Mandatory Post-Petition Elapsed-Time Credit and No “Credit-for-Suspension” Trade-Off: Commentary on State v. L. Charles, 2025 MT 58

Introduction

In State v. L. Charles, 2025 MT 58, the Montana Supreme Court clarified and reinforced a critical rule governing credit awards when a suspended sentence is revoked. The Court held that under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, a defendant is statutorily entitled to “elapsed time” credit (often called street-time credit) for any period served under supervision without specific recorded violations—even after a report of violation (ROV) or petition to revoke is filed. The Court further reiterated that trial courts cannot “swap” or offset mandatory credit by crafting a more lenient disposition (such as reimposing a suspended sentence) and that jail credit for days actually spent incarcerated must also be awarded.

The case arises from a revocation proceeding in Lake County. The District Court reimposed a four-year suspended sentence on Leroy Michael Charles but denied him credit for the six months between the ROV and the revocation disposition, reasoning that its grant of another suspended sentence was the “credit” Charles would receive. The Supreme Court reversed, directing the trial court to award:

• Elapsed-time credit from December 1, 2022 through May 3, 2023 (154 days), less any days Charles was incarcerated in that span.
• Jail credit for any days actually spent in custody on the November 9, 2022 and December 19, 2022 warrants.
• Corrected street-time credit from February 14, 2021 to the first violation on June 6, 2022 (477 days), rather than the 487 days the District Court awarded.

Case Overview

The State charged Charles with multiple offenses in 2017. He pled guilty to criminal endangerment in exchange for dismissal of other charges and received an eight-year sentence with four years suspended. After serving the custodial portion and beginning supervision on February 14, 2021, Charles remained compliant for over a year. In 2022, DOC filed an ROV alleging drug use and testing failures, among other issues. The District Court eventually revoked and reimposed a fully suspended four-year term, but disputed how much credit Charles was owed (for street time, elapsed time after the ROV, and any incarceration while the revocation was pending). Charles appealed.

Key Issues

• Whether Charles was entitled to elapsed-time credit from the ROV date through disposition (October 21, 2022 to May 3, 2023), particularly after a single positive drug patch on November 30, 2022.
• Whether the District Court’s calculation of street-time credit (time on supervision before the violation) was correct.
• Whether jail credit must be awarded for days actually spent in custody under warrants associated with the revocation process.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for recalculation of credits:

• Elapsed-Time Credit: The Court held Charles was entitled to elapsed-time credit for December 1, 2022 through May 3, 2023 (154 days), because the record showed no specific violations in that period and documented meaningful treatment and sobriety. The Court emphasized that § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, mandates this credit absent evidence of specific violations; a court cannot deny the credit by “trading” it for a more lenient sentence structure.
• Jail Credit: The Court directed the District Court to award credit for any actual incarceration:
  • From the arrest on the November 9, 2022 warrant through release on November 30, 2022, and
  • For any days incarcerated following the December 19, 2022 warrant through May 3, 2023.
• Street-Time Credit: The Court corrected the street-time calculation to 477 days (February 14, 2021 through June 6, 2022), not the 487 days the trial court allowed. The Court declined to start the calculation in April 2019 because the only firm record was the February 14, 2021 supervision date acknowledged by Charles and his counsel.

Factual and Procedural Background

• 2017: Charles pleads guilty to criminal endangerment. Sentenced to 8 years with 4 suspended, and granted 189 days of pre-sentence jail credit.
• February 14, 2021: Charles begins suspended supervision. He remains compliant until June 2022.
• June-October 2022: DOC documents drug use and missed tests. ROV filed October 21, 2022; State petitions to revoke October 24, 2022.
• November 9, 2022: Warrant issued; by November 30, Charles appears and is released on OR with drug-testing conditions.
• November 29, 2022: Charles begins intensive outpatient treatment (IOT).
• November 30, 2022: Drug patch returns positive (specific violation).
• December 19, 2022: Court revokes OR release and issues warrant based on the November 30 positive test.
• January 31, 2023: Treatment provider (Cedar Creek) confirms compliance, sobriety, weekly counseling, and progress.
• February 15, 2023: Charles admits two violations (drug use and missed tests).
• May 3, 2023: Disposition hearing. Court reimposes four years, all suspended; awards 487 days of street credit but denies elapsed-time credit for ROV-to-disposition.
• Appeal: Charles challenges the denial of elapsed-time credit and the credit calculations.

Analysis

Statutory Framework: § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA

The statute requires that when revoking a deferred or suspended sentence, the court:

• “Shall consider any elapsed time” and, in consultation with probation records or recollection, “allow all of the elapsed time served without any record or recollection of violations as a credit against the sentence.”
• If the judge determines elapsed time should not be credited, the judge must state reasons in the order.
• “Credit must be allowed for time served in a detention center” and for home arrest time already served.

The current version removes judicial discretion to deny street-time credit absent specific evidence of violations during the period at issue. The entitlement is statutory, and calculating credit is a legal mandate, not a discretionary act.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81:
  • Established that the revised statute eliminates a district court’s discretion to withhold street-time credit absent specific violations.
  • Supports awarding elapsed-time credit even after the revocation process has begun.
• State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178:
  • Clarified that elapsed-time credit must be given for periods after and between violations.
  • Held that a court cannot avoid granting mandatory credit by adjusting the form of the revocation sentence (no “swap” of credit for a lenient disposition).
• State v. Tippets, 2022 MT 81, and State v. Pennington, 2022 MT 180:
  • Reinforce that calculating street-time and jail credit is a legal requirement reviewed de novo; it is not a matter of sentencing discretion.
  • Pennington also underscores that denial of elapsed time must be grounded in “specific record of a violation.”
• State v. Johnson, 2022 MT 216:
  • Upholds denial of elapsed-time credit where the probation record shows substantial evidence of specific, ongoing violations during the claimed period.
  • Distinguishes situations like Charles’s, where only one violation is documented and subsequent compliance is established.
• State v. Johnson, 2018 MT 277:
  • Cited for the clear-error standard governing factual determinations (e.g., whether and when a defendant was incarcerated for jail credit).

Legal Reasoning Applied

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

1. Elapsed time after the ROV and disposition:
   • There is one specific violation during the ROV-to-disposition window: the November 30 positive drug patch. After that date, the record demonstrates continuous compliance—intensive outpatient treatment, weekly counseling, negative tests, and provider documentation of sobriety and progress.
   • Under § 46-18-203(7)(b) and the Jardee/Gudmundsen line, Charles was entitled to credit for all days without specific violations. Therefore, the Court awarded credit starting the day after the violation (December 1, 2022) through the disposition date (May 3, 2023) for 154 days, less any days of actual incarceration in that period.
   • The District Court’s rationale—that granting another suspended sentence “was” the credit—contravenes Gudmundsen. A court cannot offset mandatory elapsed-time credit by tailoring a lenient sentence.
2. Jail credit for incarceration while revocation was pending:
   • The statute mandates credit for all time served in a detention center. The record was incomplete on arrest and custody dates, but the Court identified two distinct warrant periods (November 9–30, 2022; post–December 19, 2022) and ordered the trial court to award credit for any actual incarceration within those spans.
   • Because the existence and length of custody are factual questions, the Court remanded for findings and correct credits.
3. Street-time credit before the first violation:
   • Street time runs from the start of the suspended supervision to the first violation. The only reliable record date for the start of supervision was February 14, 2021 (admitted by Charles and counsel). The first violation was June 6, 2022. That period equals 477 days.
   • The Court rejected the defendant’s argument to start in April 2019 due to lack of corroborating record evidence and counsel’s concessions below.
   • Because calculating credit is a matter of law, the Court corrected the miscalculation from 487 to 477 days.

Impact and Prospective Significance

This decision deepens Montana’s consistent, defendant-protective approach to credit in revocation proceedings:

• Mandatory nature of elapsed-time credit reaffirmed: Courts must award credit for every day on supervision without a specific violation, including days after a revocation petition has been filed and between violations.
• End to “credit-for-suspension” trade-offs: Sentencing leniency cannot substitute for statutorily mandated credit. This anchors uniformity and discourages ad hoc balancing.
• Record-keeping obligations elevated: Because credit depends on “specific evidence” of violations and actual incarceration dates, probation officers and courts must maintain and cite precise records. Any ambiguity will generally be resolved in favor of awarding credit.
• Incentives for compliance, even after an ROV: Defendants who resume compliance post-violation can continue to accrue credit. This supports rehabilitation and fairness, aligning incentives with treatment and sobriety efforts.
• Litigation clarity: Defense and prosecution must be prepared with granular timelines of compliance, violations, and incarceration to avoid remands and ensure accurate credit calculations at the time of disposition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

What is “street time” vs. “elapsed time” vs. “jail credit”?

• Street time: Time a defendant spends on supervised release under a suspended or deferred sentence, before the first violation. It counts toward the sentence if later revoked.
• Elapsed time: A broader concept under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, capturing any period on supervision without recorded violations. It includes time after an ROV is filed and between violations. If a day has no violation, it “must” be credited.
• Jail credit: Days actually spent in custody (detention center or home arrest) must be credited—separately from street/elapsed time.

Can a court deny credit if it gives a lenient sentence on revocation?

No. After Gudmundsen and reaffirmed here, a court cannot “swap” mandatory credit for a favorable disposition such as a fully suspended reimposed term. Credits are statutory entitlements. Sentencing structure cannot nullify them.

Does elapsed-time credit stop once a revocation petition is filed?

No. Credit continues to accrue for days without specific violations. The key is whether the record shows particular violations for those days—not whether a petition is pending.

What qualifies as a “specific violation” for denying credit for a given day?

• Examples: A positive drug test on a specific date; a missed test on a recorded date; a documented new offense; verified noncompliance events.
• Insufficient: Generalized references to noncompliance, uncorroborated suspicion, or a lack of contemporaneous records.

Standards of Review

• Legal questions (e.g., entitlement to credit; interpretation of § 46-18-203(7)(b)): De novo.
• Factual questions (e.g., exact days incarcerated; whether an event occurred): Clear error.
• Revocation decisions generally: Abuse of discretion, but credit determinations are treated as legal mandates reviewed de novo.

Practical Guidance

For District Courts

• Calculate credits expressly:
  • Street time: From start of supervision to first violation.
  • Elapsed time: All days without specific violations, including post-ROV and between violations.
  • Jail credit: Each day actually incarcerated on relevant warrants or holds.
• If denying elapsed-time credit for any period, state specific reasons tied to specific violations in the written order.
• Avoid trading credit for sentencing leniency; award credit first, then impose the appropriate disposition.
• Ensure the record contains precise dates for arrests, releases, and violations to avoid remands.

For Probation and Parole Officers

• Maintain detailed logs of:
  • Violation dates and the nature of the violation.
  • Testing records (positive, negative, missed) with dates.
  • Custody status dates if known.
  • Compliance activities (e.g., treatment completion or attendance).
• When recommending credit, provide a clear computation and the supporting records to facilitate accurate judicial findings.

For Defense and Prosecution

• Build a timeline charting:
  • Start date of supervision (with documentary proof).
  • Each alleged violation date with corroborating evidence.
  • All periods of incarceration (booking and release dates and basis).
• Defense: Highlight post-ROV compliance to secure elapsed-time credit; confirm supervision start date in the record to avoid later disputes.
• State: If opposing elapsed-time credit for certain days, marshal specific, date-linked violation evidence and ensure it is in the court file.

Application to the Charles Case: The Numbers

• Street time before first violation: February 14, 2021 through June 6, 2022 = 477 days (correcting the trial court’s 487 days).
• Elapsed-time credit post-violation: December 1, 2022 through May 3, 2023 = 154 days, less any days incarcerated in that period.
• Jail credit:
  • Any days actually incarcerated between arrest on the November 9, 2022 warrant and release on November 30, 2022.
  • Any days actually incarcerated after the December 19, 2022 warrant through May 3, 2023.

Note: The Court declined to start street-time credit in April 2019 because the only supported start date for the suspended portion in the record was February 14, 2021, as acknowledged by Charles and his counsel. This underscores the importance of clean, corroborated records and avoiding unsupported concessions at hearings.

Conclusion

State v. L. Charles cements a straightforward but vital rule in Montana revocation jurisprudence: elapsed-time and jail credits are statutory entitlements, not bargaining chips. A court must award credit for all days on supervision without specific violations—even after an ROV is filed—and must grant credit for all days actually spent in custody. A trial court cannot deny or diminish those credits on the ground that it is imposing a lenient disposition. The opinion also emphasizes the necessity of accurate recordkeeping and meticulous credit calculations, reinforcing earlier decisions such as Jardee, Gudmundsen, Tippets, and Pennington.

Practically, Charles encourages defendants to re-engage with treatment and compliance even after an infraction, since compliant days still count toward the sentence. For courts and counsel, the message is clear: prove up precise timelines, cite specific violations or confinement dates, and make a full record. Doing so ensures lawful, uniform credit awards and reduces the likelihood of reversals and remands.