Mandatory Joinder of Map Act Takings in Direct Condemnation Actions: Commentary on Sanders v. N.C. Dep't of Transportation

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in Sanders v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, No. 87PA24 (Dec. 12, 2025). The case sits at the intersection of two major strands of North Carolina takings law:

the now‑familiar “Map Act” litigation that followed Kirby v. NCDOT, 368 N.C. 847 (2016), and
the statutory framework in Chapter 136 governing direct condemnation and inverse condemnation against the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT).

The core question is procedural but outcome‑determinative: when NCDOT has already filed a direct condemnation action that statutorily encompasses the landowner’s “entire tract,” must the landowner raise all existing Map Act–related takings claims as part of that condemnation action, or may those claims be brought later in a separate inverse condemnation suit under N.C.G.S. § 136‑111?

The Supreme Court holds that state law required the landowner to raise his Map Act takings claims in NCDOT’s earlier direct condemnation proceeding. Because he failed to do so in a timely answer, he waived any further proceeding to determine just compensation with respect to his tract, and his later inverse condemnation action is barred.

The decision establishes an important new procedural rule: where NCDOT has filed a complaint and declaration of taking describing the “entire tract” as required by Chapter 136, any existing Map Act (or similar) takings affecting that tract are “pertinent” to that condemnation action and must be raised in the landowner’s § 136‑106 answer. If not raised, they cannot later be pursued via an inverse condemnation action under § 136‑111.

II. Background and Facts

A. The Map Act Framework

The now‑repealed Roadway Corridor Official Map Act (the “Map Act”), enacted in 1987 and repealed in 2019, allowed NCDOT to record official “corridor maps” for future highway projects. Once recorded, these maps imposed significant, indefinite restrictions on development and subdivision within the corridor unless owners obtained specific administrative approvals.

As summarized in Kirby v. NCDOT, owners of property within a recorded corridor had limited options:

seek permits or subdivision approvals and wait up to three years,
apply for a variance under N.C.G.S. § 136‑44.52, or
seek “advanced acquisition” based on hardship under § 136‑44.53.

In practice, as Justice Newby observed in dissent in Beroth Oil Co. v. NCDOT, 367 N.C. 333 (2014), the system functioned as a cost‑containment tool: by clouding title and depressing market values in advance of actual takings, the State could reduce future acquisition costs.

In Kirby (2016), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that these corridor restrictions themselves amounted to a taking of property rights requiring just compensation under both the federal and state constitutions.

B. Sanders’s Property and the Corridor Maps

Plaintiff William T. Sanders owned a tract of nearly 650 acres in Cumberland County. NCDOT recorded two relevant corridor maps for the Fayetteville Outer Loop project:

1992 Map – recorded 29 October 1992; covered 92.969 acres of Sanders’s tract.
2006 Map – recorded 6 June 2006; covered an additional 20.135 acres.

Together, the maps subjected significant portions of Sanders’s tract to Map Act development restrictions for decades, long before the litigation at issue.

C. NCDOT’s Direct Condemnation Actions

1. The 2002 Direct Action and 2004 Consent Judgment

On 23 December 2002, NCDOT filed a complaint and declaration of taking to acquire:
- 9.280 acres in fee simple, and
- easements on another 6.169 acres.
This 2002 taking was “unrelated” to the Fayetteville Outer Loop, but it included some property already encumbered by the 1992 corridor map.
NCDOT’s pleadings did not mention Map Act restrictions.
By March 2004, Sanders’s counsel communicated to NCDOT that Map Act encumbrances created an “extraordinary hardship” by preventing development.
The parties nevertheless concluded a settlement for $192,630, which the trial court incorporated into a 29 November 2004 consent judgment.

2. The 2010 Direct Action and 2011 Consent Judgment

On 5 August 2010, NCDOT filed a second complaint and declaration of taking, this time to acquire:
- 101.763 acres in fee simple, and
- easements on 3.613 acres.
About 60 acres of the fee simple taking lay within the 1992 corridor; the 20.135 acres added by the 2006 map were also taken in fee simple.
Again, NCDOT’s pleadings made no reference to Map Act restrictions, even though they had existed for years.
The parties settled for $15,800,000, and the trial court entered a 2011 consent judgment.
After this 2010/2011 proceeding, 28.041 acres of Sanders’s tract remained subject to Map Act restrictions under the 1992 map.

In 2016, shortly after the Court’s decision in Kirby, the General Assembly repealed the 1992 and 2006 maps, ending the formal restrictions.

D. The 2018 Inverse Condemnation Suit

On 13 December 2018, Sanders filed a complaint in Cumberland County Superior Court asserting:

statutory inverse condemnation claims under N.C.G.S. § 136‑111, and
direct constitutional takings claims under the federal and state constitutions (later dismissed and not before the Supreme Court).

He alleged that the 2004 and 2011 consent judgments did not compensate him for the Map Act restrictions themselves, and that NCDOT therefore still owed him just compensation for the period during which his property was encumbered by the corridor maps.

NCDOT moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(c), asserting in relevant part:

the statute of limitations,
res judicata, and
bar under North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes (i.e., Chapter 136 required such claims to be raised in prior condemnation actions).

Sanders sought a hearing under N.C.G.S. § 136‑108 on all liability issues other than damages.

III. Procedural History

A. Trial Court Ruling

In its 28 December 2021 order, the Superior Court:

Held Sanders could have, but was not required to, raise Map Act claims in the 2002 or 2010 condemnations.
Applied res judicata in part:
- Inverse condemnation claims were barred as to the portions of land taken in fee simple by the 2002 and 2010 actions.
- But Sanders could proceed as to the remaining 28.041 acres still encumbered by the Map Act after the 2010 condemnation.
Rejected NCDOT’s statute-of-limitations argument based on § 136‑111’s 24‑month period:
- Because the Fayetteville Outer Loop project was not yet complete, the filing was timely.
Dismissed Sanders’s direct constitutional claims on the ground that § 136‑111 provided an adequate statutory remedy (an issue not appealed to the Supreme Court).

B. Court of Appeals Decision

A unanimous, unpublished panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed on 6 February 2024. Critical to the Supreme Court’s later review, the Court of Appeals:

Rejected NCDOT’s argument that the twelve‑month answer period in § 136‑107 barred the inverse condemnation claim.
Reasoned that the interests at issue in Sanders’s § 136‑111 action—Map Act corridor restrictions—were “independent” from the fee and easement interests addressed in the earlier complaints and declarations of taking.
Concluded that the statutory 12‑month answer period for direct condemnations did not govern Sanders’s separate inverse condemnation claim for a different property interest.

C. Supreme Court Review

NCDOT petitioned for discretionary review, arguing among other things that:

§ 136‑111 does not apply where NCDOT has already filed a complaint and declaration of taking for the “affected property,” and
under §§ 136‑106, 136‑107, and 136‑112, Sanders was required to raise his Map Act claims as part of the 2010 condemnation proceeding.

Sanders filed a conditional petition seeking review of additional issues. The Supreme Court allowed both petitions, but ultimately held discretionary review was improvidently allowed as to all issues other than the statutory bar question on which it ruled for NCDOT.

IV. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and holds that:

N.C.G.S. § 136‑111 is inapplicable once NCDOT has filed a complaint and declaration of taking that covers the “affected property,” because § 136‑111 applies only where “no complaint and declaration of taking has been filed.”
The “affected property” in this case is the landowner’s entire tract, not just the specifically taken slices. This conclusion rests on the requirement in § 136‑103 that NCDOT’s complaint and declaration describe “the entire tract or tracts affected.”
Under § 136‑112(1), damages for the 2010 partial taking had to be calculated by reference to the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before the taking and the value of the remainder immediately after. Because Map Act encumbrances existed before and after the 2010 taking and allegedly reduced market value, they were necessarily “pertinent to” the condemnation action within the meaning of § 136‑106.
Section 136‑106 therefore required Sanders to plead the Map Act restrictions as an affirmative matter in his answer to the 2010 complaint and declaration of taking. His failure to file such an answer within twelve months of service triggered § 136‑107’s waiver rule, which deems the deposited amount to be just compensation and bars “any further proceeding to determine just compensation.”
Because Sanders was obligated to assert his Map Act claims in the 2010 proceeding, he may not later pursue them in a separate inverse condemnation action under § 136‑111.

In short, the Map Act takings claim did not survive outside the procedural confines of the earlier direct condemnation. The Supreme Court therefore reverses and holds that Sanders’s inverse condemnation suit cannot proceed.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and the Court’s Interpretation

1. The Inverse Condemnation Statute: N.C.G.S. § 136‑111

Section 136‑111, titled “Remedy where no declaration of taking filed,” provides a cause of action in inverse condemnation:

“Any person whose land or compensable interest therein has been taken by an intentional or unintentional act or omission of the Department of Transportation and no complaint and declaration of taking has been filed by said Department of Transportation may, within 24 months of the date of the taking of the affected property or interest therein or the completion of the project involving the taking, whichever shall occur later, file a complaint….”

The Court gives weight to both the title of the statute and its text. Together, they make clear that § 136‑111 is a gap‑filling remedy—available only when NCDOT has not already instituted a direct condemnation action over the “affected property.”

Thus, the critical interpretive question becomes: what counts as the “affected property” in this context?

2. The Direct Condemnation Framework: §§ 136‑103, 136‑106, 136‑107, and 136‑112

Chapter 136 also sets out the procedure for NCDOT’s direct condemnations:

§ 136‑103 – NCDOT commences a condemnation by filing a complaint and declaration of taking, accompanied by a deposit of estimated just compensation.
- Both the complaint and declaration must describe “the entire tract or tracts affected by the taking.” (§ 136‑103(b)(2), (c)(2), emphasis added).
§ 136‑106 – The landowner’s answer must contain:
- allegations of his own estimate of just compensation, and
- “[s]uch affirmative defenses or matters as are pertinent to the action.”
§ 136‑107 – The owner has 12 months from service of the complaint and declaration to file an answer. Failure to do so “shall constitute an admission that the amount deposited is just compensation and shall be a waiver of any further proceeding to determine just compensation.”
§ 136‑112 – Governs the measure of damages:
- For a partial taking: the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before the taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately after, with certain benefit adjustments.
- For a total taking: the fair market value of the property at the time of taking.

These provisions, read together, are the backbone of the Court’s reasoning. They demonstrate the legislature’s intent that condemnation damages be fully and finally determined in a single, comprehensive proceeding encompassing the entire tract affected.

3. The Court’s Use of “In Pari Materia” Interpretation

Relying on the canon that related statutes must be construed together to discern legislative intent, the Court harmonizes § 136‑111 with the direct condemnation provisions:

Because § 136‑103 requires the complaint and declaration to describe the “entire tract or tracts affected,”
and § 136‑112 measures damages by the change in value of the entire tract and the remainder,
the “affected property” for purposes of § 136‑111 in this case is the entire Sanders tract, not just the specific acres taken in fee or by easement.

Once NCDOT filed its 2010 complaint and declaration describing the entire tract, the statutory condition for § 136‑111—that “no complaint and declaration of taking has been filed” for the affected property—was no longer satisfied.

B. Why Map Act Restrictions Were “Pertinent” to the 2010 Condemnation

The crucial substantive step in the analysis is the Court’s determination that the Map Act restrictions were “pertinent to” the 2010 condemnation within the meaning of § 136‑106(a).

For a partial taking, § 136‑112(1) requires the factfinder to measure damages as:

“the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract immediately prior to said taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately after said taking….”

Sanders alleged in his complaint that the corridor restrictions:

“severely impact[ed] [his property’s] use, marketability, and value.”

Accepting this as true (as required at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage), the Court reasons:

Map Act encumbrances affected the fair market value of the tract immediately before the 2010 taking (since the restrictions were in place and long‑standing by then).
The restrictions also remained in effect on 28.041 acres of the remainder immediately after the 2010 condemnation.
Therefore, any accurate calculation of the before‑and‑after difference in fair market value had to account for the restrictions.
Because they were essential to the proper damages calculation, the restrictions were necessarily “pertinent to the action” within § 136‑106(a).
As “pertinent” affirmative matters, the restrictions had to be raised in Sanders’s answer to the 2010 complaint and declaration.

This logic converts what might appear to be a separate regulatory taking (the Map Act encumbrance) into part of the damages matrix within the existing direct condemnation action. It is not a separate cause of action for statutory purposes; it is a damages component that should have been litigated earlier.

C. The Waiver Mechanism: Failure to Answer Within Twelve Months

Section 136‑107 says plainly:

“If any person named in and served with [a] complaint and declaration of taking shall fail to file answer as herein provided, the judge shall, upon motion of the Department of Transportation, enter judgment confirming the title of the Department in the lands described in the complaint and declaration of taking and declaring that the amount of deposit theretofore made is just compensation and such failure to answer shall constitute a waiver of any further proceeding to determine just compensation….” (emphasis added)

Sanders did not file an answer raising Map Act issues within twelve months of service in the 2010 condemnation. Under the statute, that omission:

deemed NCDOT’s deposit to be just compensation, and
constituted a waiver of “any further proceeding to determine just compensation” for that tract.

The Supreme Court reads this waiver language broadly to preclude Sanders from later resurrecting a compensation claim for the same tract through § 136‑111.

D. Distinguishing Sanders’s Contrary Reading of § 136‑111

Sanders argued that § 136‑111’s reference to the “affected property or interest therein” means that an owner cannot file an inverse condemnation claim only for the same interest NCDOT already took by direct condemnation, but may file one for different property interests—such as Map Act encumbrances—within the same tract.

The Court disagrees, emphasizing:

The statutory scheme focuses on the tract as the unit of analysis, not the catalog of distinct property interests (fee, easement, regulatory encumbrances) within that tract.
Both the complaint and declaration must describe the “entire tract … affected,” and damages for partial takings are measured by the tract as a whole.
Consequently, once a condemnation covering the tract is commenced, § 136‑111 cannot be used for any compensable interest within that tract if the taking for that interest existed at the time the condemnation was filed.

The Court’s reading thus prioritizes finality and comprehensiveness of condemnation proceedings over a more granular, interest‑by‑interest conception of “affected property.”

E. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Kirby v. NCDOT, 368 N.C. 847 (2016)

Kirby established the foundational proposition that Map Act corridor restrictions “constitute a taking” of property rights by eminent domain, triggering a right to just compensation. Sanders assumes Kirby’s substantive rule but addresses a different question: how and when those takings claims must be asserted procedurally when a direct condemnation has occurred.

In other words, Kirby answers the “what is a taking” question; Sanders answers the “where and when must compensation for that taking be sought” question in the presence of direct condemnations.

2. Beroth Oil Co. v. NCDOT, 367 N.C. 333 (2014)

The Court quotes Justice Newby’s partial dissent in Beroth describing corridor maps as cost‑cutting devices that depress future acquisition costs. In Sanders, this observation functions as contextual support: the Map Act was known to NCDOT as a mechanism influencing market value, and NCDOT could—and should—have understood its impact on condemnation valuations just as landowners did.

3. Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531 (1960)

This case is cited for the basic principle that eminent domain is inherent in sovereignty, but the constitution requires “payment of fair compensation for the property so taken.” Sanders uses this as a background reminder that just compensation is constitutionally mandated, even as it enforces statutory mechanisms that regulate how and when that compensation must be claimed.

4. City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656 (1965)

Spratt is referenced primarily for its definition of “inverse condemnation” as a cause of action against a government to recover the value of property taken in fact, even when no formal condemnation has been pursued.

However, the Court notes a critical limitation: Spratt pre‑dated the enactment of § 136‑111 and was decided under common law principles. Its broad conception of inverse condemnation is now channeled into, and constrained by, the specific statutory framework of § 136‑111.

5. Lea Co. v. N.C. Board of Transportation, 308 N.C. 603 (1983)

Sanders relied heavily on Lea to argue that a landowner may bring a separate inverse condemnation suit for additional takings even while a direct condemnation is pending.

In Lea:

NCDOT condemned part of the plaintiff’s land for a highway project.
After the parties signed a settlement agreement (but before it was incorporated into a consent judgment), the plaintiff’s remaining land flooded, allegedly due to the project.
The landowner then brought an inverse condemnation suit seeking compensation for this later flooding.

The Court in Lea rejected NCDOT’s argument that all such damages should have been sought in the condemnation proceeding, stating that nothing in the statutes “mandates that property owners must seek to recover compensation in the ongoing condemnation proceedings for a subsequent further taking by the State.”

In Sanders, the Court distinguishes Lea on the key ground of timing:

In Lea, the flooding occurred after the condemnation action was initiated and after the parties had already agreed to settle.
In Sanders, the Map Act restrictions had encumbered the property for years before the 2010 condemnation; they were not a “subsequent further taking” but a pre‑existing taking.

Thus, the rule of Lea remains intact: owners are not required to litigate compensation for takings that arise after a condemnation is already underway. But Sanders clarifies that Lea does not apply where the alleged taking predates the condemnation and is already affecting market value at the time of the taking.

6. Dep’t of Transportation v. Bragg, 308 N.C. 367 (1983)

Bragg—cited by the Court of Appeals—is also distinguished. In Bragg, water damage alleged to have been caused by highway construction arose in connection with a condemnation, and the landowner was allowed to introduce evidence of such damage in the condemnation case.

The Supreme Court in Sanders notes that Bragg did not concern a separate lawsuit for a pre‑existing taking; rather, it addressed what evidence could be considered within the condemnation proceeding itself.

7. Other Authorities

The Court also cites:

Dep’t of Transp. v. Bloomsbury Estates, LLC, 386 N.C. 384 (2024), for the general principle that federal and state constitutions require due process and just compensation.
Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805 (1999), and similar cases on statutory construction, particularly the relevance of statutory titles in discerning legislative intent.
Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669 (1984), for the in pari materia canon (reading related statutes together).

These primarily support the interpretive methodology rather than resolving the specific Map Act issue.

F. Issues the Court Declined to Decide

Because the Court resolves the case on the statutory bar (failure to raise Map Act takings in the 2010 condemnation), it expressly:

Declines to address the statute-of-limitations issues under § 136‑111,
Does not definitively decide whether Sanders also had an obligation to raise Map Act restrictions in the 2002 condemnation, though it notes that this is “may well be” so, and
Holds discretionary review was improvidently allowed on the remaining issues presented.

Those questions remain open for another day, although the Court’s reasoning implicitly suggests a similar analysis would likely apply to older condemnations if the factual predicates are comparable.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Procedural Consolidation of Takings Claims

The most significant doctrinal impact is procedural: when NCDOT commences a direct condemnation covering a landowner’s entire tract, all existing takings affecting that tract must be raised and valued within that proceeding. This includes:

Map Act encumbrances existing at the time of filing,
other regulatory restrictions that amount to takings and predate the condemnation, and
any other compensable property interests already impaired by government action.

Failure to raise such issues as “pertinent” affirmative matters in an answer within the 12‑month window results in a statutory waiver of further proceedings for just compensation under § 136‑107.

B. Limiting § 136‑111 Inverse Condemnation

Sanders significantly narrows the contexts in which § 136‑111 may be invoked:

It remains available where:
- NCDOT has never filed a complaint and declaration of taking for the tract or interest at issue, or
- the alleged taking occurs after a prior condemnation has already been initiated and resolved (the Lea-type “subsequent further taking”).
It is not available where:
- NCDOT has filed a complaint and declaration of taking that describes the “entire tract” as required by § 136‑103, and
- the alleged taking (e.g., Map Act encumbrance) predates that filing and affects the tract’s value at the time of the condemnation.

For landowners whose property both:

was subjected to Map Act restrictions, and
was later the subject of a direct condemnation that complied with Chapter 136,

this decision may foreclose inverse condemnation remedies if Map Act damages were not previously asserted.

C. Practical Implications for Landowners and Counsel

The decision carries concrete practice implications:

Heightened diligence in condemnation responses. Landowners and their attorneys must scrutinize all government actions—regulatory or physical—that could affect the value of the tract at the time of condemnation and raise them expressly in their § 136‑106 answers.
Strategic valuation of Map Act encumbrances. When a Map Act corridor overlaps land that is later condemned, counsel must ensure that the condemnation valuation explicitly accounts for the Map Act taking—both for:
- the value of the part taken, and
- the diminished value of the remainder still under the corridor at the time of taking.
Increased importance of the 12‑month deadline. The statutory one‑year answer period under § 136‑107 becomes a de facto limitations period for embedding all existing takings/damages issues related to the tract into the condemnation proceeding.

D. Implications for NCDOT and Condemning Authorities

For NCDOT and similar condemning agencies, Sanders offers:

Greater finality – Once a condemnation involving the entire tract is resolved and no timely answer raised additional taking issues, agencies can rely on the consent judgment or award as conclusively determining just compensation for that tract, subject only to later “subsequent” takings.
Potential cost transparency – Agencies can no longer expect to settle direct condemnations and then litigate Map Act liability separately; instead, both parties must confront all existing encumbrances in a single valuation exercise.

E. Effects on the Map Act Litigation Landscape Post‑Kirby

Following Kirby, numerous landowners pursued inverse condemnation claims under the Map Act. Sanders carves out a subset of those potential claims as non‑viable:

Owners whose Map Act‑encumbered tracts were never subject to direct condemnation—or whose takings occurred after a condemnation—may still rely on § 136‑111.
But owners whose tracts were previously condemned in proceedings compliant with Chapter 136, and who did not raise Map Act issues in those condemnations, may find their claims foreclosed by Sanders.

The decision thus likely reduces the universe of surviving Map Act inverse condemnation claims.

F. Adequate Statutory Remedy and Constitutional Claims

The trial court dismissed Sanders’s constitutional claims on the ground that § 136‑111 constituted an adequate remedy; that issue was not appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court does not revisit it.

The practical effect, however, is notable: although the constitutional right to just compensation remains intact, the Court’s decision suggests that when an adequate statutory remedy existed at the time of the direct condemnation (i.e., the ability to raise all takings in that proceeding), a landowner who fails to use that remedy may not later revive a constitutional claim simply because his statutory route is now procedurally barred.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Eminent Domain vs. Inverse Condemnation

Eminent domain – The government’s power to take private property for public use, with a constitutional requirement to pay just compensation. When the government uses formal procedures (like filing a condemnation complaint and declaration of taking), it’s a direct condemnation.
Inverse condemnation – The flipside: the government has already taken or substantially impaired property rights (physically or by regulation) but has not filed formal condemnation papers. The landowner sues to recover compensation for that de facto taking.

2. The Map Act “Taking”

The Map Act did not always involve an immediate physical seizure of land. Instead, it:

froze development and subdivision,
signaled probable future acquisition, and
depressed market values.

In Kirby, the Court held these severe, indefinite restrictions on ordinary property rights amounted to a taking, even without a shovel in the ground.

3. Partial vs. Total Takings

Total taking – The government acquires the entire parcel (or the entire compensable interest); damages equal the property’s fair market value at the time of taking.
Partial taking – Only part of a tract is taken. North Carolina’s rule (§ 136‑112(1)) calculates damages as:
- Value of the entire tract before the taking, minus
- Value of the remainder after the taking, adjusted for certain “special or general benefits.”

This before‑and‑after analysis makes it crucial to consider all factors affecting value at those two snapshot moments—including Map Act encumbrances.

4. “Pertinent to the Action” and Affirmative Matters

Section 136‑106 requires a landowner’s answer to include “affirmative defenses or matters as are pertinent to the action.” In plain terms, this means:

If some legal or factual issue can change how much compensation is owed in the condemnation (e.g., prior takings, existing encumbrances, special damages), it must be raised in the answer.
Failing to raise such issues can forfeit the right to have them considered.

5. Waiver under § 136‑107

“Waiver” here is not stray language; it is a statutory consequence with teeth:

If no answer is filed within 12 months, the owner is deemed to accept NCDOT’s deposit as full just compensation.
The owner cannot later demand more by claiming additional damage components that could have been litigated then.

6. Res Judicata vs. Statutory Bar

The trial court relied partially on res judicata, the judicial doctrine that a final judgment between the same parties on the same claim bars re‑litigation. The Supreme Court, however, resolves Sanders primarily on statutory grounds—waiver under § 136‑107 and the inapplicability of § 136‑111—without reaching or relying on traditional res judicata analysis.

7. “Discretionary Review Improvidently Allowed”

When the Court says discretionary review was “improvidently allowed in part,” it means:

Although it initially agreed to consider several issues,
it later concluded, after fuller examination, that those additional issues were unnecessary or unsuitable for decision in this case.

The Court thus limits its holding to the statutory bar question and leaves other issues unresolved for future cases.

VIII. Conclusion: The Significance of Sanders in North Carolina Takings Law

Sanders v. NCDOT does not revisit the substantive holding of Kirby that Map Act corridor restrictions are takings. Instead, it defines when and where compensation for those takings must be sought if a related direct condemnation occurs.

The decision establishes a clear, and strict, procedural rule:

When NCDOT files a condemnation complaint and declaration describing a landowner’s entire tract,
and a Map Act (or similar regulatory) taking already burdens that tract and affects its value,
the landowner must raise that taking as a component of damages in an answer under § 136‑106 within the 12‑month window set by § 136‑107.
If the landowner fails to do so, the waiver provision in § 136‑107 forecloses “any further proceeding to determine just compensation,” including an inverse condemnation action under § 136‑111.

This rule furthers legislative goals of:

Comprehensiveness – all existing takings affecting a tract are resolved in a single condemnation proceeding; and
Finality – once that proceeding ends without an answer, both sides can rely on the judgment as conclusive on just compensation for that tract, subject only to truly subsequent, separate takings.

For future litigation, Sanders underscores that North Carolina takings remedies are robust but procedurally demanding. Landowners and counsel must timely assert all existing takings and damages, including Map Act‑style restrictions, in any ongoing condemnation over the same tract—or risk permanently losing the right to compensation for those injuries.