Marbury v. United National Insurance: The Fifth Circuit Re-defines “Self-Serving” Evidence and Reaffirms Louisiana’s Expansive Concept of Insurable Interest

1. Introduction

In Marbury v. United National Insurance Company, No. 24-30599 (5th Cir. Jul. 29 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit revisited two recurring issues in insurance and civil-procedure practice:

• What constitutes a legally sufficient “insurable interest” under Louisiana law when the claimant is not on title to the property; and
• How district courts must treat deposition or affidavit testimony that is labelled “self-serving” at the summary-judgment stage.

Appellant Annie Marbury—co-founder and president of a church that owns a parsonage—procured a homeowner’s policy in her own name. After Hurricane Laura damaged the property, the insurer (United) partially denied coverage and obtained summary judgment on the theory that Marbury lacked any insurable interest. The district court also disregarded Marbury’s deposition testimony as “self-serving” because she produced no corroborating documents.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the procedural waiver ruling but vacated summary judgment on the merits, setting a significant precedent on the evidentiary weight of party testimony and clarifying Louisiana’s generous doctrine of multiple insurable interests.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit’s per-curiam decision (Higginson, J., joined by Ho, J.; Wilson, J., concurring):

1. Waiver of evidentiary objection: Marbury forfeited her challenge to a letter introduced in the insurer’s reply brief because she neither sought leave to file a sur-reply nor moved to strike below.
2. Reversal on insurable-interest grounds: The panel held that the district court erroneously discounted Marbury’s deposition testimony—evidence that, if credited, could establish a personal economic stake in the property. The “self-serving” label alone is not a basis for disregard.
3. Remand with limited discovery: The case returns to the district court for discovery focused on how (and whose funds) the mortgage and furnishings were paid, followed by a renewed Rule 56 analysis.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157 (5th Cir. 2021)
    • Established that competent, first-hand “self-serving” statements can defeat summary judgment.
• Salazar v. Lubbock County Hospital District, 982 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., conc.)
    • Quoted to reinforce that self-interest “does not reduce value” absent vagueness or lack of personal knowledge.
• Georgia Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 99 F.4th 770 (5th Cir. 2024)
    • Controls reply-brief evidence procedure; litigants must request leave for sur-reply or waive the point.
• Haddad v. Elkhateeb, 46 So. 3d 244 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2010); Armenia Coffee Corp., 946 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006)
    • Articulate Louisiana’s broad test: any “lawful and substantial economic interest” suffices, and multiple insurable interests can coexist.
• Procedural authorities: Balboa Capital Corp., Huynh v. Walmart, Viazis, et al.—framed standards of review for evidentiary and summary-judgment issues.

These cases collectively shaped the panel’s dual holdings: first, that preserving evidentiary objections requires action; second, that competent party testimony—even if uncorroborated—can create a genuine dispute.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. No preserved evidentiary error. The panel emphasized the two-step abuse-of-discretion inquiry (Balboa): (a) was there an error; (b) if so, was it substantially prejudicial? Because Marbury remained silent for two weeks while other filings were made, she failed both prongs.
2. Deposition testimony as summary-judgment evidence. Relying on Guzman, the court reiterated that testimony based on personal knowledge cannot be discounted solely because it originates from an interested party. The district court’s de facto “corroboration prerequisite” was incompatible with Rule 56 and Fifth Circuit precedent.
3. Insurable interest under Louisiana law. The panel recited the statute and caselaw providing that anyone who stands to suffer “direct, immediate or potential financial loss” has an insurable interest, even without title or possession. Therefore, if Marbury personally paid mortgage installments or invested in furnishings, she may possess such an interest despite the church’s ownership.
4. Procedural disposition. Rather than reverse outright, the court vacated and ordered targeted discovery to clarify whether Marbury made payments in her personal capacity or solely as a corporate agent—an ambiguity that goes to the heart of the substantive standard.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Clarification of evidence law: District courts within the Fifth Circuit must now treat competent “self-serving” testimony on equal footing with other evidence unless it is conclusory, vague, or lacks personal knowledge. Corroborating documents are helpful but not mandatory.
• Insurance litigation: The decision reaffirms that Louisiana’s concept of insurable interest is expansive and fact-intensive, protecting non-titleholders (family members, corporate officers, etc.) who demonstrate genuine economic stakes.
• Procedure on reply evidence: Litigants are on notice: failure to request a sur-reply or move to strike new reply-brief evidence will almost certainly bar appellate relief.
• Statutory context: Although § 22:1973 was repealed in 2024, the panel’s analysis of statutory bad-faith claims remains relevant for pre-repeal conduct and analogous provisions.
• Future cases: Expect increased emphasis on deposition content and more frequent denial of summary judgment where an affiant offers specific, first-hand financial details—even if records are sparse. Insurers may respond by conducting more rigorous discovery before moving for summary judgment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Insurable Interest: A person doesn’t need legal title to have “skin in the game.” If you would lose money or be otherwise harmed if the property is destroyed, you may insure it.
• Self-Serving Evidence: Testimony that benefits the speaker. Courts cannot disregard it just for being beneficial; it must be conclusory (no facts), vague (unclear facts), or unsupported by personal knowledge before it can be ignored.
• Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A way to end a case early when there is no real disagreement on facts that matter. The court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
• Sur-Reply: An optional filing that lets the non-movant respond to new material found in the movant’s reply brief. Failing to request one usually waives objection to that new material.

5. Conclusion

Marbury v. United National Insurance sets two clear guideposts:

1. Competent, first-hand testimony—no matter how “self-interested”—can preclude summary judgment unless demonstrably conclusory or speculative; courts cannot demand extrinsic corroboration as a threshold matter.
2. Under Louisiana law, the existence of title is not dispositive. Any substantial economic stake—such as paying the mortgage or furnishing a property—may constitute an “insurable interest,” and multiple interests can coexist.

Together, these holdings strengthen policyholder protections and tighten evidentiary standards within the Fifth Circuit, ensuring that meritorious disputes survive to trial unless the movant truly eliminates all genuine issues of material fact.