Mandatory Revocation for Firearm Possession: § 3553(a) Factors Not Required & Consecutive Sentencing Presumed — Commentary on United States v. Rafael Perez (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Rafael Perez is an unpublished yet instructive decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, clarifying two recurring questions in federal sentencing practice: (1) whether a district court must articulate or even consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when revoking supervised release under the mandatory-revocation provision of § 3583(g), and (2) whether a revocation sentence may, or should, run consecutive to the sentence for the new substantive offense that triggered the revocation.

Rafael Perez, already serving a federal supervised-release term, admitted to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. That new felony itself yielded a 137-month sentence. It also triggered revocation of his supervised release, for which the district court imposed an additional 24 months to be served consecutive to the 137 months. Perez appealed, advancing both procedural and substantive unreasonableness arguments. The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed. While the opinion is designated “Do Not Publish,” it squarely re-affirms circuit precedent and adds useful gloss on how courts should handle identical challenges going forward.

Summary of the Judgment

Procedural Reasonableness: No error—§ 3583(g)(2) made revocation mandatory once Perez admitted to firearm possession; therefore, the district court was not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors.
Substantive Reasonableness: The 24-month sentence, set to run consecutive to the 137-month felon-in-possession sentence, fell within the advisory Guideline framework (U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3 & 7B1.3) and was well within the district court’s discretion.
Holding: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in all respects, emphasizing that the failure to mention § 3553(a) was not erroneous under mandatory-revocation circumstances and that consecutive sentencing is presumptively appropriate for revocation terms.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000)

“When revocation of supervised release is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), the statute does not require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.”

The court leaned primarily on Brown to reject Perez’s procedural claim, reaffirming that § 3553(a) analysis is unnecessary when revocation is triggered by firearm possession, a mandatory ground under § 3583(g)(2).

United States v. Owens, 96 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024)

Provided the framework for plain-error review where the defendant fails to object at sentencing. Perez’s procedural claim was subject to this heightened standard because his counsel did not raise a contemporaneous objection.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Cited for the general rule that district courts must consider § 3553(a); however, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Gall in light of the statutory carve-out for mandatory revocations.

United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020)

Quoted to emphasize that imposing consecutive sentences for new criminal conduct plus revocation time is “well within the district court’s discretion.”

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

Supplied the appellate standard: the panel would overturn a sentence only if “left with the definite and firm conviction” of clear error in balancing the § 3553(a) factors.

Sentencing Guidelines Provisions

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) – discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive terms for undischarged sentences.
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) & cmt. n.4 – Commission’s explicit recommendation that imprisonment imposed upon revocation run consecutively.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

Standard of Review:
- Procedural claim — plain error, because no objection was registered.
- Substantive claim — abuse-of-discretion, assessing totality of circumstances.
Mandatory Nature of Revocation under § 3583(g)(2): Perez admitted to possessing a firearm—an automatic revocation trigger. Once revocation is mandatory, § 3553(a) considerations become irrelevant; the only variable left for the court is the length of the revocation term within statutory maxima (here, two years).
Guideline Preference for Consecutive Sentencing: The district court relied—implicitly but sufficiently—on §§ 5G1.3 & 7B1.3, both of which signal that a revocation sentence should add to, not overlap with, the punishment for the new felony.
Substantive Reasonableness: A 24-month term was near the upper bound but still within statutory limits; given the seriousness of the new offense and repeated firearms conduct, the panel found nothing “greater than necessary.”

Likely Impact of the Decision

Clarity for District Courts. Judges in the Eleventh Circuit have authoritative reassurance that they need not articulate § 3553(a) findings when revocation is compulsory under § 3583(g). This streamlines sentencing hearings and inoculates them from appellate reversal on that ground.
Defense Counsel Strategy. Counsel representing supervisees facing mandatory revocation should focus less on § 3553(a) arguments and more on minimizing the length of the revocation term within the statutory cap, perhaps by contesting factual predicates or advocating for concurrent time only in non-firearm contexts.
Consecutive Default Strengthened. Although the Guidelines have long favored consecutive sentences, this opinion reiterates that consecutive sentencing in revocation contexts is “well within” discretion—making any pitch for concurrency an uphill battle.
Appellate Review Predictability. The plain-error and abuse-of-discretion lenses are again confirmed as exacting hurdles for defendants; substantive challenges will rarely succeed absent stark disparity or misapplication of law.
Unpublished but Persuasive. Even though the opinion is non-precedential, district courts frequently cite unpublished Eleventh Circuit authority for persuasive value; expect to see Perez invoked in sentencing memoranda and bench colloquies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A period of community supervision imposed after imprisonment. Violation can lead to additional imprisonment.
Mandatory vs. Discretionary Revocation: Most violations give the judge discretion to decide whether to revoke supervision; certain violations (e.g., firearm possession, drug trafficking) force the judge to revoke — there is no choice.
§ 3553(a) Factors: A set of congressional directives guiding sentencing: seriousness of offense, deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, sentencing disparities, etc.
Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences: Concurrent sentences run at the same time; consecutive sentences start only after the prior sentence ends.
Plain-Error Review: An appellate standard applied when no timely objection was made. The appellant must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.
Advisory Guidelines: Since United States v. Booker (2005), the Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory but remain the “starting point and initial benchmark” for federal sentencing.

Conclusion

United States v. Rafael Perez cements two practical propositions within Eleventh Circuit sentencing jurisprudence: (1) A district court commits no procedural error by omitting § 3553(a) analysis when revocation is compelled under § 3583(g)(2) for firearm possession, and (2) Ordering the revocation sentence to run consecutive to the sentence for the new substantive offense is a textbook application of U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3 and 7B1.3, and is therefore substantively reasonable.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the limited avenues for appeal in mandatory-revocation scenarios and reaffirms the central role of the Sentencing Guidelines’ commentary in shaping consecutive-sentence outcomes. Although unpublished, Perez is poised to guide district courts and litigants in future supervised-release revocation proceedings involving firearm violations.