Education Law § 3035 Teacher-Clearance Denials Are Sustained When SED Applies Correction Law Article 23-A Factors; Post-Denial Certificates of Relief Do Not Retroactively Trigger the Rehabilitation Presumption

Introduction

In Matter of Winkler v New York State Educ. Dept. (2026 NY Slip Op 00177), the Appellate Division, Third Department reviewed—via a CPLR article 78 proceeding—the New York State Education Department’s (SED) denial of “clearance for employment” for a nonpublic school teacher under Education Law § 3035.

The petitioner, Matthew L. Winkler, sought clearance after his school requested it. SED’s review of his criminal history revealed a 2018 conviction for attempted assault in the third degree and a separate, apparently unresolved assault in the third degree charge. SED issued an “intent to deny,” provided an opportunity to respond within 25 days, and—after no timely response—denied clearance. On administrative appeal, the Executive Coordinator affirmed, finding (1) a direct relationship between the criminal history and the teaching position and (2) that employment would pose an unreasonable risk to student and staff safety. Supreme Court dismissed the article 78 petition, and the Third Department affirmed.

The key issues were whether SED acted arbitrarily and capriciously in applying Correction Law §§ 752 and 753 to an Education Law § 3035 clearance determination, and whether a subsequently issued certificate of relief from disabilities altered the analysis. The court also addressed preservation of a due process mailing/notice argument.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department held that SED’s denial had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious because SED expressly weighed the eight factors in Correction Law § 753(1) and reasonably concluded that the conviction/unresolved charge bore a direct relationship to teaching and that clearance would create an unreasonable risk to student and staff safety under Correction Law § 752.

The court further held that a certificate of relief from disabilities issued after SED’s denial and after the administrative appeal did not trigger the Correction Law § 753(2) presumption of rehabilitation at the time SED decided the application. Finally, the court found petitioner’s due process argument unpreserved because it was not adequately raised at the administrative level or in Supreme Court.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Article 78 review: “arbitrary and capricious” / rational basis

Matter of Richmond Children's Ctr., Inc. v Delaney (233 AD3d 1328 [3d Dept 2024]) was cited for the governing CPLR 7803(3) standard: whether the agency acted in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious/abuse of discretion. Its function here was to frame the court’s limited role—reviewing rationality and legality, not substituting judgment.
Matter of Evercare Choice, Inc. v Zucker (218 AD3d 882 [3d Dept 2023]) and Matter of Garden Eden Home, LLC v Bassett (235 AD3d 1147 [3d Dept 2025]) were used to reinforce what “arbitrary and capricious” means (action taken without sound basis in reason or regard to facts) and the corollary rule: if there is a rational basis, the determination must be upheld even if the reviewing court might have decided differently. This supported the court’s refusal to “reweigh” SED’s factor balancing.

2) Education Law § 3035 clearance must apply Correction Law Article 23-A

Matter of Boatman v New York State Dept. of Educ. (72 AD3d 1467 [3d Dept 2010]) supplied the crucial doctrinal bridge: when SED decides whether to grant or deny clearance under Education Law § 3035, it “must apply” the standards and factors in Correction Law §§ 752 and 753. The Winkler court relied on Boatman both for the governing framework and as a comparator showing that a reasoned § 753 analysis yields a sustainable agency determination.

3) “Direct relationship” and “unreasonable risk” under Correction Law § 752

Matter of Arrocha v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. (93 NY2d 361 [1999]) was cited for the broader Article 23-A approach: agencies must consider the statutory factors, and adverse action may be justified where a direct relationship or unreasonable risk exists. In Winkler, it buttressed the proposition that safety-sensitive employment (teaching) can justify denial even while acknowledging the State’s rehabilitation policy.
Matter of Wunderlich v New York State Educ. Dept., Comm. on the Professions (82 AD3d 1345 [3d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 715 [2011]) supported deference to an education-related agency’s risk assessment when the record shows consideration of the statutory factors and a rational safety rationale.

4) Weighting recency, seriousness, and maturity

Matter of Bonacorsa v Van Lindt (71 NY2d 605 [1988]) was cited for the idea that, even within Article 23-A’s rehabilitative policy, agencies may reasonably consider seriousness, recency, and other contextual facts when evaluating risk and the relationship between the offense and the job. The Winkler court used Bonacorsa to validate SED’s emphasis on the assault nature of the offense, its timing (within 10 years), and petitioner’s maturity at the time.

5) No impermissible reweighing; certificates of relief and timing

Matter of Dempsey v New York City Dept. of Educ. (108 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2013], affd 25 NY3d 291 [2015]) played two roles. First, it reinforced that courts may not substitute their own balancing for the agency’s where the agency weighed the statutory factors and reached a rational outcome. Second (through the Court of Appeals decision at 25 NY3d 291), it informed the court’s treatment of the certificate of relief presumption: the presumption is relevant when it exists at the time of decision; it does not retroactively invalidate an earlier agency determination made before issuance.

6) Preservation of due process/procedural arguments

State of New York v Konikov (182 AD3d 750 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 906 [2021]) and Matter of Stasack v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation (176 AD3d 1456 [3d Dept 2019]) were invoked for ordinary preservation principles: issues not properly raised before the agency (and/or not presented to Supreme Court) generally will not be considered on appeal. This supported rejection of petitioner’s due process theory beyond his limited claim of non-receipt.

Legal Reasoning

Statutory framework controls the discretion. The court first anchored SED’s authority in Education Law § 3035(3)(a) (SED must notify whether an applicant is “cleared” based on criminal history). Through Boatman, it treated Correction Law Article 23-A as mandatory decision criteria for this clearance context.
Correction Law § 752 sets the two permissible grounds for denial. Denial is allowed only if either (a) there is a “direct relationship” between the offense(s) and the job, or (b) hiring would pose an “unreasonable risk” to property or safety/welfare. The Executive Coordinator relied on both grounds, a posture the court treated as well within § 752’s permissible bases.
Correction Law § 753(1)’s eight-factor balancing is the heart of rationality. The decision turned on process as much as outcome: SED “weighed and evaluated each of the eight statutory factors,” explicitly identifying factors favoring the petitioner (e.g., evidence of rehabilitation and the State’s general rehabilitative policy) but still concluding risk and relationship concerns outweighed those positives in a school setting.
Specific facts supported SED’s weighting. The court highlighted SED’s reliance on: (i) petitioner’s adulthood (“mature adult”) at the time, (ii) the seriousness of the assault-related conviction, (iii) recency (within 10 years), and (iv) an unresolved assault charge. These considerations mapped onto the § 753 factors commonly addressing seriousness, time elapsed, and relevance to the position.
The court refused to re-balance the factors. Applying the rational-basis lens described in Evercare and Dempsey, the court treated petitioner’s arguments as an invitation to reweigh, which is outside article 78 review so long as SED’s weighing was lawful and reasoned.
Timing of the certificate of relief was dispositive. Although Correction Law § 753(2) creates a presumption of rehabilitation upon issuance of a certificate of relief from disabilities or good conduct, the court held that presumption “did not arise” at the time of SED’s denial because the certificate was issued only in July 2024—after denial and after the administrative appeal.
Due process claim failed on preservation. The court did not reach the merits of whether mailing/notice issues rose to a due process violation because the argument was not properly raised before the Executive Coordinator or in Supreme Court (beyond a limited factual assertion of non-receipt).

Impact

Reinforces “process sufficiency” as the key to surviving article 78 review. For SED clearance denials, the most litigation-resistant decisions will be those that explicitly walk through all eight Correction Law § 753(1) factors and articulate how they support a § 752 “direct relationship” and/or “unreasonable risk” conclusion—especially in student-facing roles.
Clarifies the limited utility of post-decision rehabilitation documentation. The ruling underscores that applicants cannot retroactively invalidate an already-issued denial by later obtaining a certificate of relief. Practically, it pushes applicants to secure such certificates (and compile supporting evidence) early—before the agency decision—if they want the statutory presumption to be part of the initial calculus.
Highlights the importance of raising procedural objections promptly. Notice and due process challenges must be clearly presented at the administrative appeal stage and preserved in the article 78 pleadings; otherwise, appellate review may be foreclosed.
Signals that unresolved charges may matter in safety-sensitive clearance decisions. While Article 23-A is conviction-focused, the decision indicates that an “unresolved” assault charge appearing in the criminal history record may be treated as a relevant risk datum in the overall safety assessment (at minimum, as part of the factual context supporting the agency’s § 752 conclusions).

Complex Concepts Simplified

CPLR article 78 review / “arbitrary and capricious”: A special court procedure to challenge administrative action. The court does not decide what it would do in the agency’s place; it asks whether the agency followed the law and had a rational, fact-based reason for its decision.
Education Law § 3035 clearance: A screening decision by SED indicating whether a prospective employee in a covered school setting is “cleared” for employment based on criminal history records.
Correction Law Article 23-A: New York’s statutory scheme limiting discrimination in licensing/employment based on criminal convictions. It embodies a rehabilitation policy but permits denial when the conviction is directly related to the job or hiring would pose unreasonable safety risk.
“Direct relationship” (Correction Law § 752): A close connection between the nature of the offense and the duties of the job—e.g., assault-related conduct and a position involving authority, trust, and daily contact with students.
“Unreasonable risk” (Correction Law § 752): A judgment that employing the applicant would pose too great a threat to safety or welfare, assessed in context (here, a school environment with children and staff).
Eight factors (Correction Law § 753[1]): A required checklist (policy of rehabilitation, duties of the job, bearing of the offense on fitness, time elapsed, age at offense, seriousness, rehabilitation evidence, and legitimate safety interests) that agencies must weigh before denying based on a conviction.
Certificate of relief from disabilities (Correction Law § 753[2]): A judicial/administrative certificate that reduces collateral consequences of a conviction and creates a presumption of rehabilitation for specified offenses. In Winkler, it did not help because it was issued after SED had already decided.
Issue preservation: A rule requiring parties to raise arguments at the proper time before the proper decision-maker (agency and trial court). If not preserved, appellate courts often will not consider them.

Conclusion

Matter of Winkler v New York State Educ. Dept. confirms that SED’s denial of teacher employment clearance under Education Law § 3035 will be upheld on article 78 review where SED applies Correction Law §§ 752 and 753, meaningfully evaluates all eight § 753(1) factors, and articulates a rational basis for finding a direct relationship and/or unreasonable risk in a school setting.

The decision also underscores two practical rules: (1) a certificate of relief from disabilities affects the analysis only once issued and does not retroactively attach a presumption of rehabilitation to earlier agency determinations, and (2) procedural/due process objections must be clearly raised and preserved at the administrative and Supreme Court levels to be reviewable on appeal.

Matter of Winkler v. New York State Educ. Dept. (3d Dept 2026) — Commentary