Mandatory Consideration of “Battered Parent” Status in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Commentary on In re J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H.

Mandatory Consideration of “Battered Parent” Status in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Commentary on In re J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H.

Case: In re J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H., No. 24-306 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2025) Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Disposition: Adjudicatory and dispositional orders vacated and remanded with directions

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

I. Introduction

The decision in In re J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H. significantly clarifies how West Virginia circuit courts must handle claims that a parent is a “battered parent” in child abuse and neglect proceedings. Building on prior case law and the statutory scheme, the Supreme Court of Appeals transforms what had been implicit in earlier decisions into explicit, binding procedural requirements.

At the center of the case is J.K., the petitioner mother, whose three children—J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H.—were removed from her care after allegations that she violated a prior no-contact order by allowing the terminated father, J.F.-2, back into the home and that domestic violence continued in the children’s presence. J.K. asserted that she herself was a domestic violence victim and sought to be recognized as a “battered parent” under West Virginia Code § 49-1-201.

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred by failing to adjudicate the mother’s “battered parent” claim as required by statute. The Court vacated both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders—including the termination of J.K.’s parental rights—and remanded for a new adjudicatory hearing and proper findings.

This opinion is especially important because it:

  • Creates clear procedural rules requiring trial courts to consider and rule on “battered parent” status when raised; and
  • Reemphasizes that a valid adjudication is a prerequisite to any dispositional order, including termination of parental rights.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The 2021 Abuse and Neglect Case

The petitioner mother, J.K., first became involved in abuse and neglect litigation in 2021, along with the father, J.F.-2, who is the biological father of two of the three children (J.F.-1 and C.F.). In that 2021 proceeding:

  • The petition alleged that both parents engaged in domestic violence in the children’s presence and that the father physically and emotionally abused L.H.
  • J.K. participated in services for over a year (counseling, parenting and adult life skills classes, and supervised parenting).
  • At disposition:
    • The circuit court returned the children to J.K.’s care, custody, and control.
    • The father’s parental rights to all three children were involuntarily terminated.
    • The court entered a no-contact order: the father was forbidden any direct or indirect contact with the children, and all parties—including J.K.—were ordered not to permit such contact.

J.K. was present at the 2021 dispositional hearing where the no-contact order was discussed, so her knowledge of it was uncontested.

B. The 2023 Petition and Removal

On November 30, 2023, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS,” successor to DHHR for these purposes) filed a new abuse and neglect petition against J.K. The new petition alleged:

  • J.K. engaged in “habitual domestic violence and aggression” that posed a risk to the children.
  • The father, whose rights had been terminated, was again living in J.K.’s home, in defiance of the earlier no-contact order.
  • Domestic violence between J.K. and the father continued in the presence of the children.
  • J.K. “failed to protect” the children by permitting and condoning contact with the terminated father.

At the preliminary stage:

  • J.K. appeared but waived a preliminary hearing.
  • The circuit court found probable cause and imminent danger, and ordered continued removal and DHS custody under W. Va. Code § 49-4-602(a)(1).
  • The court imposed a no-contact order between J.K. and the children.
  • The court directed DHS to provide a psychological evaluation and “all necessary services” to J.K., but DHS did not, in fact, provide services.

C. Child Advocacy Center Interviews and Amended Petition

In December 2023, the children were interviewed at a Child Advocacy Center (CAC). The interviews described:

  • Continuing domestic violence between J.K. and the father;
  • Verbal altercations; and
  • Multiple occasions of physical violence in the children’s presence after the father’s parental rights had been terminated.

Shortly before the adjudicatory hearing, DHS filed an amended petition incorporating portions of these CAC interviews.

D. The Adjudicatory Hearing and the “Battered Parent” Claim

A contested adjudicatory hearing took place on February 7, 2024. Key points from the evidence:

  • DHS witnesses testified that:
    • The father was in the home despite the no-contact order.
    • The children observed physical fights between J.K. and the father.
  • J.K. testified that:
    • She knew about the no-contact order.
    • She did not “allow” the father back in “necessarily”; rather, he “pushed his way in” when she opened the door.
    • He was a drug addict who appeared early in the morning and did not have a key, but had “cut deadbolts” and “padlocks” to gain entry.
    • She tried to get him to leave but “couldn’t stop him” and was afraid of what he would do if she called the police.
    • She filed a domestic violence petition against the father in late November 2023.
    • She believed she did “everything” she could to protect the children short of calling law enforcement, which she feared might trigger lethal retaliation.
  • The DHS provided the CAC interviews to the court, which stated it would review them and possibly make supplemental findings.

At the close of the evidence, J.K.’s counsel formally requested that she be recognized as a non-abusing “battered parent” under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201—arguing that she, like the children, was a victim of the father’s domestic violence and lacked the ability to stop the abuse.

The circuit court did not make any express findings on the “battered parent” question. Instead, it orally adjudicated J.K. as an abusive and neglectful parent.

E. The Adjudicatory Order

On March 6, 2024, the court entered a written adjudicatory order finding:

  • The children were “abused and neglected” within the meaning of W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i);
  • J.K. was an “abusive and neglectful parent”;
  • J.K. knew the father’s parental rights were terminated and that he could not have contact with the children, yet allowed him back into the home and failed to protect the children; and
  • J.K. and the father “physically abused the children and each other” and committed multiple acts of domestic violence in the children’s presence.

The order acknowledged that J.K. claimed to be a battered parent and a victim of domestic violence, and that she said the father was in the home against her wishes. However, it made no explicit findings as to whether she met the statutory definition of a “battered parent” under § 49-1-201, nor did it relate the domestic violence findings to that statutory framework.

The court:

  • Kept the children in DHS custody;
  • Denied J.K.’s motion for an improvement period;
  • Maintained a no-contact order between J.K. and the children; and
  • Found J.K. in contempt of the prior no-contact order regarding the father.

The Supreme Court’s opinion notes that some findings implying J.K. physically abused the children (for example, that “both parents” abused them “physically and emotionally”) were unsupported by the pleadings or evidence.

F. Psychological Evaluation and Dispositional Hearing

After adjudication, J.K. underwent a psychological evaluation, which concluded that:

  • She accepted little responsibility for her behavior;
  • She tended to rationalize and blame others; and
  • Her prognosis for improved parenting was “poor.”

At the April 2024 dispositional hearing:

  • The guardian ad litem (GAL) and DHS both requested termination of J.K.’s parental rights.
  • The GAL emphasized:
    • J.K.’s tendency to blame L.H. for the prior case;
    • The absence of any substance use or mental health diagnosis that might otherwise contextualize her behavior; and
    • Her prioritization of a dysfunctional relationship with the father over the children’s safety.
  • DHS called the father, who testified that:
    • He moved back into the home immediately after the first case concluded;
    • He and J.K. were in an ongoing relationship; and
    • She never asked him to leave.
  • A DHS caseworker testified that:
    • Domestic violence conditions persisted in the home; and
    • J.K. told L.H. she needed to “move on” and “get over” what the father had done.
  • The evaluator testified that J.K. seemed “more frustrated that her children had told what had happened” than that the children had been abused.
  • J.K. denied the father’s claims, insisting she did everything in her power to protect the children short of calling law enforcement, which she feared could provoke lethal retaliation.

G. Dispositional Order: Termination of Parental Rights

On May 7, 2024, the circuit court:

  • Terminated J.K.’s parental and custodial rights to the children under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6);
  • Found that she knowingly allowed the father to live in the house despite the termination of his rights and the no-contact order;
  • Held that “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family were not required due to “horrific circumstances and severe domestic violence” in the children’s presence;
  • Found no reasonable likelihood that she could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect; and
  • Concluded that terminating her rights was in the children’s best interests.

J.K. appealed both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders, primarily challenging the handling of her “battered parent” claim and the termination of her parental rights.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals, per Chief Justice Wooton, vacated both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders and remanded for further proceedings. The core holdings are encapsulated in the syllabus points:

A. Standard of Review and Process-Compliance Principles

  1. The Court reaffirmed the well-established standard of review for abuse and neglect proceedings from In re Tiffany Marie S., emphasizing:
    • Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo;
    • Factual findings are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard; and
    • Appellate courts must defer to plausible factual interpretations of the record, even if they might have decided differently.
  2. The Court reiterated from In re Edward B. that when the process mandated by the abuse and neglect rules and statutes is “substantially disregarded or frustrated,” the resulting dispositional order must be vacated and the case remanded for compliance.

B. New Procedural Rules on “Battered Parent” Claims (Syllabus Points 3 and 4)

The most significant new law is contained in Syllabus Points 3 and 4:

  1. When a respondent asserts “battered parent” status under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 before the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court:
    • Must allow presentation of evidence on that issue at adjudication; and
    • At the conclusion of adjudication, must make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the parent meets the statutory definition of a “battered parent” under W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i).
  2. If the circuit court determines at adjudication that a respondent is a “battered parent,” then the court must consider that determination during the dispositional phase as required by W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c).

C. Adjudication as a Prerequisite to Disposition

The Court reaffirmed, via Syllabus Point 5 quoting State v. T.C., that a valid adjudication of whether a child is abused or neglected is a prerequisite to making any dispositional orders under § 49-4-604, including termination of parental rights.

D. Application to J.K.’s Case

Applying these principles, the Court held:

  • J.K. expressly raised the “battered parent” issue at the adjudicatory hearing.
  • Under § 49-4-601(i), once raised, the circuit court was required to decide whether J.K. met the statutory definition of a battered parent and enter findings and conclusions on that question.
  • The circuit court failed to make those required findings, merely acknowledging the assertion and then adjudicating J.K. as an abusing/neglecting parent without analysis under the battered parent framework.
  • This failure substantially frustrated the required process and necessitated vacatur under Edward B..
  • Because adjudication was defective, the dispositional order terminating J.K.’s parental rights was also invalid and had to be vacated under T.C. and In re Z.S.-1.

The case was remanded for a new adjudicatory hearing and a new order addressing the battered parent question and “any matters ancillary to that issue.” The Court declined to reach J.K.’s remaining assignments of error, as they were rendered moot by the need for a new adjudication.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. The Multi-Stage Structure of Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

West Virginia’s child abuse and neglect process, codified principally in Article 4 of Chapter 49, has two key substantive stages:

  1. Adjudication (W. Va. Code § 49-4-601):
    • The court determines whether the child is “abused” and/or “neglected” and whether each respondent is an “abusing,” “neglecting,” or (as relevant here) “battered” parent.
    • Findings must be based on evidence presented at an adjudicatory hearing.
    • The statute requires findings of fact and conclusions of law to be incorporated into the order.
  2. Disposition (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604):
    • If the child is adjudicated abused/neglected, the court moves to the dispositional phase.
    • The court considers a range of dispositional alternatives—from dismissal and community-based supports to placement with relatives, temporary custody with DHS, improvement periods, and, at the extreme, termination of parental rights.
    • Statutory factors, including “battered parent” status, must be weighed in selecting an appropriate disposition.

This structure is critical: you cannot lawfully get to disposition without a lawful adjudication. That is the thrust of State v. T.C. and its progeny, and the Court reaffirmed that in this opinion.

2. The “Battered Parent” Definition: W. Va. Code § 49-1-201

The Legislature has defined “battered parent” specifically for use in abuse and neglect cases:

“Battered parent” for the purposes of § 49-4-601 et seq. means a respondent parent, guardian, or other custodian who has been adjudicated by the court to:
  • have not condoned the abuse or neglect; and
  • has not been able to stop the abuse or neglect of the child or children due to being the victim of domestic violence as defined in § 48-27-202,
which domestic violence was perpetrated by the same person or persons determined to have abused or neglected the child or children.

The definition has three core elements:

  • The respondent did not condone the abuse or neglect;
  • The respondent could not stop the abuse or neglect because they were a victim of domestic violence; and
  • The domestic violence perpetrator is the same person who abused/neglected the child.

3. Statutory Mandate to Decide “Battered Parent” at Adjudication

W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i) requires that at the conclusion of adjudication, the court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether:

  • The child is abused or neglected; and
  • The respondent is “abusing, neglecting, or, if applicable, a battered parent.”

The use of “shall” makes this a mandatory duty. If the battered parent issue is raised, a court cannot simply ignore it or treat it as an informal argument; it must reach and resolve the question in its adjudicatory order.

4. Dispositional Consequences of “Battered Parent” Status: § 49-4-604(c)

The significance of being adjudicated a “battered parent” lies in the dispositional statute. Several subsections explicitly contemplate different treatment for battered parents:

  • § 49-4-604(c)(2): The court may refer the battered parent to community agencies for assistance and dismiss the petition.
  • § 49-4-604(c)(4): The court may impose supervised terms designed to assist the child and any battered parent.
  • § 49-4-604(c)(5): If a battered parent is presently unable or unwilling to provide adequately for the child, the court may temporarily commit the child to DHS or a suitable agency/person.

These options recognize that a parent’s own victimization can fundamentally alter what is just and appropriate at disposition. It does not guarantee dismissal or immunize the parent from adjudication, but it must shape the court’s dispositional analysis.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Tiffany Marie S. – Standard of Review

The Court quoted Syllabus Point 1 from In re Tiffany Marie S., which establishes:

  • De novo review for legal conclusions;
  • Clearly erroneous review for factual findings (definite and firm conviction of mistake required to overturn);
  • Deference to plausible trial court accounts of the evidence.

This standard frames the Supreme Court’s review of the circuit court’s handling of J.K.’s claim—but here, the key issue is failure to follow mandatory procedure, which is primarily a legal question and thus reviewed de novo.

2. In re Edward B. – Remedy for Frustrated Process

Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B., reaffirmed here, provides that when the process mandated by the abuse and neglect rules and statutes has been “substantially disregarded or frustrated,” the appellate court must vacate the dispositional order and remand for compliance.

In J.F.-1, the Court applied this principle by holding that the circuit court’s failure to make battered parent findings, as required by § 49-4-601(i), substantially frustrated the statutory process. That failure infected both adjudication and disposition and required vacatur.

3. In re H.L. – Earlier Treatment of “Battered Parent” Claims

In In re H.L., 243 W. Va. 551, 848 S.E.2d 376 (2020), the Court addressed a similar scenario:

  • The petitioner argued she should be treated as a “battered parent.”
  • The circuit court did not properly consider that argument at adjudication.

H.L. made two important points:

  • Being adjudicated a “battered parent” does not automatically dismiss the petition; it is a factor to be weighed at disposition under § 49-4-604.
  • Failure to consider the battered parent argument at adjudication frustrated the statutory process and warranted a new adjudicatory hearing.

The present decision effectively codifies H.L.’s logic into binding syllabus law, giving it broader precedential force and procedural clarity.

4. State v. T.C. and In re Z.S.-1 – Adjudication as a Prerequisite

The Court reiterated from State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), that:

  • A finding that the child is abused or neglected is a prerequisite to any dispositional alternative under § 49-4-604.

In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023), reinforced that “without properly made findings of abuse and/or neglect at adjudication, a case cannot proceed to disposition.”

By failing to rule on the battered parent issue—an integral part of adjudication for a respondent who raises it—the circuit court rendered its adjudicatory order incomplete, thereby invalidating the subsequent disposition under these precedents.

5. Memorandum Decisions on “Battered Parent” Limits

The Court also cited two memorandum decisions:

  • In re M.R. – The battered parent definition does not apply where the respondent is herself the primary perpetrator of abuse/neglect absent ongoing domestic violence by another.
  • In re C.W. – The definition does not apply where the respondent herself engages in domestic violence against the other parent.

These illustrate that:

  • “Battered parent” is a narrow, fact-specific status; and
  • It is inapplicable where the respondent is the abuser, not the victim, or where the abuse is reciprocal in a way that undermines the statutory rationale.

In J.F.-1, the Court did not decide that J.K. is or is not a battered parent; rather, it held that the circuit court was required to make that determination on the record.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Central Legal Question

The core question was whether the circuit court erred by failing to adjudicate J.K.’s status as a “battered parent” after the issue was squarely raised at adjudication. The Court approached this as a matter of statutory interpretation and procedural compliance.

2. Statutory Text and Legislative Policy

The Court’s reasoning centers on the interplay of three statutes:

  • § 49-1-201 – defining “battered parent”;
  • § 49-4-601(i) – requiring findings at adjudication, including on “battered parent” status “if applicable”; and
  • § 49-4-604(c) – requiring consideration of battered parent status at disposition.

From the structure and content of these provisions, the Court drew several inferences:

  • The Legislature expressly recognized domestic violence’s impact on parenting and “failure to protect” scenarios by defining “battered parent.”
  • The use of “shall” and the explicit reference to “battered parent” in § 49-4-601(i) show that the Legislature intended courts to make this determination when raised, not to treat it as a discretionary or optional label.
  • Because “battered parent” status unlocks specific dispositional options in § 49-4-604(c)(2), (4), and (5), failing to decide the issue deprives both the court and the parties of the full statutory framework for disposition.

3. The New Procedural Rule (Syllabus Point 3)

On this basis, the Court announced the following clear rule:

  • If a respondent parent asserts “battered parent” status before the end of adjudication:
    • The circuit court must allow evidence on that issue during the adjudicatory hearing; and
    • At the close of adjudication, the court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the statutory elements are satisfied.

At a minimum, a trial court’s findings must address:

  • Whether the respondent condoned the abuse or neglect;
  • Whether the respondent was unable to stop the abuse or neglect because they were a victim of domestic violence; and
  • Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence is the same person who abused or neglected the child.

4. The Dispositional Obligation (Syllabus Point 4)

If the trial court finds the respondent is a “battered parent,” that status does not end the case. Instead, the court is legally obligated to consider that determination in selecting a disposition under § 49-4-604(c). This requirement ensures that:

  • Battered parents may receive community referrals and supports;
  • Supervision and services may be uniquely tailored; and
  • Temporary rather than permanent removal may be more appropriately considered before resorting to termination.

5. Application to the Circuit Court’s Handling of J.K.’s Case

The Court then applied these principles to the record:

  • J.K. explicitly asked the court to recognize her as a “battered parent” at the close of adjudication.
  • The court acknowledged the assertion but made no findings under § 49-1-201.
  • Although the court made findings about domestic violence generally, it never analyzed:
    • Whether J.K. condoned the father’s abuse;
    • Whether her inability to stop the abuse stemmed from being a domestic violence victim; or
    • Whether the father’s domestic violence was the same conduct that constituted the children’s abuse.

Because the trial court failed to comply with the statutory directive of § 49-4-601(i) and the structural requirements articulated in H.L. and Edward B., the Supreme Court held that:

  • The adjudicatory order was defective and had to be vacated.
  • Without a valid adjudication, the dispositional order—including termination of parental rights—was also invalid under T.C. and Z.S.-1.

Consequently, the case was remanded for a new adjudicatory hearing, during which the battered parent claim must be properly developed and resolved.

D. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

1. For Circuit Courts

This decision imposes concrete obligations on trial courts:

  • Duty to create a record: When a battered parent claim is raised, judges must allow targeted evidence and must enter explicit findings and conclusions on the statutory elements.
  • No silent rejection: Courts cannot silently disregard or implicitly deny the claim by simply finding a parent “abusing” or “neglecting” without resolving the battered parent status.
  • Risk of reversal: Failure to comply with this process will almost certainly result in vacatur and remand, even if the result might otherwise appear substantively justified.

2. For DHS, Guardians ad Litem, and Parent Counsel

The decision also carries implications for the participants in abuse and neglect litigation:

  • DHS and GALs must:
    • Investigate and present evidence concerning whether a respondent is a victim of domestic violence;
    • Address explicitly whether the statutory elements of “battered parent” are met; and
    • Prepare to argue how such a finding should affect disposition under § 49-4-604(c).
  • Parent’s counsel must:
    • Recognize when domestic violence dynamics may support a battered parent claim;
    • Assert such a claim clearly before the conclusion of adjudication; and
    • Develop the evidentiary record on coercion, fear, inability to control the abuser, and non-condonation.

3. For the Substantive Law of “Failure to Protect”

This decision further refines West Virginia’s approach to “failure to protect” allegations. It acknowledges that:

  • A non-abusing parent’s inability to prevent a child’s exposure to abuse may be a product of their own victimization.
  • Statutory recognition of battered parents requires a nuanced lens, not a simplistic “you let him in; therefore you failed to protect.”
  • Nevertheless, battered parent status does not automatically excuse all conduct or preclude adjudication.

The Court’s insistence on a formal battered parent analysis thus simultaneously:

  • Protects domestic violence victims from reflexively being treated as co-offenders; and
  • Ensures that children’s safety remains paramount, with courts empowered to impose protective dispositions even where the non-abusing parent is a victim.

4. For Domestic Violence and Child Welfare Policy

From a policy standpoint, the decision signals:

  • A strong legislative-judicial commitment to understanding the intersection of domestic violence and child protection;
  • A recognition that coercive control, fear of lethal retaliation, and economic or emotional dependence may explain why a victim cannot simply “make” the abuser leave or call police; and
  • An expectation that abuse and neglect proceedings will incorporate, rather than ignore, this context when assigning legal responsibility and determining remedies.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Battered Parent” vs. “Abusing/Neglecting Parent”

In simple terms:

  • An abusing/neglecting parent is found responsible for causing or allowing abuse or neglect.
  • A battered parent is a respondent who:
    • Did not approve or condone the abuse;
    • Tried but could not stop it because they themselves were being abused (domestic violence); and
    • Whose abuser is also the one abusing the child.

A battered parent can still be part of an abuse and neglect case, but their victim status must shape what the court does at disposition.

2. Adjudication vs. Disposition

Think of the process in two main steps:

  1. Adjudication: “Did abuse or neglect happen, and who is responsible?”
  2. Disposition: “Given what happened and who is responsible, what should the court do to protect the child and address the family’s situation?”

You cannot skip Step 1 to get to Step 2. If Step 1 is defective (as here, because the court did not rule on the battered parent issue), then everything done in Step 2 must be undone and redone.

3. “Clearly Erroneous” Standard

When reviewing facts, an appellate court asks:

  • Is there evidence to support the trial court’s finding?
  • Even if so, are we left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made?

If not, the finding stands—even if the appellate court might have weighed the evidence differently. Here, however, the main error was not the weighting of evidence but the failure to make required findings at all.

4. “Vacated and Remanded with Directions”

“Vacated” means the challenged orders are nullified—they no longer have legal effect. “Remanded with directions” means the case is sent back to the circuit court with specific instructions:

  • Hold a new adjudicatory hearing;
  • Allow full development of the battered parent issue; and
  • Make proper findings and conclusions under the statutes and this opinion.

V. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The Supreme Court’s decision in In re J.F.-1, C.F., and L.H. sets out a clear and consequential procedural rule: when a respondent parent claims battered parent status in a West Virginia abuse and neglect case, the circuit court must address that claim head-on at adjudication, with specific findings and conclusions under the statutory definition. If such a finding is made, the court is further obligated to incorporate it into its dispositional analysis.

This framework ensures:

  • Faithful adherence to the statutory scheme in Chapters 48 and 49;
  • Meaningful recognition of the complex realities of domestic violence in “failure to protect” cases;
  • More nuanced and just dispositional outcomes, particularly regarding whether termination of parental rights is truly necessary and proportionate; and
  • Robust appellate review by requiring trial courts to articulate their reasoning on the record.

By vacating both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders and remanding for a new adjudicatory hearing, the Court makes clear that procedural shortcuts in this area are not harmless: they strike at the integrity of the entire proceeding. In re J.F.-1 thus stands as a significant precedent in West Virginia child welfare law, particularly for cases involving domestic violence and allegations of “failure to protect,” and will shape both trial practice and appellate review for years to come.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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