MDT Noncompliance as Harmless Error and the Scope of “Reasonable Efforts” in Termination of Parental Rights: Commentary on In re J.B. and A.B.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re J.B. and A.B., No. 24-633 (Nov. 4, 2025), addresses two recurring and practically important issues in child abuse and neglect litigation:

1. Whether the failure of a multidisciplinary team (“MDT”) to hold a court-ordered, statutorily required meeting prior to disposition requires reversal of a termination order.
2. What is required for the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to have made “reasonable efforts to preserve the family” under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv).

The petitioner father, D.B., challenged the Wirt County Circuit Court’s order terminating his parental rights to J.B. and A.B. He argued that: (1) the MDT violated Rule 51(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑405(d) by failing to meet before the dispositional hearing; and (2) DHS did not make reasonable efforts to preserve the family, particularly in light of these procedural failures.

The Supreme Court affirmed. It held, under the “limited circumstances” of this record, that the failure to conduct one additional MDT meeting—though contrary to statute, rule, and a specific court order—did not constitute reversible error because it would not have changed the outcome. The Court also held that DHS satisfied its reasonable-efforts obligation where it offered a broad array of reunification services, notwithstanding the father’s extensive noncompliance.

Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, the opinion provides substantive guidance on how West Virginia courts may treat MDT noncompliance under a harmless-error framework and how they will evaluate the “reasonable efforts” requirement where a parent repeatedly fails to engage with offered services.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Abuse and Neglect Petition

In May 2023, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition concerning two children, J.B. and A.B. The petition alleged that the parents failed to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, and bedding, and that the home environment was unfit for children:

• The home was dirty and cluttered to such an extent that some areas were inaccessible.
• The house had no electricity.
• The children’s bedroom was filled with trash, liquor bottles, and miscellaneous objects.

These conditions, if proven, squarely implicate the statutory definitions of neglect and expose the children to health and safety risks.

B. Adjudication and the Post‑Adjudicatory Improvement Period

At the October 2023 adjudicatory hearing, the father stipulated that he failed to provide adequate housing, and he was adjudicated an “abusing and neglecting parent” as to both children.

The circuit court granted him a post-adjudicatory improvement period. As is typical in West Virginia practice, the improvement period was structured around a case plan specifying services and expectations. The father was required to:

• Attend all MDT meetings and court hearings;
• Participate in parenting classes;
• Attend scheduled visitation with the children;
• Obtain a safe and stable residence with utilities for the children;
• Submit to a parental fitness evaluation;
• Participate in therapy sessions;
• Maintain contact with DHS case workers.

C. Early Noncompliance and Continued Services

By the February 2024 status hearing, DHS reported significant noncompliance:

• The father had failed to maintain contact with his assigned DHS worker.
• He was not attending therapy sessions.
• He had not obtained a stable home; the residence lacked electricity and water service.
• He was described as generally combative with service providers.

The circuit court found the father was not substantially compliant with the improvement period. Although an order stated the improvement periods “shall cease,” the court simultaneously directed DHS to continue offering services, and the later dispositional order formally “terminated” the improvement period. Thus, there was no gap in the availability of services to the father, even as his compliance deteriorated.

D. Protective Order, Loss of Housing, and Service Discharge

In April 2024, the children’s mother obtained a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against the father, alleging harassment. As a result:

• The father was compelled to vacate the home he had shared with the mother.
• He became effectively homeless or without a suitable residence.
• He later was arrested for violating the DVPO after attempting to contact the mother at her residence.

After being forced to leave the home, the father contacted his DHS worker, asking what he needed to do to regain custody of his children. The worker directed him back to the terms of his improvement period and told him to confer with his attorney. No MDT meeting was scheduled or held at that time to re-assess his case plan in light of these new circumstances.

At a May 2024 hearing, the court:

• Ordered that an MDT meeting be held to discuss disposition; and
• Suspended visitation due to the father’s failure to attend several scheduled visits.

Subsequently, DHS reported that the father failed to attend three separate provider appointments without notice, leading to his discharge from services.

E. Dispositional Hearing and Termination

At the September 2024 dispositional hearing, DHS presented evidence of the father’s “overall noncompliance”:

• No participation in services or visitation since April 2024;
• Inconsistent contact with his case worker;
• No progress toward safe, stable housing; at the time of disposition he had no proper residence for the children.

DHS also admitted that—despite the court’s May 2024 order—no MDT meeting had occurred since April 2024. The circuit court addressed this lapse directly, finding that one more MDT meeting would not have changed the outcome or helped the children, given the father’s minimal engagement over a six-month period.

On the merits of disposition, the circuit court found:

• There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.
• Termination of parental rights was necessary for the welfare of the children, who required permanency.
• DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve the family, offering a wide range of services, including:
  • Parental fitness examinations;
  • Transportation to and from service providers;
  • Parenting classes;
  • Supervised visitation;
  • Assistance with utilities in the home;
  • Adult life-skills classes (budgeting, job applications);
  • Alcohol and drug screening and rehabilitation services;
  • Individual therapy.

The circuit court terminated the father’s parental rights. The mother’s rights were also terminated, but she did not appeal, and her case is not addressed in this opinion.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, the father challenged the termination order on two grounds:

1. The MDT’s failure to hold a required meeting before the dispositional hearing; and
2. The alleged insufficiency of DHS’s reasonable efforts to preserve the family.

Applying the abuse and neglect standard of review from syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011), the Supreme Court:

• Reviewed the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error;
• Reviewed its legal conclusions, including interpretation of the rules and statutes, de novo.

The Court held:

• Although the MDT clearly violated Rule 51(c), West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑405(d), and a specific court order, the failure to hold an additional MDT meeting was not reversible error because the record showed the father’s ongoing noncompliance and the circuit court found that another meeting would not have changed the result.
• DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve the family, as required by § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv), by offering numerous reunification services; the father’s nonparticipation and discharge from services did not negate DHS’s efforts.
• The circuit court’s findings that there was (1) no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction of the abusive/neglectful conditions in the near future and (2) termination was necessary for the children’s welfare were supported by ample evidence and aligned with statutory standards and existing case law such as In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination of the father’s parental rights.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. MDT Noncompliance and the Emerging Harmless-Error Approach

1. Statutory and Rule Framework

Two provisions govern MDT meetings in West Virginia abuse and neglect proceedings:

• Rule 51(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: It requires that the MDT meet at least once every three months while the case is pending.
• West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑405(d): A parallel statutory mandate that the MDT meet “at least every three months” until the case is dismissed from the court’s docket.

The MDT is intended to be the central coordinating body for case planning, service delivery, and review of progress. It typically includes DHS workers, service providers, parents, counsel, and the guardian ad litem. Courts often rely on MDT recommendations when making dispositional decisions.

2. The Father’s Argument

The father contended that:

• The MDT violated both Rule 51(c) and § 49‑4‑405(d) by failing to meet for more than three months;
• The MDT failed to comply with the circuit court’s explicit May 2024 order directing an MDT meeting before disposition;
• Because the MDT failed to meet, the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights, and the dispositional order should be vacated.

Implicit in his argument is the notion that MDT compliance is a procedural safeguard for parents, and that violation of these requirements should vitiate the subsequent termination.

3. The Supreme Court’s Response: Noncompliance, But No Reversible Error

The Supreme Court acknowledged that:

• The MDT did violate Rule 51(c) and § 49‑4‑405(d).
• The MDT also failed to follow the circuit court’s order to convene before the dispositional hearing.

However, the Court emphasized the circuit court’s explicit finding that an additional MDT meeting would not have “change[d] anything or help[ed] the children,” given the father’s minimal effort throughout his six-month improvement period. The record showed that:

• From early in the improvement period, the father failed to:
  • Participate in services;
  • Attend scheduled visits with the children;
  • Maintain contact with the DHS case worker;
  • Obtain a proper residence for the children.
• His engagement only deteriorated further after April 2024, culminating in his discharge from services and a complete stoppage of visitation.

Against this backdrop, the Court concluded that, “under the limited circumstances of this case,” the MDT’s failure to meet did not warrant reversal.

4. Implicit Adoption of a Harmless-Error Framework

While the Court did not explicitly invoke the phrase “harmless error,” its analysis mirrors a harmless-error approach:

• First, it recognized a clear procedural error: statutory and rule-based noncompliance, coupled with violation of a court order.
• Second, it assessed whether the error affected the outcome—whether another MDT meeting could have altered the dispositional decision.
• Third, it concluded, based on the record and the circuit court’s findings, that the error did not prejudice the father or undermine the reliability of the disposition.

The decision thus signals that:

• MDT meeting requirements, while mandatory, are not treated as jurisdictional or as creating automatic reversal if violated.
• A parent challenging MDT noncompliance must effectively show prejudice—that the missed meeting could have meaningfully changed the course or outcome of the case.
• Circuit courts should address MDT lapses on the record, including whether and why an omitted meeting would (or would not) have altered the disposition.

Notably, the Court carefully cabined its holding, stressing the “limited circumstances” here— an important caveat that preserves the possibility of reversal in future cases where MDT lapses occur in a closer case or where the MDT might realistically have influenced services, visitation, or permanency options.

B. “Reasonable Efforts” to Preserve the Family

1. Statutory Requirement

West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)(C)(iii) and (iv) require that when a court terminates parental rights, its order must address:

• Whether DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family; and
• How those efforts were tailored to facilitate reunification, unless aggravated circumstances remove that requirement (not applicable here).

These provisions implement both state policy favoring family preservation and the federal “reasonable efforts” framework linked to funding under the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).

2. The Father’s Argument

The father contended that the record did not support a finding of reasonable efforts, especially in light of:

• The MDT’s failure to meet; and
• The lack of any MDT-based adjustment in his case plan after he became homeless due to the DVPO.

He implicitly argued that DHS’s efforts were either insufficient or inadequately coordinated to give him a meaningful opportunity to remedy the conditions.

3. DHS’s Efforts as Identified by the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court

Both the circuit court and the Supreme Court pointed to a “plethora of services” offered by DHS:

• Parental fitness examinations;
• Transportation to and from service providers;
• Parenting classes;
• Supervised visitation;
• Assistance with utilities in the home;
• Adult life-skills classes, including budgeting and job application assistance;
• Alcohol and drug abuse screening and rehabilitation services;
• Individual therapy.

All of these services were aimed at enabling the father to correct deficiencies in housing, parenting, mental health or substance use (if present), and general stability—core elements of reunification.

4. Noncompliance Does Not Negate “Reasonable Efforts”

The Supreme Court focused not only on the existence of services, but on the father’s response (or lack of response) to them:

• He failed to attend multiple appointments and services, leading to his discharge; and
• He failed to attend scheduled visits, leading the court to suspend visitation.

The Court emphasized that “the weighing of evidence is the exclusive task of the circuit court,” citing In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025), and refused to reweigh the sufficiency of DHS efforts in light of the father’s noncompliance.

The upshot is that DHS meets its “reasonable efforts” obligation by:

• Offering appropriate, accessible services reasonably related to the problems that led to the removal; and
• Documenting those efforts and the parent’s level of engagement.

DHS is not required to ensure parental success, nor to endlessly re-offer services when the parent repeatedly fails to participate. Reasonable efforts are measured by what the agency does, not by what the parent ultimately achieves.

C. Application of the Termination Standard under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)

1. The Statutory Two‑Part Test

The controlling termination standard appears in West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), and is restated in syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), which itself quotes syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980):

Termination of parental rights may be employed when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and when necessary for the welfare of the child.

Thus, the court must find:

1. No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future; and
2. Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

2. Evidence Supporting No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction

The Supreme Court found ample evidence for the circuit court’s conclusion that the father could not substantially correct the conditions:

• Persistent noncompliance: From early in the improvement period, the father did not participate meaningfully in services, maintain communication, or follow through with case plan requirements.
• Failure to improve housing: The petition was originally triggered by unfit housing and lack of utilities. By disposition, the situation worsened—he was without any suitable residence.
• Lack of visitation: His repeated no-shows led to suspension of visitation. Under In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996), a parent’s willingness to visit when the child is out of their custody is a significant indicator of potential for improvement.

The Court therefore accepted the circuit court’s finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship would not reasonably lead to correction of conditions in the near term.

3. Necessity for the Welfare of the Children

The circuit court’s order stressed that the children require permanency. The Supreme Court echoed this, noting:

• The father’s failure to progress despite a full six-month improvement period;
• The absence of stable housing or ongoing visitation;
• The overarching need to avoid indefinite uncertainty for the children.

Children cannot be kept in limbo while parents continue to fail to engage with services. Termination both frees the children for a permanent plan (such as adoption or permanent guardianship) and brings legal closure to a situation where the father showed no realistic prospect of rehabilitation.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Cecil T. – Standard of Review

Syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T. establishes that in abuse and neglect appeals:

• Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error;
• Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

This standard frames the entire opinion: the Supreme Court defers to the circuit court’s credibility judgments and weighing of testimony about compliance, services, and housing, while independently interpreting rules and statutes (such as MDT and reasonable-efforts provisions).

2. In re D.S. – No Reweighing of Evidence

The Court explicitly quotes In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025): “We … do not reweigh the evidence.”

This citation underscores the Court’s refusal to second-guess the circuit court’s conclusion that DHS’s efforts were reasonable and that the father failed to adequately participate. For practitioners, this signals that attacks on the sufficiency of reasonable efforts must focus on legal error or absence of substantial evidence, not an invitation to re-litigate factual disputes on appeal.

3. In re Katie S. – Importance of Visitation Interest

In a footnote in In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996), the Court observed that a parent’s interest in visiting children placed outside their custody is a “significant factor” in assessing potential for improvement. The present decision invokes that principle to support the view that the father’s failure to attend visits (leading to suspension of visitation) reflected poorly on his ability and willingness to meet minimum parenting standards in the future.

4. In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M. – Termination Standard

The Court relies on In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), which in turn quotes In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), to reaffirm that:

Termination of parental rights is permitted when there is no reasonable likelihood of correcting the conditions of abuse or neglect in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

By anchoring its disposition in these longstanding precedents, the Court signals continuity rather than innovation: In re J.B. and A.B. applies established doctrine to a new factual scenario, particularly regarding noncompliance during an improvement period and the need for permanency.

E. The Court’s Underlying Legal Reasoning

Three themes run throughout the Court’s reasoning:

1. Child-centric focus with time-limited opportunities for parental change.
2. Process matters, but errors must be prejudicial to be reversible.
3. Reasonable efforts mean reasonable opportunities, not guaranteed outcomes.

1. Child-Centric, Time-Limited Approach

The decision reflects a standard policy judgment of modern child welfare law: children are entitled to stability and timely permanency. Improvement periods are structured, time-limited opportunities for parents to show they can safely parent. When a parent:

• Repeatedly fails to participate in services;
• Refuses or neglects to attend visitation;
• Makes no demonstrable progress on core safety issues (like housing);

the court is justified in concluding that extended efforts are unlikely to yield improvement “in the near future.”

2. Procedural Requirements and Prejudice

The MDT rules and statutes reflect important procedural protections and case-planning mechanisms. However, the Court treats violations as subject to a prejudice analysis:

• The MDT’s error is recognized and criticized, but not treated as automatically fatal.
• The circuit court’s finding that the missing MDT would not have changed the outcome is central.

This approach balances the importance of procedural compliance with a reluctance to disrupt otherwise well-supported dispositional decisions where the record shows a parent’s longstanding noncompliance and lack of progress.

3. Reasonable Efforts as Reasonable Opportunities

By affirming the reasonable-efforts finding, the Court reinforces that DHS’s duty is to:

• Identify the problems;
• Provide targeted services to address those problems;
• Facilitate participation (for example, through transportation and scheduling);
• Document efforts and parental engagement.

DHS is not required to endlessly modify plans when the parent refuses to take advantage of offered services, nor is DHS required to overcome a parent’s lack of cooperation. In effect, the Court adopts a “reasonable opportunity” model: DHS must provide a fair chance, but the parent must do the work.

F. Impact and Future Implications

1. MDT Practice and Litigation

This decision will likely influence both practice and litigation concerning MDT compliance:

• For DHS and MDT members: The opinion is a warning that courts will take note of MDT noncompliance and expect an explanation. Although the error was found harmless here, in a closer case—where a parent is actively engaged and making incremental progress—a missed MDT could be grounds for reversal if a parent can show that the error deprived them of an important planning or service opportunity.
• For defense counsel: It signals that MDT violations alone are unlikely to secure reversal unless tied to concrete prejudice—such as lost opportunities for services, housing assistance, visitation adjustments, or alternative permanency options. Counsel should build a record of what an MDT could have addressed or changed.
• For circuit courts: The decision encourages explicit findings regarding MDT failures, including whether an omitted MDT meeting could have reasonably altered the course of the case or the outcome.

2. Reasonable Efforts in the Face of Noncompliance

On the reasonable-efforts question, the case reinforces a practical rule:

• DHS is judged on its efforts (what it offered and attempted to provide), not on whether the parent took full advantage or succeeded.
• A robust menu of services—particularly when tailored to the actual problems (housing, parenting, life skills, therapy, substance use if relevant)—will often suffice.
• Parental noncompliance, repeated no-shows, and discharge from services are powerful counterweights to claims that DHS failed to do enough.

Future appellants challenging reasonable-efforts findings will need to show not merely that services were imperfect, but that DHS’s efforts were objectively unreasonable in scope or substance, or that essential services were withheld or unreasonably curtailed.

3. Termination Jurisprudence and Permanency

In re J.B. and A.B. fits within, and slightly sharpens, a long line of West Virginia cases emphasizing:

• Strict time limits on improvement periods;
• The centrality of parental engagement during those periods;
• The legitimacy of termination when parents repeatedly fail to capitalize on services.

By affirming termination despite clear procedural shortcomings (MDT noncompliance) and focusing on the father’s nonparticipation, the Court underscores that:

• Children’s rights to permanence and stability take precedence when parental rehabilitation appears speculative or remote;
• Termination is warranted once the statutory criteria are met, even if the process was not flawless, so long as the errors did not materially affect the outcome.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal concepts in the opinion merit brief explanation in more accessible terms.

1. Abuse and Neglect Proceeding

A formal court case in which the state alleges that a child is abused or neglected, seeking court intervention to protect the child. Outcomes can range from supervision and services to full termination of parental rights.

2. Adjudicatory Hearing

The first major stage of the case, where the court decides whether the allegations of abuse or neglect are true. If the parent admits (stipulates) or the evidence proves the allegations, the court “adjudicates” the parent as abusing or neglecting.

3. Dispositional Hearing

The second major stage, after adjudication, where the court decides what to do about the child’s placement and the parent’s rights—e.g., return the child, continue services, or terminate parental rights.

4. Improvement Period

A court-ordered period (often 3–6 months) during which a parent is given a structured opportunity, with services and supports, to correct the problems that led to the case. Conditions and expectations are spelled out in a case plan. Successful completion can lead to reunification; failure can lead to termination.

5. Multidisciplinary Team (MDT)

A group of professionals and parties—usually including DHS workers, service providers, the guardian ad litem, the parents’ counsel, and others—who meet regularly to coordinate services, monitor progress, and make recommendations to the court. In West Virginia, MDTs must meet at least every three months in active abuse/neglect cases.

6. Reasonable Efforts to Preserve the Family

The legal obligation on DHS to make a good-faith, reasonable attempt to help parents remedy the conditions that led to the child’s removal. This often involves offering services such as parenting classes, counseling, substance abuse treatment, housing assistance, and supervision. Reasonable efforts do not mean unlimited or perfect efforts; they mean offering a realistic and meaningful opportunity.

7. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

A statutory phrase meaning that, based on the evidence, it is unlikely the parent will be able to fix the problems leading to abuse or neglect in the near future, even if more time or services are provided. It is a predictive judgment about the future based on the parent’s history and pattern of behavior.

8. Harmless Error (as Applied Here)

An error in following procedures (such as missing an MDT meeting) that, while real, does not require reversal because it did not affect the fairness or outcome of the proceeding. Courts ask: “Would the result likely have been different if the error had not occurred?” If not, the error is treated as harmless.

9. Standards of Review: Clear Error and De Novo

• Clear error: The appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly wrong after reviewing the whole record.
• De novo: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions and decides the legal question anew.

VI. Conclusion

In re J.B. and A.B. is significant for two related reasons. First, it clarifies that while MDT meetings are mandatory under West Virginia law, failure to hold a required meeting will not automatically invalidate a termination order. The error will be measured for prejudice; if the record shows that the parent’s chronic noncompliance rendered another MDT meeting functionally meaningless, the error may be deemed harmless.

Second, the decision reinforces a practical interpretation of “reasonable efforts”: DHS satisfies its duty by offering a comprehensive set of services reasonably calculated to address the underlying problems. A parent’s refusal or failure to take advantage of those services does not retroactively render DHS’s efforts unreasonable.

Placed in the broader jurisprudential context of Cecil T., D.S., Katie S., Kristin Y., and R.J.M., this memorandum decision underscores West Virginia’s continuing emphasis on:

• Time-limited improvement periods;
• The central role of parental engagement with services and visitation;
• Children’s right to timely permanency; and
• A pragmatic, harm-based approach to procedural errors.

For practitioners, In re J.B. and A.B. serves as both a caution and a guide: MDT requirements must be taken seriously and followed, but reversal on MDT grounds will likely require a specific, well-developed showing of prejudice; similarly, challenges to reasonable-efforts findings must confront the breadth and relevance of services actually offered and the parent’s documented response to them.