosecutor recanting his trial testimony implicating Matt, prompting Matt to file a motion for new trial. Because the appeal was already pending, the District Court did not act on that motion; the Supreme Court’s resolution on corroboration ultimately made it unnecessary.

D. Verdict and post-trial motions

At the close of the State’s case, Matt moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State’s proof, aside from the accomplice’s testimony, did not adequately corroborate that testimony under § 46‑16‑213, MCA.

The District Court candidly described the State’s case as “weak” and “hanging on by a thread,” but nonetheless denied the motion and allowed the case to go to the jury.

Matt testified in his own defense, denying knowledge of or involvement with the drugs or paraphernalia in the console. The jury ultimately:

Acquitted him of Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, but
Convicted him of the lesser-included offense of Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (dropping the “intent to distribute by accountability” theory).

Matt appealed, raising:

The accomplice corroboration / directed verdict issue; and
The suppression issue based on the allegedly unlawful vehicle search and interrogation.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Gustafson, writing for a unanimous Court (with the Chief Justice recused), framed the sole dispositive issue as:

Did the District Court err in denying Matt’s motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient corroborating evidence?

Applying the familiar sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asking whether any rational factfinder could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt—the Court held that the State failed to present sufficient corroborating evidence to support a conviction based on accomplice testimony.

Specifically:

All evidence independent of accomplice Gadaire’s testimony (Flores’s testimony, Buck’s bodycam, the discovery of drugs, Town Pump surveillance, phone records, and Matt’s statements to Reighard) did not connect Matt to knowing possession of the drugs in the console.
This independent evidence at most raised a suspicion of involvement by showing Matt’s presence and association with Gadaire near the time of the drug transaction.
Under § 46‑16‑213, MCA, and cases like Kemp, suspicion and opportunity are insufficient as a matter of law to corroborate accomplice testimony.

Because the conviction rested on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the cause. On that basis, it declined to reach the suppression issue.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Standard of review and directed verdict

The Court reiterated that:

The denial of a motion for directed verdict is reviewed under the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, citing State v. Byers, 2003 MT 83, ¶ 6.
Evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational juror could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Trial courts have discretion to deny or grant directed verdicts, but an abuse of that discretion occurs when the State’s proof is legally insufficient.

B. Montana’s accomplice corroboration statute: § 46‑16‑213, MCA

Section 46‑16‑213, MCA, provides that:

A defendant cannot be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice, unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence that, in itself and without the aid of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

The Court emphasized several key interpretive points, drawn from prior decisions:

Rationale for the rule: As State v. Tollie recognizes, accomplice testimony is “inherently untrustworthy” because accomplices have strong motives to shift blame or minimize their own exposure.
Nature of corroboration:
- Corroboration must do more than “merely describe the circumstances of the crime or raise suspicion of the defendant’s involvement.” (Kemp; Tollie).
- The corroborating evidence must, by itself, provide some connection between the defendant and the crime—independent of the accomplice’s testimony. (Tollie).
Scope of corroboration required:
- The evidence need not corroborate every detail of the accomplice’s story; nor must it, standing alone, establish a prima facie case. (Black).
- It may be circumstantial, disputed, and even consistent with an innocent explanation; and it may come from the defendant or defense witnesses. (Black).

C. Precedents applied and distinguished

1. State v. Tollie (2022)

Tollie, 2022 MT 59, reinforces the principle underlying § 46‑16‑213, MCA: because accomplices may testify in exchange for leniency or to deflect culpability, their statements alone are insufficient for conviction. The corroboration requirement functions as a structural safeguard against wrongful convictions based solely on compromised insiders.

In Matt, the Court draws directly on Tollie to emphasize that corroboration is not a formalistic box to check but a substantive requirement rooted in concerns about reliability and fairness.

2. State v. Black (2003)

In State v. Black, 2003 MT 376, ¶ 24, the Court clarified:

Corroborating evidence need not independently establish guilt or each element of the crime.
It can be circumstantial and contested and can even come from the defendant’s own statements or defense testimony.
Its role is more modest: to provide some independent, objective link between the defendant and the crime, beyond the accomplice’s say-so.

Black is important in Matt because it prevents defendants from arguing that every element must be corroborated; instead, the question is whether there is some non-accomplice evidence that tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the offense.

3. State v. Rose (1980)

In State v. Rose, 187 Mont. 74, 608 P.2d 1074 (1980), the defendant was convicted of burglary. An accomplice testified that the defendant had committed the burglary, and the corroboration consisted largely of:

Non-accomplice testimony that Rose was a disgruntled patient of the property owner and knew the owner was out of town.
Discovery of four stolen guns in the defendant’s landlady’s car.
Rose’s own admission that he had possessed the guns after the burglary and tried to “stash” them in a pasture.

The Court in Rose held that the defendant’s admitted possession of the stolen property after the burglary, even without other connecting evidence, provided sufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony that he was the burglar.

In Matt, the Court contrasts Rose’s situation—where the defendant actively admitted possession of stolen items—with Matt, who consistently denied possession or knowledge of the methamphetamine and was not shown by independent evidence to have possessed it. The Rose line of cases, including State v. Williams, 185 Mont. 140, 604 P.2d 1224 (1979), stand for the proposition that actual or constructive possession of fruits or instrumentalities of a crime can, by itself, serve as corroboration.

4. State v. Kemp (1979)

State v. Kemp, 182 Mont. 383, 597 P.2d 96 (1979), is the key analog for Matt. There, an accomplice testified that she purchased a large quantity of methamphetamine from Kemp at a hotel, financed by a $600 wire transfer from a third party. Independent evidence showed:

The third party’s $600 wire transfer to Kemp’s bank on the relevant date.
A ledger entry referencing a $600 transfer “direct to you,” apparently referring to Kemp.
An address book listing Kemp and his banker (with the banker’s name misspelled, matching the misspelling in the wire record).
Testimony from a friend who received the drugs from the accomplice and from others who got drugs through the accomplice.

Despite this constellation of circumstantial evidence, the Court in Kemp held that it merely showed an opportunity for Kemp to have committed the drug sale and raised a suspicion, but did not independently connect him to the specific crime alleged. The corroboration requirement was not met.

In Matt, Justice Gustafson explicitly analogizes Matt’s situation to Kemp’s: the independent evidence (presence near the alleged transaction, suspicious but ambiguous circumstances) “casts a cloud of suspicion” but does not cross the statutory line into genuine corroboration.

5. In re R.L.H. (2005) and the concept of possession

The Court cites In re R.L.H., 2005 MT 177, ¶ 18, for the definition of criminal possession of a dangerous drug: a person commits the offense when he or she knowingly has “dominion and control” over the dangerous drug.

This concept of dominion and control is central: Matt’s mere presence in a car where drugs are later found does not automatically show that he had such dominion and control—especially when the drugs are in the driver’s center console and there is no independent evidence he handled them, knew they were there, or exercised control over them.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. Identifying the accomplice

The Court implicitly treats Gadaire as an accomplice for purposes of § 46‑16‑213, MCA. He was charged with offenses arising from the same drugs; he cooperated and testified against Matt; and his testimony was the centerpiece of the State’s theory that Matt was involved in the drug pickup and knew about the drugs in the console.

Once a witness is deemed an accomplice, his testimony cannot alone support a conviction; some independent corroboration is required.

B. Cataloguing the non-accomplice evidence

Stripping away everything that depends on believing Gadaire’s word, the Court enumerates the remaining evidence (¶ 24):

Flores’s description of erratic driving.
Buck’s description of the traffic stop and search, plus bodycam footage showing Matt as a passenger and the drugs in the center console.
Text/call data from Gadaire’s phone, including calls with “Matt and Ashley (Belgrade)” and other drug-related texts.
The three packets of methamphetamine and paraphernalia found in the center console.
Town Pump surveillance footage showing:
- Matt entering Gadaire’s car as passenger.
- Gadaire parking next to another car, entering that car, and returning after a few minutes.
- Both men fueling up and going into the store.
Reighard’s testimony about Matt’s interview—most notably Matt’s statement that he might use his expected cash payment to buy a small amount of drugs later in Butte.

C. Why the independent evidence did not “tend to connect” Matt to the crime

The Court then asks whether this non-accomplice evidence, “in itself and without the aid of the accomplice,” tends to connect Matt to criminal possession of dangerous drugs.

Flores’s testimony and erratic driving
Flores only described how Gadaire was driving. Nothing in her testimony connected Matt to the drugs or to any criminal activity.
Bodycam footage and Buck’s testimony
These sources show that:
- Matt was in the front passenger seat.
- The drugs and paraphernalia were subsequently discovered in the center console.
The Court acknowledges (¶ 25) that this creates suspicion because of the spatial proximity of Matt to the contraband. However, merely being near drugs is not enough to show:
- That Matt knew of their presence, or
- That he exercised dominion or control over them.
Without some additional, independent indication of knowing possession—such as fingerprints, admissions, attempts to hide or discard the drugs, or control over the area where the drugs were found—this evidence remains ambiguous.
Town Pump surveillance footage
The footage shows that:
- Matt got into the passenger seat of Gadaire’s car.
- Gadaire then parked next to another vehicle and got into that vehicle for several minutes while Matt stayed in Gadaire’s car.
- When he returned, they moved to the pumps and both got out; nothing in the footage shows contraband being handled or transferred.
Critically (¶ 25), the footage:
- Does not show who was in the other vehicle;
- Does not show drugs being carried or placed in the center console; and
- Does not visibly depict Matt participating in or even observing a drug transfer.
The video’s incriminating force depends entirely on accepting Gadaire’s narrative that this was a meth pickup from “Matt and Ashley.” Without his testimony, the video is just a neutral recording of a man briefly visiting another car in a parking lot while his passenger waits.
Calls and texts from Gadaire’s phone
The phone data includes communications between Gadaire and “Matt and Ashley (Belgrade)”—a drug source—but not between Gadaire and this Matt (the defendant). Nothing in the opinion indicates that the defendant’s number was implicated in that phone data.

Thus, the phone records corroborate that Gadaire was involved in drug activity, but do not independently tie Matt (the passenger) to the drugs in the console or to the pickup transaction.
Reighard’s testimony and Matt’s interview
Matt:
- Denied knowing about the drugs in the car.
- Denied that his fingerprints would be found on the contraband.
- Admitted only that he expected to be paid in cash for labor in Boulder and might later convert some of that cash into a small personal-use quantity once back in Butte.
The Court finds this admission irrelevant to the offense charged (¶ 26). It shows, at most, a possible future intent to obtain a small amount for personal use, not any involvement in the meth actually found in Gadaire’s console that day. It does not evidence dominion or control over those drugs.

Put simply, every piece of independent evidence either:

Shows only that Matt was present, associating with a known drug user/dealer; or
Shows drug activity attributable to others (Gadaire and “Matt and Ashley”) without connecting that activity to Matt’s possession of the drugs in question.

Under § 46‑16‑213, MCA, this is legally insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony.

D. Comparisons to Rose and Kemp

The Court uses Rose and Kemp as contrasting benchmarks:

In Rose, the defendant’s own admission that he possessed stolen guns provided a concrete, independent tie to the burglary, sufficient to corroborate the accomplice.
In Kemp, multiple suspicious facts (ledger, wire transfer, address book, timing, friend’s possession of drugs) created a strong suspicion but, because they did not independently affirm that Kemp actually engaged in the charged drug transaction, were insufficient as a matter of law.

The Court aligns Matt with Kemp, not Rose:

“[T]he contemporaneousness of Matt’s presence in the vehicle and the alleged drug deal ‘casts a cloud of suspicion over [Matt],’ but ‘[w]here the claimed corroboration shows no more than an opportunity to commit a crime and simply proves suspicion, it is not sufficient corroboration to justify a conviction upon the testimony of an accomplice.’” (¶ 27, quoting Kemp).

E. Holding and disposition

The Court concludes:

The State failed its burden to offer corroborating evidence that, without reference to the accomplice, tended to connect Matt to the offense of possession of dangerous drugs.
The District Court erred in denying Matt’s motion for a directed verdict.
Matt’s conviction must therefore be reversed, the judgment and sentence vacated, and the cause dismissed.

Because the sufficiency issue is dispositive, the Court does not decide whether the search of the vehicle or the questioning of Gadaire violated constitutional or statutory protections.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Reinforcement of a strict corroboration standard

The most important doctrinal impact of State v. Matt is a strong reaffirmation of a demanding standard for corroboration of accomplice testimony:

Mere presence and association are not enough. Being in a car or in the same general vicinity as an accomplice who is clearly involved in criminal activity does not, by itself, suffice.
Suspicion, opportunity, and timing remain inadequate. Echoing Kemp, the Court makes clear that even significant circumstantial suspicion—such as temporal proximity to a drug transaction and presence in a vehicle containing drugs—does not automatically create the “tends to connect” link required by statute.
Modern evidentiary tools do not dilute the statute. The presence of video footage and digital phone records did not alter the analysis. Unless those materials show something that independently connects the defendant to the criminal act (e.g., handling drugs, coordinating the transaction, claiming ownership), they remain insufficient for corroboration purposes.

B. Consequences for prosecution strategies in drug and accountability cases

This decision has practical implications for prosecutors, especially in drug cases involving multiple actors and vehicles:

Greater emphasis on independent proof of knowledge and control.
To secure convictions against passengers or peripheral actors, the State must now be especially careful to seek:
- Physical evidence like fingerprints or DNA on the drugs or containers.
- Admissions by the defendant acknowledging knowledge of or access to the drugs.
- Text messages, calls, or other records directly tying the defendant to the procurement or planned distribution of the specific contraband at issue.
Limits on leveraging cooperating accomplices.
Although plea deals and cooperation agreements remain valid tools, Matt warns that the State cannot simply “backfill” a weak evidentiary record with an accomplice narrative, however plausible that narrative may sound. Without independent corroboration, such testimony cannot support a conviction.
Accountability theories face the same corroboration hurdle.
Matt was originally charged under an accountability (accomplice liability) theory. While the jury convicted of simple possession instead, the opinion underscores that when the key evidence of aiding, abetting, or otherwise facilitating a crime comes from an accomplice, that evidence also must be corroborated. Accountability does not sidestep § 46‑16‑213, MCA.

C. Clarifying “possession” in shared-occupancy scenarios

This case also has subtle but important implications for what counts as “possession” in shared-occupancy settings (e.g., vehicles with multiple occupants, shared residences):

Dominion and control, not mere proximity. A person sitting near contraband is not automatically in possession of it. There must be some evidence that the person:
- Knew of its presence, and
- Had the ability and intent to exercise control over it.
Vehicle passengers are not presumptive co-possessors. Matt illustrates that a passenger’s presence next to a console containing drugs is not, without more, enough to prove possession, much less corroborate an accomplice’s accusation that the passenger was a willing participant in a drug pickup.

D. Trial-court obligations when facing “threadbare” corroboration

The District Court’s remarks—recognizing that the State’s case was “weak” and “hanging on by a thread”—but still denying a directed verdict, highlight a critical point for trial judges:

Where the only real linkage to the defendant is accomplice testimony and the independent evidence merely creates suspicion, the statute compels a judicial screening function.
Matt signals that appellate review will not hesitate to reverse where this legislative protection against wrongful conviction is not enforced at trial.

E. Effect on Matt’s case and double jeopardy implications

Because the Court reversed on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, the case is remanded to vacate the judgment and dismiss the cause. As a general matter in criminal law, a reversal for insufficient evidence is treated as the equivalent of an acquittal, and retrial is barred by double jeopardy principles. The Court’s mandate to dismiss the case reflects that finality.

F. Unresolved search-and-suppression issues

The opinion expressly notes, in ¶ 28, that because the corroboration issue is dispositive, the Court does not reach Matt’s argument that the search of the vehicle and Buck’s interrogation of Gadaire (including the pre-Miranda questioning) violated constitutional and statutory protections.

As a result:

The case does not create precedent on:
- Whether a probationer or parolee’s vehicle can be searched based solely on an officer’s request to a supervising officer after suggestive questioning, or
- Whether a passenger probationer has standing to challenge such a search, or
- How pre-Miranda questioning of a supervisee affects the validity of consent or probation-based search authorization.
Those questions remain open for future litigation, where the sufficiency of evidence is not independently dispositive.

VII. Complex Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

A. What is an “accomplice” and why is their testimony treated differently?

An accomplice is someone who:

Participated in the same crime as the defendant, or
Could himself or herself be charged with that crime based on their role.

Their testimony is viewed with extra caution because:

They may testify in exchange for a more lenient sentence.
They have a strong incentive to minimize their own involvement or shift blame to others.
They might tailor their story to fit what law enforcement wants to hear.

Montana law, through § 46‑16‑213, MCA, responds to this risk by requiring corroboration—meaning some independent evidence supporting their claims—before a defendant can be convicted based on that testimony.

B. What is “corroboration” of accomplice testimony?

In this context, corroboration means independent evidence that:

Does not come from the accomplice’s mouth, and
By itself, tends to connect the defendant to the crime charged.

Important features:

It does not have to prove the entire case or every detail.
It can be circumstantial (for example, fingerprints on contraband, or an incriminating statement).
It must be more than speculation and more than proof that the defendant could have committed the crime.

In Matt, the key message is that proximity and suspicion are not enough. There must be some solid link—like possession, admission, or clearly incriminating communications—tying the defendant to the criminal act.

C. What is a “directed verdict” in a criminal trial?

A directed verdict is a ruling by the judge, usually at the close of the prosecution’s case (and sometimes at the close of all evidence), that:

Even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
No reasonable jury could lawfully find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

If granted, the case is taken away from the jury and the defendant is acquitted. The idea is to prevent convictions where the legally required quantum of proof is simply absent.

In Matt, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge should have granted Matt’s motion for a directed verdict because, without the accomplice’s uncorroborated testimony, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law.

D. What does “possession” mean in this context?

Possession can be:

Actual possession: having the drugs on your person (in your pocket, hand, etc.).
Constructive possession: you don’t physically hold the drugs, but you:
- Know they are there, and
- Have the ability and intent to exercise control over them (e.g., drugs in your locked glovebox, or in your bedroom closet).

Merely being near drugs—like sitting near a center console in which drugs are hidden—does not automatically show possession. The State has to show both:

Knowledge (you knew they were there), and
Dominion and control (you could and intended to control them).

That is why, in Matt, the Court treated the discovery of drugs in the console as insufficient to link Matt, as a passenger, to possession absent additional proof of knowledge and control.

E. Accountability (accomplice liability)

Although the jury ultimately did not convict Matt under the “by accountability” theory, it is helpful to understand it:

Under Montana law, a person can be convicted as an accomplice (by accountability) if they intend to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense and aid, abet, agree, or attempt to aid in its commission.
This does not require physically handling the drugs; participating in planning, providing security, or helping execute the transaction can suffice.

However, if the only proof of such participation is accomplice testimony, § 46‑16‑213, MCA, still requires corroboration—just as in direct liability cases. Matt implicitly confirms that accountability theories are fully subject to the same corroboration constraints.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Matt is a strong modern reaffirmation of Montana’s statutory protection against convictions based solely on accomplice testimony. The Court’s core holding is that:

Mere presence near contraband and association with an accomplice—no matter how suspicious the circumstances—do not, by themselves, satisfy the corroboration requirement of § 46‑16‑213, MCA.

By aligning this case with State v. Kemp and distinguishing State v. Rose, the Court reiterates that corroboration must be something more: independent evidence that tends to connect the defendant to the specific criminal act charged. Without that link, even powerful-sounding accomplice narratives—like Gadaire’s shifting accounts—cannot support a conviction.

Practically, Matt will influence how prosecutors handle multi-party drug investigations, underscoring the need for tangible, non-accomplice evidence of knowledge and control in shared-occupancy situations, especially vehicles. For defense counsel, it provides a clear blueprint for challenging weak corroboration and for pressing directed-verdict motions where the State’s case hangs “by a thread” on one incentivized witness.

The opinion does not decide important questions about probation-based vehicle searches or the scope of standing for passengers to challenge those searches; those issues remain for future cases. But on the law of accomplice testimony and corroboration, State v. Matt decisively reinforces Montana’s longstanding, strict standard: opportunity and suspicion are not enough; corroboration must be real.