1. Introduction

In Pinnacle In Home Care, LLC v. 1 Source Senior Care, LLC, 2025 Ark. 193 (Dec. 4, 2025), the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a recurring but often under‑litigated problem in civil practice: when can a lawyer who previously represented several co‑defendants in a single lawsuit continue to represent only one of them after conflicts emerge?

The decision centers on Rule 1.9 of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, which governs conflicts of interest with former clients. Specifically, the court clarified when a current client’s interests are “materially adverse” to those of former clients in the same litigation and reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the “appearance of impropriety” doctrine, even though it is no longer expressly found in the Model Rules.

1.1 Parties and Factual Background

The dispute arises between two competitors in the home‑care industry:

• Pinnacle In Home Care, LLC (Pinnacle) – the appellant, a provider of targeted case‑management and personal‑care services.
• 1 Source Senior Care, LLC (1 Source) – the appellee and plaintiff below, a direct competitor of Pinnacle operating in the same service space.

1 Source initially sued Pinnacle and two individuals, Sarah and Anthony Sanchez, who were then employees of Pinnacle but had previously worked for 1 Source. The allegations against Pinnacle and the individual defendants were wide‑ranging:

• breach of noncompete agreements,
• defamation,
• breach of confidentiality obligations and duty of loyalty,
• conversion,
• tortious interference with business relationships,
• unjust enrichment, and
• civil conspiracy.

Attorney Timothy Hutchinson of the law firm RMP LLP initially appeared for all defendants. During the course of the litigation:

• It was acknowledged that Sarah Sanchez was deceased; Anthony was later appointed special administrator of her estate and substituted as a party in that capacity.
• Anthony Sanchez left Pinnacle’s employ, and RMP withdrew from representing the Sanchezes, expressly citing a “potential conflict of interest” between them and Pinnacle.
• A new individual, Amanda Sumpter, also left 1 Source for Pinnacle and was added as a defendant on similar noncompete‑based allegations; RMP again represented both Pinnacle and Sumpter, then withdrew from representing Sumpter when she later left Pinnacle, again citing a potential conflict.

Over time, RMP shifted from representing all defendants to representing only Pinnacle, while the individual defendants (Anthony, Sarah’s estate, and Sumpter) became RMP’s former clients.

1.2 Procedural Posture and the Issue on Appeal

The central procedural events leading to the appeal are:

• 1 Source served requests for admission on Anthony, both individually and as special administrator for Sarah. Anthony did not respond, so the requests were deemed admitted by operation of law.
• These deemed admissions included statements directly adverse to Pinnacle, such as an admission that Pinnacle instructed Anthony to contact 1 Source’s clients and make defamatory statements to induce them to move their business.
• Pinnacle, though not the addressee of these requests, filed a statement attempting to insulate itself by asserting that any admissions by Anthony should not be imputed to Pinnacle.
• 1 Source filed a second amended complaint; RMP filed an answer only for Pinnacle.
• RMP then noticed the depositions of its former clients, Anthony and Sumpter.
• 1 Source moved to disqualify RMP from further representing Pinnacle, arguing that continued representation violated Rule 1.9 because Pinnacle’s interests were materially adverse to RMP’s former clients in the same matter.
• The Washington County Circuit Court granted the motion and disqualified RMP and its attorneys, Hutchinson and Scott Tidwell, from representing any defendant in the case.

Pinnacle took an interlocutory appeal. It argued:

1. The circuit court erred in finding that Pinnacle’s interests were “materially adverse” to those of its codefendants, thus misapplying Rule 1.9; and
2. 1 Source’s disqualification motion was filed for tactical reasons and should not have been granted.

The Arkansas Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1‑2(a)(5), which covers matters related to regulation of the practice of law, and affirmed the disqualification order.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Arkansas Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Webb, affirmed the circuit court’s order disqualifying RMP LLP from representing Pinnacle.

2.1 Core Holding

The court held that:

• RMP’s continued representation of Pinnacle in this case violated Rule 1.9(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct because Pinnacle’s interests were materially adverse to those of RMP’s former clients (Anthony Sanchez, Sarah’s estate, and Amanda Sumpter) in the same matter, and there was no written informed consent from those former clients.
• The record clearly established adversarial interests among the defendants, particularly concerning allocation of liability and the effect of Anthony’s deemed admissions.
• The claim that 1 Source acted tactically in moving to disqualify RMP was legally irrelevant; the reviewing court evaluates only whether the circuit court abused its discretion, not the movant’s subjective motives.

2.2 Key Determinative Facts

The court relied on several salient facts:

• The complaint alleged that the individual defendants acted “within the course and scope of their employment with Pinnacle and at Pinnacle’s encouragement.” This gave rise to intrinsic tension over whether the individuals acted for Pinnacle’s benefit (potentially exposing Pinnacle to vicarious and direct liability) or acted outside its control (benefiting Pinnacle’s defense but undermining the individuals).
• Anthony’s deemed admissions included an admission that Pinnacle instructed and encouraged him to make defamatory statements to lure clients away from 1 Source. Pinnacle denied, in its own pleadings, that these acts occurred within the scope of employment, thereby setting Pinnacle’s theory directly against its former client’s admissions.
• Pinnacle’s answer to the second amended complaint affirmatively alleged that 1 Source’s damages were caused by persons “over whom Pinnacle had no control and for whom Pinnacle is not responsible”— a classic blame‑shifting defense inherently adverse to the interests of the individual defendants.
• RMP had itself twice acknowledged “potential conflicts of interest” when withdrawing from representing the individual defendants as they ceased to be Pinnacle employees.

On this record, the court found a clear Rule 1.9 conflict and upheld the disqualification.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.1.1 Standard of Review and General Disqualification Principles

The court reiterated well‑established principles governing attorney disqualification:

• Sturdivant v. Sturdivant, 367 Ark. 514, 241 S.W.3d 740 (2006): disqualification orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• Craig v. Carrigo, 340 Ark. 624, 12 S.W.3d 229 (2000): an abuse of discretion may arise from an erroneous interpretation of the law, not just from arbitrary or capricious decision‑making.
• Park Apts. at Fayetteville, LP v. Plants, 2018 Ark. 172, 545 S.W.3d 755: the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct apply in disqualification proceedings.
• SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 334 Ark. 134, 969 S.W.2d 193 (1998): whether an attorney has violated the Arkansas Model Rules of Professional Conduct is directly relevant to disqualification.

These cases collectively emphasize that:

• Disqualification is a discretionary decision grounded in ethical rules.
• Appellate review focuses on whether the circuit court misapplied those rules.

3.1.2 The Central Precedent: First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co.

The court’s most significant reliance was on First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990). In that case:

• An attorney’s law firm had previously represented one defendant in litigation and then, after the relationship ended, represented other defendants in the same matter whose interests were adverse to the former client.
• The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed disqualification, identifying a conflict under Rule 1.9 and emphasizing that the issue of relative fault among co‑defendants made their interests adversarial.

Two doctrinal points from First American Carriers are key:

1. The “appearance of impropriety” doctrine remains influential.
   The court in that case acknowledged that Canon 9 of the old ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (which provided that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety) is not textually present in the Model Rules. However, it held that:
   “its meaning pervades the Rules and embodies their spirit.” 302 Ark. at 92, 787 S.W.2d at 672.
   In Pinnacle, the court reiterates that this principle still informs analysis under Rule 1.9, especially as reflected in Comment [10] to Rule 1.9 referencing Rule 1.7’s “appearance of impropriety” comment.
2. Co‑defendants can be “adversarial” even when formally aligned in the caption.
   In First American Carriers, the court reasoned that because relative fault among defendants would be litigated, the defendants’ interests were functionally adverse. The court in Pinnacle expressly quotes this reasoning and applies it to the current setting:
   “we concluded that the interests of the defendants were ‘adversarial as the issue of relative fault between these parties will be litigated.’ … Likewise, defendants in this case will be in an adversarial position as the issue of individual liability is litigated.”

Thus, Pinnacle does not break new ground so much as apply and reinforce First American Carriers in the context of employment‑based business torts between competitors.

3.1.3 Rule 1.9 and the “Appearance of Impropriety” through Comments

The court quotes the core text of Arkansas Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a):

It then cites Comment [10] to Rule 1.9, which in turn incorporates Comment [37] to Rule 1.7:

This link is doctrinally important. It confirms that the court continues to:

• Use the appearance‑of‑impropriety concept as an interpretive lens for the modern conflict rules, and
• Read Rule 1.9 in a protective, prophylactic way, particularly when a lawyer might have incentives to challenge or undermine a former client in favor of a current one.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning on “Material Adversity”

3.2.1 The Rule 1.9 Framework

Applying Rule 1.9(a), the court’s analysis involves three key questions:

1. Former representation? – RMP undoubtedly formerly represented Anthony Sanchez, Sarah’s estate (through Anthony as special administrator), and Amanda Sumpter in this same lawsuit.
2. Same or substantially related matter? – The court treats this as self‑evident. The former and current representations all concern the same underlying case and facts: alleged breaches of noncompete and confidentiality agreements, alleged defamation, and alleged interference with 1 Source’s business.
3. Material adversity + lack of written consent? – The crux of the appeal. Were Pinnacle’s interests “materially adverse” to those of the former clients, and did the former clients give informed, written consent? (There was no written consent.)

The dispute thus centers on the meaning and application of “materially adverse” in a co‑defendant context.

3.2.2 Why the Interests Were “Materially Adverse”

The court identifies several interlocking reasons:

1. Allegations of agency and scope of employment create inherent tension.
   1 Source’s complaint alleged that the individual defendants acted:
   “within the course and scope of their employment with Pinnacle and at Pinnacle’s encouragement to commit tortious acts.”
   This allegation raises a classic conflict:
   • Pinnacle may wish to argue that any wrongful conduct was outside the scope of employment and contrary to its directions, in order to avoid liability.
   • The individual defendants, by contrast, may argue that they were merely following Pinnacle’s policies or instructions and thus were not personally culpable, or at least should share or shift blame to Pinnacle.
   The court explains:
   “This necessarily creates a tension between defendants as to the attribution of liability. Were separate defendants acting for their own benefit or for the benefit of Pinnacle and at its behest?”
   That question puts Pinnacle and the individual defendants on a collision course regarding facts and legal theories.
2. Anthony’s deemed admissions directly implicate Pinnacle.
   When Anthony failed to respond to requests for admission, certain statements became conclusively established against him. Among them was the admission that Pinnacle:
   “instructed and encouraged Anthony ‘to contact 1 Source clients and make derogatory and defamatory statements about 1 Source in an attempt to induce the clients to stop doing business with 1 Source and move their business to Pinnacle.’”
   This admission places Pinnacle at the center of the alleged wrongful scheme.
   • Pinnacle’s answer, however, denied that the Sanchezes made defamatory statements within the scope of their employment, implicitly contesting or distancing itself from Anthony’s admitted conduct.
   • This mismatch between the former client’s deemed admissions and the current client’s defense posture exemplifies “material adversity.”
3. Pinnacle’s affirmative pleading to shift blame to “persons over whom Pinnacle had no control.”
   Pinnacle’s answer to the second amended complaint included an affirmative allegation that any damage suffered by 1 Source was caused by persons “over whom Pinnacle had no control and for whom Pinnacle is not responsible.” This defense strategy:
   • Explicitly seeks to separate Pinnacle’s liability from the actions of others—most naturally, the codefendants who allegedly carried out the wrongful acts.
   • Positions Pinnacle to argue that any wrongdoing was the sole responsibility of those other persons (including its former clients) rather than the company itself.
   • Is functionally incompatible with continuing a loyalty‑based obligation to those former clients; it depends on sacrificing their interests to protect Pinnacle.
4. RMP’s own recognition of “potential conflicts of interest.”
   Twice, RMP moved to withdraw as counsel for the individual defendants (the Sanchezes and Sumpter), each time expressly citing a “potential conflict of interest” between Pinnacle and those individuals once they were no longer Pinnacle employees.
   • While a lawyer’s subjective view is not dispositive, it is relevant that RMP itself saw the risk of conflicting interests between Pinnacle and its co‑defendants.
   • That risk only became more concrete once Pinnacle adopted pleadings that shifted blame away from itself and once Anthony’s admissions established facts directly implicating Pinnacle.
5. Guidance from First American Carriers on relative fault among co‑defendants.
   Drawing explicitly on First American Carriers, the court emphasizes that:
   “defendants in this case will be in an adversarial position as the issue of individual liability is litigated.”
   Even if the defendants all want to defeat 1 Source’s claims, their interests diverge once the case turns to who is liable if any claims succeed and in what proportion. That divergence is enough to trigger Rule 1.9 concerns, particularly where the attorney has confidential information from all of them.

Synthesizing these points, the court concludes:

3.3 Rejection of Pinnacle’s “Common Defense” Argument

Pinnacle contended that its interests were “aligned” with the other defendants in denying 1 Source’s allegations and that they would present a common defense. The court finds this argument untenable for two reasons:

1. The pleadings contradict the claim of unity.
   Pinnacle’s blaming “persons over whom Pinnacle had no control” is squarely inconsistent with an undivided, joint defense theory. It implicitly casts the individual defendants as independent wrongdoers.
2. Anthony’s admissions and Pinnacle’s denials cannot be reconciled.
   When a former client (Anthony) is now legally deemed to have admitted that Pinnacle directed the wrongful conduct, while Pinnacle denies it, their interests are plainly at odds. The court views this as objective evidence of material adversity.

The court’s reasoning is practical: it looks past Pinnacle’s rhetoric about a “common defense” and focuses on how Pinnacle has actually positioned itself in its pleadings and the evidentiary record.

3.4 Treatment of the “Tactical Motive” Argument

Pinnacle’s second major contention was that 1 Source moved to disqualify RMP for tactical reasons. Here the court’s response is brief but doctrinally significant:

The implications are:

• Even if a disqualification motion has tactical consequences (and many do), that fact does not negate the underlying ethical problem if a Rule 1.9 violation exists.
• The appellate court’s inquiry is structural: Did the circuit court properly apply the law and exercise sound discretion? The subjective strategizing of the movant is not a controlling factor.

Since the court found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s application of Rule 1.9, it affirmed without delving into alleged tactical motivations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Disqualification of Counsel

A motion to disqualify counsel asks the court to remove a lawyer (and sometimes an entire firm) from representing a party in a case due to ethical conflicts. Courts grant disqualification to:

• Protect the integrity of the judicial process,
• Enforce professional conduct rules, and
• Prevent unfair use of confidential information or divided loyalties.

Disqualification is a serious remedy; it can delay litigation and require a party to find new counsel. For that reason, courts apply it cautiously—but they will do so where conflicts of interest threaten fairness or ethical compliance.

4.2 Rule 1.9 and “Material Adversity” with Former Clients

Rule 1.9(a) addresses conflicts with former clients. It rests on two core ideas:

1. Continuing duty of loyalty and confidentiality.
   Even after representation ends, a lawyer cannot:
   • Use confidential information against a former client, or
   • Switch sides in the same or a closely related matter in a way that harms the former client, unless the former client gives informed, written consent.
2. Material adversity.
   Interests are “materially adverse” when:
   • The lawyer is now advocating a position that would significantly harm the former client’s legal or financial interests in the same or a related matter; or
   • The lawyer’s representation of the current client requires undermining the former client’s credibility, challenging their admissions, or shifting liability onto them.
   In practice, this includes:
   • Suing a former client on a related matter,
   • Defending a new client by blaming the former client,
   • Cross‑examining the former client as a hostile witness on issues tied to the former representation.

In Pinnacle, material adversity is clear because Pinnacle’s optimal defense strategy is to distance itself from and blame the former clients whose conduct is at issue.

4.3 “Same or Substantially Related Matter”

Rule 1.9 applies when the former and current representations involve:

• The same case, or
• A different case with substantially similar facts, parties, and legal issues, such that confidential information from the former matter could be used in the latter.

Here, there is no question: RMP’s former and current representations all occur in the same lawsuit and revolve around the same alleged scheme to divert 1 Source’s clients using former employees.

4.4 The “Appearance of Impropriety” Doctrine

Historically, Canon 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility instructed lawyers to avoid even the “appearance of professional impropriety.” While modern Model Rules, including Arkansas’s, do not codify Canon 9 verbatim, Arkansas precedent and the comments to Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 confirm that:

• The concept still influences how conflict rules are applied.
• Lawyers should not only avoid actual conflicts, but also circumstances where their divided loyalties would reasonably appear questionable to clients, courts, or the public.

In Pinnacle, the court invokes that principle as part of its justification for disqualification: continued representation of Pinnacle by a firm that previously represented the individual co‑defendants in the same case—while Pinnacle’s defense shifts blame to those individuals—would at minimum present an appearance of impropriety.

4.5 Requests for Admission and Deemed Admissions

Under civil procedure rules (including Arkansas’s), a request for admission is a discovery device where one party asks another to admit or deny specific facts. If the responding party:

• Fails to respond within the prescribed time, the matters are deemed admitted;
• Those admissions are binding in the case unless the court allows them to be withdrawn or amended.

In this case, Anthony’s failure to respond resulted in binding admissions that Pinnacle:

• Instructed and encouraged him to make defamatory statements about 1 Source,
• Did so as part of an effort to move business from 1 Source to Pinnacle.

Pinnacle’s defense strategy is to deny these facts and argue that, if Anthony did anything wrong, he did it outside the scope of his employment. That puts Pinnacle’s position squarely at odds with its former client’s deemed admissions.

4.6 Special Administrator and Substitution

Because Sarah Sanchez had died, 1 Source moved to appoint a special administrator—a person appointed by the court to manage the deceased person’s estate for purposes of litigation—and to substitute that administrator as a party in Sarah’s place. The court appointed Anthony as special administrator and substituted him in that capacity.

This meant RMP represented Anthony in two roles:

• as an individual defendant, and
• as special administrator of Sarah’s estate.

After RMP withdrew from representing Anthony in both capacities, those representations became “former client” relationships governed by Rule 1.9.

5. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

5.1 Clarification of “Material Adversity” Among Co‑Defendants

The most significant doctrinal contribution of Pinnacle is its concrete application of “materially adverse” interests under Rule 1.9 to the context of:

• Multi‑defendant litigation,
• Where a single firm has sequentially represented multiple defendants, and
• Where a core defense strategy involves shifting blame from the entity to the individuals.

The opinion makes clear that:

• Co‑defendants do not cease to be adverse simply because they are aligned on some claims or share an interest in defeating the plaintiff’s case.
• Once issues of relative fault, scope of employment, and who directed the wrongful acts come to the foreground, defendants may be functionally adverse even while formally on the same side of the caption.
• Lawyers cannot avoid Rule 1.9 problems by withdrawing from some defendants but continuing to represent others in the same case when the remaining client’s optimal defense depends on undermining the former clients.

5.2 Confirming the Continuing Role of “Appearance of Impropriety”

Although Canon 9 is no longer a black‑letter rule, Pinnacle (following First American Carriers) confirms:

• The appearance‑of‑impropriety standard “pervades” the Model Rules and informs their application.
• Comments to the Rules (like Comment [10] to Rule 1.9 and Comment [37] to Rule 1.7) are not merely aspirational; they shape how courts interpret whether a conflict exists.

Practitioners in Arkansas should therefore assume that courts will evaluate not only hard conflicts but also situations where representation may appear compromised or unfair—even if all parties insist they are comfortable with the arrangement.

5.3 Lessons for Defense Counsel in Multi‑Defendant Cases

For litigators, Pinnacle carries several practical warnings:

1. Be cautious when initially agreeing to represent multiple defendants.
   In cases where:
   • Employees and an employer are jointly sued, and
   • The allegations involve scope of employment, direction, or encouragement of tortious acts,
   future conflict is highly foreseeable. Shared representation may not be sustainable once defenses crystallize.
2. Withdrawal from some defendants may not cure all conflicts.
   Once a lawyer has represented multiple defendants in the same case:
   • The lawyer owes ongoing duties to former clients under Rule 1.9.
   • Continuing to represent one defendant (such as the employer) may still be impermissible if that defendant’s likely defense requires blaming or discrediting the former clients.
3. Written, informed consent is essential—and may not be realistically obtainable.
   Rule 1.9 allows former clients to consent in writing to adverse representation. But:
   • Obtaining meaningful, informed consent from an unrepresented (and perhaps now adverse) former client is often impractical, especially once interests have demonstrably diverged.
   • Courts may view late‑stage consents skeptically if they appear coerced or not fully informed.
4. Litigation strategy will be scrutinized, not just labels.
   Courts will look at:
   • Actual pleadings,
   • Discovery positions, and
   • Likely trial strategy (e.g., cross‑examining former clients, relying on their admissions),
   rather than taking at face value a party’s assertion that “our interests are aligned” or that there is a “common defense.”

5.4 Limited Role of “Tactical Motive” Objections

Counsel often argue that disqualification motions are filed to disrupt the opposing party’s representation. Pinnacle makes clear that:

• The focus on appeal is on whether a real conflict exists and whether the circuit court applied the ethical rules correctly, not on whether the moving party hoped to gain a tactical advantage.
• If there is a clear Rule 1.9 violation, disqualification is appropriate regardless of the movant’s subjective motives.

This should dissuade lawyers from relying heavily on “tactical motive” arguments when opposing disqualification and instead concentrate on demonstrating the absence of an actual, legally significant conflict.

6. Conclusion

Pinnacle In Home Care, LLC v. 1 Source Senior Care, LLC is an important reaffirmation and clarification of Arkansas conflict‑of‑interest law in the context of multi‑defendant litigation. Applying Rule 1.9 and drawing on First American Carriers, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that:

• When an attorney has represented multiple defendants in the same case and later continues to represent only one of them, the remaining representation is impermissible if it is materially adverse to the former clients and no written informed consent exists.
• Material adversity is present where the current client’s defense strategy necessarily involves shifting blame to former clients, contesting their admissions, or minimizing their credibility and responsibility.
• The “appearance of impropriety” continues to play a meaningful role in interpreting conflict rules, particularly where public confidence in the fairness of proceedings is at stake.
• Allegations that a disqualification motion was filed for tactical reasons do not, by themselves, undercut a properly supported finding of conflict; the appellate focus is on whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the ethical rules.

In a broader sense, the decision underscores the enduring principle that a lawyer’s duty of loyalty to former clients survives the end of the attorney–client relationship and constrains whom the lawyer may later represent in related disputes. For Arkansas practitioners, especially those handling employment and business‑tort litigation involving multiple defendants, Pinnacle serves as a cautionary guide: early and careful conflict analysis, conservative multi‑client engagement, and rigorous adherence to Rule 1.9 are essential to avoid mid‑stream disqualification and to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.