Material-Omission Liability Under GBL § 349 for Soft-Close Door Hazards: The Second Circuit’s (Non-Precedential) Affirmance in Boateng v. BMW

Introduction

In a summary order without precedential effect, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict holding BMW liable under New York General Business Law § 349 for a deceptive omission concerning the safety of “soft close” car doors. The case arises from a 2016 accident in which plaintiff Godwin Boateng suffered a partial thumb amputation when the soft close feature of his 2013 BMW X5 engaged as he stepped back to avoid an oncoming truck on a narrow street, drawing the door shut with significant force and trapping his thumb.

The district court (E.D.N.Y., Matsumoto, J.) had granted summary judgment to BMW on multiple product liability and related claims (including design defect, failure to warn, manufacturing defect, and others), but allowed a GBL § 349 consumer-protection claim to proceed to trial. After a one-week trial, the jury found liability only on the § 349 claim and awarded Boateng $255,360 for past loss of earnings, $800,000 for past pain and suffering, and $850,000 for future pain and suffering. BMW moved for judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50), a new trial (Rule 59), and remittitur or a new damages trial (Rule 59); the district court denied those motions. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in all respects.

Although labeled a “Summary Order” and therefore non-precedential under the Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision provides persuasive guidance on several recurring issues: the proof necessary to establish a deceptive omission under GBL § 349, how “common sense” arguments fare when a design feature adds risk beyond background hazards, the adequacy of general warnings in owner’s manuals, causation in § 349 claims (where reliance is not required), standards governing new-trial motions premised on attorney conduct, how to substantiate lost wages for a highly compensated independent contractor, and how New York’s “deviates materially” standard applies to pain-and-suffering awards for “crush” versus “sharp” hand injuries.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirmed denial of BMW’s Rule 50(b) motion, holding that a reasonable jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find a deceptive omission under GBL § 349. Evidence showed the soft close doors exerted force exceeding thresholds to fracture a thumb, were designed to stop on rigid obstructions but not on soft tissue like a finger, and that BMW was aware of multiple soft-close injuries, yet the manual warned only of a generic “danger of pinching.”
• The Court rejected BMW’s causation arguments, emphasizing that reliance is not an element of § 349 and finding sufficient evidence that nondisclosure of the added soft-close risk was a substantial factor in Boateng’s injury.
• The Court declined to review BMW’s “weight of the evidence” challenge to the verdict, as such denials are not reviewable on appeal.
• The Court affirmed denial of a new trial based on alleged misconduct by plaintiff’s counsel, noting sustained objections, curative instructions, and the district court’s broad discretion.
• The Court upheld the lost-wages award as supported by documentary evidence and reasonable inferences about rate continuity and work availability for Boateng’s Department of Defense contracting work.
• The Court affirmed the pain-and-suffering awards, agreeing with the district court’s distinction between “crush” and “sharp” finger injuries and concluding that the awards did not deviate materially from comparable New York cases.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

The Court’s analysis draws on a set of New York and federal decisions that jointly shape the § 349 framework, the standards of review for Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions, evidentiary sufficiency for wage loss, and the assessment of non-economic damages in New York.

• GBL § 349 Elements and Omissions:
  • Chufen Chen v. Dunkin’ Brands, Inc., 954 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2020): Reiterates the three elements of a § 349 claim: (1) consumer-oriented conduct; (2) materially misleading act or omission; and (3) injury.
  • Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20 (N.Y. 1995): Clarifies omission liability—plaintiff must show the business alone possessed material information and failed to provide it, or that the information was not reasonably obtainable by the consumer. Oswego also confirms that reliance is not an element of § 349.
  • Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24 (N.Y. 2000): Emphasizes the reasonable consumer standard for deception and explains causation for § 349—plaintiff must show that the materially misleading act caused the injury; no reliance requirement.
• Adequacy of Warnings:
  • Urena v. Biro Mfg. Co., 114 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1997): Under New York law, the adequacy of warnings is generally a question of fact for the jury. The panel invoked this principle in upholding the jury’s view that a “danger of pinching” manual statement did not adequately apprise consumers of amputation-level risks from soft close doors.
• Rule 50 and Rule 59 Standards:
  • Ortiz v. Stambach, 137 F.4th 48 (2d Cir. 2025): Articulates the de novo standard for reviewing denials of Rule 50 motions and the strict threshold (no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the verdict). It also stresses deference to the jury’s credibility determinations and inferences.
  • Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237 (2d Cir. 2003), and DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998): Set out the Rule 59 new-trial framework (less stringent than Rule 50 but still reserved for seriously erroneous verdicts or miscarriages of justice).
  • Ferreira v. City of Binghamton, 975 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2020): Holds that denial of a new trial based on weight of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal, foreclosing BMW’s attempt to relitigate sufficiency in that posture.
• Attorney Misconduct:
  • Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass’n, 963 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1992), and Matthews v. CTI Container Transport Int’l Inc., 871 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1989): Provide the lens for new trials based on attorney conduct—asking whether conduct was de minimis or prejudicial, and affording trial judges broad discretion, with curative instructions as an important mitigating factor.
• Lost Wages:
  • Clanton v. Agoglitta, 615 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2d Dep’t 1994), Carroll v. United States, 295 F. App’x 382 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order), and Mugavero v. Arms Acres, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2010): Together, these decisions require lost earnings to be shown with reasonable certainty, typically through documentation such as contracts, pay stubs, and tax records—not merely uncorroborated testimony.
• Pain and Suffering; Excessiveness:
  • Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2014) and Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012): Under New York’s “deviates materially” test (CPLR 5501(c)), courts compare the award to similar cases to assess excessiveness.
  • Albanese v. Przybylowicz, 985 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dep’t 2014): Exemplifies the comparative method—comparing awards for comparable injuries.
  • Class v. Steering Wheel Rentals, Inc., JVR No. 378343, 2000 WL 1515708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2000), and McKeon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 690 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1st Dep’t 1999): Serve as benchmarks, with the district court distinguishing “crush” injuries (like Boateng’s) from “sharp” amputations with cleaner reattachment prospects and less chronic neuropathic pain.
• Evidence of Notice and Material Omission:
  • Bozick v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 2022 WL 4561779 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2022), and Woods v. Maytag Co., 807 F. Supp. 2d 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2011): Stand for the proposition that customer complaints alone do not establish an omission claim, but when combined with other evidence—such as regulatory correspondence—they can support an inference that undisclosed, additional risks were known and material.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s core holding rests on the difference between generalized awareness of door-closing hazards and the specific, additional risk posed by soft close technology. Three strands of proof supported the jury’s verdict that BMW omitted material safety information:

• Force Profile and Obstruction Response: Expert trial evidence indicated that the soft close mechanism exerted roughly 135–225 pounds of force—well above the 95–100 pounds that can fracture a thumb. The system was designed to stop on certain rigid obstructions (a steel bar) but not on a finger. This technical showing permitted the jury to find that soft close adds risks materially greater than those posed by standard doors and that the hazard is not intuitively obvious to a reasonable consumer.
• Inadequacy of Generic Warnings: The owner’s manual warned only of a “danger of pinching.” Against the background of the quantified force and the mechanism’s tendency not to detect soft tissue, the jury could find that a pinching warning did not adequately convey the risk of amputation-level injury. Under New York law, adequacy of warnings is generally a jury question, which the Court honored by deferring to the verdict.
• BMW’s Knowledge and Regulatory Correspondence: On the day of Boateng’s injury, BMW told a German regulator it knew of 44 soft-close finger injuries (2001–2016) and later stated that such injuries were typically tissue damage or nail fractures. Coupled with customer complaints and at least one incident similar to Boateng’s, this supported the finding that BMW possessed material information about an “additional risk” unique to soft close doors and did not disclose it.

The Court also rejected BMW’s causation challenges. Under § 349, a plaintiff must prove causation but not reliance. The jury could reasonably conclude that, had BMW disclosed the magnitude and character of the risk, Boateng would have declined the premium package that included soft close or changed his behavior to avoid the feature’s hazards; either theory suffices to establish that the omission was a substantial factor in his injury. BMW’s contention that Boateng’s step back to avoid a truck was the but-for cause did not undermine this conclusion, particularly because the jury attributed no comparative fault to Boateng.

On BMW’s Rule 59 arguments, the panel:

• Declined to review the “weight of the evidence” argument, which is unreviewable on appeal when a district court denies a new trial on that ground.
• Found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of alleged attorney misconduct. Plaintiff’s counsel challenged discrepancies in BMW’s counts of soft-close incidents; objections were sustained where counsel insinuated dishonesty, and curative instructions were given. The record did not show prejudice warranting a new trial.
• Upheld lost wages, noting that Boateng’s hourly rate ($114), 40-hour workweek, and 56-week period of lost employment were corroborated by his contract, pay stubs, and tax returns. The jury could reasonably infer rate continuity based on ongoing Department of Defense work and contract terms paying the existing rate for work completed after the expiration date; the court also observed that a scheduled raise to $117 in September 2016 meant the $114 rate was conservative.
• Affirmed pain-and-suffering awards as within the range of comparable cases. Critically, the district court distinguished “crush” injuries—like Boateng’s—from “sharp” amputations in which clean reattachment is more feasible and long-term neuropathic pain is often less severe. Boateng required multiple surgeries, has intermittent nerve pain, and persistent hypersensitivity, supporting the awards.

Impact

While the order is non-precedential, it offers practical guidance with likely persuasive value for future litigation in the Second Circuit and New York courts.

• Product Safety Disclosures and Consumer Protection:
  • Additional Risk Beyond Background Hazards: Manufacturers should assess whether a design feature meaningfully elevates risk beyond the baseline hazard consumers already expect. If so, generic warnings may be inadequate; specific, risk-focused disclosures may be necessary to avoid § 349 exposure.
  • Evidence That Resonates with Juries: Quantitative proof connecting force levels to injury thresholds, and evidence that safety systems detect rigid obstructions but not soft tissue, can be decisive in establishing a material omission.
  • Complaints and Regulator Communications: Customer complaints alone may not prove a deceptive omission; combined with internal or regulatory acknowledgments of the specific risk, however, they can support materiality and knowledge.
  • Reliance Not Required: Plaintiffs need not prove reliance under § 349; they must show that the omission was a substantial factor in causing injury. Purchaser behavior (e.g., declining a package) or altered usage can suffice.
• Litigation Strategy and Trial Practice:
  • Distinguishing GBL § 349 from Product Liability: Even where design-defect or failure-to-warn claims fail or do not go to the jury, a § 349 omission theory can survive if consumer-facing disclosures are materially incomplete.
  • Handling Inconsistent Incident Counts: Parties should anticipate that discrepancies in incident tallies will be probed. Courts may allow credibility testing, but counsel must avoid insinuations of dishonesty absent proof; limiting instructions can cure potential prejudice.
  • Appellate Constraints: Challenges to the weight of the evidence in a Rule 59 denial will not be reviewable on appeal; preserving Rule 50 issues is critical, and appellants must meet the exacting standard that no reasonable jury could find for the non-movant.
• Damages Proof:
  • Lost Wages for Independent Contractors: Courts will expect documentary corroboration (contracts, pay stubs, tax returns). Evidence of ongoing client relationships and contract terms can justify inferences of rate continuity notwithstanding nominal expiration dates or later, slightly lower rates in new contracts.
  • Pain and Suffering in Hand Injuries: The “crush” versus “sharp” injury dichotomy may meaningfully affect comparator analyses under CPLR 5501(c). Chronic neuropathic pain, multiple surgeries, and hypersensitivity can sustain higher awards than clean, reattachable amputations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• GBL § 349 (New York’s consumer-protection statute): Prohibits deceptive business acts or practices. To win, a plaintiff must show consumer-directed conduct, a materially misleading act or omission, and injury caused by the deception. For omissions, it is key that the business had material safety information not reasonably available to consumers and did not disclose it. Reliance is not required.
• Deceptive “Omission”: Not saying something that a reasonable consumer would consider important to their decision or safety, especially when the company alone knows it (or consumers can’t reasonably find it out).
• Reasonable Consumer Standard: The jury asks what an average consumer, acting reasonably under the circumstances, would think or understand—not a specialized expert, nor a particularly careless person.
• Rule 50 Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL): An appellate court will reverse a verdict only when no reasonable jury could have found for the prevailing party based on the evidence. Credibility choices and factual inferences belong to the jury.
• Rule 59 New Trial: A trial judge may order a new trial if the verdict is seriously wrong or a miscarriage of justice. Appellate review is deferential; some grounds (like “weight of the evidence”) aren’t reviewable on appeal when the trial judge denies the motion.
• Remittitur and “Deviates Materially”: Under New York law, a damages award is excessive if it materially deviates from awards in similar cases. Courts compare injuries and verdicts to determine a proper range.
• “Crush” vs. “Sharp” Injuries: A “sharp” injury is a clean cut (e.g., saw), often allowing better reattachment and potentially less chronic pain. A “crush” injury pulverizes or severely damages nerves and tissue (e.g., high-force pinch), often requiring multiple surgeries and leading to lasting hypersensitivity and neuropathic pain. This difference matters when comparing verdicts.

Conclusion

Boateng v. BMW underscores that a manufacturer’s generalized warnings do not insulate it from consumer-protection liability when a design feature introduces an additional, non-obvious safety risk. The jury had ample evidence to find that soft close doors exerted force levels sufficient to cause amputation and failed to detect soft tissue, that BMW knew of similar injuries, and that its manual warned only of a generic “pinch” hazard. The Second Circuit, applying deferential review standards and New York damages law, affirmed the verdict and the damages awards.

For manufacturers and sellers, the case offers a roadmap to avoid § 349 exposure: when a feature elevates risk above the baseline hazard consumers might expect, disclose the nature and magnitude of that specific risk—not just a generic warning. For litigants, Boateng illustrates the kind of technical, documentary, and comparator evidence that will carry the day on liability, causation, lost earnings, and pain-and-suffering awards. Although non-precedential, the decision will likely prove influential in both consumer-protection and product-safety litigation across New York and the Second Circuit.