Mandatory FMLA Medical Certification as an ADA “Inquiry” – A Comprehensive Commentary on Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
1. Introduction
Case: Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 22-12354 (11th Cir. 2025)
Parties: Aileen Mullin, a Ratings Veterans Service Representative at the VA’s St. Petersburg Regional Office, sued the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for:
- Disability discrimination (disparate treatment and failure to accommodate)
- Unlawful disclosure of medical information
- Retaliation and hostile-work-environment retaliation
The district court granted summary judgment to the VA. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all issues except the unlawful-disclosure claim, which it revived and remanded for trial. In doing so, the Court issued two precedential holdings:
- Requiring an employee to submit a medical certification to obtain statutory leave is a “medical inquiry” under 42 U.S.C. §12112(d)(4)(A).
- Employees have a private right of action to sue for violations of §12112(d)(4) independent of disability status, aligning the Eleventh Circuit with the D.C., Fifth, and other circuits.
2. Summary of the Judgment
- Disparate-Treatment Disability Discrimination: Affirmed. Mullin could not show that any leave was denied solely because of her disability.
- Failure to Accommodate: Affirmed. The VA provided multiple incremental accommodations and ultimately granted full-time telework; the three-month delay was not unreasonable.
- Retaliation / Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment: Affirmed. The challenged acts were accommodation disputes, not materially adverse actions; no severe or pervasive harassment.
- Unlawful Disclosure (§12112(d)(4)): Reversed & Remanded. A jury must decide whether HR manager Bonnie Wax’s disclosure of Mullin’s breast-cancer diagnosis to a union steward violated ADA confidentiality rules and caused tangible harm.
- Shotgun Pleading Caveat: Judge Tjoflat concurred separately to chastise the parties for tolerating a 184-paragraph “shotgun” complaint.
- Partial Dissent: Judge Jordan agreed in part but would leave to the jury the antecedent question whether the VA in fact “initiated” the inquiry because Mullin may have first volunteered her diagnosis.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role
- Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2003) – Central analogue. The Eleventh Circuit adopted Doe’s reasoning that conditioning FMLA leave on submission of medical details constitutes a statutory inquiry.
- Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) – Distinguished. Cash held voluntary disclosure not covered by §12112(d); Mullin limits Cash by clarifying that disclosures stemming from mandatory paperwork are not “voluntary.”
- Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs., 593 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) & Russell v. City of Mobile, 552 F. App’x 905 (11th Cir. 2014) – Provided groundwork for recognizing a §12112(d)(4) private right of action.
- Solloway v. Clayton, 738 F. App’x 985 (11th Cir. 2018) – Relied on for telework-accommodation analysis.
- Owens v. Governor’s Office, 52 F.4th 1327 (11th Cir. 2022) – Clarified mutual-agreement principle in interactive-process duties.
- Additional ADA/Rehabilitation Act stalwarts (Lucas, Stewart, Ellis, Tice, Armstrong) guided standards for prima-facie disability claims, damages, and confidentiality.
3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning
- Disparate Treatment: No evidence any leave was denied “solely by reason of” disability. Multiple approvals of advanced leave and worker-leave donation program undercut causation.
- Failure to Accommodate:
- A three-month gap (after Mullin’s return from six-month cancer leave) is not per se unreasonable where employer continued iterative accommodations (new workstations, three air purifiers, modified schedules).
- An employee is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, not necessarily her first choice (Stewart).
- Inquiry & Confidentiality:
- The VA required continued medical documentation to maintain statutory FMLA leave; thus, submission of the completed WH-380 form was compelled.
- Compulsion = “inquiry.” Rejects argument that FMLA certification cannot be an inquiry because some leave-qualifying conditions are not disabilities.
- Because §794(d) imports ADA standards, §12112(d)(4) applies to federal agencies.
- Information from such an inquiry must be kept “on separate forms … as a confidential medical record.” Disclosing to a union steward who had no need-to-know could violate the statute.
- Private Right of Action: Although not explicitly addressed before, the panel held that §12112(d)(4) provides a private remedy whether or not the plaintiff is disabled, extending earlier dicta in Harrison.
- Damages: Emotional distress (anxiety interfering with cancer recovery) suffices as “tangible injury” at summary-judgment stage; corroborative OWCP PTSD/depression notices strengthen the point.
3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision
- National Reach: The Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia) becomes the first circuit in the South to deem compelled FMLA certification a regulated inquiry, aligning with the D.C. Circuit and deepening a developing consensus.
- Employer Policies: Federal and private employers must treat all medical paperwork demanded as part of leave or accommodation processes as confidential. HR training, document-storage protocols, and “need-to-know” dissemination lists will need updating.
- Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs now have a clear statutory hook for confidentiality breaches even when they are not disabled. Defense counsel must scrutinize whether their clients requested the medical information or merely received it voluntarily.
- Practical Accommodations: The opinion re-emphasises that iterative, good-faith accommodation—short of an employee’s preferred solution—meets ADA/Rehabilitation Act duties unless the delay is extreme or the measures ineffective.
- Pleading Standards Warning: Judge Tjoflat’s concurrence is a blueprint for trial courts to strike “shotgun” pleadings sua sponte, foreshadowing stricter enforcement of Rule 8/10 in the circuit.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Rehabilitation Act vs. ADA: The Rehab Act governs federal agencies; §794(d) instructs courts to apply ADA Title I standards, so ADA case law controls.
- §12112(d)(4) “Inquiry”: Any employer request that forces an employee to reveal medical details (e.g., form, email, questionnaire) is an inquiry. If the employee volunteers information without prompting, it is not an inquiry.
- “Tangible Injury” Requirement: To sue for unlawful disclosure, a plaintiff must show actual harm such as emotional distress, out-of-pocket costs, or job consequences—not merely that the statute was violated.
- Reasonable vs. Ideal Accommodation: The law requires accommodations that let the employee perform essential job functions. It does not promise the “best” or “preferred” fix.
- Shotgun Pleadings: Complaints that lump all facts into all counts make it impossible to discern which facts support which claims. Courts must demand a cleaner, count-by-count structure.
5. Conclusion
Mullin is most notable for two doctrinal clarifications: (1) a compulsory FMLA medical-certification request is a statutory medical inquiry, and (2) employees have a direct cause of action for breaches of the ADA’s confidentiality rules. These holdings extend privacy protections for workers’ health data and alert employers that HR leave procedures fall within ADA scrutiny. At the same time, the decision reaffirms that employers satisfy accommodation duties through good-faith, progressive adjustments rather than perfect, immediate solutions. Finally, the strong dicta against “shotgun” pleadings signals an administrative tightening in the Eleventh Circuit, promising leaner, more targeted litigation going forward.
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