Material Omissions, Authorship Inconsistencies, and “Canned” Corroboration: The Second Circuit’s Application of Adverse Credibility Principles in Padilla‑Guaman v. Bondi

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Padilla‑Guaman v. Bondi, No. 23‑7611 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), a petition for review brought by Maria Martina Padilla‑Guaman and her minor children, all natives and citizens of Ecuador. The petitioners sought judicial review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

Although the decision is explicitly a “summary order” without formal precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s local rules, it is important as a practical illustration of how the court:

Applies the substantial evidence standard to an adverse credibility determination;
Evaluates material omissions from a written statement in light of Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions;
Relies on inconsistencies regarding the preparation and authorship of an applicant’s affidavit;
Assesses the absence and quality of corroborating evidence, including “canned” or formulaic letters from friends and family.

The key legal issue was whether substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, which in turn was dispositive of all forms of relief. The panel (Judges Walker, Lohier, and Pérez) denied the petition, holding that the IJ’s credibility assessment rested on sufficiently specific and cogent grounds: significant omissions, an important inconsistency about the authorship of the written statement, and inadequate corroboration.

II. Procedural and Factual Background

A. Parties and Claims

The lead petitioner, Maria Martina Padilla‑Guaman, and her minor children are natives and citizens of Ecuador. She applied for:

Asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158,
Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and
CAT protection under regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture.

Her children were derivative applicants based on the same underlying factual narrative of past harm and feared future harm.

B. Agency Proceedings

Immigration Judge (IJ): On August 11, 2022, the IJ denied all forms of relief. The denial rested primarily on an adverse credibility determination, based on:
- Omissions in her written statement concerning key aspects of the claimed persecution;
- An inconsistency about whether she personally authored a handwritten Spanish statement despite later claiming she could not read or write Spanish well enough;
- Insufficient and weakly supported corroborative evidence.
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA): On September 29, 2023, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, adopting and endorsing the IJ’s adverse credibility finding and the resulting denial of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief.

C. Petition for Review

The petitioners then sought review in the Second Circuit pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The central question before the court of appeals was whether the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence when the record was viewed under the deferential standards applicable to immigration fact-finding.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. The court:

Reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness,” consistent with Wangchuck v. DHS;
Applied the substantial evidence standard to the adverse credibility determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Held that the IJ reasonably relied on:
- Omissions in the written statement concerning (i) whether attackers referenced ethnicity or religion and (ii) whether threats and harassment continued for a year;
- An inconsistency about who prepared the Spanish handwritten statement, given Padilla‑Guaman’s claimed limited literacy in Spanish;
- Weak corroboration: her husband’s letter failing to mention the critical attacks and friends’ letters with nearly identical language and authors not available for cross‑examination.
Concluded that, considering the totality of the circumstances, these problems in testimony and corroboration provided substantial evidence for the adverse credibility finding.
Noted that because asylum, withholding, and CAT claims all rested on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility ruling was dispositive of all forms of relief.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the BIA’s decision and denied all pending motions, vacating any stays.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The decision is firmly grounded in existing Second Circuit and statutory authority. While not creating new law, it illustrates the ongoing application and refinement of established principles.

A. Scope of Review and “For the Sake of Completeness”

The court cites Wangchuck v. Department of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006), reaffirming that when the BIA adopts and supplements an IJ’s reasoning, the court may review both decisions:

We have reviewed both the IJ's decision and the BIA's decision “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck, 448 F.3d at 528.

This clarifies that the appellate court can consider the reasoning at both levels to understand the full basis for the agency’s decision.

B. Standard of Review: Substantial Evidence

The court reiterates the statutory substantial evidence standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B):

“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

The court emphasizes that adverse credibility determinations are reviewed under this deferential standard, citing:

Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) – Adverse credibility determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence, and the court defers to the IJ unless the record compels a contrary conclusion.
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) – The court will defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable fact‑finder could make such a ruling.

C. Statutory Credibility Framework (REAL ID Act)

The court relies on 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), a central provision of the REAL ID Act’s credibility regime:

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on … the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements, … the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record … and any inaccuracies or falsehoods … without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim….”

This provision authorizes IJs to consider any inconsistencies or inaccuracies—material or not—in evaluating credibility, so long as they do so under the “totality of the circumstances.”

D. Nexus Requirement: 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and Paloka

The court underlines that asylum applicants must show a nexus between persecution and a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group), citing:

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i): “[T]he burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that … race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”
Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 196‑97 (2d Cir. 2014): The nexus analysis focuses on “the views and motives of the persecutor.”

These authorities are used to support the point that omissions concerning statements by the attackers about ethnicity or religion are material, because such facts bear directly on persecutor motive.

E. Omissions vs. Inconsistencies: Hong Fei Gao and Jian Liang

The court cites Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions for the proposition that:

“[I]n general omissions are less probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,” but “the probative value of a witness’s prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to disclose.” 891 F.3d at 78 (quotation marks omitted).

The court also references Jian Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th 106, 115 (2d Cir. 2021), where the Second Circuit upheld an adverse credibility determination because an applicant’s written statement omitted highly significant details (e.g., that police looked for him a second time and that he was on a blacklist).

Together, these cases explain how and when omissions can legitimately be treated as strong evidence undermining credibility.

F. Single and Multiple Inconsistencies: Likai Gao

The panel leans on Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2020), noting:

“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.” Id. at 145 n.8.

This supports the conclusion that the IJ was entitled to rely on even one significant inconsistency in rejecting credibility, and that the combination of multiple issues makes the adverse finding even more resistant to challenge.

G. Evaluating Explanations for Inconsistencies: Majidi

The decision invokes Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005):

“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact‑finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted).

This frames the high bar an applicant faces when attempting to explain away inconsistencies or omissions.

H. Corroboration, Documentary Evidence, and “Canned” Affidavits

On corroboration, the court draws on:

Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) – Lack of corroboration can reinforce an adverse credibility determination because it prevents rehabilitation of already doubtful testimony.
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) – The court generally defers to the agency’s evaluation of the weight afforded to documentary evidence.
Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 149 – Upholding an IJ’s decision to give little weight to letters from interested parties who are unavailable for cross‑examination.
Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 524 (2d Cir. 2007) – Endorsing the “commonsensical notion” that strikingly similar affidavits may reflect “canned” or manufactured testimony.

These authorities support the IJ’s skepticism of letters from friends that contained nearly identical language and the decision to give reduced weight to such evidence.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Omissions in the Written Statement as Evidence of Non‑Credibility

The IJ and BIA focused first on what was missing from Padilla‑Guaman’s written statement:

It omitted any assertion that her attackers referenced her ethnicity or religion.
It omitted any claim that the attackers continued to threaten and harass her for a full year after a second attack.

The Second Circuit acknowledged, following Hong Fei Gao, that omissions are generally less probative than direct contradictions. However, the key question is whether these were facts that one would naturally expect an asylum applicant to include:

The alleged references to ethnicity or religion were central to demonstrating that the harm was on account of a protected ground (nexus).
The allegation of continued threats and harassment over a year was central to demonstrating a continuing fear of future persecution.

Because these details go directly to:

The motivation of the persecutors (protected‑ground nexus), and
The ongoing nature of the threat, which supports a well‑founded fear of future persecution,

the court held that the IJ reasonably treated their omission as highly probative of credibility, rather than trivial.

When confronted with these omissions, Padilla‑Guaman explained that:

She could not remember the incidents very well; and
It was too upsetting to recount all the details in writing.

The court, invoking Majidi, held that these explanations did not compel a reasonable fact‑finder to accept her testimony. This was especially so because she was able to supply detailed recollections at the hearing, undermining the idea that memory or emotional distress prevented inclusion in the original statement.

Thus, in line with Hong Fei Gao and Jian Liang, the court endorsed the IJ’s reliance on significant omissions where the missing facts are ones an applicant would naturally include in an asylum affidavit.

B. Inconsistency Regarding Authorship and Language Ability

The second major factor was an inconsistency about the preparation of Padilla‑Guaman’s Spanish handwritten statement:

Initially, she testified that she prepared the statement on her own.
Later, she claimed she could not read or write Spanish well enough to understand her own or her husband’s statements.

This raised doubts about:

Whether the written statement was truly her own account;
Whether someone else may have drafted it or shaped its content without her full understanding.

The court rejected her argument that this inconsistency was immaterial because the statement’s contents were consistent with her testimony. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) and Xiu Xia Lin, an IJ may rely on any inconsistency as part of the totality of the circumstances, “without regard to whether [it] goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”

Moreover, the inconsistency here was not trivial: it directly affected the reliability of the written statement itself. If the applicant could not read or write Spanish at the level required to author the statement, the IJ could infer that:

The written narrative might not accurately reflect her own recollection;
Omissions and phrasing in the statement might be attributable to a third party (possibly with different goals or misunderstandings);
The applicant’s representations about the preparation process were themselves unreliable.

The court thus found it reasonable for the IJ to treat this inconsistency as further undermining credibility.

C. Lack and Quality of Corroboration

The third pillar of the adverse credibility finding was the absence of reliable corroborating evidence of the alleged attacks.

Spousal letter:
- Padilla‑Guaman’s husband allegedly would have been in a position to know about the attacks.
- However, his letter did not mention them at all.
- This silence is conspicuous, as one would reasonably expect a spouse to corroborate such critical events if they occurred.
Friends’ letters:
- Her friends did describe the attacks, but:
- The IJ noted that two of the letters contained identical language, suggesting they were “canned” or formula‑based.
- The declarants were not available for cross‑examination.

Drawing on Biao Yang, Likai Gao, Y.C., and Mei Chai Ye, the court endorsed the IJ’s devaluation of such letters:

When an applicant’s testimony is already in doubt, the absence of strong corroboration makes it impossible to rehabilitate credibility.
Affidavits with strikingly similar language may fairly be treated as “canned”, casting doubt on their authenticity or independence.
The agency may reasonably assign little weight to letters from interested parties who cannot be cross‑examined, especially when their statements track each other in boilerplate terms.

Accordingly, the court held that the IJ acted within her discretion in giving limited weight to this documentary evidence and relying on its deficiencies as part of the overall credibility assessment.

D. Totality of the Circumstances and Deference to the IJ

The decision exemplifies the “totality of the circumstances” approach mandated by § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii):

Material omissions from the written statement (nexus and ongoing threats);
A key inconsistency about the authorship and understanding of the Spanish statement;
Weak, partially “canned,” and incomplete corroborative documentation.

When aggregated, these factors convinced the IJ that the overall narrative was not credible. Under the substantial evidence standard, the Second Circuit asks only whether “any reasonable adjudicator” would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion. The panel held that:

The record did not compel belief in Padilla‑Guaman’s account;
On the contrary, the IJ’s concerns were reasonable and adequately grounded in the record.

E. Adverse Credibility as Dispositive of All Claims

The court then noted that the adverse credibility finding is dispositive because all three forms of relief—asylum, withholding, and CAT—were based on the same factual predicate. Citing Hong Fei Gao, it reaffirmed the principle that:

If the core factual narrative is not believed, then:
- If there is no credible past persecution, asylum and withholding claims fail;
- If there is no credible risk of harm or torture, CAT claims fail as well.

Absent any independent, credible factual basis for fear of torture or persecution, there was no residual theory under which CAT relief or withholding could survive the credibility ruling.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

A. Summary Order and Precedential Effect

The court’s opening notice emphasizes that this is a summary order:

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, such orders may be cited but do not have precedential effect.
They are binding on the parties but formally do not bind future panels.
Nonetheless, practitioners and judges often consider them as persuasive authority or as illustrations of how existing precedents are being applied.

B. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Relief

Asylum:
- Discretionary relief available to noncitizens who show they are refugees under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
- Requires a well‑founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group).
Withholding of Removal:
- Mandatory if the noncitizen shows it is more likely than not that their life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal based on a protected ground.
- Higher burden of proof than asylum, but lacks some of asylum’s discretionary elements and benefits.
Convention Against Torture (CAT):
- Protection is mandatory if the applicant shows it is more likely than not that they will be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a public official if removed.
- Does not require a nexus to a protected ground.

In many cases, all three forms of relief rely on the same set of alleged past events and anticipated future harm. When credibility is rejected as to that common narrative, all claims may fail together.

C. Adverse Credibility Determination

An adverse credibility determination means the IJ does not believe the applicant’s testimony, at least as to material aspects of the claim. Under the REAL ID Act:

An IJ may base adverse credibility on inconsistencies, omissions, or inaccuracies in:
- Oral testimony;
- Written statements;
- Consistency with other evidence in the record.
The IJ need not find that every inconsistency goes to the heart of the claim, but must consider the totality of the circumstances.

Once an adverse credibility finding is made and upheld on appeal, it is typically outcome‑determinative unless there is independent, credible documentary evidence establishing eligibility for relief.

D. Substantial Evidence Standard

“Substantial evidence” is a highly deferential standard of review:

The question is not whether the appellate court would have reached the same findings as the IJ, but whether:
- There is evidence in the record that a reasonable adjudicator could rely on; and
- No reasonable fact‑finder would be compelled to find the opposite.
Even if the record could support a different decision, the IJ’s findings must be upheld if they are reasonable and supported by the evidence.

E. Nexus to a Protected Ground

To win asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must show that persecution is “on account of” a protected ground. This is the nexus requirement:

Protected grounds include race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and political opinion.
The applicant must show that such a ground was at least “one central reason” for the persecution (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).
Statements by persecutors referencing ethnicity, religion, or other protected traits are often the most direct evidence of motive, as emphasized in Paloka.

Hence, omitting such statements from an asylum affidavit is particularly damaging because it removes the clearest evidence of nexus.

F. “Canned” or Boilerplate Affidavits

The term “canned” affidavits, drawn from Mei Chai Ye, refers to multiple supporting letters or statements that:

Use nearly identical language;
Contain formulaic or boilerplate phrasing;
Appear to have been drafted from a common template rather than independent recollections.

IJs are allowed to treat such evidence with skepticism, particularly where:

The authors are unavailable for cross‑examination;
The affidavits appear coordinated or manufactured.

Such documents may provide little or no support for an applicant’s credibility.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Doctrinal Impact

Although this is a non‑precedential summary order, it reinforces several practical doctrines in Second Circuit immigration law:

Omissions can be critical when they concern nexus or the ongoing nature of harm; they may be treated as strongly probative of credibility where a reasonable applicant would include them.
Any inconsistency, even about documentary preparation or language ability, may legitimately factor into an adverse credibility determination.
Corroboration matters. When testimony is questioned, the lack of robust corroborative evidence—and the presence of weak or “canned” letters—can seal the fate of a claim.
Deference to IJs remains substantial: the court will not intervene unless the record compels a contrary conclusion.

B. Practical Guidance for Practitioners and Applicants

The decision carries clear lessons for asylum litigants and counsel:

Drafting the Initial Affidavit:
- Include all key facts that show:
  - Why you were targeted (ethnicity, religion, social group, political opinion);
  - Any ongoing threats or persecution after main incidents.
- Avoid leaving out information that would naturally be expected in a persecution narrative; such omissions may later be treated as damaging.
Language and Authorship Issues:
- Be fully transparent about who wrote any statement and in what language.
- If a third person helped or translated, this should be clearly and accurately documented.
- Misstatements about authorship can severely undermine the reliability of the entire application.
Consistency Between Testimony and Written Statements:
- Before the hearing, carefully review prior statements for consistency.
- If there are discrepancies, be prepared with a compelling, documented explanation.
Corroborating Evidence:
- Obtain detailed letters or affidavits from key witnesses (spouses, close family, eyewitnesses) that explicitly address the main incidents of harm.
- Avoid boilerplate or templated language; each affidavit should reflect the writer’s individual voice and experience.
- Where possible, make witnesses available to testify or explain why they cannot appear.
Preparing for Credibility Challenges:
- Recognize that even a single inconsistency may be enough to sustain an adverse credibility finding.
- Work proactively to identify and resolve any inconsistencies or omissions in advance of the merits hearing.

C. For Adjudicators

For IJs and the BIA, the order reaffirms their:

Authority to consider omissions, inconsistencies, and corroboration as part of the totality of the circumstances;
Discretion in weighing documentary evidence, including skepticism toward “canned” affidavits;
Broad deference they receive from the courts of appeals when their findings are adequately reasoned and supported by the record.

VIII. Conclusion: Significance of Padilla‑Guaman v. Bondi

Padilla‑Guaman v. Bondi does not announce a new legal rule; it is a summary order that faithfully applies existing Second Circuit and statutory law. Its significance lies in how it operationalizes the REAL ID Act credibility standards and prior case law such as Hong Fei Gao, Xiu Xia Lin, Likai Gao, Biao Yang, and Mei Chai Ye.

Key takeaways include:

Omissions of facts that naturally bear on nexus or ongoing harm can powerfully undermine credibility.
Even non‑core inconsistencies, especially about authorship and language, can erode trust in an applicant’s account.
Corroboration must be genuine, detailed, and as independent as possible; formulaic letters with identical language are suspect.
Under the substantial evidence standard, appellate courts will not overturn an IJ’s adverse credibility finding unless the record compels a contrary result.
When all claims (asylum, withholding, and CAT) rest on the same disbelieved factual predicate, an adverse credibility ruling is dispositive.

For practitioners and applicants, Padilla‑Guaman underscores the importance of careful, complete, and consistent presentation of the asylum narrative from the very outset, backed by thoughtfully prepared corroborating evidence. For adjudicators, it confirms their broad discretion to evaluate credibility in a holistic manner and their central role in determining which narratives are sufficiently reliable to support protection under U.S. immigration law.