Introduction

In In re Marriage of Meek (No. 124,904, Kansas Supreme Court, April 18, 2025), the Kansas Supreme Court resolves two recurring points of contention in Kansas family and appellate practice. First, it clarifies the preservation doctrine: to preserve a legal issue for appellate review, a litigant must raise the issue in the district court, but need not file a post‑judgment motion to alter or amend merely because the court decided the legal issue adversely. Second, the Court adopts a strictly textual, “statutory approach” to property classification at divorce: under K.S.A. 23‑2801, all property owned by married persons becomes marital property upon commencement of a divorce action that culminates in a final decree.

The case arises from a marriage in which the husband, Aaron Meek, suffered devastating workplace injuries. Both spouses received significant personal injury recoveries: Aaron for his injuries and Nancy Karanja‑Meek for loss of consortium. The trial court—relying on Court of Appeals decisions—treated the annuities funding each recovery as separate and not subject to equitable division. The Court of Appeals reversed, labeling its view the “mechanical approach”: all property owned by either spouse is divisible. On review, the Supreme Court rejects the mechanical/analytical labels altogether, grounds the analysis in the statutory text, and instructs lower courts to follow the statutes, not judge‑made “approaches.”

The parties’ threshold dispute on preservation also frames an important practice point. Nancy argued Aaron failed to preserve his legal challenge because he did not file a post‑judgment motion under K.S.A. 60‑252 to alter or amend the district court’s ruling. The Supreme Court disagrees, emphasizing that while litigants must raise legal issues below, there is no blanket requirement to file reconsideration motions to preserve legal error.

Summary of the Opinion

• Preservation: A party preserves a legal issue for appeal by raising it in the district court. A party need not file a motion to alter or amend the judgment to preserve a purely legal issue for appellate review. The Court disapproves Court of Appeals decisions suggesting otherwise.
• Property Classification: Reading K.S.A. 23‑2601 and K.S.A. 23‑2801 together, “all property owned by married persons” becomes marital property upon the commencement of a divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment action in which a final decree is entered.
• Analytical vs. Mechanical Labels: The Court rejects and disapproves future references to the “analytical” or “mechanical” approaches in Kansas. Courts are to apply the statutory text (a “statutory approach”).
• Equitable Division: Once classified as marital under K.S.A. 23‑2801, the division of property proceeds under K.S.A. 23‑2802(c), which lists nonexclusive equitable factors (e.g., age, duration of marriage, time/source/manner of acquisition, earning capacities, taxes, dissipation, etc.).
• Disposition: The Court of Appeals’ decision reversing the district court is affirmed; the district court is reversed; the case is remanded for equitable division considering both annuities as marital property. The Supreme Court expresses no view on the ultimate distribution.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion engages a cluster of Kansas and out‑of‑state authorities to draw two lines: one concerning property classification and another concerning appellate preservation.

• In re Marriage of Buetow (27 Kan. App. 2d 610, 3 P.3d 101 [2000]): The Court of Appeals applied an “analytical approach” to exclude certain Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) benefits from marital property by examining the purpose of the award, the period of diminished earning capacity, the nature/date of injury, and the award’s terms. Meek disapproves the use of such extra‑statutory labels and factor tests at the classification stage, redirecting courts to the statutes. While Buetow’s policy concerns may surface in equitable division, they do not control classification.
• In re Marriage of Powell (13 Kan. App. 2d 174, 766 P.2d 827 [1988]): Powell held personal injury settlements are subject to equitable division, relying on other states’ cases rather than close statutory analysis. Meek reorients the analysis to statutory text, implicitly confirming the result (subject to division) but rejecting non‑textual methodologies.
• Marshall v. Marshall (298 Neb. 1, 902 N.W.2d 223 [2017]): Cited to describe the “analytical approach” as employed elsewhere. Meek references Marshall to identify the approach it is rejecting for Kansas classification purposes.
• In re Marriage of Bradley (258 Kan. 39, 899 P.2d 471 [1995]): Emphasizes that objections to inadequate findings help ensure an adequate record for appellate review. Meek relies on Bradley to ground preservation doctrine in the purpose of findings—record sufficiency—rather than a rote requirement of post‑judgment motions for every adverse legal ruling.
• Bicknell v. Kansas Department of Revenue (315 Kan. 451, 509 P.3d 1211 [2022]): The Court explained that adequate findings can obviate remand and that failure to object can waive certain issues, reinforcing the centrality of record sufficiency. Meek uses Bicknell to show the proper focus of preservation doctrine.
• State v. Espinoza (311 Kan. 435, 462 P.3d 159 [2020]): The Court held an as‑applied constitutional challenge was not reviewable absent necessary factual findings and a Rule 165 motion. Meek cites Espinoza to illustrate when a lack of factual findings—rather than an adverse legal ruling—precludes appellate review absent an objection.
• In re Care & Treatment of Miller (289 Kan. 218, 210 P.3d 625 [2009]): Recites the general rule that issues must be raised in the district court to be reviewed on appeal. Meek adheres to this baseline rule while clarifying what additional steps are and are not required.
• In re N.E. (316 Kan. 391, 516 P.3d 586 [2022]): Confirms that questions of law and statutory interpretation get plenary review. Meek invokes this to set the review standard for both issues.
• State v. Spencer Gifts (304 Kan. 755, 374 P.3d 680 [2016]): States that plain statutory language governs over judicial glosses and policy preferences. Meek uses Spencer Gifts to justify its strict textual approach to property classification and to reject judge‑made frameworks.
• In re Marriage of Stewart (No. 125,850, 2023 WL 8499235 [Kan. App. 2023] [unpublished]): The Court of Appeals faulted a party for not filing a K.S.A. 60‑252 motion to alter/amend before appealing a legal ruling. Meek expressly disapproves of such decisions, holding that post‑judgment motions are not a prerequisite to preserve a legal issue already raised below.

Statutory Framework and the Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is fundamentally textual and straightforward.

• K.S.A. 23‑2601 defines separate property during the marriage: property owned at marriage, and property acquired by descent, devise, bequest, or gift, along with their proceeds, remains the owner’s sole and separate property “notwithstanding the marriage.”
• K.S.A. 23‑2801(a) then provides the pivot: “All property owned by married persons … whether described in K.S.A. 23-2601 … or acquired by either spouse after marriage … shall become marital property at the time of commencement by one spouse against the other of an action in which a final decree is entered for divorce, separate maintenance, or annulment.” The inclusion of specific categories—such as vested or unvested military retirement pay and marketable professional goodwill—underscores the breadth of “all property.”
• K.S.A. 23‑2802(c) lists ten nonexclusive factors guiding equitable division of marital property, including age, marriage duration, property owned, earning capacities, “the time, source and manner of acquisition of property,” family obligations, maintenance, dissipation, tax consequences, and a catch‑all for other just and reasonable considerations.

From this structure, the Court draws two key conclusions:

1. Classification is simple and statutory: once a qualifying action is commenced and results in a final decree, “all property owned by married persons” is marital property. Courts should not interpose judge‑made “analytical” or “mechanical” tests to re‑classify assets (including personal injury awards) at this stage.
2. Distribution is equitable and contextual: any nuance about the source, purpose, timing, or nature of an asset (e.g., pain and suffering vs. lost wages; personal injury vs. consortium) may be considered within the statutory division factors—particularly factor (5) (“time, source and manner of acquisition”) and factor (10) (catch‑all)—without recasting assets as “separate” for classification purposes.

Emphasizing Spencer Gifts, the Court refuses to supplement the statutory scheme with preferred social policy. It disapproves future references to “mechanical” or “analytical” frameworks; the “statutory approach” governs.

Preservation Doctrine Clarified

The Court rejects the notion that a party must file a post‑judgment motion to amend or alter (invoking K.S.A. 60‑252 or Supreme Court Rule 165) each time the party loses a legal issue. The touchstone is whether the party raised the legal issue in the district court and whether the appellate record is sufficient for review.

• If the district court’s findings are inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review of a claim dependent on factual determinations, a party should object or seek additional findings (see Bradley; Espinoza). Otherwise, appellate review may be precluded or a remand may be necessary.
• But where the issue is purely legal and was raised below, a litigant “need not move to amend or alter the judgment to preserve that issue for appellate review.” The Court disapproves Court of Appeals decisions, such as Stewart, that impose a contrary prerequisite.

Application to the Meek Facts

Both parties received lump‑sum personal injury settlements and annuities with guaranteed payments through 2045. Nancy filed for divorce roughly two years later. The district court—following Court of Appeals precedent—treated the annuities as separate, not divisible. The Court of Appeals reversed, treating them as marital under a “mechanical” view.

The Supreme Court affirms the reversal, but on statutory grounds. It holds that under the plain text of K.S.A. 23‑2801, all property owned by the spouses—including their respective personal injury annuities—became marital property upon commencement of the divorce that resulted in a final decree. The case is remanded for the district court to exercise its “considerable discretion” to equitably divide the marital estate under K.S.A. 23‑2802(c). The Court expresses no view on the appropriate division.

Impact and Future Implications

Meek is a significant recalibration for Kansas family law and appellate practice.

• Uniform classification rule: The decision removes uncertainty and doctrinal fragmentation around asset classification. Personal injury recoveries—including loss‑of‑consortium awards—and analogous “special” assets are marital property at the time of commencement of a divorce action that proceeds to final decree. The battleground shifts to equitable division, not classification.
• Analytical factors move to distribution: The concerns motivating the old analytical approach (purpose of award, nature and timing of injury, period of disability, etc.) may still be urged under K.S.A. 23‑2802(c), particularly factors (5) and (10). Expect more nuanced valuation and distribution arguments at the remedy stage rather than threshold classification fights.
• Practice guidance for trial courts: District courts should cease invoking “mechanical” or “analytical” labels. They should:
  • Classify assets as marital under K.S.A. 23‑2801 once a qualifying action is commenced and results in a final decree.
  • Then apply the K.S.A. 23‑2802(c) factors to reach a just and reasonable allocation, explaining how specific factors inform the percentage split, set‑offs, or structured awards.
• Appellate preservation: Counsel need not file a 60‑252 motion simply to preserve a legal argument already presented to the district court. However, when an appellate issue requires factual findings not made by the district court, counsel should consider Rule 165 or equivalent requests to ensure an adequate record.
• Settlement dynamics: With classification clarified, parties are incentivized to address source‑specific equities in negotiated allocations, supported by expert valuations (e.g., present value of annuity streams), tax analyses, and detailed reference to K.S.A. 23‑2802(c) factors.
• Contracting around defaults: Prenuptial or postnuptial agreements that comply with Kansas law may still alter default allocations. Meek does not impair valid agreements; it standardizes statutory defaults in their absence.
• Doctrinal clean‑up: Meek disapproves reliance on the “mechanical” or “analytical” terminology and rejects decisions requiring a post‑judgment motion to preserve legal error. Counsel should update briefs and templates to reflect the “statutory approach” and the clarified preservation rule.

Comparative Perspective

Many states historically used “mechanical” (all property is marital) or “analytical” (classify by the nature/purpose of the asset) approaches for tort recoveries and similar assets. Nebraska’s Marshall v. Marshall exemplifies an analytical model. Kansas, via Meek, decisively aligns with a textual, statute‑driven regime: classification is determined by K.S.A. 23‑2801, and distribution by K.S.A. 23‑2802(c). This enhances predictability and reaffirms legislative primacy in domestic relations policy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Marital vs. Separate Property: “Separate” property (e.g., premarital assets, gifts, inheritances) remains separate during the marriage (K.S.A. 23‑2601). But under K.S.A. 23‑2801, once a divorce action is commenced and ultimately results in a final decree, all property owned by either spouse at that time is treated as marital for purposes of equitable division.
• Equitable Division: “Equitable” does not mean “equal.” Courts consider ten statutory factors (K.S.A. 23‑2802[c]), including how and when the property was acquired, earning capacities, taxes, and dissipation, to reach a fair distribution.
• Personal Injury and Loss of Consortium Awards: These are compensatory. Loss of consortium compensates a spouse for loss of companionship/services due to the other spouse’s injury. Under Meek, both spouses’ personal injury‑related annuities are marital property at classification; the court may account for their nature and purpose when dividing them equitably.
• Annuities: Financial products paying periodic sums over time. For property division, courts commonly determine present value or structure division to address future payments, taxes, and risk allocation.
• Preservation of Error: To appeal a legal issue, you must have raised it in the district court. You do not need to file a post‑judgment motion merely because the court ruled against you on the law. But if factual findings are missing and necessary for appellate review, you must seek them (e.g., via Rule 165) or risk remand or dismissal.
• Supreme Court Rule 165 and K.S.A. 60‑252: These tools concern findings of fact and conclusions of law. They ensure a reviewable record. They are not a universal prerequisite to appeal an adverse legal conclusion already argued below.

Conclusion

In re Marriage of Meek delivers two clear directives that will reverberate through Kansas domestic relations and appellate practice. First, property classification at divorce is governed by the plain text of K.S.A. 23‑2801: upon commencement of a divorce proceeding that results in a final decree, all property owned by married persons becomes marital property. Courts must abandon mechanical/analytical labels and adhere to the statute. Second, preservation of legal issues does not require a post‑judgment motion to alter or amend where the legal issue was presented to the district court and the record permits meaningful review.

The decision thereby simplifies classification, relocates nuanced considerations to the equitable division stage under K.S.A. 23‑2802(c), and streamlines appellate practice by focusing preservation on issue‑raising and record sufficiency, not on perfunctory reconsideration motions. Meek’s statutory fidelity enhances predictability and doctrinal coherence while preserving trial courts’ broad discretion to craft just and reasonable property divisions.