MDLEA Jurisdiction in Exclusive Economic Zones and Limits on Minor-Role Reductions for Maritime Couriers:
Commentary on United States v. Robles, Vasquez & Pushiana (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, non-argument calendar decision in the consolidated appeals of United States v. Robles, United States v. Vasquez, and United States v. Ruben Pushiana, Nos. 23‑11483, 23‑11498, and 23‑11524, decided November 19, 2025.

Although styled here by the user as United States v. Ruben Pushiana, the opinion adjudicates the appeals of three codefendants together. All three defendants—Wilfredo Robles, Jonathan Vasquez, and Ruben Pushiana (collectively, “appellants”)—challenged their convictions and sentences arising from a maritime cocaine-trafficking operation interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Dominican Republic.

The case sits at the intersection of:

• Congress’s Article I power under the Felonies Clause (Art. I, § 8, cl. 10);
• the reach of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508;
• the interaction between international law concepts such as the EEZ and the “high seas”; and
• federal sentencing law, particularly the availability of a minor‑role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

The appellants raised three principal issues:

1. An as-applied constitutional challenge to the MDLEA based on the contention that conduct in a foreign state’s EEZ lies outside the “high seas” and thus beyond Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.
2. A Due Process and Felonies Clause “nexus” challenge, arguing that prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment and exceeded congressional power because the offense had no connection to the United States.
3. A sentencing challenge, asserting that the district court erred in denying a two-level minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. While the opinion is unpublished and thus not binding precedent, it is important as a clear application and reinforcement of very recent published circuit authority—most notably United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)—on the scope of MDLEA jurisdiction in EEZs, and of longstanding precedent on “nexus” and minor-role reductions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

In 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a “go-fast” vessel within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ—waters extending up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, beyond its territorial sea. Key undisputed facts:

• The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality (no flag, registration, or other identifying marks).
• The occupants refused to answer questions, so no one identified a master or made a claim of nationality.
• The Coast Guard therefore treated the vessel as one “without nationality”, i.e., a stateless vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.
• Approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine were seized aboard.

A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted the three defendants for:

• Possessing, with intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B); and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and
• Conspiracy to commit that same offense.

The defendants moved jointly to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds. The district court denied the motion after a hearing. They then entered guilty pleas to the conspiracy count, and the government dismissed the substantive count.

At sentencing:

• Robles and Vasquez each had an advisory Guidelines range of 108–135 months; each received a below‑Guidelines sentence of 60 months and two years’ supervised release.
• Pushiana, with prior drug offenses, had an advisory range of 135–168 months; he received a within‑Guidelines sentence of 144 months and five years’ supervised release.

All three requested a two-level minor-role reduction, arguing that they were mere couriers with limited knowledge and authority. The district court denied those requests, finding them equally culpable participants in the transportation phase.

B. Issues and Holdings

1. As‑applied constitutional challenge to the MDLEA in the EEZ.
   The appellants argued that:
   • The Dominican Republic’s EEZ is not the “high seas” within the meaning of the Felonies Clause.
   • Therefore, Congress lacked constitutional authority to criminalize their conduct under the MDLEA.
   Holding: The Eleventh Circuit held this claim is squarely foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and reaffirmed in Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025). Under those precedents:
   • “International law does not limit the Felonies Clause,” and
   • EEZs are treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
   The prior-panel-precedent rule (United States v. Archer) required adherence to Alfonso, even if appellants believed it was wrongly decided.
2. Due Process / “nexus” challenge.
   Appellants argued that:
   • Their conduct had no nexus to the United States (no U.S. vessel, no U.S. destination, no U.S. citizens, etc.).
   • Therefore, their prosecution violated both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause.
   Holding: The Eleventh Circuit, relying on United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020), reiterated that:
   • The MDLEA is a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause authority even when the crime lacks a nexus to the United States;
   • The Due Process Clause does not bar prosecution of aliens captured on the high seas while trafficking drugs on stateless vessels, because the MDLEA provides clear notice and the conduct is universally condemned.
3. Denial of minor‑role reductions.
   Appellants argued that they were entitled to a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) as minor participants.
   Holding: Applying United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), and United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019), the court held:
   • The relevant comparison is each defendant’s role within the relevant conduct for which he was held accountable, not within the larger, unknown conspiracy.
   • The district court was not required to compare them to unidentified, more-culpable conspirators (e.g., recruiters, organizers, owners of the drugs).
   • Given that all three knowingly transported a large quantity of cocaine and were critical to the transportation, the district court did not clearly err in finding they were not minor participants.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences in full.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)

Alfonso is the crucial, controlling precedent on which this opinion turns. It addressed the same fundamental question raised by the appellants here: Can Congress, under the Felonies Clause, criminalize conduct occurring in a foreign state’s Exclusive Economic Zone under the MDLEA?

In Alfonso, the Eleventh Circuit held:

• International law does not limit the Felonies Clause. In other words, Congress’s constitutional authority to “define and punish Felonies committed on the high Seas” is defined by the Constitution, not by customary international law or treaty concepts of “high seas” boundaries.
• For Felonies Clause purposes, EEZs are treated as part of the “high seas.” Thus, Congress may exercise its Felonies Clause power over felonies committed in EEZ waters, such as drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels.

This directly answered and rejected the principal constitutional argument raised by Robles, Vasquez, and Pushiana. The panel in this case explicitly acknowledges that the appellants’ argument is “foreclosed” by Alfonso and declines to re-examine that question. The opinion also notes that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Alfonso, see 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025), signaling that, at least for now, the Court has declined to review that constitutional framework.

2. United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)

Canario‑Vilomar is cited as having reaffirmed Alfonso. According to this opinion, Canario‑Vilomar held that:

• Congress is not constrained by international law when crafting the MDLEA; and
• Congress may reach conduct in an EEZ under the MDLEA.

By invoking Canario‑Vilomar, the panel underscores that Alfonso is not an isolated or tenuous ruling but is entrenched in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence. Together, these cases close off any argument in this circuit that the EEZ is constitutionally off-limits for MDLEA enforcement.

3. Prior-panel-precedent and adherence to circuit law: Archer and Lee

The opinion relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior-panel-precedent rule, as articulated in:

• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008), which holds that a prior panel’s holding is binding on later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the en banc Eleventh Circuit.
• United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018), which clarifies that the argument that a precedent is “wrongly decided” cannot override that rule.

Appellants candidly conceded that Alfonso foreclosed their position but argued it was wrongly decided. The panel explains that such an assertion is legally irrelevant under the prior-panel-precedent rule: only the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc can revisit Alfonso.

4. “Nexus” and Due Process: Campbell and Cabezas‑Montano

The Eleventh Circuit has long rejected the idea that the MDLEA requires a nexus between the offense and the United States. This opinion reinforces that line of authority by citing:

• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014), and
• United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020).

From these cases, the court reiterates two core principles:

1. No nexus requirement under the Felonies Clause.
   The MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause even as applied to drug-trafficking crimes with no nexus to the United States. The statute can reach conduct on:
   • stateless vessels, and
   • foreign vessels, subject to certain jurisdictional provisions,
   without proof that the drugs were destined for, originated in, or otherwise involved the United States.
2. Due Process satisfied for aliens on stateless vessels.
   The court reaffirms that the Due Process Clause does not bar the prosecution of aliens captured on the high seas while trafficking drugs on stateless vessels because:
   • The MDLEA gives clear notice that such conduct is criminal wherever it occurs.
   • Drug trafficking on the high seas is a universally condemned activity.
   • Stateless vessels enjoy no protection from any state; thus, application of U.S. law does not unfairly infringe another sovereign’s rights.

5. Guilty pleas and preserved constitutional challenges: Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018)

The opinion briefly notes that, despite their guilty pleas, the defendants were still permitted to challenge “the Government’s power to constitutionally prosecute” them. This comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Class v. United States, which held that a guilty plea, by itself, does not bar a defendant from raising a facial or as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction on direct appeal.

Thus, the court correctly recognizes that appellants’ plea did not waive their ability to raise the Felonies Clause and Due Process challenges to the MDLEA’s application to them.

6. Minor-role and sentencing jurisprudence: De Varon, Valois, Boyd, Cruickshank

The sentencing portion of the opinion leans heavily on established Eleventh Circuit precedent governing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2:

• United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
  Sets out the foundational framework for determining minor-role reductions, establishing:
  1. Compare the defendant’s role to the relevant conduct attributed to him at sentencing; and
  2. Compare the defendant’s role to that of other participants in that same relevant conduct.
  Critically, the analysis focuses on the conduct for which the defendant is held accountable, not on the broader, possibly uncharged conspiracy.
• United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019)
  Reemphasizes the two-part De Varon framework, adds that:
  • A minor-role determination is a fact-intensive inquiry under the totality of the circumstances;
  • The guideline commentary’s factor list (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C)) must be considered “to the extent applicable”; and
  • The inquiry is about a minor role in the conduct already attributed to the defendant, not in a “larger criminal conspiracy.”
• United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002), and
  United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016)
  These cases underscore the deferential “clear error” standard for review of a district court’s role determination and stress that when the district court’s view is one of two permissible interpretations of the evidence, appellate courts will rarely overturn it.

7. Sentencing Guidelines commentary after Dupree and Jews

The opinion also references:

• United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)
  Held that courts may not defer to commentary to the Guidelines if the guideline text itself is unambiguous. Thus, commentary cannot be used to add to or alter clear guideline language.
• United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023)
  Clarified that where no party contests the validity or interpretation of commentary, the court can—and often will—continue to rely upon it.

In this case, because “both parties rely on the commentary and do not dispute its validity,” the panel follows Jews and applies the commentary to § 3B1.2, including the enumerated factors for assessing role. The decision thus quietly confirms that, post‑Dupree, unchallenged commentary still plays a practical role in sentencing.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The as-applied Felonies Clause challenge in the EEZ

The appellants’ first argument was that the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to them because their conduct occurred within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ rather than on the “high seas” in a strict international-law sense. They contended that the EEZ is not the high seas for purposes of Article I, § 8, cl. 10, and thus that Congress could not define and punish their conduct as a felony “committed on the high Seas.”

The Eleventh Circuit did not re-engage the merits of this constitutional argument. Instead, it disposed of the claim through the prior-panel-precedent rule:

• Alfonso had already held that EEZ waters are part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause authority, and
• That decision also held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause.”

By citing Archer and Lee, the panel explains that it is bound by Alfonso unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the full Eleventh Circuit. The fact that defendants believe Alfonso was wrongly decided does not permit a three-judge panel to disregard it.

As a result, the MDLEA’s application to a stateless vessel carrying cocaine in a foreign EEZ is constitutionally permissible in the Eleventh Circuit, and the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment on that ground.

2. The Due Process / “nexus” challenge

The appellants’ second constitutional argument was that their prosecution violated the Due Process Clause and exceeded congressional power under the Felonies Clause because there was no nexus between their conduct and the United States.

The Eleventh Circuit again relies on prior precedent to reject this claim:

• Cabezas‑Montano and Campbell hold that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause even without a nexus to the United States.
• Those cases also hold that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not bar the trial and conviction of aliens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking, because there is:
  • clear statutory notice that drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas is criminal, and
  • near-universal international condemnation of such conduct.

In short:

• No requirement of proof that the drugs were bound for the United States;
• No requirement that any conspirator or vessel have U.S. nationality; and
• No due process bar if the defendants are foreign nationals so long as they are intercepted as drug traffickers on stateless vessels in waters over which Congress may legislate.

The appellants acknowledged that this line of precedent forecloses their argument; the panel recognizes they are preserving the issue for potential Supreme Court or en banc review, but nonetheless follows circuit law and affirms.

3. Denial of minor-role reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)

The final issue is whether the district court erred in refusing to reduce each defendant’s offense level by two points for being a “minor participant” under § 3B1.2(b).

(a) Legal standard

Key aspects of the legal framework, as applied by the court:

• A minor participant is one who is “less culpable than most other participants” in the criminal activity but whose role is not minimal. (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.5)
• The defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to the reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. (Valois)
• The inquiry is fact-intensive and considers the totality of the circumstances. (Guideline commentary n.3(C))
• The commentary lists specific factors to evaluate (understanding of the scope, degree of planning/organizing, decision‑making authority, nature and extent of participation, and the benefit anticipated).
• Under De Varon and Valois, courts must:
  1. Compare the defendant’s role to the relevant conduct attributed to him (“for which he has been held accountable”), and
  2. Compare his role to that of other participants in that relevant conduct.
• The district court’s determination is reviewed only for clear error. It will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” (Cruickshank).

The panel further notes that, consistent with Dupree and Jews, it is proper to rely on commentary to § 3B1.2 here because neither side disputed its validity or applicability.

(b) Application to the appellants

The appellants argued that:

• They were mere couriers with “very limited courier-type roles”; and
• “More culpable” individuals—recruiters, organizers, financiers, and owners of the drugs—sat above them in the hierarchy of the trafficking scheme.

The Eleventh Circuit responds in two steps:

1. Relevant comparison is limited to relevant conduct and known participants.
   The court notes that the correct question is whether each appellant “played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [he] has already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy.” (Valois)
   
   Therefore:
   • The district court was not required to consider the culpability of unknown conspirators, such as distant recruiters or drug distributors. (Cabezas‑Montano)
   • The proper focus is on the boat-based trafficking conduct and the roles of those who shared in that conduct.
2. Evidence supported equal culpability among the three defendants.
   The record established that:
   • All three appellants knowingly participated in transporting a large quantity (400 kg) of cocaine.
   • They were critical to the transportation phase of the trafficking scheme—without them, the drugs would not have been moved.
   • They were expected to receive payment for their roles.
   • They were each held responsible for the same quantity of drugs and the same conduct for Guidelines purposes.
   Citing Valois, the panel notes that while such facts do not categorically bar a minor-role reduction, they do support the denial of such a reduction when the district court, on this record, finds no relatively lesser culpability.

The panel concludes that the district court:

• Considered each defendant’s arguments and the totality of the circumstances;
• M ade the correct legal comparisons (to relevant conduct and identifiable co-participants); and
• Chose one of two permissible views of the evidence—that none of the three was substantially less culpable than the others.

Therefore, there was no clear error in denying the minor-role reductions.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of broad MDLEA jurisdiction in the Eleventh Circuit

The most immediate significance of this opinion is as a practical reaffirmation of the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive view of MDLEA jurisdiction:

• EEZ prosecutions are firmly entrenched. By treating Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar as controlling and uncontroversial, this panel confirms that MDLEA prosecutions in EEZ waters are routine and constitutionally sound in the Eleventh Circuit.
• No nexus needed, even for aliens. Building on Campbell and Cabezas‑Montano, the opinion confirms that the government need not show any connection to the United States—no U.S. destination, no U.S. vessel, no U.S. citizens—to prosecute aliens apprehended on stateless, drug-laden vessels in the EEZ.

For defense counsel, this underscores that Felonies Clause and “nexus” arguments are effectively foreclosed at the panel level in the Eleventh Circuit, and that such constitutional arguments are, at present, preserved primarily for higher-court review rather than for obtaining relief in that court.

2. The constitutional status of international law limits

The opinion’s reliance on the statement that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause” carries broader doctrinal importance:

• It reflects a constitution-first view of Congress’s powers: the scope of “high Seas” in Article I is determined as a matter of domestic constitutional interpretation, not by later-evolving international norms.
• This stance may sit in varying degrees of tension with other doctrines (e.g., the Charming Betsy canon), which counsel courts to interpret statutes consistently with international law where possible. But in the Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA jurisprudence, Congress’s chosen reach is respected, even if broader than conventional international-law labels might suggest.

This approach gives the political branches substantial leeway in addressing transnational crime, particularly drug trafficking, but raises ongoing academic and policy questions about comity and international relations.

3. Practical implications for maritime drug prosecutions

From a practice standpoint:

• For prosecutors:
  • The decision confirms that interdictions in foreign EEZs, where a vessel is stateless (no indicia of nationality, no claim of nationality), are well within MDLEA coverage.
  • The government can rely on a solid wall of Eleventh Circuit precedent to respond to Felonies Clause, international-law, and nexus-based challenges.
• For defense counsel:
  • Constitutional challenges to MDLEA jurisdiction in EEZ waters will likely fail at the circuit level absent an en banc or Supreme Court change.
  • Defense strategies may need to shift toward:
    • fact-specific arguments (e.g., contesting statelessness, or the circumstances of boarding),
    • statutory construction issues (e.g., compliance with MDLEA’s jurisdictional certification requirements), and
    • sentencing advocacy (mitigation, safety valve, cooperation, individualized circumstances).

4. Sentencing: Minor-role reductions for maritime couriers remain difficult

This opinion also reinforces a long-standing practical reality in MDLEA cases: obtaining a minor-role reduction as a maritime drug courier is difficult, especially when:

• All participants on the vessel share similar tasks and knowledge;
• They are all held responsible for the same drug quantity; and
• There is no clear evidence that a particular defendant is substantially less culpable than his co-defendants.

The court’s emphasis that the relevant comparison is within the conduct of the vessel’s crew—not against the broader, shadowy network of recruiters and organizers—narrows the path to a minor-role reduction. Being “only a courier” is not, by itself, sufficient where everyone on the boat is essentially a courier and equally essential to the transportation.

This has significant sentencing consequences: without a minor-role reduction, defendants often face higher offense levels and longer Guidelines ranges, even if they occupy a relatively low position in the overall drug-trafficking hierarchy.

5. Post‑Dupree sentencing practice

The opinion also implicitly clarifies the practical post‑Dupree landscape:

• Where guideline text is ambiguous and commentary is uncontested, courts may still rely on commentary for interpretive guidance.
• Parties who wish to challenge the application of commentary must raise the issue explicitly; silence will often result in courts treating the commentary as operative.

Here, because neither side questioned the commentary to § 3B1.2, the court freely adopted the commentary’s definitional and factor framework.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) vs. “high seas”

Under modern international law (e.g., the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea):

• The territorial sea generally extends up to 12 nautical miles from the coast. The coastal state has full sovereignty there, like land territory.
• The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends from the outer edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles. The coastal state has special rights to explore and exploit resources (like fishing, oil, gas), but does not have full sovereignty as in the territorial sea.
• Beyond the EEZ lies what is traditionally called the “high seas”—areas not under the sovereignty of any state.

The Eleventh Circuit, however, treats the EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, meaning Congress can legislate in that area under its power to define and punish felonies “on the high Seas.”

2. Stateless vessel

A stateless vessel is a ship that:

• Does not fly the flag of any country;
• Does not carry registration or documentation tying it to a country; or
• Fails to make or support a claim of nationality when asked by enforcement authorities.

International law affords stateless vessels no protection from interference by any state, and U.S. law (including the MDLEA) treats them as particularly amenable to U.S. jurisdiction. In this case, the lack of any indicia of nationality and refusal to claim nationality allowed the Coast Guard to treat the boat as stateless and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.

3. Felonies Clause

Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power:

“To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”

This clause is divided into three distinct grants:

1. Piracies Clause: power to define and punish piracies;
2. Felonies Clause: power to define and punish felonies on the high seas; and
3. Offences Clause: power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.

The MDLEA is justified primarily under the Felonies Clause. The Eleventh Circuit interprets this clause broadly, allowing Congress to reach stateless-vessel drug trafficking even in foreign EEZs.

4. “Nexus” requirement

A “nexus” in this context means a meaningful connection between the criminal conduct and the United States—such as:

• Involvement of a U.S. vessel;
• Involvement of U.S. citizens;
• Drugs destined for or originating from the United States; or
• Conduct having substantial effects within the United States.

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the MDLEA does not require such a nexus for prosecutions involving stateless vessels on the high seas (including EEZs for constitutional purposes). The absence of a nexus does not, in this circuit’s view, render the statute unconstitutional or violate Due Process.

5. Prior-panel-precedent rule

In the Eleventh Circuit, the prior-panel-precedent rule means:

• Once a panel of the court has decided a legal issue and published its opinion, that decision is binding on all later panels of the court;
• A later three-judge panel cannot overrule an earlier panel’s decision, even if it thinks the decision was wrong;
• Only the en banc court (all active judges sitting together) or the U.S. Supreme Court can overrule prior panel precedent.

Thus, because Alfonso resolved the EEZ/Felonies Clause issue, this panel was bound to follow it.

6. Minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2

The minor-role reduction is a sentencing adjustment that reduces a defendant’s offense level if he is “less culpable than most other participants” in the criminal activity but not a “minimal participant.”

Key points:

• It is a relative concept: the defendant’s role is compared to:
  • the conduct attributed to him (relevant conduct), and
  • other participants in that same conduct.
• The defendant must prove he is entitled to the reduction.
• Merely being “a courier” does not automatically qualify one as minor if:
  • everyone on the vessel is a courier, and
  • all are equally essential to the transport of large drug quantities.
• Appellate courts defer heavily to the district court’s determination, which is reviewed only for clear error.

V. Conclusion

This unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision in United States v. Robles, Vasquez & Pushiana provides a clear and succinct application of the circuit’s now well‑settled MDLEA jurisprudence and role‑in‑offense doctrine.

Its key takeaways are:

• MDLEA jurisdiction over EEZ waters is constitutionally secure in the Eleventh Circuit: the court treats EEZs as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and international law does not constrain Congress’s power to define and punish felonies there.
• No nexus to the United States is required to prosecute aliens for drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas (including EEZs). Due Process is satisfied because the MDLEA clearly criminalizes such conduct and it is universally condemned.
• Minor-role reductions remain difficult to obtain for maritime couriers when each crew member is equally involved in transporting a large quantity of drugs and held accountable for the same conduct. The relevant comparison is to co‑participants in the same relevant conduct, not to shadowy figures in the broader conspiracy.

While the opinion is “not for publication” and thus nonprecedential, it exemplifies the current state of Eleventh Circuit law in MDLEA cases: broad extraterritorial reach under the Felonies Clause, rejection of nexus-based constitutional challenges, and a demanding framework for establishing minor-participant status in maritime trafficking prosecutions.