Material Support Means Substantial Aid to Terrorist Activities: Fourth Circuit Narrows INA Bar; Forced Cooking for Captors Is Not “Material Support”

Introduction

This published decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revisits the scope of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s “material support” bar to asylum and withholding of removal. The case arises from the removal proceedings of Izuchukwu Ozurumba, a Nigerian national who, after being lured into a rural camp run by an Igbo separatist-affiliated group known as the “Unknown Gunmen,” was confined and compelled to work as a cook for the camp’s leaders.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that this forced cooking amounted to “material support” to a terrorist organization, rendering him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. On petition for review, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Wynn, joined by Judge Berner; Judge Richardson dissenting) granted relief, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded, holding that the record did not support a finding that Ozurumba’s conduct constituted “material support.”

The case squarely presents (1) how “material” in “material support” should be construed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), (2) whether the BIA’s expansive de minimis approach in Matter of A‑C‑M‑ survives the end of Chevron deference after Loper Bright, and (3) how to reconcile the text’s objects of support—“for the commission of a terrorist activity” versus “to a terrorist organization.” The court resolves the first question, declines to defer to the BIA on the second, and reserves the third (duress-related) issue for a future case.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: “Material support” under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) requires support that is both relevant and significant to a terrorist organization’s terrorist activities; in the Fourth Circuit’s formulation, it is support “sufficiently substantial standing alone to help the terrorist organization accomplish its terrorist activities.” Forced cooking of meals for a camp’s leaders, on these facts, does not satisfy that standard.
Outcome: Petition for review granted; BIA order of removal vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
No deference to the BIA’s de minimis approach: The court declines to defer to the BIA’s In re A‑C‑M‑ definition (“logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote, sustain, or maintain the organization, even if only to a de minimis degree”), explaining that after Loper Bright courts do not defer to an agency’s interpretation merely because a statute is ambiguous, and that A‑C‑M‑ effectively reads the word “material” out of the statute.
Duress exception not decided: Although the IJ/BIA treated the material-support bar as having no duress exception (per pre‑Loper Bright Fourth Circuit precedent), the panel did not reach whether a duress exception is implied in the statute following the demise of Chevron, leaving the issue for a future case.
CAT claim: The court declined to reach the CAT deferral denial as unnecessary given the vacatur and remand.
Return facilitation: The court noted ICE’s policy of facilitating return of lawfully removed noncitizens who prevail on petition for review, leaving to the agency whether Ozurumba’s presence is necessary on remand.

Case Background

After returning to Nigeria from Venezuela, Ozurumba was recruited to a job as a cook, taken to a guarded rural camp, and confined. Only later did he learn the camp was associated with the “Unknown Gunmen,” groups the Nigerian government regards as terrorist organizations and that have been linked to arson, killings, and political intimidation. For approximately six months, he cooked three meals daily for 15–17 leaders; he was unpaid for roughly the second half of that period and prevented from leaving. He eventually escaped, fled within Nigeria, endured assaults and threats, left again for Venezuela, and ultimately reached the U.S. border in 2023, where he sought protection.

The IJ deemed him removable, found the Unknown Gunmen to be a Tier III terrorist organization, and held that his cooking constituted “material support,” barring asylum and statutory withholding. The IJ also denied CAT deferral. The BIA affirmed, emphasizing there is no de minimis or duress exception to the material-support bar. The Fourth Circuit took the case on petition for review.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

Viegas v. Holder (4th Cir. 2012): The court had previously upheld a finding of material support where the noncitizen voluntarily paid monthly dues for four years and hung posters for a terrorist group. Crucially, Viegas endorsed the idea that support is material if it is “sufficiently substantial standing alone to have some effect on the ability of the [organization] to accomplish its goals,” but it left open the lower boundary of what counts as material.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) (U.S. 2010): Interpreting the criminal material-support statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), the Supreme Court held that “training” and other forms of coordinated support—even aiming at peaceful advocacy—could be prohibited because money and resources are fungible and such support lends legitimacy facilitating recruitment and fundraising. The Fourth Circuit draws from HLP the proposition that “material support” includes support that practically facilitates terrorist operations—e.g., by freeing resources or enhancing legitimacy—rather than any support whatsoever.
Hosseini v. Nielsen (6th Cir. 2018): Emphasized that “material” means both “relevant” and “significant.” The Sixth Circuit’s gloss supported the Fourth Circuit’s two‑pronged understanding of “materiality” in immigration’s material‑support bar.
In re A‑C‑M‑ (BIA 2018): Adopted a de minimis‑inclusive view of material support (any logical, reasonably foreseeable tendency to sustain the organization). The Fourth Circuit rejects this reading as inconsistent with the statute and non‑binding post‑Loper Bright.
Barahona v. Holder (4th Cir. 2012): Previously deferred to the BIA in concluding there was no duress exception to the bar. Post‑Loper Bright, the panel questions whether Barahona’s Chevron‑based reasoning remains binding as a matter of “statutory stare decisis,” but the court avoids deciding the duress question here.
Camara v. Ashcroft (4th Cir. 2004): Reinforces that ineligibility for asylum generally implies ineligibility for withholding of removal when the same disqualifying ground applies.
Kouyate v. Garland (4th Cir. 2024): Confirms the material‑support bar does not foreclose CAT deferral; the panel here declines to reach the CAT claim because vacatur and remand may render it unnecessary.
Post‑Chevron framework: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (U.S. 2024) eliminated Chevron deference; Chavez v. Bondi (4th Cir. 2025) underscored “statutory stare decisis” for prior Chevron‑era outcomes, but not necessarily for agency interpretations as such. The panel notes diverging circuit approaches and leaves the duress-stare decisis puzzle for another day.
Textual canons and dictionary usage: The court uses ordinary-meaning sources and noscitur a sociis reasoning (interpreting general terms by the company they keep) to read “material support” in light of its statutory exemplars—“safe house, transportation, communications, funds … weapons, explosives, training.”

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

What does “material” add? “Material” means something. The modifier cannot be surplusage. Drawing on Black’s Law Dictionary and appellate decisions, the court reads “material” to capture both relevance (logical connection) and significance (non‑triviality) in this context. The term’s ordinary meaning and the statute’s structure thus require a threshold of importance that excludes incidental or trivial support.
Noscitur a sociis from the enumerated list: The statute’s examples—“safe house, transportation, communications, funds, … weapons, explosives, training”—share a common thread: each is either directly usable to plan or carry out terrorist activities or is readily divertible to such use. That pattern constrains the breadth of the general term “material support,” showing Congress targeted support functionally connected to terrorist operations.
Qualitative, not merely quantitative: While materiality is qualitative, Viegas’s “sufficiently substantial standing alone” language is embraced: support must be enough, by its nature and in its circumstances, to materially advance terrorist activities. The Government’s position that “material” describes only a type (and never an amount or degree) is rejected because, in practice, the statute uses both exemplars and the “material” modifier to distinguish meaningful from incidental support.
Rejecting the BIA’s de minimis standard: In re A‑C‑M‑, which captures any support with a foreseeable tendency to sustain the organization—even to a de minimis degree—collapses “support” into “material support” and provides no limiting principle. Post‑Loper Bright, courts owe no Chevron deference, and A‑C‑M‑’s breadth is untenable given the statutory text and structure.
Application to the facts:
- Forced cooking is not material support on this record. Cooking meals using the organization’s supplies did not provide the organization with a thing it could use or readily divert to plan or carry out terrorist operations, nor did it publicize or legitimize the group in the public sphere (as, for example, distributing propaganda or paying dues would). The court characterizes Ozurumba as a captive laborer whose role was disconnected from the group’s violent activities.
- Contrast with Viegas and Hosseini. Paying dues and hanging posters (Viegas) or producing flyers (Hosseini) either inject resources (fungible money) or confer legitimacy and outreach that facilitate organizational operations. By comparison, forced meal preparation behind closed doors lacks that operational or legitimizing nexus.
HLP reconciled: The panel reads HLP as confirming that “material support” includes support that, through fungibility or legitimization, furthers an organization’s terrorist activities. HLP does not stand for the proposition that any support to an organization, however domestic or inward-facing, is “material” within the INA’s bar; it still must appreciably facilitate the organization’s violent objectives.

3) The Dissent and the Majority’s Response

Dissent’s view (Judge Richardson):
- Textually, § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) targets support “for the commission of a terrorist activity” as well as support “to a terrorist organization.” By separately listing both objects of support, Congress intended the latter to sweep more broadly than support tied to specific violent acts.
- Food is “support” in the ordinary sense (sustenance). Providing thousands of meals for leaders over months is quantitatively and qualitatively “material,” comparable to shelter in a safe house—both basic needs that meaningfully advance an organization’s ability to operate, even if not directly used to commit a violent act.
- HLP, properly read, rejects requiring an act-specific nexus to terrorism. The majority’s reading, the dissent argues, improperly narrows the phrase “to a terrorist organization” into “for terrorism.”
Majority’s rejoinder:
- The statute’s exemplars reveal a common operational thread—items usable or divertible to plan or carry out terrorist activities. “Safe house,” in context, connotes clandestine operational use, not generic shelter. Reading “food” into the list overreads the statute and risks absurdity (e.g., soup kitchens inadvertently feeding bad actors).
- HLP’s discussion of fungibility and legitimacy supports the need for a nexus to the organization’s terrorist enterprise, not merely its existence; otherwise, “material” loses its limiting function.
- The Government’s and BIA’s positions fail to identify any category of “immaterial” support and thus effectively erase the “material” modifier from the statute.

4) Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

Immediate doctrinal shift in the Fourth Circuit: Within the Fourth Circuit (MD, NC, SC, VA, WV), the “material support” inquiry now requires a concrete, substantial connection between the support and the terrorist organization’s activities of terrorism. The mere fact that support “sustains” the organization at large is not enough.
Constraint on BIA’s A‑C‑M‑ approach: IJs and the BIA must adjust in Fourth Circuit cases; the A‑C‑M‑ de minimis standard no longer governs. Expect more nuanced factual development on whether the support is (a) relevant to terrorist operations or readily divertible to them, and (b) significant enough to matter “standing alone.”
Practical relief for forced/incidental laborers: Individuals compelled to undertake domestic or non‑operational tasks (e.g., cooking, cleaning, low‑level maintenance) under coercive conditions will be less likely to be swept into the bar. Applicants should develop records showing lack of operational nexus and absence of legitimizing/public‑facing support.
Potential circuit friction: The opinion’s narrowing approach may diverge from cases like Singh‑Kaur (3d Cir.) and Hernandez (2d Cir.), which sustained findings that certain food and shelter supplies were “material support.” The decision thus sets the stage for more inter‑circuit litigation or Supreme Court review.
Duress question post‑Loper Bright: The court flags—without deciding—whether its prior Chevron‑based rejection of a duress exception (Barahona) is still binding under “statutory stare decisis.” Expect focused briefing in a future case squarely presenting duress.
Government strategy adjustments: DHS/DOJ may devote more energy to proving that a noncitizen’s conduct freed resources, conferred legitimacy, or otherwise measurably facilitated terrorism (e.g., fundraising, communications, training, or operational support), rather than relying on generic organizational sustenance. They may also consider use of the Attorney General’s discretionary exemptions (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v)) more sparingly or strategically.
CAT claims still available: Even when the bar applies, CAT deferral remains a potential avenue; however, here the CAT issue is remanded as unnecessary at this stage.
Agency return facilitation: The decision underscores ICE Policy Directive 11061.1 (2012) concerning facilitation of return for noncitizens who prevail on petition for review where their presence is necessary for further proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Material support bar (INA § 1182(a)(3)(B)): A rule that makes some noncitizens ineligible for asylum/withholding if they provided “material support” to terrorist activity, terrorists, or terrorist organizations. The Fourth Circuit now requires that such support be relevant and significant to the group’s terrorist activities—enough, by itself, to matter to those activities.
Tier I/II/III terrorist organizations:
- Tier I/II: Formally designated by the U.S. Government; knowledge elements differ and are less forgiving.
- Tier III: Determined case‑by‑case in immigration proceedings; a noncitizen may avoid the bar by showing by clear and convincing evidence that they did not, and should not reasonably have, known the group was a terrorist organization.
Noscitur a sociis: A canon of interpretation: general terms are understood by the company they keep. Here, because the statute lists “safe house, transportation, communications, funds, weapons, explosives, training,” the general category “material support” takes on the operational character of those examples.
Fungibility and legitimization: Practical concepts from HLP explaining why training, funds, or publicity can be “material”—because such support frees other resources for violent ends or boosts recruitment/fundraising capacity.
Asylum vs. withholding vs. CAT:
- Asylum: Discretionary protection; the material‑support bar applies.
- Withholding: Mandatory if eligibility shown, but the same bars apply; being barred from asylum on material‑support grounds typically also bars withholding.
- CAT deferral: Protection against torture notwithstanding many statutory bars; the material‑support bar does not preclude CAT deferral.
Chevron deference and Loper Bright: Courts once deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes (Chevron). Loper Bright ended that, instructing courts to interpret statutes independently. “Statutory stare decisis” means prior outcomes remain precedential, but agency interpretations themselves are not entitled to deference merely due to ambiguity.

Practical Takeaways for Practitioners

Develop detailed records showing the nature of any alleged “support,” emphasizing:
- whether the activity supplied tools, funds, facilities, or communications that are usable or divertible for terrorist operations;
- whether the conduct had any public-facing component that lent legitimacy, broadened outreach, or raised resources;
- constraints, coercion, or captivity that sever the connection to organizational operations (even though duress remains an unresolved legal issue post‑Loper Bright).
When the Government relies on In re A‑C‑M‑ in Fourth Circuit cases, invoke Loper Bright and this decision’s rejection of a de minimis standard that reads “material” out of the statute.
Preserve duress arguments explicitly; the panel signaled the question remains open post‑Loper Bright, notwithstanding Barahona.
Do not overlook CAT deferral where risks of torture persist; its availability is unaffected by the material‑support bar.
If a client has been removed pending petition for review, consider the ICE policy on facilitating return post‑victory and build a record on why the client’s presence is necessary on remand.

Conclusion

In Ozurumba v. Bondi, the Fourth Circuit clarifies a critical limiter on the INA’s “material support” bar: not all support to a terrorist organization qualifies. “Material” support must be both relevant and significant to the organization’s terrorist activities—“sufficiently substantial standing alone” to help accomplish them. Forced domestic labor like cooking, absent evidence of operational or legitimizing effect, falls outside the bar.

Doctrinally, the decision narrows the BIA’s expansive de minimis approach and reflects the post‑Loper Bright landscape in which courts independently construe immigration statutes. Practically, it reopens protection pathways for noncitizens coerced into incidental or domestic tasks by violent groups, while leaving for another day whether the INA contains an implied duress exception. The opinion will significantly influence asylum and withholding adjudications within the Fourth Circuit and may catalyze further appellate or Supreme Court review to harmonize national standards for the material‑support bar.