Introduction

This commentary analyzes the North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Interest of K.I.B., which clarifies the scope of juvenile court discretion to require sex offender registration under the pre–July 1, 2025 version of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15. The juvenile court had exempted K.I.B., a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for felony offenses involving sexual content under Chapter 12.1-27.2, from registration, relying on perceived discretion when there was no evidence of ongoing danger to the public. The State appealed, arguing the juvenile court misapplied the statute by deviating from what the State viewed as a mandatory registration requirement.

The Supreme Court addressed three principal issues: (1) whether the State had standing and statutory authority as an “aggrieved party” to appeal; (2) whether N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(a) mandated registration for juveniles adjudicated of felony-level sexual offenses, with only a narrow exception; and (3) whether ordering registration on appeal would impermissibly increase punishment under criminal appeal statutes. The Court’s resolution centers on statutory text, legislative policy-making primacy, and the proper reading of “shall” and “unless” in the registration statute.

Summary of the Opinion

• Appealability/Jurisdiction: The State is an “aggrieved party” under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-26(1) and may appeal a juvenile court’s final order. The Court exercised jurisdiction.
• Mandatory registration under § 12.1-32-15(2)(a): For individuals adjudicated “as a felonious sexual offender”—a category that includes juvenile delinquent adjudications of equivalent felony sexual offenses—registration is mandatory. The only exception in the prior statute was when “the offense is listed in subdivision c,” which enumerated narrow offenses for which limited judicial discretion could be exercised.
• No discretion for K.I.B.’s offenses: Because K.I.B. was adjudicated delinquent for felony offenses under Chapter 12.1-27.2 (promoting a sexual performance by a minor and possession of certain prohibited materials), and those offenses are not listed in § 12.1-32-15(2)(c), the juvenile court had no authority to deviate from mandatory registration.
• Criminal-appeal limitation inapplicable: N.D.C.C. § 29-28-35 (prohibiting increased punishment on a criminal appeal) does not apply in juvenile proceedings; juvenile appeals are governed by the Juvenile Court Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.2.
• Result: The juvenile court misapplied the statute and abused its discretion by exempting K.I.B. from registration. The order is reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the opinion—that is, requiring registration.
• Temporal note: The Court interpreted the version of § 12.1-32-15 in effect before July 1, 2025. Later amendments (effective July 1 and August 1, 2025) restructured the statute, deleting former § 12.1-32-15(2)(c) and adding new juvenile-specific provisions; those amendments were not applied here.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Appeal-rights framework:
  • Gum v. Muddy Boyz Drywall LLC, 2025 ND 111 (appeal rights are purely statutory).
  • Sanderson v. Walsh County, 2006 ND 83 (same principle quoted in Gum).
  • Int. of A.P., 2023 ND 39; Cossette v. Cass County Joint Water Resource District, 2017 ND 120 (defining “aggrieved party” as one whose legal interests are immediately, directly, and adversely affected by the decision).
  • In re M.H.P., 2013 ND 61; In re D.J., 2011 ND 142 (prior State appeals involving juvenile sex offender registration issues, illustrating assumed propriety of such appeals).
  • Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (courts are not bound by prior unexamined exercises of jurisdiction, but those practices can still inform jurisdictional analysis).
• Purpose and character of sex offender registration:
  • In re L.T., 2011 ND 120 (registration protects public safety and aids monitoring).
  • State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143 (registration’s public safety purpose and remedial character inform the State’s legal interest).
• Statutory interpretation and legislative role:
  • In re Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31; Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414 (N.D. 1967) (the legislature sets policy; courts interpret statutes as written).
  • State v. Berkley, 2025 ND 134; Bang v. Continental Resources, Inc., 2025 ND 131 (statutory interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo; primary goal is legislative intent discerned from plain meaning and context).
  • Dictionaries defining “unless” (American Heritage; Webster’s New World; New Oxford American; Merriam-Webster) support the Court’s narrow reading of the exception.
• Juvenile versus criminal proceedings:
  • State v. Overby, 209 N.W. 552 (N.D. 1926) (juvenile court is not a criminal court and aims to protect and rehabilitate juveniles).
  • In Interest of M.D.N., 493 N.W.2d 680 (N.D. 1992) (contrasting rehabilitative juvenile dispositions with punitive adult criminal sentencing).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The statutory command in § 12.1-32-15(2)(a). The pre–July 1, 2025 version of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(a) provided that courts “shall impose” and “shall require” sex offender registration when an individual is found guilty or adjudicated “as a felonious sexual offender,” explicitly including “juvenile delinquent adjudications of equivalent offenses” unless “the offense is listed in subdivision c.” The Court emphasized the force of “shall,” signaling a mandatory duty, and then applied the ordinary meaning of “unless” to establish that only the offenses specifically listed in subdivision (2)(c) were exemptible from this mandate.

b) Who is a “sexual offender” and when is the offense “felonious”? Section 12.1-32-15(1)(g) defines a “sexual offender” to include persons—explicitly including juveniles adjudicated delinquent—who commit offenses in Chapter 12.1-27.2, among others. The juvenile court adjudicated K.I.B. delinquent for violating § 12.1-27.2-04 (promoting a sexual performance by a minor) and § 12.1-27.2-04.1 (possession of certain materials prohibited), which are felonies. Accordingly, K.I.B. fell squarely into the class of “felonious sexual offender[s]” for whom registration is mandated by § 12.1-32-15(2)(a).

c) The narrow exception in § 12.1-32-15(2)(c). At the time of adjudication, subsection (2)(c) carved out a narrow category for juvenile delinquency adjudications under § 12.1-20-03(1)(d) and (2)(a), and for juveniles who were “a sexual offender for a misdemeanor.” For those enumerated circumstances only, the juvenile court could deviate from registration if it found both that the juvenile had no prior sexual offender or crime-against-a-child conviction and did not exhibit mental abnormality or predatory conduct in the offense. The Court held these deviation criteria cannot be generalized to all juvenile sexual offenses; they applied only if the offense itself fell within subsection (2)(c).

d) Misapplication and abuse of discretion by the juvenile court. The juvenile court invoked the subsection (2)(c) discretionary criteria (no prior offense; no mental abnormality or predatory conduct) even though K.I.B.’s offenses were not among those enumerated in (2)(c). Because § 12.1-32-15(2)(a) mandates registration for juvenile felony sexual offenses except for those listed in (2)(c), the juvenile court’s deviation was a misapplication of the statute and thus an abuse of discretion.

e) Appealability and the State’s standing. The Court held the State qualifies as an “aggrieved party” under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-26(1), both by the statute’s plain language (“including the state”) and because the State has a direct and immediate legal interest in maintaining public safety through effective registration systems. The Court also noted it had previously entertained similar appeals by the State (In re M.H.P.; In re D.J.) and recognized the persuasive force of that practice (Brown Shoe), even if not strictly binding.

f) Criminal appeal statute inapplicable. The Court rejected the contention that requiring registration on appeal would violate N.D.C.C. § 29-28-35’s ban on increasing punishment on criminal appeals. Juvenile proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Court Act, not Title 29’s criminal appeal provisions, and juvenile courts are not criminal courts (Overby; M.D.N.). The appealability and scope of relief are controlled by § 27-20.2-26, not § 29-28-35.

3) Practical Impact and Prospective Considerations

Immediate effect. For cases governed by the pre–July 1, 2025 version of § 12.1-32-15, juvenile courts must require sex offender registration for juveniles adjudicated delinquent of felony sexual offenses (including Chapter 12.1-27.2) unless—and only unless—the offense is among those enumerated in § 12.1-32-15(2)(c). Courts cannot import the subsection (2)(c) deviation criteria to offenses not listed there.

Standardization and predictability. The decision forecloses ad hoc, policy-driven non-registration determinations in the juvenile context for felony sexual offenses outside (2)(c). That predictability reinforces the legislature’s specified public-safety objectives and eliminates inconsistent county-to-county practices.

Guidance for practitioners (pre–July 2025 statute):

• Identify whether the juvenile adjudication is for a felony sexual offense and whether it falls within the statutory definition of “sexual offender” in § 12.1-32-15(1)(g).
• If the offense is felony-level and not among those enumerated in (2)(c), registration is mandatory; the (2)(c) deviation factors cannot be invoked.
• If the offense is within (2)(c), the court may consider deviation, but only if both statutory conditions are satisfied (no prior specified convictions; no mental abnormality or predatory conduct).

State’s appellate posture fortified. By squarely recognizing the State’s “aggrieved party” status, the decision ensures appellate oversight over juvenile registration rulings—particularly important given the statute’s public safety function and the potential statewide ramifications of non-registration orders.

Interplay with 2025 statutory amendments. The Court interpreted and applied the pre–July 1, 2025 version of § 12.1-32-15. The statute was amended effective July 1, 2025 (and again effective August 1, 2025): subsection (2)(c) was deleted, the wording of (2)(a) changed, and a new (2)(e) was added addressing juveniles “adjudicated delinquent of an offense which would classify the child as a sexual offender.” While this decision does not construe the amended text, it underscores two enduring interpretive principles going forward:

• Courts will adhere closely to the statute’s text and structure, giving effect to “shall” and any enumerated exceptions.
• Juvenile-specific provisions must be applied as written; courts should not expand or contract statutory exceptions beyond their terms based on policy preferences.

Policy balance reaffirmed. The Court reiterates the separation of powers: the legislature sets policy (including the scope of mandatory registration), while courts interpret and apply that policy. Concerns about over- or under-inclusiveness in juvenile registration are legislative, not judicial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Shall” vs. “may”: “Shall” denotes a mandatory duty; “may” indicates discretion. Here, § 12.1-32-15(2)(a) says courts “shall” require registration—making it compulsory except where a statutory exception applies.
• “Unless” as an exception limiter: The word “unless” means “except if.” It limits a rule to specific exceptions. The Court used dictionaries to confirm that the only exception to mandatory registration in (2)(a) was for offenses listed in (2)(c).
• “Sexual offender” and “felonious sexual offender”: “Sexual offender” is defined in § 12.1-32-15(1)(g) and includes juveniles adjudicated of certain sexual offenses (including Chapter 12.1-27.2). A “felonious sexual offender” is one whose qualifying offense is a felony.
• Juvenile adjudication vs. criminal conviction: Juvenile proceedings are civil and rehabilitative; they are not criminal prosecutions. Different statutes govern appealability and remedies in juvenile cases (Juvenile Court Act) than in criminal cases.
• “Aggrieved party” on appeal: One whose legal interests are immediately and adversely affected by an order. The State qualifies because non-registration directly impairs its public safety and monitoring functions.
• Abuse of discretion via legal error: A court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets or misapplies controlling law. Here, using (2)(c)’s deviation criteria outside the offenses listed in (2)(c) was legal error.

Conclusion

Interest of K.I.B. establishes a clear rule under the pre–July 1, 2025 version of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15: juvenile courts must require sex offender registration for juveniles adjudicated of felony sexual offenses, including offenses under Chapter 12.1-27.2, unless the offense is specifically listed in § 12.1-32-15(2)(c). The decision rejects a broader, policy-driven discretionary approach in favor of strict adherence to statutory text and structure. It also confirms the State’s capacity to appeal juvenile registration decisions and clarifies that criminal appeal constraints do not limit juvenile appellate outcomes.

In short, the Court restored the mandatory nature of juvenile sex offender registration for felony-level offenses under the pre–July 2025 statute and confined judicial discretion to the narrow statutory carve-outs that then existed. As the legislature has since amended § 12.1-32-15, practitioners should study the revised framework, but the interpretive methodology employed here—text-focused, exception-limited, and respectful of legislative policy choices—will continue to guide judicial application in future cases.