Mandatory Harmless-Error Review and the “Overwhelming Evidence” Test Reaffirmed: State v. Roberts (2025-Ohio-5120)

Introduction

In State v. Roberts, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-5120, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the First District Court of Appeals and reinstated Elijah Blaine Roberts’s convictions for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. The case arose from the killing of Roberts’s mother, Tracey Epperson, who was strangled in her Cincinnati apartment on July 31, 2019. The trial court admitted (1) custodial statements made by Roberts to an Indiana deputy after a point the court of appeals later deemed to be the onset of “custody” and (2) certain other-acts testimony from Roberts’s aunt. The First District found both sets of evidence were erroneously admitted and, further, that the errors were not harmless, warranting reversal.

The Supreme Court granted the State’s discretionary appeal limited to whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the errors were not harmless as to the aggravated-murder and aggravated-robbery counts. Applying Crim.R. 52(A) and the framework from State v. Morris, the Court held that—once the offending evidence is excised—the remaining record overwhelmingly proves Roberts’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision clarifies and reinforces the duty of appellate courts to conduct mandatory harmless-error review and to focus on the strength of the remaining record rather than on speculation about missing or untested evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

Chief Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, assumed without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting Roberts’s post-custody statements (after 15:59 on the body-worn-camera video) and the aunt’s other-acts testimony under Evid.R. 404(B). Proceeding directly to the third prong of the Morris harmless-error analysis—whether the remaining evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—the Court found the evidence of guilt overwhelming. It emphasized:

Objective, time-stamped surveillance and receipt evidence placing Epperson alive at specific times with her wallet in her purse (Kroger at 2:18 p.m.; Jimmy John’s at 2:31 p.m. on July 31).
The discovery later that day of Epperson’s wallet in the center console of her Honda CR-V, which Roberts was driving in Tipton County, Indiana (approximately 2.5 hours from Cincinnati), along with corroborating chain-of-travel receipts and observations.
Crime-scene evidence showing a violent ambush immediately upon entry and death by ligature strangulation using the strap of Epperson’s purse.
Consciousness-of-guilt indicators: Roberts’s visible nervousness and initial lies about his identity and age.
The presence of Roberts’s belongings, DNA, and receipts in his aunt’s Honda Pilot parked at Epperson’s apartment complex.
Evidence that Epperson did not know Roberts was in Cincinnati and was actively searching for him in Georgia on the morning of her death.

The Court held that even without the challenged statements and other-acts testimony, a rational jury would find beyond a reasonable doubt that Roberts purposely killed Epperson with prior calculation and design, and that he inflicted serious physical harm while committing a theft offense—thereby satisfying aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01(A)) and aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01(A)(3)). Finding the remaining record overwhelming, the Court further concluded that a remand for the First District to address the manifest-weight claim was unnecessary; by logical necessity, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court reversed the appellate judgment and reinstated the two convictions.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Crim.R. 52(A): Harmless-error rule (“Any error … which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”). The Court reiterated that Rule 52(A) is mandatory, citing State v. Perry, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶15: appellate courts must perform harmless-error analysis whenever preserved error is claimed.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): The State must prove preserved constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Morris, 2014-Ohio-5052, and State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-166: Ohio’s three-part test for harmless error of preserved claims; the Court again applied Morris and treated the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as governing for both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors that were preserved. Notably, the Court flagged (in a footnote) that it does not foreclose future arguments regarding a different harmless-error standard for nonconstitutional errors—a nod to existing debates (e.g., Kotteakos) that two justices did not join.
Circumstantial evidence equivalency: State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); jurors may draw reasonable inferences using common sense and experience.
Consciousness of guilt: flight or use of false name may be considered as evidence of guilt (State v. Echols, 2024-Ohio-5088; State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145 (1969)).
Prior calculation and design: State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295; State v. Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-1019; State v. Taylor, 1997-Ohio-243; State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8 (1978); State v. Coley, 2001-Ohio-1340; State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-791; State v. Cassano, 2002-Ohio-3751; State v. Franklin, 2002-Ohio-5304; State v. Nicholson, 2024-Ohio-604; State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-3311. These cases guide evaluation of “prior calculation and design,” emphasizing totality of circumstances over bright-line rules.
Seventh Circuit formulation for harmless error: an error is harmless if, without it, “no reasonable juror would have voted to acquit,” United States v. Williams, 698 F.3d 374, 383 (7th Cir. 2012), quoted approvingly.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis turned on Morris’s third prong: once the improperly admitted evidence is excised, does the remaining record establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? The Court concluded yes, for both aggravated murder and aggravated robbery.

What Remained After Excision

Surveillance and receipt evidence placing Epperson at Kroger at 2:18 p.m. and Jimmy John’s at 2:31 p.m. on July 31, with her wallet plainly inside her purse as she left Kroger.
The crime scene: a violent ambush immediately upon entry; groceries still bagged and strewn; broken chair; purse strap used as a ligature around Epperson’s neck; purse on table without a wallet; plastic bag over Epperson’s head; no forced entry; a matching box of trash bags in the kitchen.
Medical findings: clear ligature strangulation, with furrow on the front of the neck and intramuscular hemorrhages in the back; asphyxial death takes minutes.
Travel-time evidence: Tipton, Indiana is roughly a 2.5-hour drive from Cincinnati; Roberts encountered the deputy in Epperson’s Honda CR‑V at about 7:00 p.m. on July 31.
Epperson’s wallet was found in the CR‑V’s center console later that evening; inside was the Kroger receipt she had placed in her wallet at 2:18 p.m. (corroborating her recent possession).
Roberts’s aunt’s Honda Pilot—containing Roberts’s belongings, DNA, receipts, and debit card—was found in the lot adjacent to Epperson’s building, further tying Roberts to the scene and timeline without needing the aunt’s testimony for probative value on the charged counts.
Evidence that Epperson was trying to locate Roberts in Georgia, indicating she did not know he was in Cincinnati (e.g., notes of calls to the Richmond County Jail and area hospitals; phone-tracking instructions on a clipboard).
Roberts’s visible nervousness, his initial lies about his name and age, the implausibility of his purported destination, and lack of luggage—all before the custody point—supported consciousness-of-guilt inferences.
Found in Roberts’s backpack in the CR‑V: a book marked at a page depicting strangulation—consistent with the chosen manner of killing.

Aggravated Murder (R.C. 2903.01(A))

Purpose: The nature of the attack, the use of the purse strap as a ligature, and the medical testimony that strangulation requires sustained force for minutes supported an inference that Roberts acted “purposely” (R.C. 2901.22(A)).

Prior calculation and design: Applying the Franklin/Taylor factors and related cases, the totality showed a drawn-out plan:

Relationship strain could be inferred: Roberts did not inform Epperson he was in Cincinnati, even as she searched for him in Georgia; he had moved in with an aunt rather than his mother; the record permitted the inference that he took steps to prevent being tracked.
Choice of weapon and site: the purse strap as ligature; an apparent ambush immediately upon entry; no forced entry; Roberts had (or used) the apartment key; the aunt’s car was parked at Epperson’s complex; the marked book image depicting strangulation reinforced forethought about the method.
Drawn-out course: Whether conceived hours or days earlier, the evidence indicated advance reasoning rather than a spontaneous eruption—lying in wait or following Epperson inside, immediate attack, and then strangulation with the purse strap.

On this record, a rational jury could find “prior calculation and design” beyond a reasonable doubt without relying on the excised materials.

Aggravated Robbery (R.C. 2911.01(A)(3))

The State needed to show that, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in immediate flight, the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict serious physical harm. The Court found:

Serious physical harm was obvious: strangulation causing death.
The theft nexus was supported circumstantially: Epperson’s wallet was in her purse as she left Kroger; immediately after the attack, the purse sat on the table without a wallet; the wallet was later found in the CR‑V Roberts drove in Indiana; and he fled the scene in the victim’s vehicle.

The jury could reasonably infer that Roberts inflicted serious harm while committing a theft offense or in immediate flight thereafter.

The Court’s Critique of the First District’s Harmless-Error Analysis

The Court identified three analytical missteps in the First District’s approach:

Overemphasis on inconclusive DNA: Mixtures with minor contributors too small to interpret proved nothing about a third party; the appellate court’s reliance on these mixtures to undermine the case was misplaced.
Speculation about untested fingernails: Harmless-error review does not ask what evidence was not developed; it asks whether the remaining, properly admitted record proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Familial relationship equals “permission” speculation: On the totality, it was unreasonable to infer that Epperson granted permission to take her wallet, keys, and car immediately before being ambushed and strangled at her own doorway. The remaining facts supported the opposite inference.

The Court emphasized that Rule 52(A) requires focusing on the remaining record, not hypothesizing about gaps or alternative narratives unsupported by the evidence.

Harmless-Error Standard and Preservation

The defendant argued the State forfeited harmless error by not raising it below. The Court rejected that argument, reiterating that Crim.R. 52(A) imposes a mandatory duty on appellate courts to conduct harmless-error review when preserved error is claimed, whether or not the State separately briefed harmlessness in the intermediate court (citing Perry). The Court reaffirmed the Morris framework (applicable to both constitutional and nonconstitutional preserved errors) and, in a footnote, noted that parties remain free to argue in future cases for a different harmless-error standard for nonconstitutional errors—a point two justices declined to join.

No Remand for Manifest-Weight Review

Because the Court determined that the remaining record overwhelmingly established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it held that any manifest-weight challenge necessarily fails. A remand would be futile. This is a practical clarification: where the Supreme Court’s harmless-error analysis squarely determines overwhelming proof of guilt, it may dispose of manifest-weight claims without further proceedings.

Potential Impact

Appellate practice: The decision underscores that harmless-error analysis under Crim.R. 52(A) is mandatory and rigorous. Courts must excise the tainted evidence and then ask whether the remaining record, viewed as a whole, leaves any reasonable juror able to acquit. Speculation about missing or untested evidence does not substitute for weighing the admitted evidence and the reasonable inferences it supports.
Trial practice: Even where trial errors occur (e.g., Miranda timing disputes; Evid.R. 404(B) missteps), convictions can be sustained if the admissible record is overwhelming. Prosecutors should build robust circumstantial cases; defense counsel should contest the weight and inference structure of the remaining record, not only admissibility.
Evidence law and 404(B): The Court did not bless the other-acts evidence here; it assumed error and found it harmless. Litigants should not treat this outcome as a signal that 404(B) evidence is low risk. Rather, the opinion shows how a strong independent record can render such error harmless.
Miranda and custody: The Court took the First District’s custody determination as a given for the harmless-error analysis. Law enforcement should continue to exercise caution about when roadside inquiries evolve into “custodial” interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.
Prior calculation and design: The opinion is a modern exemplar of how circumstantial evidence—including method, location, preparation, and the sequence of events—can satisfy R.C. 2903.01(A) without direct evidence of intent or planning.
Future of harmless-error standards: The footnote invites future litigants to test whether a distinct standard should govern nonconstitutional errors, though Morris remains controlling for now. Two members of the majority did not join that footnote, signaling potential debate ahead.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Harmless error (Crim.R. 52(A)): Even if a trial court made a mistake, a conviction stands if the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. For preserved errors, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The reviewing court excises the tainted evidence and asks whether the remaining proof is overwhelming.
Miranda and “custodial” statements: Once a person is in custody, police must give Miranda warnings before interrogation. Statements obtained without warnings may be inadmissible. Here, the appellate court found custody began at minute 15:59; the Supreme Court assumed error after that point and still found the remaining record overwhelming.
Other-acts evidence (Evid.R. 404(B)): Evidence of a person’s prior wrongs or acts generally cannot be used to show they acted in conformity therewith, although it may be admissible for non-propensity purposes (e.g., motive, identity) if strict conditions are met. The First District found error in admitting certain aunt-related testimony; the Supreme Court proceeded on that assumption.
Circumstantial vs. direct evidence: Ohio law treats circumstantial evidence as having the same probative value as direct evidence. Jurors may draw reasonable inferences from established facts using common sense and experience.
Prior calculation and design: This aggravated-murder element looks for advance reasoning to kill—there is no bright line. Courts consider factors such as relationship strain, planning or choice of weapon/site, and whether events show more than a momentary impulse.
Aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01(A)(3)): Requires proof that, in attempting or committing a theft offense (or in immediate flight), the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict serious physical harm. Evidence here showed death by strangulation and theft of the victim’s wallet and car.
Sufficiency vs. manifest weight: Sufficiency asks whether, as a matter of law, the evidence can support each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Manifest weight asks whether, after weighing all the evidence and credibility, the factfinder clearly lost its way. If the remaining record is overwhelming, a manifest-weight claim will fail.

Case Timeline and Remaining Evidence Snapshot

July 29, 2019: Roberts leaves Augusta, Georgia, in his aunt’s Honda Pilot.
July 30, morning: Receipts place Roberts in South Carolina (7:24) and North Carolina (9:25 a.m.).
July 30, 9:52 p.m.: Surveillance places Roberts at a McDonald’s 1.7 miles from Epperson’s apartment.
July 31, 2:18 p.m.: Epperson shops at Kroger; wallet returned to purse on video.
July 31, 2:31 p.m.: Epperson buys Jimmy John’s; meal later found still bagged among groceries at the scene.
July 31, ~7:00 p.m.: Indiana deputy encounters Roberts in Epperson’s Honda CR‑V; Tipton is ~2.5 hours from Cincinnati. Epperson’s wallet (with Kroger receipt) is later recovered from the CR‑V.
August 1: Epperson found dead; purse strap around neck; no wallet in purse; aunt’s Honda Pilot found at the complex with Roberts’s belongings and DNA.

Conclusion

State v. Roberts is a clear, forceful reaffirmation that Crim.R. 52(A) harmless-error review is mandatory and outcome-focused: when preserved errors occur, appellate courts must excise them and ask whether the remaining record is so compelling that no reasonable juror would vote to acquit. The decision demonstrates how robust circumstantial evidence—timeline, forensic pathology, crime-scene reconstruction, possession and flight, and consciousness-of-guilt indicators—can overwhelmingly establish aggravated murder (with prior calculation and design) and aggravated robbery, even in the absence of direct evidence such as confessions or eyewitnesses.

Beyond correcting the First District’s analysis, the Court offered two notable clarifications: (1) the State need not have argued harmless error below for the appellate court’s Rule 52(A) duty to apply, and (2) where the Supreme Court itself finds the remaining evidence overwhelming, a remand for manifest-weight review is unnecessary. Finally, while the Court applied the Morris beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard across the board for preserved errors, it left open the possibility that future litigants may test whether a different harmless-error standard should govern nonconstitutional errors.

The upshot: trial and appellate courts must rigorously separate admissibility from outcome. Errors, even serious ones, do not compel reversal when the properly admitted evidence independently and overwhelmingly proves guilt.