Massey v. State: Delaware Supreme Court Confirms Threshold Indicia of Falsity Required to Impeach with Prior Sexual Assault Allegations; Affirms Trial Courts’ Discretion to Allow Child-Comfort Aids

Introduction

In this en banc decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the convictions of Rhandy Massey for multiple sexual offenses against his two minor daughters and upheld the Superior Court’s rulings on two tightly focused evidentiary issues. First, the Court addressed whether a defendant may impeach child complainants with their prior sexual assault allegations against third parties, clarifying that—whatever the precise doctrinal framework might be—there must be at least some indicia of falsity before such allegations may be used to attack credibility. Second, the Court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by permitting one child witness to hold a stuffed animal while testifying, given the demonstrated need and the steps taken to mitigate prejudice.

The decision stops short of adopting or rejecting a specific burden of proof (such as “clear and convincing evidence”) for proving falsity of prior allegations under Delaware’s Rape Shield Statute (11 Del. C. § 3508). But it establishes a practical floor: absent evidence suggesting falsity, trial courts may preclude use of prior sexual assault allegations for impeachment. The Court also offers pragmatic guidance on accommodating child witnesses, reaffirming that trial judges retain broad discretion when reasonable safeguards limit any risk of unfair prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirms Massey’s convictions and 119-year sentence, after a jury found him guilty of most charged offenses relating to sexual abuse of his daughters (one first-degree rape count was acquitted; one second-degree rape count was reduced to unlawful sexual contact as a lesser-included offense).
• On the impeachment issue:
  • The Court does not definitively decide whether Delaware requires “clear and convincing” proof of falsity (as suggested by State v. Bailey, a Superior Court decision), or some other standard. Nor does it decide whether false accusations fall within “sexual conduct” under § 3508.
  • Instead, it holds that under any approach, a defendant must present some evidence of falsity before prior allegations can be used to impeach. Massey presented none.
• On the accommodation issue:
  • The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing one child to hold a stuffed animal while testifying. The State made an oral motion citing the child’s counselor; the judge took steps to avoid juror sympathy (child seated before jurors entered, direction to avoid drawing attention to the item; the item was barely visible).
• Other issues, including a Brady claim and a broader “sexualization” theory, were waived or abandoned on appeal and not considered.

Factual and Procedural Background

Massey was indicted in 2021 on multiple sex offenses involving his daughters, M.M. (then age 7) and L.M. (then age 8). On the eve of trial, he moved under Delaware’s Rape Shield Statute (§ 3508) to admit evidence of the children’s prior sexual conduct and prior sexual abuse allegations against others to attack their credibility or show knowledge of sexual activity at a young age. During argument, defense counsel withdrew requests to use alleged sexual conduct between the sisters and earlier allegations against Massey, leaving two items in play: (1) a 2017 allegation by L.M. against half-brother N.M., and (2) a babysitter’s vague 2017 report that the girls were “acting inappropriately.”

The Superior Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding the babysitter’s statement nonspecific and concluding the defense had not shown falsity for the N.M. allegation (relying on State v. Bailey’s clear-and-convincing standard), while warning that admission would spawn mini-trials. After trial, the jury convicted on most counts. Before sentencing, Massey sought a new trial, arguing the wrong legal standard had been applied and objecting to the child’s stuffed animal at the stand; the motion was denied.

On initial appeal, Massey raised a Brady claim based on a previously undisclosed 2015 police report about a cousin, A.M. The State requested remand for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the Superior Court took testimony from the mother, the daughters, and reviewed the 2015 and 2017 CAC interviews. The court denied Brady relief and again rejected admission of prior allegations, finding no evidence of falsity—no recantations, consistent CAC statements naming the half-brother, and no investigative indications the prior reports were false. Back on appeal, Massey narrowed issues to (1) the legal standard and exclusion of prior allegations evidence, and (2) the stuffed animal accommodation. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• Delaware Rape Shield Statute (11 Del. C. § 3508)
  • Purpose: Balance confrontation rights with protection against humiliating, marginally probative sexual-history inquiry.
  • Procedure: Written motion supported by affidavit and offer of proof; if sufficient, an in camera hearing; court specifies what may be admitted and the scope of questioning.
  • Relevance standard: Prior sexual conduct must be relevant to credibility to be admissible after the statutory process.
• Wright v. State (513 A.2d 1310 (Del. 1986)) and Scott v. State (642 A.2d 767 (Del. 1994))
  • Explain that rape shield statutes protect complainants from unnecessary humiliation while maintaining defendants’ confrontation rights within reasonable limits.
  • Confirm the statutory gating function to assess relevance outside the jury’s presence.
• State v. Bailey (1996 WL 587721 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996))
  • Superior Court case surveying other jurisdictions and articulating a “majority rule” that prior sexual assault allegations are admissible only if the defendant shows falsity by clear and convincing evidence.
  • Concerned about mini-trials and Rule 403 prejudice when falsity is not established.
  • Relied on by the Superior Court here; the Supreme Court declines to adopt a definitive standard but affirms on narrower ground (no indicia of falsity under any test).
• Bryant v. State (1999 WL 507300 (Del. 1999) (TABLE))
  • Remanded for in camera inquiry; dicta suggested that even inconclusive evidence of falsity may be admissible to challenge credibility (citing Rhode Island and Maine cases).
  • Massey cites this dicta; the Court notes Bryant did not resolve the precise standard and, regardless, Massey offered no indication of falsity here.
• Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
  • Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965): Guarantee cross-examination but allow reasonable limitations to protect witnesses and maintain orderly trials.
  • Delaware Rule of Evidence 611(a)(3) authorizes courts to protect witnesses from harassment and undue embarrassment.
• Child witness accommodations
  • Czech v. State, 945 A.2d 1088 (Del. 2008): Special accommodations typically require a motion and a showing of substantial need; judges have broad discretion in trial management.
  • Gomez v. State, 25 A.3d 786 (Del. 2011): Allowing a child to hold a stuffed animal can be appropriate if steps mitigate juror sympathy (e.g., seat the child before the jury enters).
  • 11 Del. C. § 5131: The General Assembly recognizes the need to provide child victims and witnesses with additional consideration and protections in Superior Court criminal proceedings.
• Standards of review
  • Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005): Legal standard questions reviewed de novo.
  • Seward v. State, 723 A.2d 365 (Del. 1999): Evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Czech v. State, 945 A.2d at 1095: Trial management reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Dillard v. State, 2025 WL 1794375 (Del. 2025) (TABLE); Burrell v. State, 332 A.3d 412 (Del. 2024): Waiver (affirmative abandonment) forecloses appellate review.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

2.1 Rape Shield, Confrontation, and the “Falsity” Threshold

The Court situates the Rape Shield Statute within the constitutional landscape: cross-examination is central to confrontation but is subject to reasonable limits (Wright; Davis). Section 3508 operationalizes that balance by requiring a motion, affidavit, and offer of proof; if the proffer suffices, the court holds an in camera hearing to determine admissibility and scope. The statutory touchstone is relevance, and—when offered to impeach—the inquiry is whether the evidence is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness.

Massey sought to use prior sexual abuse allegations by the children against a cousin (2015) and a half-brother (2017) to attack their credibility and to suggest prior sexual knowledge. The Superior Court relied on Bailey’s “clear and convincing falsity” standard to exclude the evidence. The Supreme Court declined to adopt or reject that standard for Delaware, noting:

• The statutory text does not expressly address prior false accusations and it is unsettled whether such accusations are “sexual conduct” under § 3508.
• The parties had not fully briefed the competing approaches in other jurisdictions or the constitutional dimensions.
• Even if it announced a definitive standard, the outcome here would be the same because Massey failed to show any indicia of falsity.

Crucially, the Court emphasizes a minimum requirement that transcends doctrinal variations: a party seeking to impeach with prior sexual assault accusations must present some evidence of falsity. On remand, the Superior Court found none—no recantations, CAC interviews that consistently referenced the half-brother, no investigative statements indicating deceit, and testimony that largely aligned with earlier reports (accounting for the children’s young ages and faded memories). The Supreme Court defers to that factual determination and affirms exclusion.

2.2 Babysitter’s Vague Observations and “Prior Knowledge” Theory

The babysitter’s comment that the children “knew too much for their age” was deemed nonspecific and unhelpful. Without concrete details, such observations are not probative of truthfulness (and risk substantial prejudice and confusion). The defense also withdrew broader “sexualization” arguments and later acknowledged, post-remand, that the evidentiary record did not support that theory.

2.3 Child-Comfort Aid (Stuffed Animal) and Trial Management

The Court reaffirms trial judges’ discretion to accommodate child witnesses, so long as steps are taken to avoid undue juror sympathy or prejudice (Czech; Gomez; § 5131). Here, the State orally moved to allow a stuffed animal based on the counselor’s suggestion. The judge:

• Required the child to be seated before the jury entered;
• Directed that attention not be drawn to the item;
• Observed the item was barely visible and no record evidence suggested the jury noticed it.

Under abuse-of-discretion review, these steps sufficed. The Court rejects Massey’s argument that the accommodation prejudiced his substantive rights.

3) Impact and Practical Consequences

3.1 The “Indicia of Falsity” Floor: What Practitioners Must Show

While leaving open the ultimate doctrinal standard for admitting prior sexual assault accusations (e.g., clear and convincing vs. preponderance), the Court sets a functional baseline: there must be some evidence of falsity before such accusations can be used to impeach. Mere non-prosecution or “unsubstantiated” status is not enough. Practitioners should marshal concrete indicators, such as:

• Recantations or materially inconsistent statements by the complainant;
• Forensic or investigative findings that directly undermine the prior accusation;
• Admissions or extrinsic proof demonstrably showing fabrication or impossibility;
• Documented credibility assessments or findings from prior proceedings (subject to hearsay and Rule 403 constraints).

Absent such indicia, § 3508’s relevance threshold is not met, and courts may deny the motion (and even the in camera hearing) because the offer of proof is insufficient.

3.2 Unresolved Questions Preserved for Future Cases

• Does “sexual conduct” in § 3508 encompass false accusations (making them subject to the statute’s procedures and limits), or are false-accusation impeachment efforts governed instead by other evidence rules (e.g., D.R.E. 608(b))? The Court expressly leaves this for a fully briefed case.
• What is the precise burden of proof for falsity (clear and convincing vs. preponderance, or a different threshold), and does the Confrontation Clause constrain that standard? The Court again leaves this open.
• To what extent can courts admit such impeachment evidence when the falsity showing is “inconclusive” (as suggested in Bryant’s dicta)? That too remains for development.

3.3 Child Witness Accommodations: A Roadmap

Massey reinforces best practices for accommodating child witnesses:

• Require a motion (written or oral) and a reasoned justification (e.g., counselor’s recommendation).
• Implement safeguards: seat the child before the jury enters, ensure the item is unobtrusive, instruct the witness not to draw attention to it, and keep a clear record of the court’s observations.
• Be prepared to articulate how accommodations address the child’s needs while minimizing any risk of undue sympathy.

Defense counsel, for their part, should make a clear record of any claimed prejudice and propose alternative accommodations or remedies (such as targeted curative instructions).

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rape Shield Statute (11 Del. C. § 3508): A rule that limits evidence about a complainant’s prior sexual behavior. It requires a pretrial motion with an offer of proof, and if sufficient, a private hearing. Only relevant, admissible evidence is allowed—and the court controls the scope.
• Offer of Proof: A proffer explaining what the evidence is and why it matters legally. Here, the offer had to show the prior allegations were relevant to truthfulness—typically by indicating falsity.
• Indicia of Falsity: Concrete reasons to think a prior allegation was untrue (e.g., recantation, contradictory statements, investigative findings). Mere non-charging does not equal falsity.
• Confrontation Clause: The constitutional right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. It allows reasonable limitations to protect witnesses and prevent unfair trials.
• Abuse of Discretion: An appellate standard deferring to the trial judge’s judgment unless it was arbitrary, unreasonable, or based on untenable grounds.
• Substantial Need (for accommodations): A threshold showing that a special measure (like a comfort aid) is necessary to allow a child to testify effectively, balanced against potential prejudice.
• CAC Interview: A forensic interview at a Children’s Advocacy Center designed to elicit reliable information from children in a developmentally appropriate way.

Key Takeaways

• A defendant seeking to impeach a complainant with prior sexual assault allegations against others must present some evidence of falsity; without that, the evidence is not relevant to credibility under any approach and is excludable.
• The Delaware Supreme Court leaves open the precise standard (e.g., clear and convincing) for proving falsity and whether false-accusation impeachment falls inside or outside § 3508’s “sexual conduct,” inviting fuller briefing in a future case.
• Child-witness accommodations, including comfort items, are permissible when justified and carefully managed to reduce prejudice; trial judges retain broad discretion in this sensitive area.
• Waiver matters: arguments abandoned in the trial court or on appeal (e.g., Brady and broader “sexualization” contentions here) will not be reviewed.
• Practitioners should build detailed, corroborated proffers—recantations, forensic contradictions, or other concrete indicia—if they plan to use prior accusation evidence for impeachment.

Conclusion

Massey v. State delivers a measured but consequential clarification in Delaware evidence law: before a defendant may use prior sexual assault accusations to impeach a complainant, there must be at least a threshold showing of falsity. That minimum requirement aligns with the Rape Shield Statute’s goal of preventing humiliating, marginally probative attacks while preserving meaningful confrontation. Equally, the Court underscores that trial judges hold wide latitude to accommodate child witnesses when justified and when safeguards minimize potential prejudice to the accused.

Although the Court declines to codify a definitive burden (e.g., clear and convincing) or to decide whether false accusations are “sexual conduct” within § 3508, its insistence on concrete indicia of falsity sets practical guardrails for future litigation. The opinion thus balances constitutional and evidentiary values, offering a template for trial courts and litigants in the recurring—and delicate—context of child sexual abuse prosecutions.