Mandatory Consideration of Elapsed “Street Time” Credit in Montana Revocation Proceedings

Introduction

Williams v. Green, 2025 MT 102 (Mont. May 13, 2025), presents an important interpretive ruling on the court’s obligation to consider “elapsed time” or “street time” credit when revoking suspended sentences under Montana law. Chad Williams, the petitioner, challenged the Missoula County District Court’s refusal to award “street time” credit during multiple periods on probation and parole. The State responded that Williams’s remedy lay only on direct appeal and that his petition for writ of habeas corpus was procedurally improper. Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the unanimous opinion, concluding that while the trial court must consider all elapsed time under § 46-18-203, MCA (2015 and 2017), Williams forfeited his challenge by failing to object or appeal. The Supreme Court denied habeas relief, clarifying both the statutory obligation to consider street time credit and the limits of habeas jurisdiction in revocation contexts.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Montana held that:

Under § 46-18-203(7)(b) and (9), MCA, trial courts have a mandatory duty to consider all elapsed time served while on probation or parole—regardless of the statutory version in effect.
Williams did not establish that the District Court failed to consider the relevant credit period (November 25, 2013–August 16, 2016), given the record of violations and revocation proceedings.
Because Williams neither objected at sentencing nor pursued a direct appeal, he waived any challenge to the denial of street time credit.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle to attack a revocation-sentence within statutory bounds when procedural rights (objection or appeal) were available and unexercised.
The Court declined to apply the Lenihan exception for sentences alleged to be illegal, finding the sentence was facially lawful.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning draws heavily on prior Montana decisions establishing both the burden in habeas proceedings and the statutory interpretation of revocation credit:

Miller v. Eleventh Judicial District Court, 2007 MT 58: Affirmed that the habeas petitioner bears the burden to show a facially invalid sentence.
Petition of Dyer, 154 Mont. 499 (1969) & Petition of Tooker, 148 Mont. 69 (1966): Established the petitioner’s duty to present a sufficient record to justify habeas relief.
In re Hart, 178 Mont. 235 (1978): Clarified the “prima facie showing” requirement for habeas petitions.
State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81: Addressed the effect of the 2017 amendment to § 46-18-203 and the “bright line” effective date rule—though the Supreme Court here declined to adopt a narrow bright‐line rule, instead holding that both 2015 and 2017 versions impose the same mandatory consideration duty.
State v. Youpee, 2018 MT 102: Held that failure to object to denial of street time credit at sentencing waives the claim and cannot be remedied in habeas.
State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338 (1979) and State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17: Discussed the exception for illegal sentences even without trial objection, but reaffirmed that sentences within statutory parameters are not “illegal” for Lenihan purposes.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s decision rests on three pillars:

Statutory Interpretation: Both the 2015 and 2017 versions of § 46-18-203(7)(b) and (9), MCA, require sentencing courts to “consider any elapsed time” served on probation regardless of the original sentencing conditions. The 2017 amendment refined record‐keeping requirements but did not eliminate the duty to consider street time credit.
Procedural Default: Habeas corpus relief is available only for facially invalid sentences under § 46-22-101, MCA. Where an appeal or contemporaneous objection could have raised an erroneous or unlawful sentence, failure to utilize those remedies constitutes a waiver. Williams did not object at the revocation hearing or appeal the District Court’s disposition.
Lenihan Exception Narrowly Applied: While Lenihan allows direct review of illegal sentences even without objection, this Court confirmed that the exception does not apply to sentences within statutory limits—even if credit denial arguably misapplied the statute. The sentence imposed was within the statutory maximum and the court had discretion to grant or deny credit after consideration.

Impact

Williams v. Green clarifies two critical points for Montana criminal practice:

Trial courts must explicitly consider all “street time” credit under both pre- and post-2017 statutes. Failure to do so risks reversible error on direct appeal, though not habeas relief.
Defendants must object at the revocation sentencing hearing or lodge a timely appeal to preserve challenges to credit denials. Habeas corpus is not an available substitute remedy for unpreserved sentencing errors in revocation cases.

Going forward, district courts should enter detailed dispositional orders reflecting their consideration of elapsed time credits, and practitioners should ensure that any objection or appeal is timely filed if credit is denied. This decision underscores the boundary between direct appeal and habeas corpus jurisdiction in Montana.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Elapsed Time (“Street Time”) Credit: Credit for periods when an offender is not in custody but under probation or parole. Montana law requires courts to consider this time and potentially deduct it from any custodial sentence imposed upon revocation.

Lenihan Exception: A narrow rule allowing direct appellate review of an “illegal” sentence—one that exceeds statutory maximums—even if the defendant did not object at trial. It does not apply to discretionary decisions within statutory limits.

Procedural Default: The legal principle that issues not raised at trial or on direct appeal are forfeited and cannot be raised later in collateral proceedings such as habeas corpus, absent extraordinary circumstances.

Conclusion

Williams v. Green reinforces the dual obligations in Montana revocation law: courts must consider all elapsed time credit, and defendants must preserve any challenge by timely objection or appeal. By denying habeas relief, the Supreme Court delineated the proper procedural channel for credit disputes and narrowed the Lenihan exception to truly “illegal” sentences. This ruling will guide both sentencing courts and advocates to ensure full compliance with § 46-18-203 and vigilant preservation of appeal rights.